The article focuses on the crucial changes that science as an established social institution and an epistemological enterprise is undergoing, the key one is the loss of its monopoly on the production of socially useful knowledge and gradual transformation into something new, which, due to institutional and cultural reasons, we continue to call ‘science’. We suppose that the most appropriate conceptualization of the new phenomenon, which is replacing science as an institution, is “technoscience”, since the technical component in scientific practices (...) has now taken a dominant position and technology production has become more important than fundamental knowledge. Technoscience has at least two sources: 1) capitalization of scientific activity that has led to classical science has been replaced with technoscience developing on first-priority funded applied research; 2) theorization and autonomy of the techno sphere, which have resulted in instrumentalization of all levels of knowledge production as well as in technological / symbolic construction of reality and tangled ontology of technoscientific objects. We discuss both of these sources, with particular attention being paid to such trends as epistemic strategies transformation, modified reality, social sciences and humanities conformation to technoscience norms, and knowledge bearers egalitarianization. A crucial transformation of both science itself and its position in society breaks inevitably a demarcation line that separates scientific knowledge from other types of knowledge while promotes the replacement of scientific theory with discourses. Apparently, in “technoscience” an ethos of its own is being formed, where interaction with the “external environment” (with other social spheres) is crucial. In this context, scientific activity is becoming more and more transepistemic, transinstitutional practice, and accordingly ceases to be guided by the classical scientific ethos determined by the goals and objectives of academic community itself. (shrink)

In many ways the twentieth century was a turning point in the history of mankind. Rebellious social forces defied any reasonable explanation. Philosophical theories of society that had previously been considered true turned out to be inapplicable to the analysis of new historical processes. To an even greater extent than before, religion began to be used by its ministers in the service of corporate and political interests. The hope of solving the problems of human existence and social development with the (...) help of science was also shaken, for many phenomena of human life and cosmic processes were not amenable to scientific explanation. In spite of the impressive successes of science, which changed the face of the world, a critical, even negative, attitude towards science increasingly took hold of public opinion, for the negative features of the technogenic civilization that science helped to create became more and more visible. There were also cultural crises. Alongside beautiful examples of painting, poetry, literature, music, and architecture, a mass culture ruled by the dark spirit of consumerism, banality, and violence sprang up and entrenched itself. The moral sphere is in serious crisis. First the West and, following it, Russia tasted the bitter fruits of the sexual revolution. All of this was the reflection of a deep spiritual crisis that enveloped mankind, a crisis that became obvious in the twentieth century. (shrink)

Methodology and ethics: these two terms have only recently begun to be linked organically in scientific thought, especially when the discussion is about man as the subject and object of knowledge. It is not as if this situation had not been anticipated in the history of thought. Suffice it to mention Kant's perspicuity: his analysis of "the conditions of the thinkability" of an object of knowledge is combined with ideas about man as an end in itself, as self-sufficient, and about (...) man's freedom, his ability to set goals in general. Crudely put, for Kant ethics is primary, it "anticipates" direct knowledge. (shrink)

This paper summarizes the discussion on technoscience and its key question whether the phenomenon indicated by this term means a radical transformation of science and its replacement with some new social objectification. Based on the remarks of the discussion participants, we raise questions on mathematical rationality contribution in technoscience development, technical (magical) domination on nature (environment) and man as the leitmotif of the New European culture and the connection of techno-science, financial capital and liberal capitalism.

Moral principles are indispensable for the assessment of the sciences. Medicine is one of the sciences in need of the guidance of ethics. Ethical principles are put forward and interpreted by society. Vital principles for bioethics include a high standard for professional medical workers, confidentiality between the physician and the patient, and informed consent. Marxist teaching calls for the unity of science and ethics, based on humanist ideas. Keywords: ethics of science, ethical neutrality, professional ethics, Marxism-Leninism, humanist ideals, USSR, bioethics (...) CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The article examines main competing conceptions of the cor­respondence theory of truth. First, the author investigates pos­sible candidates for the role of truth-bearers. Among those he examines following entities: instances of sentences as concrete sequences of symbols (sounds or letters), which should satisfy wide scope of requirements, such as to be grammatical, mean­ingful, affirmative and so on; abstract propositions, which are ex­pressed by concrete sentences; utterances (either explicit or in lingua mentalis); beliefs of agents as their special mental states. Then (...) he turns to the study of possible candidates for the role of truth-makers, i.e. of those entities to which truth-bearers should correspond to be true. He observes states of affairs, situations, facts and mereological sums of individuals. Then he shows that a notion of correspondence is a functional relationship of interpre­tation of linguistic expressions, where certain fragment of real­ity is taken as a model, i.e. as a finite set of elements on which some functions and relations can be operationally defined. He shows how in some simple cases such interpretation function can be built in operationalist’s manner. After that, he considers some natural objections to this approach, which point that he has no direct cognitive access to the actual world, so it is not possible to take its fragments as a model for any theory. Such objections lead us to the coherentist’s approach, but he shows that the question about origin and status of so-called “specified set” implicitly either leads to infinite regress or requires certain correspondence on some level of investigation and reasoning. Finally, the authore presents some reflections on the meaning of correspondence approach for scientific realism and all other versions of realistic philosophy and metaphysics. (shrink)

