Listening to someone from some distance in a crowded room you may experience the following phenomenon: when looking at them speak, you may both hear and see where the source of the sounds is; but when your eyes are turned elsewhere, you may no longer be able to detect exactly where the voice must be coming from. With your eyes again fixed on the speaker, and the movement of her lips a clear sense of the source of the sound will (...) return. This ‘ventriloquist’ effect reflects the ways in which visual cognition can dominate auditory perception. And this phenomenological observation is one what you can verify or disconfirm in your own case just by the slightest reflection on what it is like for you to listen to someone with or without visual contact with them. (shrink)
A long-standing theme in discussion of perception and thought has been that our primary cognitive contact with individual objects and events in the world derives from our perceptual contact with them. When I look at a duck in front of me, I am not merely presented with the fact that there is at least one duck in the area, rather I seem to be presented with this thing in front of me, which looks to me to be a duck. Furthermore, (...) such a perception would seem to put me in a position not merely to make the existential judgment that there is some duck or other present, but rather to make a singular, demonstrative judgment, that that is a duck. My grounds for an existential judgment in this case derives from my apprehension of the demonstrative thought and not vice versa. (shrink)
G. F. Stout is famous as an early twentieth century proselyte for abstract particulars, or tropes as they are now often called. He advanced his version of trope theory to avoid the excesses of nominalism on the one hand and realism on the other. But his arguments for tropes have been widely misconceived as metaphysical, e.g. by Armstrong. In this paper, I argue that Stout’s fundamental arguments for tropes were ideological and epistemological rather than metaphysical. He moulded his scheme to (...) fit what is actually given to us in perception, arguing that our epistemic practices would break down in an environment where only universals were given to us. (shrink)
: The object of G. F. Meier's Vernunftlehre and its abridgement for courses, the Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, does not consist exclusively in the elaboration of the formal aspects of logic, but rather in the individuation of the elements of thought and language, which make human understanding possible. Instead of limiting himself to formal truth, Meier investigates the realms of epistemic, aesthetic, and historic truths, of horizons, and prejudices. Kant used both Meier's Vernunftlehre and its Auszug for about forty years (...) in his logic-lectures. Kant's Logik, and also his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, were thus strongly influenced by Meier. (shrink)
Thora Ilin Bayer - G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 1825-26. Volume II: Greek Philosophy - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.4 664-665 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Thora Ilin Bayer Xavier University of Louisiana Robert F. Brown, editor and translator. G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 1825–26. Volume II: Greek Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Pp. xiv + 375. Cloth, $160.00. (...) Hegel delivered his lectures on the history of philosophy nine times during his career, giving them for the first time in Winter 1805–06 in Jena prior to his publication of the Phenomenology of Spirit in 1807. He began to give them for a tenth time before his death in Berlin in 1831. Hegel.. (shrink)
This paper is an investigation of the general logic of "identifications", claims such as 'To be a vixen is to be a female fox', 'To be human is to be a rational animal', and 'To be just is to help one's friends and harm one's enemies', many of which are of great importance to philosophers. I advocate understanding such claims as expressing higher-order identity, and discuss a variety of different general laws which they might be thought to obey. [New version: (...) Nov. 4th, 2016]. (shrink)
Reviews : Gregor McLennan, Marxism and the Methodologies of History, , pp. 272. Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, , pp. 294. Raphael Samuel, ed., People's History and Socialist Theory. History Workshop Series, , pp. vi + 417. G. Osborne and W. F. Mandle, eds., New History Studying Australia Today, , pp. 216.
