The main purpose of this paper is to bring out some significant humanistic characteristics of Chinese religious thought. My account is limited to what is originally and typically Chinese. That is to say, it will exclude what has been influenced by Buddhism from India or Christianity from the Western world. Some of the theses of this paper are based on scholarly works, while others are drawn from the author's primary experience.
The phenomenon of attention fascinated the psychologist and philosopher William James and human experience is unimaginable without it. Yet until recently it has languished in the backwaters of philosophy. Recent years, however, have witnessed a resurgence of interest in attention, driven by recognition that it is closely connected to consciousness, perception, agency and many other problems in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. This is the first book to introduce and assess attention from a philosophical perspective. Wayne Wu discusses the (...) following central topics and problems: • a brief history of theories of attention, including the work of William James and founders of experimental psychology such as Wilhelm Wundt • empirical studies of attention - such as the Spotlight Model, Feature Integration Theory and the Biased Competition model of attention - and whether they answer philosophical questions about attention • philosophical accounts of attention, particularly the ‚cognitive unison‘ account and the relationship between attention and consciousness • is attention necessary for perceptual consciousness? Can attention ever be unconscious? • is attention needed for knowledge of the external world? What role does attention play in introspection and self-knowledge? • what role does attention play in bodily action? Can there be 'joint attention' and is this necessary for cooperative behaviour? A central feature of the book is its skilful analysis of empirical work on attention and how this relates to philosophy. Additional features, including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary makes this an ideal starting point for anyone studying the philosophy of attention for the first time as well as more advanced students and researchers, in psychology and cognitive science as well as philosophy. (shrink)
Say that a d.c.e. degree d is isolated by a c.e. degree b, if bMathematics Subject Classification (2000): 03D25, 03D30, 03D35 RID=""ID="" Key words or phrases: Computably enumerable (...) set – d.c.e. degree – Isolation – High/low hierarchy RID=""ID="" Ishmukhametov's research is supported by RFBR grant 01-01-00733, and Wu's research is supported by the Marsden Fund of New Zealand. Wu would like to thank his supervisor, Prof. Rod Downey, for his many helpful suggestions and comments. (shrink)
Lachlan observed that any nonzero d.c.e. degree bounds a nonzero c.e. degree. In this paper, we study the c.e. predecessors of d.c.e. degrees, and prove that given a nonzero d.c.e. degree , there is a c.e. degree below and a high d.c.e. degree such that bounds all the c.e. degrees below . This result gives a unified approach to some seemingly unrelated results. In particular, it has the following two known theorems as corollaries: there is a low c.e. degree isolating (...) a high d.c.e. degree [S. Ishmukhametov, G. Wu, Isolation and the high/low hierarchy, Arch. Math. Logic 41 259–266]; there is a high d.c.e. degree bounding no minimal pairs [C.T. Chong, A. Li, Y. Yang, The existence of high nonbounding degrees in the difference hierarchy, Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 138 31–51]. (shrink)
Erratum to: Found Sci DOI 10.1007/s10699-014-9364-0The author, Kun Wu’s name, affiliation and biography have been incorrectly published in the original article. The correct affiliation and biography are provided below.
ABSTRACT We show that there is a polynomial over the rational number field corresponding to each propositional formula in a given many-valued logic. To decide whether a propositional formula can be deduced from a finite set of such formulas (deduction problem), we only need to decide whether a polynomial vanishes on an algebraic variety. By using Wu's method, an algorithm for this problem is presented.
