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G. F. Schueler
University of Delaware
  1.  90
    Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action.G. F. Schueler - 1995 - MIT Press.
    Does action always arise out of desire? G. F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished - roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes - apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken. Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At (...)
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  2.  86
    Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action.G. F. Schueler - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation--our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact (...)
  3.  92
    Modus Ponens and Moral Realism.G. F. Schueler - 1988 - Ethics 98 (3):492-500.
  4.  51
    Why Modesty is a Virtue.G. F. Schueler - 1997 - Ethics 107 (3):467-485.
  5.  94
    Why "Oughts" Are Not Facts (or What the Tortoise and Achilles Taught Mrs. Ganderhoot and Me About Practical Reason).G. F. Schueler - 1995 - Mind 104 (416):713-723.
  6. 10. Nicholas Rescher, Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason Nicholas Rescher, Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason (Pp. 917-919). [REVIEW]Tamar Schapiro, A. John Simmons, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Sarah Buss, Julia Driver, G. F. Schueler, James Montmarquet, Mark van Roojen & Samantha Brennan - 1999 - Ethics 109 (4).
  7.  81
    Why IS Modesty a Virtue?G. F. Schueler - 1999 - Ethics 109 (4):835-841.
  8. Pro-Attitudes and Direction of Fit.G. F. Schueler - 1991 - Mind 100 (400):277-81.
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  9. Motivational Internalism and Externalism.G. F. Schueler - 2010 - In Timothy O. Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 293-300.
  10. The Humean Theory of Motivation Rejected.G. F. Schueler - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):103-122.
    In this paper I will argue that the latter group [of Non-Humeans] is correct. My argument focuses on practical deliberation and has two parts. I will discuss two different problems that arise for the Humean Theory and suggest that while taken individually each problem appears to have a solution, for each problem the solution Humeans offer precludes solving the other problem. I will suggest that to see these difficulties we must take seriously the thought that we can only understand an (...)
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  11. Action and Its Explanation.David-Hillel Ruben & G. F. Schueler - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):139-142.
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  12.  32
    Pro-Attitudes and Direction of Fit.G. F. Schueler - 1991 - Mind 100 (2):277 - 281.
  13. Interpretative Explanations.G. F. Schueler - 2009 - In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  14.  10
    The Humean Theory of Motivation Rejected.G. F. Schueler - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):103-122.
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  15.  50
    Alfred R. Mele, Motivation and Agency: Mele, Alfred R. Motivation and Agency. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. 264. $49.95 (Cloth).G. F. Schueler - 2004 - Ethics 115 (1):145-148.
  16. `X's Reason for Φ-Ing Was P'.G. F. Schueler - 1979 - Mind 88 (349):111-114.
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  17. Review: Brute Rationality. [REVIEW]G. F. Schueler - 2006 - Mind 115 (458):412-415.
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  18.  12
    Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science.G. F. Schueler - 1997 - Ethics 107 (2):349-351.
  19.  57
    Direction of Fit.G. F. Schueler - 2013 - In Huge LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell.
    The difference between cognitive and conative mental states, such as beliefs and desires, has sometimes been held to be that they have different “directions of fit” between the mind and the world – mind-to-world for beliefs and world-to-mind for desires (see Desire). Some philosophers have pursued the idea that if this thought can be given a plausible explanation it can be used to ground Hume's claim that “reason is the slave of the passions,” i.e., that no moral or other “practical” (...)
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  20. Why and How? Teleological and Causal Concepts in Action Explanation.G. F. Schueler - 2019 - In Gunnar Schumann (ed.), Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography. New York, NY, USA: pp. 59-77.
    This paper argues that both teleological and causal concepts are required for explanations of intentional actions. It argues against ‘causalism’, the idea that action explanations are essentially causal. This requires analyzing Mele’s Q-Signals-from-Mars argument that having a purpose and behaving so as to achieve it aren’t sufficient to explain an intentional action. Though Mele’s example shows that external causal interference can defeat the claim that an intentional action has been performed, this is consistent with teleological concepts being required (even if (...)
     