In this article, I explicate Martin Luther King, Jr.’s account of emancipatory history and activism by examining the influence of G. W. F. Hegel’s account of world-historical individuals on his thought. Both thinkers, I argue, affirm that history’s spiritual destiny works through individuals who are driven by the contingencies of their subjective character and given situation to undertake particular actions, and yet who nevertheless freely and decisively break the new from the old by forsaking subjective satisfaction to spur events forward (...) to a more rational state of affairs. This synthetic unity of abstract freedom and concrete embodiment reflects the ‘civil war’ between the universal and infinite essence, and particular and finite passions, that King and Hegel identify as equally constitutive of human will. Through an examination of King’s account of Rosa Parks’ pivotal arrest, I develop the consequences of this ‘Hegelian’ view for our understanding of political action and historical progress. (shrink)
"Interpreting Hegel means taking a stand on all the philosophical, political and religious problems of our century." Merleau-Ponty G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), arguably the greatest philosopher of the nineteenth century, decisively influenced the direction of all subsequent European thought. He has been interpreted variously as a theist and an atheist, a conservative and a liberal, an essentialist and a proto-existentialist, a rationalist and an irrationalist. In all the areas he covered, Hegel sought a new form of understanding that had (...) eluded his predecessors but which he believed was necessary for mankind to once again find itself "at home in the world." This collection of works on Hegel reflects the many-sided nature of Hegel's reception from 1831 onwards, and offers critical studies on the full range of his work. The four volumes incorporate the classic readings of Hegel, from both the continental and analytic traditions, and also include the central twentieth-century readings influenced by developments in European thought which reappraise his work. These volumes offer a unique perspective on Hegel by revealing how our understanding of him is influenced by historical readings of his work. Each volume provides a clear and helpful introduction which sets the articles in their historic context and highlights the central philosophical issues they raise. (shrink)
Aristotelis Πολιτία 'Αθνναίων Ediderunt G. Kaibel et U. De Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. Berolini apud Weidmannos. Mk. 1.80.De Republica Atheniensium. Aristotelis qui fertur liber 'Αθνναίων Πολιτία. Post Kenyonem ediderunt H. Van Heeweeden et J. Van Leeuwen J. F. Lugduni Batavorum apud A. W. Sythoff. 6 Mk.Aristote, la République Athénienne, traduite en Français pour la première fois par Théodore Reinach. Fr. 1.50.
Aristotle on the Athenian Constitution, translated, with introduction and notes, by F. G. Kenyon. London. Bell. 4s. 6d. Aristotle on the Constitution of Athens, translated by E. Poste. London. Macmillan. 3s. 6d. Aristoteles Schriftvom Staatswesen der Athener, verdeutscht von Georg Kaibel und Adolf Kiessling. Strassburg. 2 Mk. Aristotele la Costituzione degli Ateniesi Testo Greco, versione Italiana, introduzione e note per cura di C. Ferrini. Milano.
Elias G. Carayannis and David F. J. Campbell, Mode 3 Knowledge Production in Quadruple Helix Innovation Systems: 21st-Century Democracy, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship for Development Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 139-142 DOI 10.1007/s11024-012-9194-6 Authors Barbara Prainsack, Department of Sociology and Communications, Brunel University, Kingston Lane, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, UK Journal Minerva Online ISSN 1573-1871 Print ISSN 0026-4695 Journal Volume Volume 50 Journal Issue Volume 50, Number 1.
Given the fact that both R.G. Collingwood and P.F. Strawson introduced, inspired by Kant, a 'reform of metaphysics' and thereby used a strikingly similar terminology, the absence of an extensive article about the comparison between their concepts of a 'reformed metaphysics' is, to say the least, rather surprising. The first aim of this article is filling up this gap. But there is more at stake. Traditionally, a twofold connection is laid between their concepts of metaphysics. First, there is the fact (...) that both authors consider metaphysics as a reflexion about the basic presuppositions of our thought and so subscribe to Kant's 'reform of metaphysics'. Subsequently, the central point of difference to be considered is that Strawson sets basic presuppositions as universal and invariable and so more directly leans against Kant than Collingwood who ascribes to these presuppositions a variable and cultural-historical character. In this article — and that is its central aim — I would like to make some critical remarks to this interpretation. First, I try to show how the resemblances between their concepts of metaphysics originate from their adoption of both Kants 'Copernican revolution' and his repudiation of transcendent metaphysics. Furthermore, I want to point out the differences between both their concepts of metaphysics, starting from their respective interpretations of Kant s transcendental idealism. While Strawson propounds an 'anodyne' interpretation of transcendental idealism, Collingwood proposes a 'radicalization' of transcendental idealism. Against the backdrop of these different interpretations, the contrast between the universal character of Strawson's metaphysics and the so-called historical-relativist character of Collingwood s metaphysics can be clarified. Finally, I will dwell on six repercussions of both their views of metaphysics. (shrink)
The thought of G. W. F. Hegel has had a deep and lasting influence on a wide range of philosophical, political, religious, aesthetic, cultural and scientific movements. But, despite the far-reaching importance of Hegel's thought, there is often a great deal of confusion about what he actually said or believed. G. W. F. Hegel: Key Concepts provides an accessible introduction to both Hegel's thought and Hegel-inspired philosophy in general, demonstrating how his concepts were understood, adopted and critically transformed by later (...) thinkers. The first section of the book covers the principal philosophical themes in Hegel's system: epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, ethical theory, political philosophy, philosophy of nature, philosophy of art, philosophy of religion, philosophy of history and theory of the history of philosophy. The second section covers the main post-Hegelian movements in philosophy: Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism, analytic philosophy, hermeneutics and French poststructuralism. The breadth and depth of G. W. F. Hegel: Key Concepts makes it an invaluable introduction for philosophical beginners and a useful reference source for more advanced scholars and researchers. (shrink)