Cholak, Groszek and Slaman proved in J Symb Log 66:881–901, 2001 that there is a nonzero computably enumerable (c.e.) degree cupping every low c.e. degree to a low c.e. degree. In the same paper, they pointed out that every nonzero c.e. degree can cup a low2 c.e. degree to a nonlow2 degree. In Jockusch et al. (Trans Am Math Soc 356:2557–2568, 2004) improved the latter result by showing that every nonzero c.e. degree c is cuppable to a high c.e. degree (...) by a low2 c.e. degree b. It is natural to ask in which subclass of low2 c.e. degrees can b in Jockusch et al. (Trans Am Math Soc 356:2557–2568, 2004) be located. Wu proved in Math Log Quart 50:189–201, 2004 that b can be cappable. We prove in this paper that b in Jockusch, Li and Yang’s result can be noncuppable, improving both Jockusch, Li and Yang, and Wu’s results. (shrink)
Cooper proved in [S.B. Cooper, Strong minimal covers for recursively enumerable degrees, Math. Logic Quart. 42 191–196] the existence of a c.e. degree with a strong minimal cover . So is the greastest c.e. degree below . Cooper and Yi pointed out in [S.B. Cooper, X. Yi, Isolated d.r.e. degrees, University of Leeds, Dept. of Pure Math., 1995. Preprint] that this strongly minimal cover cannot be d.c.e., and meanwhile, they proposed the notion of isolated degrees: a d.c.e. degree is isolated (...) by a c.e. degree if is the greatest c.e. degree below , and we also say that isolates . In [G. Wu, Bi-isolation in the d.c.e. degrees, J. Symbolic Logic 69 409–420], Wu extended Cooper–Yi’s notion and proved that there are intervals of d.c.e. degrees containing exactly one c.e. degree . Following Cooper and Yi’s notion, is called a bi-isolating degree. The bi-isolating degrees are dense in the high c.e. degrees. Arslanov asked whether the bi-isolating degrees occur in every jump class. In this paper, we prove that there are low bi-isolating degrees, providing a partial solution to Arslanov’s question. (shrink)
Is vision informationally encapsulated from cognition or is it cognitively penetrated? I shall argue that intentions penetrate vision in the experience of visual spatial constancy: the world appears to be spatially stable despite our frequent eye movements. I explicate the nature of this experience and critically examine and extend current neurobiological accounts of spatial constancy, emphasizing the central role of motor signals in computing such constancy. I then provide a stringent condition for failure of informational encapsulation that emphasizes a computational (...) condition for cognitive penetration: cognition must serve as an informational resource for visual computation. This requires proposals regarding semantic information transfer, a crucial issue in any model of informational encapsulation. I then argue that intention provides an informational resource for computation of visual spatial constancy. Hence, intention penetrates vision. (shrink)
Milner and Goodale's influential account of the primate cortical visual streams involves a division of consciousness between them, for it is the ventral stream that has the responsibility for visual consciousness. Hence, the dorsal visual stream is a ‘zombie’ stream. In this article, I argue that certain information carried by the dorsal stream likely plays a central role in the egocentric spatial content of experience, especially the experience of visual spatial constancy. Thus, the dorsal stream contributes to a pervasive feature (...) of consciousness. (shrink)
I argue that when perception plays a guiding role in intentional bodily action, it is a necessary part of that action. The argument begins with a challenge that necessarily arises for embodied agents, what I call the Many-Many Problem. The Problem is named after its most common case where agents face too many perceptual inputs and too many possible behavioral outputs. Action requires a solution to the Many-Many Problem by selection of a specific linkage between input and output. In bodily (...) action the agent perceptually selects, and in this way perceptually attends to, relevant information so as to guide the execution of specific movements. Since perceptual attention is a necessary part of solving the Many-Many Problem, it is a necessary part of bodily action. Indeed, the process of implementing a solution to the Many-Many Problem, as constrained by the agent's motivational state, just is the agent's performing an intentional bodily action in the relevant way. (shrink)
In response to Mole 2009, I present an argument for zombie action. The crucial question is not whether but rather to what extent we are zombie agents. I argue that current evidence supports only minimal zombie agency.
Do self-monitoring accounts, a dominant account of the positive symptoms, explain auditory verbal hallucination (AVH)? In this essay, I argue that the account fails to answer many crucial questions any explanation of AVH must address. Where the account provides a plausible answer, I make a case for an alternative explanation: AVH is not the result of a failed control mechanism, namely failed self-monitoring, but the persistent automaticity of auditory experience of a voice. The argument emphasizes the importance of careful examination (...) of phenomenology as a constraint on causal models of the positive symptoms in schizophrenia. (shrink)
In this paper, I argue that visual attention is cognitively penetrated by intention. I present a detailed account of attention and its neural basis, drawing on a recent computational model of neural modulation during attention: divisive normalization. I argue that intention shifts computations during divisive normalization. The epistemic consequences of attentional bias are discussed.
