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Gösta Grönroos
Stockholm University
  1.  98
    Wish, Motivation and the Human Good in Aristotle.Gösta Grönroos - 2015 - Phronesis 60 (1):60-87.
    _ Source: _Volume 60, Issue 1, pp 60 - 87 Aristotle invokes a specifically human desire, namely wish, to provide a teleological explanation of the pursuit of the specifically human good in terms of virtuous activity. Wish is a basic, unreasoned desire which, independently of other desires, or evaluative attitudes, motivates the pursuit of the human good. Even a person who pursues what she mistakenly believes to be good is motivated by wish for what in fact is good, although she (...)
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  2. Why Is Aristotle’s Vicious Person Miserable?Gösta Grönroos - 2015 - In Øyvind Rabbås, Eyjolfur Kjálar Emilsson, Hallvard Fossheim & Miira Fossheim (eds.), The quest for the good life: Ancient philosophers on happiness. Oxford: OUP. pp. 146–163.
    The question raised in this chapter is why Aristotle portrays the bad person as being in a miserable state. It is argued that the bad person suffers from a mental conflict, which consists of a clash between two different kinds of desire, and that fulfilling one of the desires violates values that she also desires. But in contrast to the akratic person, the bad person has no proper conception of the good. Nevertheless, although the bad person may succeed in achieving (...)
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  3.  50
    Listening to Reason in Aristotle's Moral Psychology.Gösta Grönroos - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 32:251-271.
  4.  48
    Two Kinds of Belief in Plato.Gösta Grönroos - 2013 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (1):1-19.
    In thesophist (263e10–264b4), Plato distinguishes between two kinds of belief. On the one hand, there is a kind of belief that occurs “according to thinking” (κατὰ διάνοιαν), being “the completion of thinking” (διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις). This kind is called ‘doxa.’ On the other hand, there is another kind of belief that occurs “through sense perception” (δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως). This kind is called ‘phantasia,’ perhaps best rendered as “appearing.”1 The purpose of this paper is to uncover the distinction between these two different kinds (...)
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    Review of Paula Gottlieb, The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics[REVIEW]Gösta Grönroos - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (9).
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  6.  10
    Paula Gottlieb: The Virtue of Aristotle's Etics.Gösta Grönroos - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 9 (37):1-6.
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