This article considers an asymmetric contest with incomplete information. There are two types of players: informed and uninformed. Each player has a different ability to translate effort into performance in terms of the contest success function. While one player’s type is known to both players, the other is private information and known only to the player himself. We compare the Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome of a one-sided private information contest to the Nash equilibrium with no private information, in which both (...) players know the type of the other player. We show conditions under which uncertainty increases the investment of the uninformed player and the rent dissipation of the contest, while decreasing the expected net payoff of the informed player. In addition, we consider conditions under which the informed player—before knowing his own type—prefers that the uninformed player knows his type. Moreover, we show conditions for the existence/non-existence of equilibrium in a two-stage contest in which the informed player declares his type (or does not declare) in the first stage and in the second stage the two players play according to the information available to them. (shrink)

This paper presents a monotonic system of Post algebras of order +* whose chain of Post constans is isomorphic with 012 ... -3-2-1. Besides monotonic operations, other unary operations are considered; namely, disjoint operations, the quasi-complement, succesor, and predecessor operations. The successor and predecessor operations are basic for number theory.

Government intervention often gives rise to contests and the government can influence their outcome by choosing their type. We consider a contest with two interest groups: one that is governed by a central planner and one that is not. Rent dissipation is compared under two well-known contest success functions: the generalized logit and the all-pay auction. We also consider the case in which the government can limit the size of the non-governed interest group in order to determine the scope of (...) rent dissipation, with the goal of either increasing the rent obtained by the government or reducing the wasted resources invested in the contest. (shrink)

This is a collection of invited papers from the 1975 International Sym posium on Multiple-valued Logic. Also included is an extensive bib liography of works in the field of multiple-valued logic prior to 1975 - this supplements and extends an earlier bibliography of works prior to 1965, by Nicholas Rescher in his book Many-Valued Logic, McGraw-Hill, 1969. There are a number of possible reasons for interest in the present volume. First, the range of various uses covered in this collection of (...) papers may be taken as indicative of a breadth which occurs in the field of multiple-valued logic as a whole - the papers here can do no more than cover a small sample: question-answering systems, analysis of computer hazards, algebraic structures relating to multiple-valued logic, algebra of computer programs, fuzzy sets. Second, a large part of the interest in such uses and applications has occurred in the last twenty, even ten years. It would be too much to expect this to be reflected in Rescher's 1969 book. Third, in the 1970's a series of annual symposia have been held on multiple-valued logic, which have brought much of this into a sharp focus. * The 1971 and 1972 symposia were held at the SUNY at Buffalo, the 1973 symposium at the Uni versity of Toronto, and the 1974 symposium at West Virginia Uni versity. Papers from these symposia are included in the bibliography which may be found in an appendix of this book. (shrink)

In a recent issue of this Bulletin, S. Meskhi cites 7 additional conditions for Heyting algebras with involution and linearly ordered matrix [10, p. 11]. In [2], R. Cignoli indicates 3 additional conditions for P-algebras [5] with normal involution [9]. The equivalence of these conditions is shown.