Results for 'Frege's puzzle'

1000+ found
Order:
See also
  1.  88
    Relational Approaches to Frege's Puzzle.Aidan Gray - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (10):e12429.
    Frege's puzzle is a fundamental challenge for accounts of mental and linguistic representation. This piece surveys a family of recent approaches to the puzzle that posit representational relations. I identify the central commitments of relational approaches and present several arguments for them. I also distinguish two kinds of relationism—semantic relationism and formal relationism—corresponding to two conceptions of representational relations. I briefly discuss the consequences of relational approaches for foundational questions about propositional attitudes, intentional explanation, and compositionality.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2. Does Semantic Relationism Solve Frege’s Puzzle?Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):97-118.
    In a series of recent works, Kit Fine, 605–631, 2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege’s puzzle. Radically departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that Frege’s puzzle forces us to reject compositionality. In this paper we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational semantics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, by Fine. We then show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate, forcing Fine to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3. Russellian Acquaintance and Frege’s Puzzle.Donovan Wishon - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):321-370.
    In this paper, I argue that a number of recent Russell interpreters, including Evans, Davidson, Campbell, and Proops, mistakenly attribute to Russell what I call ‘the received view of acquaintance’: the view that acquaintance safeguards us from misidentifying the objects of our acquaintance. I contend that Russell’s discussions of phenomenal continua cases show that he does not accept the received view of acquaintance. I also show that the possibility of misidentifying the objects of acquaintance should be unsurprising given underappreciated aspects (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  4. Frege's Puzzle for Perception.Boyd Millar - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):368-392.
    According to an influential variety of the representational view of perceptual experience—the singular content view—the contents of perceptual experiences include singular propositions partly composed of the particular physical object a given experience is about or of. The singular content view faces well-known difficulties accommodating hallucinations; I maintain that there is also an analogue of Frege's puzzle that poses a significant problem for this view. In fact, I believe that this puzzle presents difficulties for the theory that are (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  15
    Berg’s Answer to Frege’s Puzzle.Wayne A. Davis - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-16.
    Berg seeks to defend the theory that the meaning of a proper name in a belief report is its reference against Frege’s puzzle by hypothesizing that when substituting coreferential names in belief reports results in reports that seem to have different truth values, the appearance is due to the fact that the reports have different metalinguistic implicatures. I review evidence that implicatures cannot be calculated in the way Grice or Berg imagine, and give reasons to believe that belief reports (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6. Can Frege Pose Frege's Puzzle?Stavroula Glezakos - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 202.
    Gottlob Frege maintained that two name-containing identity sentences, represented schematically as a=a and a=b,can both be true in virtue of the same object’s self-identity but nonetheless, puzzlingly, differ in their epistemic profiles. Frege eventually resolved his puzzlement by locating the source of the purported epistemic difference between the identity sentences in a difference in the Sinne, or senses, expressed by the names that the sentences contain. -/- Thus, Frege portrayed himself as describing a puzzle that can be posed prior (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7.  71
    Frege's Puzzle is About Identity After All.Elmar Unnsteinsson - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Many philosophers have argued or taken for granted that Frege's puzzle has little or nothing to do with identity statements. I show that this is wrong, arguing that the puzzle can only be motivated relative to a thinker's beliefs about the identity or distinctness of the relevant object. The result is important, as it suggests that the puzzle can be solved, not by a semantic theory of names or referring expressions as such, but simply by a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Frege's Puzzle and Descriptive Enrichment.Jeff Speaks - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):267-282.
    Millians sometimes claim that we can explain the fact that sentences like "If Hesperus exists, then Hesperus is Phosphorus" seem a posteriori to speakers in terms of the fact that utterances of sentences of this sort would typically pragmatically convey propositions which really are a posteriori. I argue that this kind of pragmatic explanation of the seeming a posterioricity of sentences of this sort fails. The main reason is that for every sentence like the above which (by Millian lights) is (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  9. Frege's Puzzle.Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Ridgeview.
