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G. C. Goddu
University of Richmond
  1. Time Travel and Changing the Past: (Or How to Kill Yourself and Live to Tell the Tale).G. C. Goddu - 2003 - Ratio 16 (1):16–32.
    According to the prevailing sentiment, changing the past is logically impossible. The prevailing sentiment is wrong. In this paper, I argue that the claim that changing the past entails a contradiction ultimately rests upon an empirical assumption, and so the conclusion that changing the past is logically impossible is to be resisted. I then present and discuss a model of time which drops the empirical assumption and coherently models changing the past. Finally, I defend the model, and changing the past, (...)
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  2. Avoiding or Changing the Past.G. C. Goddu - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):11-17.
    Some philosophers argue that any attempt to model changing the past will either be contradictory or really model avoiding the past. Using Nicholas Smith's (1997) argument as a basis, I formulate a generic version of this Avoidance Argument. I argue that the Avoidance Argument fails because (i) it involves an equivocation of what is meant by ‘bifurcation of the time of an event’ and (ii) resolving the equivocation results in the falsity of at least one of the premises. Hence, the (...)
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  3.  17
    Arguments as Abstract Objects.Paul Simard Smith, Andrei Moldovan & G. C. Goddu - unknown
    In recent discussions concerning the definition of argument, it has been maintained that the word ‘argument’ exhibits the process-product ambiguity, or an act/object ambi-guity. Drawing on literature on lexical ambiguity we argue that ‘argument’ is not ambiguous. The term ‘argument’ refers to an object, not to a speech act. We also examine some of the important implications of our argument by considering the question: what sort of abstract objects are arguments?
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  4.  99
    What Exactly is Logical Pluralism?G. C. Goddu - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):218 – 230.
  5.  24
    What is a “Real” Argument?G. C. Goddu - 2009 - Informal Logic 29 (1):1-14.
    Numerous informal logi- cians and argumentation theorists restrict their theorizing to what they call “real” arguments. But is there a clear distinction to be made between “real” and “non-real” arguments? Here I explore four possible accounts of the alleged distinction and argue that none can serve the theoretical uses to which the distinction is most often put. Résumé: Plusieurs logiciens construction formels et théoriciens de l’argument- ation limitent leur non de théories à ce qu’ils appellent des arguments « authentiques ». (...)
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  6.  10
    Refining Hitchcock’s Definition of ‘Argument’.G. C. Goddu - unknown
    David Hitchcock, in his recent “Informal Logic and the Concept of Argument”, defends a recursive definition of ‘argument.’ I present and discuss several problems that arise for his definition. I argue that refining Hitchcock’s definition in order to resolve these problems reveals a crucial, but minimally explicated, relation that was, at best, playing an obscured role in the original definition or, at worst, completely absent from the original definition.
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  7.  34
    Walton on Argument Structure.G. C. Goddu - 2007 - Informal Logic 27 (1):5-26.
    In previous work I argued against (i) the likelihood of finding a theoretically sound foundation for the linked/convergent distinction and (ii) the utility of the distinction even if a sound theoretical basis could be found. Here I subject Douglas Walton’s comprehensive discussion of the linked/convergent distinction found in Argument Structure: A Pragmatic Theory to careful scrutiny and argue that at best Walton’s theory remains incomplete and that attempts to fill out the details will run afoul of at least one of (...)
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  8.  21
    Time Travel and Changing the Past.G. C. Goddu - 2003 - Ratio 16 (1):16-32.
    According to the prevailing sentiment, changing the past is logically impossible. The prevailing sentiment is wrong. In this paper, I argue that the claim that changing the past entails a contradiction ultimately rests upon an empirical assumption, and so the conclusion that changing the past is logically impossible is to be resisted. I then present and discuss a model of time which drops the empirical assumption and coherently models changing the past. Finally, I defend the model, and changing the past, (...)
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  9.  35
    The 'Most Important and Fundamental' Distinction in Logic.G. C. Goddu - 2002 - Informal Logic 22 (1).