Perceptual attention is essential to both thought and agency, for there is arguably no demonstrative thought or bodily action without it. Psychologists and philosophers since William James have taken attention to be a ubiquitous and distinctive form of consciousness, one that leaves a characteristic mark on perceptual experience. As a process of selecting specific perceptual inputs, attention influences the way things perceptually appear. It may then seem that it is a specific feature of perceptual representation that constitutes what it is (...) like to consciously attend to an object. In fact conscious attention is more complicated. In what follows, I argue that the phenomenology of conscious attention to what is perceived involves not just a way of perceptually locking on to a specific object. It necessarily involves a way of cognitively locking on to it as well. (shrink)
Attention has been studied in cognitive psychology for more than half a century, but until recently it was largely neglected in philosophy. Now, however, attention has been recognized by philosophers of mind as having an important role to play in our theories of consciousness and of cognition. At the same time, several recent developments in psychology have led psychologists to foundational questions about the nature of attention and its implementation in the brain. As a result there has been a convergence (...) of interest in fundamental questions about attention. This volume presents the latest thinking from the philosophers and psychologists who are working at the interface between these two disciplines. Its fourteen chapters contain detailed philosophical and scientific arguments about the nature and mechanisms of attention; the relationship between attention and consciousness; the role of attention in explaining reference, rational thought, and the control of action; the fundamental metaphysical status of attention, and the details of its implementation in the brain. These contributions combine ideas from phenomenology, neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of mind to further our understanding of this centrally important mental phenomenon, and to bring to light the foundational questions that any satisfactory theory of attention will need to address. (from OUP website). (shrink)
This paper considers the connection between automaticity, control and agency. Indeed, recent philosophical and psychological works play up the incompatibility of automaticity and agency. Specifically, there is a threat of automaticity, for automaticity eliminates agency. Such conclusions stem from a tension between two thoughts: that automaticity pervades agency and yet automaticity rules out control. I provide an analysis of the notions of automaticity and control that maintains a simple connection: automaticity entails the absence of control. An appropriate analysis, however, shows (...) that actions are forms of control and pervasively automatic even if automaticity implies the absence of control. Consequences are drawn for the theory of mental agency and the psychological concepts of automaticity and control. (shrink)
Regulatory focus theory is proposed as offering an explanation for the influence of ethical leadership on organizational citizenship behaviors and employee commitments. The prevention focus mindset of an employee is argued to be the mechanism by which an ethical leader influences extra-role compliance behavior as well as normative commitment, whereas the promotion focus mindset of an employee is argued to be the mechanism by which an ethical leader influences extra-role voice behavior as well as affective commitment. Moreover, leader-member exchange is (...) proposed as a moderator of the relationship of ethical leadership to regulatory focus mindsets and employee behavior and commitments. Using the data collected in two waves from 250 working adults, we tested the proposed relationships with moderated mediation bootstrap procedures. The findings generally support the hypothesized relationships and point toward important implications for ethical leadership in work settings. (shrink)
We examine enforcement action in China’s emerging markets by focusing on the agents that impose this action and the role played by supervisory boards. Using newly available databases, we find that supervisory boards play an active role when Chinese listed companies face enforcement action. Listed firms with larger supervisory boards are more likely to have more severe sanctions imposed upon them by the China Security Regulatory Commission, and listed companies that face more severe enforcement actions have more supervisory board meetings. (...) Our findings are of interest, as supervisory boards in China are generally perceived to be dysfunctional. This study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, we shed light on the effects of supervisory boards whose role in a fraud setting has not yet been examined. Second, the study has important policy implications for governance reform. Finally, our analyses provide the most up-to-date picture of fraud and governance issues in China’s ever-growing markets. (shrink)
Recent work on the mechanisms underlying auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) has been heavily informed by self-monitoring accounts that postulate defects in an internal monitoring mechanism as the basis of AVH. A more neglected alternative is an account focusing on defects in auditory processing, namely a spontaneous activation account of auditory activity underlying AVH. Science is often aided by putting theories in competition. Accordingly, a discussion that systematically contrasts the two models of AVH can generate sharper questions that will lead to (...) new avenues of investigation. In this paper, we provide such a theoretical discussion of the two models, drawing strong contrasts between them. We identify a set of challenges for the self-monitoring account and argue that the spontaneous activation account has much in favor of it and should be the default account. Our theoretical overview leads to new questions and issues regarding the explanation of AVH as a subjective phenomenon and its neural basis. Accordingly, we suggest a set of experimental strategies to dissect the underlying mechanisms of AVH in light of the two competing models. (shrink)
In his rich and provocative paper, Peter Carruthers announces two related theses: (a) a positive thesis that “central cognition is sensory based, depending on the activation and deployment of sensory images of various sorts” (Carruthers 2013) and (b) a negative thesis that the “central mind does not contain any workspace within which goals, decisions, intentions, or non-sensory judgments can be active” (Carruthers 2013). These are striking claims suggesting that a natural view about cognition, namely that explicit theoretical reasoning involves direct (...) operations over beliefs, is wrong. Our beliefs, on this natural view, interact with each other to yield new beliefs. If Carruthers is right, beliefs have only an indirect or mediated influence in cognition with sensory states playing the direct role. I think it an important feature of Carruthers’ discussion that he draws support from work on the neural circuits and mechanisms that subserve these processes. In what follows, I want to regis. (shrink)