Kur’an tasavvuru belli kavramlardan meydana gelmektedir. İnsanın fiziki ve manevî yönünü ifade eden fıtrat kavramı, Kur’an tasavvurunu ifade eden önemli kavramlarından biridir. Fıtrat kavramının ilk günden itibaren tefsircilerin ilgi odağı olması da bundandır. Genellikle fıtrat, İslam dini, ilk yaratılış ve insanın dini kabul etme potansiyeli olarak yorumlanmış ve bunların değişip değişmeyeceği üzerinde durulmuştur. Rum sûresinde geçen “khalqullah” ile Nisâ sûresinde geçen “khalqullah” terkiplerinin bulunduğu âyetler arasında bu çerçevede bağlantı kurulmuştur. Bu çalışmamızda fıtratın mahiyeti ile fıtratla ilgili âyetlerin birbiriyle ilişkilendirilmesi irdelenecek (...) ve fıtratın temel unsurları üzerinde durulacaktır. Akıl, sevgi, aşk, güzel şeylere ilgi duyma ve çirkinliklerden kaçınmanın, insan fıtratının temel bileşenleri arasında yer alıp almadığı tartışılacaktır. Ayrıca fıtrat âyetinde geçen tebdîl kavramı ile Nisâ sûresinde geçen tağyir kavramının, aynı manayı ifade edip etmediği üzerinde durulacaktır. (shrink)

On what grounds will the rational man become a Christian? It is often assumed by many, especially non-Christians, that he will become a Christian if and only if he judges that the evidence available to him shows that it is more likely than not that the Christian theological system is true, that, in mathematical terms, on the evidence available to him, the probability of its truth is greater than half. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate whether or (...) not this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the rational man to adopt Christianity. (shrink)

An alleged moral right to informational privacy assumes that we should have control over information about ourselves. What is the philosophical justification for this control? I think that one prevalent answer to this question—an answer that has to do with the justification of negative rights generally—will not do.

Mr Olding's recent attack on my exposition of the argument from design gives me an opportunity to defend the central theses of my original article. My article pointed out that there were arguments from design of two types—those which take as their premisses regularities of copresence and those which take as their premisses regularities of succession. I sought to defend an argument of the second type. One merit of such an argument is that there is no doubt about the truth (...) of its premisses. Almost all objects in the world behave in a highly regular way describable by scientific laws. Further, any scientific explanation of such a regularity must invoke some more general regularity. The most general regularities of all are, as such, scientifically inexplicable. The question arises whether there is a possible explanation of another kind which can be provided for them, and whether their occurrence gives any or much support to that explanation. I urged that we do explain some phenomena by explanation of an entirely different kind from the scientific. We explain states of affairs by the action of agents who bring them about intentionally of their own choice. Regularities of succession, as well as other phenomena may be explained in this way. Explanation of this kind I will term intentional explanation. Intentional explanation of some phenomenon E consists in adducing an agent A who brought E about of his own choice and a further end G which, he believed, would be forwarded by the production of E. (shrink)

In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams is rather severe on what he thinks of as an ethics of obligation. He has in mind by this Kant and W. D. Ross. For many, obligation seems the very core of ethics and the moral realm, and lives more generally are seen through the prism of this notion. This, according to Williams, flattens out our lives and moral experience and fails to take into account things which are obviously important to (...) our lives. Once we take these things into account, what do we do if they come into conflict with some of our moral obligations, as Williams, in his earlier writings on moral luck, thought to be the case. I want here to explore some of these ideas, in a way that I think harmonious with Williams's general bent though not one that I intend as in any way detailed exegesis of Williams's work. (shrink)

This volume brings together academics from a variety of disciplines to discuss Collingwood's contributions to philosophy, aesthetics, philosophy of history, political philosophy and archaeological theory. It begins with a general survey of his contribution to history, politics and philosophy.

R.G. Collingwood defined historical knowledge as essentially ‘scientific’, and saw the historian's task as the ‘re-enactment of past thoughts’. The author argues the need to go beyond Collingwood, first by demonstrating the authenticity of available evidence, and secondly, using Namier as an example, by considering methodology as well as epistemology, and the need to relate past thoughts to their present context. The ‘law of the consumption of time’ encourages historians to focus on landmark events, theories and generalisations, thus breaking from (...) Collingwood's emphasis on fidelity to past ideas and interpreting the past from the concepts of the present. This conflict can only be reconciled by the study of historiography. (shrink)

R.G. Collingwood defined historical knowledge as essentially ‘scientific’, and saw the historian's task as the ‘re-enactment of past thoughts’. The author argues the need to go beyond Collingwood, first by demonstrating the authenticity of available evidence, and secondly, using Namier as an example, by considering methodology as well as epistemology, and the need to relate past thoughts to their present context. The ‘law of the consumption of time’ encourages historians to focus on landmark events, theories and generalisations, thus breaking from (...) Collingwood's emphasis on fidelity to past ideas and interpreting the past from the concepts of the present. This conflict can only be reconciled by the study of historiography. (shrink)

This treatise on aesthetics criticizes various psychological theories of art, offers new theories and interpretations, and draws important inferences concerning ...