This article attempts to outline the contours of a transcendental phenomenology that would retain the intuition of a healthy realism. In this connection it is proposed to reinterpret the Husserlian notion of constitution, presenting constitution as a discover of reality. A distinction is made between strong and weak versions of constitution. It is constitution in the weak sense that combines, in our opinion, with the realist attitude. In order to achieve the above-mentioned goal (to present constitution as discovery), the Husserlian (...) notion of object sense is clarified: it is excluded as a representative or substitute of an intentional object; object sense is seen as a mode of givenness, as а medium by means of which the object is implied or given. The idea of a meaningful discovery of reality is best matched by this treatment of object meaning. It is thus possible to combine the realist attitude with the idea of meaningful access to the real, thus avoiding, on the one hand, naive realism and, on the other hand, transcendental-idealist implications. The Husserlian notion of constitution is further related with the idea of forming interpretative schemes of understanding the world, which may include political agendas, scientific paradigms, systems of speculative metaphysics, and religious faith. It is emphasized that, although the rejection of interpretation is impossible, interpretive schemes must be reconciled with real facts and events in order to “fine-tune” reason and reality. Finally, a separation is undertaken with the conception of J.- L. Marion, which relies on the deflation of meaning in favor of the given as such, calling into question the status of man as a being who possesses reason, who discovers reality and constitutes its meaning. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the genesis of Hegel’s philosophy of nature. It shows us that the formation of the natural philosophical views of the German philosopher took place not only in a speculative way, in the critical reception of Schelling’s works, but, first of all and for the most part, was predetermined by Hegel’s own interest in natural science and acquaintance with some prominent scientists of that time. The focus of the paper is on the evolution of the first (...) part of Hegel’s natural philosophy: the doctrine of space and time as it presented in some excerpts from two revised lecture notes on the philosophy of nature, read by Hegel in the winter semester of 1821/1822 at the University of Berlin and published as an appendix to the article by Bonzipen. In his article, Bonzipen provides historical information on the fate of these texts, raises the question of their authorship, gives a general outline of Hegel’s thought, and also compares both texts with the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. From his point of view, the revised notes allow partly to illustrate, partly to fill in some gaps in the dialectic of two forms of abstract appearance known on the basis of the Encyclopedia. Bonzipen notes that Hegel’s speculative consideration of space and time is complemented by a discussion with the history of philosophy and the history of mathematics. While reproaching traditional mathematics for being fixed on the quantitative aspect of reality, which does not allow to fully resolve the contradiction between space and time, Hegel at the same time refuses to attempt to build philosophical mathematics that focuses on the consideration of the qualitative certainty of the moments of space and time, declaring that although it is solvable, it is an extremely time-consuming task. This refusal becomes a turning point in the further development of the dialectical doctrine of space and time. (shrink)

Basing itself on the cognitive theory of the modern Canadian philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan, the article conducts a critical appraisal of the notion of intuitive knowledge (ḥads in Arabic) as espoused by the famous medieval Islamic philosopher Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna). The article shows the ways in which Lonergan’s crucial distinction between the objectivity as the knower’s intelligent grasp of the real and the objectivity as the knower’s critical affirmation of the real, revises the epistemological primacy of intuitivism that is (...) endemic not only to Avicennian thought in particular but also to Aristotelian tradition generally. At the same time, it shows various elements of continuity between Lonergan’s and Avicenna’s analyses of intentional consciousness. It argues that, while Lonergan’s thought revises Avicenna’s lack of attention to the role of one’s further rational affirmation of anything that one has gasped only intuitively, Lonergan’s cognitive theory might conceptually benefit from a number of original Avicennian insights when it comes to one’s experiential and intelligent grasp of the objects of one’s consciousness. (shrink)

Research questions asked about Pompeius’ cura annonae – often termed “grain command” – dwell mainly on what made it more like any other promagistracy. Scholars tend to approach this office as if it were a kind of military command, albeit innovative. However, unlike promagistrates before him, Pompeius was endowed with the task which concerned the sphere domi. While not neglected, this aspect of Pompeius’ power becomes even more significant if appreciated through the lens of a more general problem of late-republican (...) promagistrates’ interference in the sphere of domestic politics. This paper aims to supplement scholarly observations on the cura annonae, including F. Vervaet’s recent findings, by reconsidering especially the evidence on Pompeius’ making or revising a list of grain recipients. (shrink)

In his Bellum Ciuile, Caesar reports the events of 1 January 49 with these words : misso ad uesperum senatu omnes qui sunt eius ordinis a Pompeio euocantur. laudat Pompeius atque in posterum confirmat, segniores castigat atque incitat.When the Senate had been dismissed towards dusk, all who belonged to that order were summoned by Pompeius. He praised the determined and encouraged them for the future while criticizing and stirring up those who were less eager to act.This meeting has not attracted (...) much scholarly attention and admittedly for a good reason: other circumstances of the outbreak of the Civil War are, perhaps, more significant for understanding the events as well as the intentions and decisions of the political actors. The importance of this gathering lies, however, not so much in what its role might have been in the developments of the year 49 but rather in the context of the phenomenon of the promagistrates’ interference in the domestic politics of Late Republican Rome. (shrink)

A large team of well-known Soviet scholars is currently preparing a new textbook in philosophy. We thought it might be useful to acquaint the broad philosophical public with the ideas that guided the authors in writing the textbook, and have included its table of contents, preface, and conclusion. We also, together with the team of authors, are hoping for readers' responses. The book will be published shortly by Politizdat Publishers.