  10. Solving Frege's Puzzle.Richard G. Heck Jr - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):132-174.
    So-called 'Frege cases' pose a challenge for anyone who would hope to treat the contents of beliefs (and similar mental states) as Russellian propositions: It is then impossible to explain people's behavior in Frege cases without invoking non-intentional features of their mental states, and doing that seems to undermine the intentionality of psychological explanation. In the present paper, I develop this sort of objection in what seems to me to be its strongest form, but then offer a response to it. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  11. Frege's Puzzle and the Objects of Credence.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):587-635.
    The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence : the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  12. A Solution to Frege's Puzzle.George Bealer - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:17-60.
    This paper provides a new approach to a family of outstanding logical and semantical puzzles, the most famous being Frege's puzzle. The three main reductionist theories of propositions (the possible-worlds theory, the propositional-function theory, the propositional-complex theory) are shown to be vulnerable to Benacerraf-style problems, difficulties involving modality, and other problems. The nonreductionist algebraic theory avoids these problems and allows us to identify the elusive nondescriptive, non-metalinguistic, necessary propositions responsible for the indicated family of puzzles. The algebraic approach (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  13.  7
    Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-Reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational Agents.Emiliano Boccardi - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (1):1-31.
    ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that a number of influential Millian responses to Frege’s puzzle, which consist in denying that Frege’s data apply to natural languages, are not viable if logic is to play its role in legitimizing the logical appraisal of rational subjects. A notion of validity which does justice to the normativity of logic must make room for a distinction between valid inferences and enthymemes. I discuss the prospects of formal, relevant and manifest validity as candidates (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Comments on Mark Kalderon's “The Open Question Argument, Frege's Puzzle, and Leibniz's Law”.Peter Alward - unknown
    A standard strategy for defending a claim of non-identity is one which invokes Leibniz’s Law. (1) Fa (2) ~Fb (3) (∀x)(∀y)(x=y ⊃ (∀P)(Px ⊃ Py)) (4) a=b ⊃ (Fa ⊃ Fb) (5) a≠b In Kalderon’s view, this basic strategy underlies both Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA) as well as (a variant formulation of) Frege’s puzzle (FP). In the former case, the argument runs from the fact that some natural property—call it “F-ness”—has, but goodness lacks, the (2nd order) property of (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  65
    Frege’s Puzzle and Frege Cases: Defending a Quasi-Syntactic Solution.Robert D. Rupert - 2008 - Cognitive Systems Research 9:76-91.
    There is no doubt that social interaction plays an important role in language-learning, as well as in concept acquisition. In surprising contrast, social interaction makes only passing appearance in our most promising naturalistic theories of content. This is particularly true in the case of mental content (e.g., Cummins, 1996; Dretske, 1981, 1988; Fodor, 1987, 1990a; Millikan, 1984); and insofar as linguistic content derives from mental content (Grice, 1957), social interaction seems missing from our best naturalistic theories of both.1 In this (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  11
    Informative Identities: A Challenge for Frege's Puzzle.Elisa Paganini - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (4):513-530.
    Frege's puzzle about identity sentences has long challenged many philosophers to find a solution to it but also led other philosophers to object that the evidential datum it is grounded on is false. The present work is an elaboration of this second kind of reaction: it explains why Frege's puzzle seems to resist the traditional objection, giving voice to different and more elaborated presentations of the evidential datum, faithful to the spirit but not to the letter (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  66
    A Note on the Relationship Between Mates' Puzzle and Frege's Puzzle.M. A. Moffett - 2002 - Journal of Semantics 19 (2):159-166.
    In this note I argue that, relative to certain largely uncontroversial background conditions, any instance of Mates’ Puzzle is equivalent to some instance of Frege’s Puzzle. If correct, this result is surprising. For, barring the radical move of rejecting the possibility of synonymous expressions in a language tout court, it shows that there is no strictly lexical solution to at least some instances of Frege’s Puzzle. This forces the hand of theorists who wish to provide a semantic (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  26
    Frege’s Puzzle and Arithmetical Formalism. Putting Things in Context.Sorin Costreie - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):207-224.
    The paper discusses the emergence of Frege's puzzle and the introduction of the celebrated distinction between sense and reference in the context of Frege's logicist project. The main aim of the paper is to show that not logicism per se is mainly responsible for this introduction, but Frege's constant struggle against formalism. Thus, the paper enlarges the historical context, and provides a reconstruction of Frege's philosophical development from this broader perspective.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  7
    Frege’s Puzzle and the Direct Reference Theory.Filip Kawczyński - 2014 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Semantics and Beyond: Philosophical and Linguistic Inquiries. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 109-126.
