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  1.  12
    Linguistic Conventionalism and the Truth-Contrast Thesis.Fredrik Nyseth - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):264-285.
    According to linguistic conventionalism, necessities are to be explained in terms of the conventionally adopted rules that govern the use of linguistic expressions. A number of influential arguments against this view concerns the ‘Truth-Contrast Thesis’. This is the claim that necessary truths are fundamentally different from contingent ones since they are not made true by ‘the facts’. Instead, they are supposed to be something like ‘true in virtue of meaning’. This thesis is widely held to be a core commitment of (...)
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    Synonymy and the a Priori: A Problem for Boghossian’s Model.Fredrik Nyseth - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):559-565.
    According to Paul Boghossian, some truths are knowable a priori because they are expressed by epistemically analytic sentences. In such cases, understanding the sentence is meant to suffice for justified belief in the proposition it expresses. One alleged route from understanding to justification goes via what Boghossian calls ‘the synonymy model’. This article presents a dilemma for this model and argues that although a strategy for avoiding the dilemma is available, this does not vindicate Boghossian's model.
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    Semantic Facts and a Priori Knowledge.Fredrik Nyseth - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (2):297-304.
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