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  21.  38
    Doing Things for Reasons. [REVIEW]G. F. Schueler - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):495-497.
    The area of philosophy blandly labeled ‘practical reason’ is in reality something of a minefield of conflicting theories, problematic distinctions and difficult problems. There are Humean ‘desire-belief’ theories in conflict with Kantian views that deny the importance of desires. There are said to be important distinctions between internal and external reasons, and justifying and motivating reasons, as well as internalist and externalist accounts of reasons. And there are the problems of akrasia, and of the connection of rationality with freedom and (...)
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  22.  26
    In Praise of Desire, by Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder.G. F. Schueler - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):241-244.
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  23.  54
    Review of Three Faces of Desire by Timothy Schroeder. [REVIEW]G. F. Schueler - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):249-260.
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  24.  12
    How Can Reason Be Practical?G. F. Schueler - 1996 - Critica 28 (84):41-62.
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  25.  8
    Moral Scepticism.G. F. Schueler - 1977 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):117-128.
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  26.  34
    Harman on Moral Relativism.G. F. Schueler - 1978 - Journal of Critical Analysis 7 (3):99-103.
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  27. Exclusionary Reasons.G. F. Schueler - 1979 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 60 (4):407.
     
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  28.  32
    The Evaluation of Teaching in Philosophy.G. F. Schueler - 1988 - Teaching Philosophy 11 (4):345-348.
  29.  9
    Moral Scepticism.G. F. Schueler - 1977 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):117-128.
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  30.  15
    Some Reasoning About Preferences.G. F. Schueler - 1984 - Ethics 95 (1):78-80.
  31.  21
    Intentionality.G. F. Schueler - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
  32.  28
    Weakness of the Will.G. F. Schueler - 1992 - Ancient Philosophy 12 (2):502-504.
  33.  18
    Review of Joshua Gert: Normative Bedrock: Resopnse-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons.G. F. Schueler - 2013 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013 (05.24).
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  34.  24
    Is It Possible to Follow One's Conscience?G. F. Schueler - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):51 - 60.
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  35.  26
    Comments on Sergio Tenenbaum: Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason.G. F. Schueler - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (2):387.
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  36.  27
    Nagel on the Rationality of Prudence.G. F. Schueler - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 29 (1):69 - 73.
  37.  22
    Review of Sergio Tenenbaum (Ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good[REVIEW]G. F. Schueler - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (11).
  38.  20
    Consequences and Agent-Centered Restrictions.G. F. Schueler - 1989 - Metaphilosophy 20 (1):77–83.
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  39.  13
    Practical Reasoning: Goal-Driven, Knowledge-Based, Action-Guiding Argumentation.G. F. Schueler - 1991 - Review of Metaphysics 45 (1):155-156.
    "[I]t is the thesis of this book," the author says, "that practical reasoning is the type of reasoning characteristic of expert problem solving and expert reasoning generally". This idea is worked out by giving an account of practical reasoning and of the nature of actions, agents, and intentions, which is supposed to be based on the sort of artificial intelligence programs known as "expert systems." Throughout the book an attempt is made to use the reasoning, and sometimes the terminology, of (...)
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  40.  10
    The Notion of "Incitement".G. F. Schueler - 1974 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 7 (2):89 - 97.
    The main purpose of this paper is to answer the question of how it is that a person who incites another to do something can be held morally responsible for this second person's acts. Professor bruce franklin's dismissal from stanford university is taken as the main example and it is argued that though those incited act 'because' of what the incitor does, This 'because' is not explainable on the standard models of physical causation, Coercion or hypnosis. It is closer to (...)
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  41.  12
    Akrasia Revisited.G. F. Schueler - 1983 - Mind 92 (368):580-584.
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  42.  7
    How Not to Reply to a Moral Sceptic.G. F. Schueler - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):266 – 274.
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  43. Deliberation and Desire.G. F. Schueler - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 305-324.
    There is a tension between deliberation and desire when both are relevant to explaining the same action. A common way of understanding this situation, as contained in a standard version of the practical syllogism, is problematic. This paper attempts to resolve the tension by explaining what 'motivation by what one wants' comes to when deliberation is involved.
     
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  44. The Idea of a Reason for Acting.G. F. Schueler - 1989 - Mellen.