    In the paper, I discuss a possibility of defending the Direct Reference theory from its most dangerous threaten which is the notorious Frege's puzzle. I discuss two possible ways of doing that. First is based on King's theory of propositions as facts. I show that tools provided by King's theory are not enough to solve the puzzle. More promising is a method supported by new Soames's theory of propositions as cognitive event-types. I try to show that this (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  89
    Frege's Puzzle About the Cognitive Function of Truth.Dirk Greimann - 2004 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):425 – 442.
    The aim of this paper is to give a detailed reconstruction of Frege's solution to his puzzle about the cognitive function of truth, which is this: On the one hand, the concept of truth seems to play an essential role in acquiring knowledge because the transition from the mere hypothetical assumption that p to the acknowledgement of its truth is a crucial step in acquiring the knowledge that p, while, on the other hand, this concept seems to be (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21.  17
    Frege's Puzzle.Graeme Forbes & Nathan Salmon - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.
  22. Approaching Frege's Puzzle.Aleksandar Kellenberg - 2008 - Facta Philosophica 10 (1):247-268.
  23.  15
    Why is Frege's Puzzle Still Puzzling?Eros Corazza & Jerome Dokič - 1995 - In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 151--168.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24. Frege's Puzzle, Sense, and Information Content.William W. Taschek - 1992 - Mind 101 (404):767-791.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  25.  52
    Frege's Puzzle and Belief Ascriptions.Pierre Jacob - manuscript
    This paper is about belief ascriptions and problems that arise for a Fregean theory.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Frege's Puzzle.Nathan Salmon - 1988 - Studia Logica 47 (4):439-440.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  27. Nathan Salmon, Frege's Puzzle Reviewed By.G. W. Fitch - 1987 - Philosophy in Review 7 (5):210-212.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  70
    A Semantic Solution to Frege's Puzzle.Takashi Yagisawa - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:135-154.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  33
    Frege's Puzzle.Jennifer Hornsby - 1987 - Philosophical Books 28 (3):161-163.
  30. Frege's Puzzle.Nathan Salmon - 1988 - Mind 97 (385):136-137.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  31. Frege's Puzzle.Nathan Solomon - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  11
    Frege's Puzzle.Shannon Vallor - 2002 - Philosophy Today 46 (9999):178-185.
  33. Salmon, N., "Frege's Puzzle". [REVIEW]A. D. Smith - 1988 - Mind 97:136.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34.  6
    Frege's Puzzle.Anthony Appiah - 1988 - History of European Ideas 9 (2):243-244.
  35.  4
    Frege's Puzzle a Phenomenological Solution?Shannon Vallor - 2002 - Philosophy Today 46 (5):178-185.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  1
    Frege's Puzzle : Nathan Salmon, Bradford Books , Xi + 194 Pp., $12.50. [REVIEW]Anthony Appiah - 1988 - History of European Ideas 9 (2):243-244.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Nathan Salmon, Frege's Puzzle[REVIEW]G. Fitch - 1987 - Philosophy in Review 7:210-212.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Frege's Puzzle: A Phenomenological Solution.Shannon Vallor - 2002 - Philosophy Today 46 (Supplement):178-185.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  15
    Frege's Hierarchy: A Puzzle.Christopher Peacocke - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 159.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40. Arguing for Frege's Fundamental Principle.Bryan Frances - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):341–346.
    Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief demonstrates the lack of soundness of the traditional argument for the Fregean fundamental principle that the sentences 'S believes that a is F' and 'S believes that b is F' can differ in truth value even if a = b. This principle is a crucial premise in the traditional Fregean argument for the existence of semantically relevant senses, individuative elements of beliefs that are sensitive to our varying conceptions of what the beliefs are about. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. A Pragmatic Solution to Ostertag's Puzzle.Philip Atkins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):359-365.
