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Frederick R. Adams [17]Frederick Ray Adams [1]
  1. Defending the Bounds of Cognition.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press.
    That about sums up what is wrong with Clark's view.
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  2. Defending Non-Derived Content.Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
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  3. The Semantics of Thought.Frederick R. Adams, Robert A. Stecker & Gary Fuller - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):375-389.
  4.  60
    A Goal-State Theory of Function Attributions.Frederick R. Adams - 1979 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):493 - 518.
    The analysis of function-ascribing statements, such as “the function of x is y”, is proving to be a difficult matter. It is difficult because we are only beginning to see the complexity which is involved in ascribing functions. The process of discovery has been slow and tedious, with each newly constructed analysis of the meaning of functional ascriptions yielding insights into the structure of functional analysis and functional explanation. However, as each analysis is, in turn, dismantled, we seem to see (...)
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  5. 'X' Means X: Semantics Fodor-Style. [REVIEW]Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (2):175-83.
    InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean something X. The conditions are designed to reduce meaning to purely non-intentional natural relations. They are also designed to solve what Fodor has dubbed the “disjunction problem”. More recently, inA Theory of Content and Other Essays, Fodor has modified his list of sufficient conditions for naturalized meaning in light of objections to his earlier list. We look at his new set of conditions and give his (...)
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  6. Causal Contents.Frederick R. Adams - 1991 - In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
  7. Mental Representation.Frederick R. Adams - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
  8. Swampman's Revenge: Squabbles Among the Representationalists.Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.
    There are both externalist and internalist theories of the phenomenal content of conscious experiences. Externalists like Dretske and Tye treat the phenomenal content of conscious states as representations of external properties. Internalists think that phenomenal conscious states are reducible to electrochemical states of the brain in the style of the type-type identity theory. In this paper, we side with the representationalists and visit a dispute between them over the test case of Swampman. Does Swampman have conscious phenomenal states or not? (...)
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  9. Properties, Functionalism, and the Identity Theory.Frederick R. Adams - unknown
  10. 'X' Means X: Fodor/Warfield Semantics. [REVIEW]Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):215-31.
    In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield (...)
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  11.  80
    Rock Beats Scissors: Historicalism Fights Back.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):273-81.
    Jerry Fodor (1994) thinks that content is not historically determined. In this paper we will consider Fodor's reasons.
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  12.  33
    Rules in Programming Languages and Networks.Frederick R. Adams, Kenneth Aizawa & Gary Fuller - 1992 - In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    1. Do models formulated in programming languages use explicit rules where connectionist models do not? 2. Are rules as found in programming languages hard, precise, and exceptionless, where connectionist rules are not? 3. Do connectionist models use rules operating on distributed representations where models formulated in programming languages do not? 4. Do connectionist models fail to use structure sensitive rules of the sort found in "classical" computer architectures? In this chapter we argue that the answer to each of these questions (...)
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  13. Challenges to Active Externalism.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - forthcoming - In P. Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook on Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     
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  14. Andy Clark on Intrinsic Content and Extended Cognition.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - manuscript
    This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist (...)
     
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  15. Fodor's Asymmetrical Causal Dependency Theory of Meaning.Frederick R. Adams - unknown
  16.  2
    Reply to Russow's Fodor, Adams and Causal Properties.Frederick R. Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63-65.
  17.  12
    The Nature of Meaningfulness: Representing, Powers, and Meaning.Frederick R. Adams - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):484-488.
    Very briefly, Shope intends his analysis of representation to include causal powers and non-deviant causal chains. He devotes chapters of the book to these topics—topics not usually found in a book on meaning or representation. Chapter 3 argues that powers or abilities cannot be analyzed in terms of conditionals. Chapter 4 argues that we need not analyze powers to understand them well enough for our purposes. He wants his analysis to be able to say there can be a meaning to (...)
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