R G Collingwood is an important twentieth century historian, archaeologist and philosopher whose works are the subject of continued interest, analysis and study. There is an unquestionable need to support this research activity with the provision of a reference guide which is fully up-to-date, informed and authoritative. The Companion will therefore list all primary and secondary material relevant to the study of Collingwood in all his fields of expertise - historical theory, philosophy and archaeology. It will also provide a guide (...) to archive material relevant to his life, together with sources and locations. The resulting volume will provide an essential companion to the understanding of the life and thought of R G Collingwood. (shrink)

In this article we show that it is possible to completely classify the degrees of r.e. bases of r.e. vector spaces in terms of weak truth table degrees. The ideas extend to classify the degrees of complements and splittings. Several ramifications of the classification are discussed, together with an analysis of the structure of the degrees of pairs of r.e. summands of r.e. spaces.

The authors aptly describe their work as a narrative. The protagonists are sometimes great thinkers, sometimes ideas about literary criticism, sometimes different approaches to literature whose intermingling histories are here described. At the same time the authors are in quest of a varied and many-sided presentation of the nature and writing of literature. Accordingly the insights of philosophers and literary men are stressed more than the consistency of their opinions; understanding is valued more highly than the certainty of systems. In (...) this way classical texts are placed in an interesting new light and lesser known episodes of this history are brought to life.--R. G. S. (shrink)

A copiously documented, scholarly, and detailed history of the elaboration of the concept of the inalienability of sovereignty and the uses to which it was put in the late Middle Ages, when national monarchies were first emerging.--R. G. S.

The author attempts a classification of types of orders in the universe. This is followed by characterizations of the types of order possessed by various modes of being.--R. G. S.

Thevenaz both follows and opposes Husserl. Like Husserl, he takes the Cartesian cogito as his starting point, but he substitutes greater emphasis on the subjective for Husserl's transcendentalism. He rejects the intentional analysis not as too subjectivistic but as too objectivistic. At the time of his premature death in 1955 his magnum opus on Protestant philosophy was not completed. The present memorial volumes, collect some of his published articles. The second volume has a complete bibliography. --R. G. S.

This is the second volume in the Library of Living Philosophers which has appeared in German; it follows the familiar pattern of the other volumes in this series. The long autobiographical sketch sets the scene for a philosophy asserting that it deals with a reality which, ultimately, cannot be known unequivocally but must be realized in the philosopher's existence and which, accordingly, always presents reality in a definite historical perspective. The articles are introduced by an illuminating explanation of some of (...) the key terms in Jasper's work. Some of these are discussed in critical detail in the next six articles. Four further pieces place Jaspers in his historical situation, although not with that detail and completeness which Jaspers' historicism would seem to demand. These papers deal with Jaspers' relation to Max Weber, Judaism, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. A final, rather extensive section explores the relations between Jaspers' central position and such peripheral philosophical doctrines as political philosophy, aesthetics, criticism, the philosophies of history and religion. This volume is particularly successful in mirroring the philosophy which it tries to clarify and celebrate, for it brings to light select aspects of a philosophy which maintains that reality can only be illuminated in part, but can never be known as a whole. Appropriate to the philosophy which tends to identify the philosopher's knowing with his being, Jaspers' final reply to his critics not only makes his ideas clearer but reveals a person of impressive human stature.--R. G. S. (shrink)

Glum defends two theses: that Rousseau's political philosophy can be understood only against a religious background, and that Rousseau can supply the West with the democratic theory of the state which it is now lacking. To support the latter claim, he attempts a detailed refutation of those commentators who regard Rousseau as the father of totalitarian regimes and doctrines.--R. G. S.

The second half of this book is devoted to classic texts of Marxism, the first to a remarkably concise statement of the theories of Marx and Engels as well as of the major figures in the various Marxist movements. Mr. Hook's Introduction is rich in content, and critical without being unfair. Far superior to most introductory works on Marxism. --R. G. S.