Suppe, F. The search for philosophic understanding of scientific theories (p. [1]-241)--Proceedings of the symposium.--Bibliography, compiled by Rew A. Godow, Jr. (p. [615]-646).
Achinstein, Putnam, and others have urged the rejection of the received view on theories (which construes theories as axiomatic calculi where theoretical terms are given partial observational interpretations by correspondence rules) because (i) the notion of partial interpretation cannot be given precise formulation, and (ii) the observational-theoretical distinction cannot be drawn satisfactorily. I try to show that these are the wrong reasons for rejecting the received view since (i) is false and it is virtually impossible to demonstrate the truth of (...) (ii). Nonetheless, the received view should be rejected because it obscures a number of epistemologically important features of scientific theorizing. I show this by sketching an alternative analysis which reveals some of these features and gives a more faithful picture of scientific theorizing. (shrink)
The positivistic Received View construed scientific theories syntactically as axiomatic calculi where theoretical terms were given a partial semantic interpretation via correspondence rules connecting them to observation statements. This paper assesses what, with hindsight, seem the most important defects in the Received View; surveys the main proposed successor analyses to the Received View--various Semantic Conception versions and the Structuralist Analysis; evaluates how well they avoid those defects; examines what new problems they face and where the most promising require further development (...) or leave unanswered questions; explores implications of recent work on models for understanding theories; and rebuts the few criticisms of the Semantic Conception that have surfaced. (shrink)
Scientific articles exemplify standard functional units constraining argumentative structures. Severe space limitations demand every paragraph and illustration contribute to establishing the paper's claims. Philosophical testing and confirmation models should take into account each paragraph, table, and illustration. Hypothetico-Deductive, Bayesian Inductive, and Inference-to-the-Best-Explanation models do not, garbling the logic of papers. Micro-analysis of the fundamental paper in plate tectonics reveals an argumentative structure commonplace in science but ignored by standard philosophical accounts that cannot be dismissed as mere rhetorical embellishment. Papers with (...) illustrations often display a second argumentative structure differing from the text's. Constraints on adequate testing and confirmation analyses are adduced. "Experiments are about the assembly of persuasive arguments, ones that will stand up in court.... The task at hand is to capture the building-up of a persuasive argument about the world even in the absence of the logician's certainty." --Galison, How Experiments End, 277. (shrink)
We have seen that the operational imperative is a prescriptive thesis about formulations of theories which imposes restrictions on the sorts of theories science may employ. We assessed the operational imperative by investigating a number of relationships holding between theory formulations, theories, physical systems, and phenomena, and then applying our findings to the operational imperative. These applications showed that the operational definitions required by the operational imperative were not definitions at all, being rather statements of putative empirical regularities holding between (...) particulars which in effect are formulations of empirically true or false theories. From this fact it followed that the supposed epistemic pay-offs of following the operational imperative fail to accrue: Operational definitions do not enable one to go deductively from knowledge of observables to knowledge of unobservables, and operational definitions do not provide a means for testing theories about unobservable phenomena. As such the operational imperative should be rejected in both its weak and strong versions. However, we did discover a grain of truth in the observational imperative — namely that theories with non-observable parameters are testable only if these parameters have observable manifestations. But that grain of truth does not lead to the operational imperative as typically advanced unless one embraces certain epistemological theories about observation which recent work on observation makes highly doubtful. (shrink)
The Hatch Act of 1887 was passed in the effort to make agriculture more scientific and efficient. This promise has been seriously compromised by the fact that even research of the highest quality often has limited applicability in practical farming situations. This paper attempts to provide philosophical explanations why this is so by introducing and discussing theoretical models. Consideration is given to why Farming Systems Research does not provide a solution to the philosophical problems raised. The final section presents a (...) strategy for partially avoiding some of the limitations in practical applicability of agricultural research studies and discusses how this strategy relates to the activities of the cooperative extension services. A secondary concern of the paper is with how governmental research priorities compromise the practical applicability of research in farming situations. (shrink)
Identifying demonstratives are of the form 'this d', Where d is a descriptive noun phrase. I am concerned with the effect of a misidentifying identifying demonstrative on the truth of propositions such as 'this d is p'; I argue there are circumstances in which 'this d is p' can be true when the referent of 'this d' is a p but is not a d. Extending the results, I argue there are circumstances where 'i know that this d is p' (...) and 'i believe that this d is p' can be true when the referent of 'this d' is a p but is not a d. The philosophical importance of the results is discussed. (shrink)
Recently a number of philosophers have maintained that the meanings of terms in a scientific language are “theory-laden” or determined by the theory in which they occur, and thus that if the same term occurs in different theories, it will take on different meanings in the different theories; so the theories are incommensurable. An often-stated corollary to this doctrine is the claim that possessors of different theories cannot express or possess the same facts since they attach different meanings to the (...) terms used to give expression to the facts. Various attacks against this extreme doctrine on the relativity of facts have been mounted. Some of them consist in showing defective the argument advanced in support of this doctrine; but such criticisms at best show that the defenses offered for the doctrine are defective, not that the doctrine itself is defective. (shrink)
In this slim but excessively priced volume, Paul Horwich attempts "to exhibit a unified approach to philosophy of science, based on the concept of subjective probability... by offering new treatments of several problems... and... by providing a more complete probabilistic account of scientific methods and assumptions than has been given before". Starting with the view that beliefs are not all-or-nothing matters but rather are susceptible to varying degrees of intensity, and interpreting this via a modified Bayesian use of subjective probability, (...) Horwich treats well-known puzzles in philosophy of science by considering the following topics: accommodation of data, statistical evidence, severe tests, surprising predictions, paradox of confirmation, the "grue" problem, simplicity, ad hoc hypotheses, diverse evidence, prediction vs. accommodation, desirability of further evidence, and realism vs. instrumentalism. Preceding treatment of these topics is an acceptance of the Bayesian principle that "the degrees of belief of an ideally rational person conform to the mathematical principles of probability theory" and a treatment of probability theory and its various standard interpretations which comprises a quarter of the text. (shrink)