Modern studies of the subject the philosophical methodology of science can be brought to fruition and accordingly become the property of scientists, that is, really "work" in science, only on one condition: if they are designed not in an abstract, a priori fashion and are oriented not toward "science in general" but toward its real, concrete forms, analysis of which now has general methodological significance — it is important as a component of the general epistemology of science. This is associated (...) with the fact that, unlike classical science, modern science, particularly natural science, no longer isolates studies of philosophical methodology as an important element that does not enter into the very "body of science" but makes it an organic part and condition for concrete research. In order to understand this to the full, one must recall how the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics arose, those two fundamental disciplines that changed the face of modern science and the very style of scientific thought, and that demanded the development of a special theory of physical knowledge. Moreover, this special theory largely defined, as we know, new approaches in general epistemology, because physics became the leading branch of natural science. (shrink)

The fifth edition of the Philosophical Dictionary leaves a very favorable impression. It is a useful mass edition. It has been considerably enlarged—by almost one hundred fifty pages compared with the fourth edition. The dictionary now contains many new articles: "Acceleration of socioeconomic development," "The human factor," "The meaning of life," "Discipline," "Social conflict," "Understanding," "Computerization," "Informatics," "Philosophy of science," "The logic of scientific cognition," "Sociobiology," "Egoconception," "Scientific materialism," "Humanity," "Ethology," etc. Many of these terms were previously not found at (...) all in our philosophical reference literature, including the Philosophical Encyclopedia [Filosofskaia entsiklopediia] and the Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary [Filosofskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar']. (shrink)

A low linear order with no computable copy constructed by C. Jockusch and R. Soare has Hausdorff rank equal to $2$. In this regard, the question arises, how simple can be a low linear order with no computable copy from the point of view of the linear order type? The main result of this work is an example of a low strong $\eta $ -representation with no computable copy that is the simplest possible example.

We establish that for every computably enumerable (c.e.) Turing degree b the upper cone of c.e. Turing degrees determined by b is the degree spectrum of the successor relation of some computable linear ordering. This follows from our main result, that for a large class of linear orderings the degree spectrum of the successor relation is closed upward in the c.e. Turing degrees.

For a computable structure $\mathcal {M}$, the categoricity spectrum is the set of all Turing degrees capable of computing isomorphisms among arbitrary computable copies of $\mathcal {M}$. If the spectrum has a least degree, this degree is called the degree of categoricity of $\mathcal {M}$. In this paper we investigate spectra of categoricity for computable rigid structures. In particular, we give examples of rigid structures without degrees of categoricity.

Two aspects of the target article, (1) the extension of the equilibrium point theory to multi-joint movements, and (2) the consequence that the EMG pattern is not directly controlled by the central nervous system (CNS), are discussed in light of the experiments on upper trunk bending in humans. The principle component kinematic analysis and the analysis of the EMG data, obtained under microgravity and additional loading conditions, support the application of Feldman and Levin's for multi-joint pointing movement to equilibrium control (...) during upper trunk movement. (shrink)

In this paper we prove that any Δ30 degree has an increasing η -representation. Therefore, there is an increasing η -representable set without a strong η -representation.

The volume contains 37 invited papers presented at the Congress, covering the areas of Logic, Mathematics, Physical Sciences, Biological Sciences and the ...

Intense interest has long been shown in the nature of humankind. Are we the products of genes? Are we the products of culture? Or are we something in between? The Marxist position, stressing the dominant significance of social methods for studying humans, is sketched. Then, a number of Western, biologically influenced views are discussed and criticised. Although there are important insights in the writings of the holders of these views, ultimately they produce only a semiscience.

Opening the round table, I. T. Frolov, editor-in-chief of Voprosy filosofii, stated that discussing problems of this type today, the task lies not so much in emphasizing their general and traditional aspects but in finding a scientific and practical solution to new problems of interaction of man and nature that can now be solved only on a global scale. Furthermore, he observed that discussion of these problems as questions of morality, in terms of pessimistic or optimistic evaluation, is very (...) important but certainly entirely inadequate. Not only social and philosophical but many political conclusions follow from a discussion of problems of interaction between man and nature. Investigation and solution of these problems, which require concrete scientific and practical approaches, may facilitate the development of such policies as peaceful coexistence, strengthening of neighborly treaty relations, and so forth. Solving these problems will help peoples come closer together and contribute to the firmer establishment of peace throughout the world. (shrink)

A characteristic mark of the times is the steadily growing interest in our past, in our native philosophical legacy, which by dint of tragic circumstances was expunged from Soviet culture.