    In this paper I argue that the debate over the purported distinction between deductive and inductive arguments can be bypassed because making the distinction is unnecessary for successfully evaluating arguments. I provide a foundation for doing logic that makes no appeal to the distinction and still performs all the relevant tasks required of an analysis of arguments. I also reply to objections to the view that we can dispense with the distinction. Finally, I conclude that the distinction between inductive and (...)
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  10.  21
    Woods and Gabbay's The Reach of Abduction: Insight and Trial.G. C. Goddu - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (3).
  11.  7
    Against the "Ordinary Summing" Test for Convergence.G. C. Goddu - 2003 - Informal Logic 23 (3):215-236.
    One popular test for distinguishing linked and convergent argument structures is Robert Yanal's Ordinary Summing Test. Douglas Walton, in his comprehensive survey of possible candidates for the linked/convergent distinction, advocates a particular version of Yanal's test. In a recent article, Alexander Tyaglo proposes to generalize and verifY Yanal's algorithm for convergent arguments, the basis for Yanal's Ordinary Summing Test. In this paper I will argue that Yanal's ordinary summing equation does not demarcate convergence and so his Ordinary Summing Test fails. (...)
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  12. Banana Peels and Time Travel.G. C. Goddu - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (4):559–572.
    A world in which time travel into the past occurred would seem like a most strange world. Nicholas Smith, however, in his ‘Bananas Enough for Time Travel’, argues that time travel is not so strange as we think. In particular, he argues against what he views as the main reason time travel worlds seem so strange – the claim that time travel entails unusual numbers of coincidences. I shall argue that Smith's argument for rejecting the claim is inadequate. Hence, the (...)
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  13.  22
    Cogency and the Validation of Induction.G. C. Goddu - 2004 - Argumentation 18 (1):25-41.
    I.T. Oakley claims that the cogency of invalid, but cogent, arguments is context independent. Robert Pargetter and John Bigelow claim that the apparent cogency of any cogent, but invalid, argument is to be explained by the existence of a corresponding valid argument. I argue that both claims are incorrect and provide my own account of the cogency of arguments.
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  14.  33
    Why We Still Do Not Know What a “Real” Argument Is.G. C. Goddu - 2014 - Informal Logic 34 (1):62-76.
    In his recent paper, “What a Real Argument is”, Ben Hamby attempts to provide an adequate theoretical account of “real” arguments. In this paper I present and evaluate both Hamby’s motivation for distinguishing “real” from non-“real” arguments and his articulation of the distinction. I argue that neither is adequate to ground a theoretically significant class of “real” arguments, for the articulation fails to pick out a stable proper subclass of all arguments that is simultaneously both theoretically relevant and a proper (...)
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  15.  35
    Exemplification and Argument.G. C. Goddu - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):235-254.
    Suppose you doubt that rationally persuasive arguments can have just premises that are obviously false. But now consider:(X) Grass is red. Some arguments have merely obviously false premises.'Grass is red' is the only premise and is obviously false, so (X) should convince you that there are arguments with merely obviously false premises. On the face of it, there is nothing irrational about being so convinced by (X). But then (X) is a rationally persuasive argument with merely obviously false premises.A cheap (...)
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  16.  73
    More on Blameworthiness and Alternative Possibilities.G. C. Goddu - 2006 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1):69-75.
    The derivation of the generally held Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), roughly ‘you are morally responsible only if you could do otherwise’, from an even more generally held moral principle, K (for Kant), that roughly speaking ‘ought implies can’, has recently been the focus of significant debate. In this paper I shall argue that by focusing on PAP interpreted in terms of commissions alone an alternative derivation of PAP interpreted in terms of omissions is being overlooked. The advantage of the (...)
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  17.  12
    Banana Peels and Time Travel.G. C. Goddu - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (4):559-572.