    Gary Ostertag has presented a new puzzle for Russellianism about belief reports. He argues that Russellians do not have the resources to solve this puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena. I argue to the contrary that the puzzle can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s pragmatic account of belief reports, provided that the account is properly understood. Specifically, the puzzle can be solved so long as Salmon’s guises are not identified with sentences.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  61
    Indistinguishable Senses.Aidan Gray - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Fregeanism and Relationism are competing families of solutions to Frege’s Puzzle, and by extension, competing theories of propositional representation. My aim is to clarify what is at stake between them by characterizing and evaluating a Relationist argument. Relationists claim that it is cognitively possible for distinct token propositional attitudes to be, in a sense, qualitatively indistinguishable: to differ in no intrinsic representational features. The idea of an ‘intrinsic representational feature’ is not, however, made especially clear in the argument. I (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Frege's Distinction Between Sense and Reference.Gideon Makin - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):147-163.
    The article presents Frege's distinction between Sense and Reference. After a short introduction, it explains the puzzle which gave rise to the distinction; Frege's earlier solution, and his reasons for its later repudiation. The distinction, which embodies Frege's second solution, is then discussed in two phases. The first, which is restricted to proper names, sets out its most basic features. The second discusses 'empty' names; indirect speech, and the distinction for predicates and for complete sentences. Finally, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  44.  10
    Some Remarks on Perry’s Reflexive Content and Cognitive Significance.Filipe Martone - 2015 - Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 20 (2).
    In this paper I present and discuss the solution offered by John Perry to Frege’s Puzzle in terms of the reflexive content of utterances. I first discuss his purported solution for the indexical version of the Puzzle, and argue that reflexive content cannot explain the triviality of some utterances. Hence, it is not the sort of thing that accounts for co­­gnitive significance adequately. I then discuss Perry’s solution for the Puzzle as arising for proper names. I argue (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Names, Sense and Kripke’s Puzzle.Tim Crane - 1992 - From the Logical Point of View 2:11-26.
    Frege introduced the distinction between sense and reference to account for the information conveyed by identity statements. We can put the point like this: if the meaning of a term is exhausted by what it stands for, then how can 'a =a' and 'a =b' differ in meaning? Yet it seems they do, for someone who understands all the terms involved would not necessarily judge that a =b even though they judged that a =a. It seems that 'a =b' just (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  37
    Frege's Judgement Stroke.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):153 – 175.
    This paper brings to light a new puzzle for Frege interpretation, and offers a solution to that puzzle. The puzzle concerns Frege’s judgement-stroke (‘|’), and consists in a tension between three of Frege’s claims. First, Frege vehemently maintains that psychological considerations should have no place in logic. Second, Frege regards the judgementstroke—and the associated dissociation of assertoric force from content, of the act of judgement from the subject matter about which judgement is made—as a crucial part of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  47.  81
    Kripke's Puzzle About Belief.Carlo Penco - 1998 - teaching material.
    A traditional argument is often used against Mill's theory of names (the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent). Mill's theory implies transparency of proper names (coreferring proper names are substitutable salva veritate); but examples like Frege's and Quine's show that proper names are not transparent in belief contexts. This could be thought to be a reductio ad absurdum of Mill's theory. In " A puzzle about Belief" (1979; 1988) Kripke builds up an argument which aims (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  38
    Hume's Puzzle About Identity.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (2):187-201.
    Hume's puzzle about identity is not semantic, like Frege's, but concerns representation-as. It concerns not what there is which a representation represents, but rather what the representation represents there as being. Hume asks, what do we represent there as being when we realize that something and something are for all we know numerically identical and for all we know numerically distinct? I show that we must represent there as perhaps being something that perhaps is distinct from itself. But (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. The Logic of Opacity.Andrew Bacon & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - forthcoming - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research.
    We explore the view that Frege's puzzle is a source of straightforward counterexamples to Leibniz's law. Taking this seriously requires us to revise the classical logic of quantifiers and identity; we work out the options, in the context of higher-order logic. The logics we arrive at provide the resources for a straightforward semantics of attitude reports that is consistent with the Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is just the thing it stands for. We provide models (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Toward a New Theory of Content.George Bealer - 1994 - In R. Casati, B. Smith & G. White (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993). Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. pp. 179-92.
    The purpose of this paper is to lay out the algebraic approach to propositions and then to show how it can be implemented in new solutions to Frege's puzzle and a variety of related puzzles about content.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000