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Frederik Kaufman [20]Frederik Alexander Kaufman [1]
  1. Pre-Vital and Post-Mortem Non-Existence.Frederik Kaufman - 1999 - American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1):1 - 19.
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  2. Death and deprivation; or, why lucretius' symmetry argument fails.Frederik Kaufman - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):305 – 312.
  3.  42
    Death, Deprivation, and a Sartrean Account of Horror.Frederik Kaufman - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):335-349.
    Deprivation offers a plausible explanation for the badness of death, so fear is not unreasonable. But horror at the prospect of one's death is not just extreme fear because horror is structurally different than fear. Horror requires a different explanation. For Sartre, horror is possible only in unique circumstances. I argue that Sartre's view, when combined with the subjective incomprehensibility of one's annihilation, can explain horror and other negative emotions that are not contingent on deprivation. Further, I argue that while (...)
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  4.  43
    Thick and thin selves: Reply to Fischer and speak.Frederik Kaufman - 2000 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (1):94–97.
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  5. An answer to lucretius' symmetry argument against the fear of death.Frederik Kaufman - 1995 - Journal of Value Inquiry 29 (1):57-64.
  6.  62
    Machines, Sentience, and the Scope of Morality.Frederik Kaufman - 1994 - Environmental Ethics 16 (1):57-70.
    Environmental philosophers are often concerned to show that non-sentient things, such as plants or ecosystems, have interests and therefore are appropriate objects of moral concern. They deny that mentality is a necessary condition for having interests. Yet they also deny that they are committed to recognizing interests in things like machines. I argue that either machines have interests (and hence moral standing) too or mentality is a necessary condition for inclusion within the purview of morality. I go on to argue (...)
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  7.  69
    Speciesism and the argument from misfortune.Frederik Kaufman - 1998 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (2):155–163.
    Is there a morally relevant difference between a brain‐damaged human being and a nonhuman animal at the same cognitive and emotional level to justify, say, performing medical experiments on the animal but not the human being? Some hold that the misfortune of the human being allows us to distinguish between them. I consider the nature of misfortunate and argue that an appeal to misfortune fails to distinguish between the human being and the nonhuman animal when the treatment at issue is (...)
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  8.  98
    Late Birth, Early Death, and the Problem of Lucretian Symmetry.Frederik Kaufman - 2011 - Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):113-127.
    Lucretius famously argued that if we think death is bad because it deprives us of time we could have had by living longer than we do, then when we are born must be bad too, since we could have been born earlier than we were, and so be deprived of that time as well. John Martin Fischer thinks Lucretius’s symmetry argument fails because we have a bias toward the future. I argue that Fischer’s approach does not answer Lucretius. In contrast (...)
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  9.  19
    The Ethics of Discrimination.Frederik Kaufman - 2019 - Philosophy Now 135:9-11.
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  10.  11
    Sartrean Magic and the Impossibility of Death.Frederik Kaufman - forthcoming - Philosophical Papers:1-25.
    Deprivation explains why death is bad, if it is bad, but it cannot explain existential panic, horror, and related emotions that facing the nothingness of death can induce. I consider various attempts to explain those emotions and argue that they arise from the fact that one’s death seems impossible. For Jean-Paul Sartre, horror and related emotions can occur only in a world that is magical in his special sense of the term. A world where impossible things happen is magical in (...)
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  11.  36
    The art of life by John Kekes.Frederik Kaufman - 2004 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (3):299-303.
  12.  29
    Comments on Death, Posthumous Harm and Bioethics.Frederik Kaufman - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (9):639-640.
    I cannot possibly do justice to James Taylor's main contention that full-blooded epicureanism is true. But if it is true then, as he notes, this ‘bold’ philosophical position promises to revise our thinking about many areas in bioethics which presuppose that death is bad.1 Of course if Epicureanism is true, the implications run much wider and deeper than bioethics. Any human activity that in any way presupposes the badness of death will be groundless—killing or being killed in war will be (...)
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  13.  71
    Conceptual necessity, causality and self-ascriptions of sensation.Frederik Kaufman - 1990 - International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3):3-11.
  14.  19
    Callicott on native american attitudes.Frederik Kaufman - 1996 - Environmental Ethics 18 (4):437-438.
  15.  9
    Drugs & Harm.Frederik Kaufman - 2020 - Philosophy Now 140:31-33.
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  16.  16
    Forgiveness and Warranted Resentment.Frederik Kaufman - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 25:37-41.
    I argue that forgiveness necessarily involves overcoming resentment to which we are entitled when wronged. My view calls into question the standard understanding of forgiveness according to which resentment is no longer warranted once the transgressor apologizes or makes amends in some other way. If forgiveness entails relinquishing unwarranted resentment, as the standard account has it, then it is not freely given, since one must relinquish unwarranted resentments. On my view, forgiveness remains elective since one chooses to relinquish resentment to (...)
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  17. Moral realism and moral judgments.Frederik Kaufman - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (1):103 - 112.
    For moral realists moral judgments will be a kind of factual judgment that involves the basically reliable apprehension of an objective moral reality. I argue that factual judgments display at least some degree of conceptual sensitivity to error, while moral judgments do not. Therefore moral judgments are not a kind of factual judgment.
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  18.  38
    Steven Luper, the philosophy of death.Frederik Kaufman - 2010 - Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (4):535-538.
  19.  28
    The Fetus's Mother.Frederik Kaufman - 1990 - Hastings Center Report 20 (3):3-4.
  20.  16
    Warren on the Logic of Domination.Frederik Kaufman - 1994 - Environmental Ethics 16 (3):333-334.
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