    A world in which time travel into the past occurred would seem like a most strange world. Nicholas Smith, however, in his ‘Bananas Enough for Time Travel’, argues that time travel is not so strange as we think. In particular, he argues against what he views as the main reason time travel worlds seem so strange – the claim that time travel entails unusual numbers of coincidences. I shall argue that Smith's argument for rejecting the claim is inadequate. Hence, the (...)
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  18.  36
    A Useful Time Machine.G. C. Goddu - 2002 - Philosophy 77 (2):281-282.
    Robert Casati and Achille C. Varzi, argue that time machines would be useless or have no practical applications on the grounds that travelling to the past would involve doing what has already been done. I argue that the sense in which travelling to the past involves doing what has already been done fails to support the claim that time machines would have no practical applications.
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  19.  9
    Commentary on Yanal.G. C. Goddu - unknown
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  20.  12
    Reasonable Doubt: A Note on €˜Neutral’ Illatives and Arguments. [REVIEW]G. C. Goddu - 1999 - Argumentation 13 (3):243-250.
    George Bowles and Thomas Gilbert claim that illatives such as ‘so’, ‘therefore’, and ‘hence’ convey the meaning that the premise confers upon the conclusion a probability greater than 1/2. This claim is false, for there are straightforward uses of these illatives that do not convey the meaning that the probability is greater than 1/2. In addition, because Bowles' and Gilbert's claim is false, a revision of their definition of argument is required.
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  21.  6
    Changing, Annulling and Otherwising the Past.G. C. Goddu - 2021 - Philosophies 6 (71):71.
    Despite a growing number of models argument for the logical possibility of changing the past there continues to be resistance to and confusion surrounding the possibility of changing the past. In this paper I shall attempt to mitigate the resistance and alleviate at least some of the confusion by distinguishing changing the past from what Richard Hanley calls ‘annulling’ the past and distinguishing both from what I shall call ‘otherwising’ the past.
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  22. Commentary on Hunter.G. C. Goddu - unknown
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  23. Commentary on Krabbe.G. C. Goddu - unknown
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  24.  10
    Commentary On: Steven W. Patterson's "Are Arguments Abstract Objects?".G. C. Goddu - unknown
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  25.  16
    Critical Thinking by Alec Fisher.G. C. Goddu - 2002 - Informal Logic 22 (2).
  26.  15
    Epistemic Contextualism and the Context of an Argument.G. C. Goddu - unknown
    Contextualists with regard to knowledge argue that the truth of the claim 'x knows that P' is contextually dependent. In doing so, they attempt to articulate the nature of the contextual dependence. Since part of making knowledge claims involves the adequate justification of beliefs, I shall explore whether any epistemic contextualist theories can be modified or adapted to provide an account of the context-dependence of justificatory strength for arguments. I shall conclude that the prospects are not promising.
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  27.  11
    How Many Premises Can an Argument Have?G. C. Goddu - unknown
    Is it possible for an argument to have either zero premises or an infinite number of premises? I shall argue that regardless of how you conceive of arguments you should accept that an argument could have an infinite number of premises. The zero case is more complicated since the matter seems to depend not only on the metaphysics of arguments, but also the nature and function of arguing. I shall argue that at least a plausible case can be made for (...)
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  28.  68
    Is Anomalous Monism Inconsistent After All?G. C. Goddu - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (3-4):509-519.
  29.  4
    Logic, Truth and Inquiry.G. C. Goddu - 2013 - Informal Logic 33 (3):462-469.
    by Mark Weinstein King’s College London, UK: College Publications, 2013. Pp. viii, 1-232. Softcover. ISBN-13: 978-1-84890-100-1, ISBN-10: 1848901003. US$ 17.00.
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  30.  1
    Mark Vorobej - A Theory of Argument.G. C. Goddu - 2007 - Informal Logic 27 (3):292-298.
  31.  2
    The Context of an Argument.G. C. Goddu - unknown
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  32.  33
    The Nature of Time By Ulrich Meyer.G. C. Goddu - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):167-169.
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