7 found
  1.  38
    On the Relative Strengths of Altruism and Fairness.Jonathan H. W. Tan & Friedel Bolle - 2006 - Theory and Decision 60 (1):35-67.
    Some researchers have attributed deviations from selfish behavior to fairness. Violations of fairness theories, however, are observed in experimental dictator games with transfer rates greater than 1 (a transfer of x from the dictator yields an income of tx for the beneficiary, where x < tx): the dictator’s final income is less than the beneficiary’s. We theoretically propose that dictator giving also involves altruism, further supporting our claim with empirical evidence from four separate samples of dictator game experiments. Our nonlinear (...)
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  2.  79
    On Sen's second-order preferences, morals, and decision theory.Friedel Bolle - 1983 - Erkenntnis 20 (2):195 - 205.
  3.  31
    Comments on dynamic decision-making: Is there a conflict between rationality and efficiency?Friedel Bolle - 1981 - Erkenntnis 16 (1):131 - 136.
  4.  41
    Reciprocity, Altruism, Solidarity: A Dynamic Model.Friedel Bolle & Alexander Kritikos - 2006 - Theory and Decision 60 (4):371-394.
    Reciprocity is a decisive behavioural rule resulting in successful co-operation or deterrence. In this paper, a dynamic model is proposed, where reciprocity is described by changes in altruistic (or malevolent) ties. Multiple steady states may exist in one of which there may be general cooperation (solidarity) and the other being one of universal malice (war of each individual against all other individuals). We apply our theory to a number of examples, illustrating that the agents’ initial preferences determine whether a steady (...)
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  5.  77
    Why to buy your Darling flowers: On cooperation and exploitation.Friedel Bolle - 2001 - Theory and Decision 50 (1):1--28.
    Trusting in someone's cooperation is often connected with the danger of being exploited. So it is important that signals are exchanged which make it probable enough that the potential partner is reliable. Such signals must be too expensive for partners who are planning to abuse the trust they are given but cheap enough for those who wish to initiate a long-term cooperation. In a game theoretical model, it is shown that such signals could consist of presents given before the partnership (...)
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  6.  39
    Rewarding Trust: An Experimental Study. [REVIEW]Friedel Bolle - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (1):83-98.
    The issue of trust has recently attracted growing attention in research on work relations, capital – owner relations, cultural influences on the economic structures of different countries, and other topics. This paper analyzes a simple experiment on trust and the reward of trust. Mr A is endowed with DM 80. He decides to trust Ms B (and give her his money) or not. Ms B is able to double the sum of money (if she gets it) and can then decide (...)
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  7.  42
    Multiple motives of pro-social behavior: evidence from the solidarity game. [REVIEW]Friedel Bolle, Yves Breitmoser, Jana Heimel & Claudia Vogel - 2012 - Theory and Decision 72 (3):303-321.
    The article analyses experimental “solidarity games” with two benefactors and one beneficiary. Depending on their motive for giving—e.g., warm glow, altruism, or guilt—the benefactors’ response functions are either constant, decreasing, or increasing. If motives interact, or if envy is a concern, then more complex (unimodal) shapes may emerge. Controlling for random utility perturbations, we determine which and how many motives affect individual decision making. The main findings are that the motives of about 75% of the subjects can be identified fairly (...)
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