26 found
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  1.  70
    When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 2000 - MIT Press.
    An examination of verbal hallucinations and thought insertion as examples of "alienated self-consciousness.".
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  2.  20
    Philosophical Psychopathology.George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens - 1994 - MIT Press.
  3. When Selfconsciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):128-131.
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  4. Philosophical Psychopathology.George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):545-548.
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  5. Self-consciousness, mental agency, and the clinical psychopathology of thought insertion.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 1994 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (1):1-10.
  6.  61
    Are qualia a pain in the neck for functionalists?George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens - 1985 - American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1):73-80.
  7. Mind and mine.George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens - 1993 - In George Graham & G.L. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  8. Reconceiving delusions.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 2004 - International Review of Psychiatry 16:236-241.
     
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  9. The delusional stance.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 2007 - In Man Cheung Chung, K. W. M. Fulford & George Graham (eds.), Reconceiving Schizophrenia. Oxford University Press.
  10.  13
    When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts.Christian Perring, G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):623.
    Stephens and Grahamset themselves an apparently modest task, to understand why people who experience alien voices and inserted thoughts do not believe that they themselves are the source of these experiences. However, it soon becomes clear that there are many connected issues here. In eight short chapters, they address the phenomenology and ontology of consciousness, the phenomenology of alien voices, inserted thoughts, obsessive-compulsive thoughts and feelings, and other cases of unusual experience often associated with psychopathology, including brief discussion of multiple (...)
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  11.  51
    Minding your p's and q's: Pain and sensible qualities.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 1987 - Noûs 21 (3):395-405.
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  12.  33
    Thought insertion and subjectivity.G. Lynn Stephens - 2000 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):203-205.
  13.  22
    Philosophical psychopathology and self-consciousness.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 194--208.
  14.  7
    The Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce: A Critical Introduction.G. Lynn Stephens - 1983 - Noûs 17 (4):707-711.
  15.  16
    Commentary on "Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry".G. Lynn Stephens - 1996 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):97-98.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry”G. Lynn Stephens (bio)A necessary condition of our having free will is that we initiate some of our actions by our own will or decision. Spence argues that, in light of certain empirical findings, we can accept that willing causes action, only if we acknowledge that willing is a non-conscious phenomenon. “If the notion of free will is retained... it will (...)
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  16.  27
    Transparency and modality.Herbert Heidelberger & G. Lynn Stephens - 1978 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (4):549.
  17.  19
    Cognition and Emotion in Peirce's Theory of Mental Activity.G. Lynn Stephens - 1981 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 17 (2):131 - 140.
  18.  10
    Commentary on Kant, Thought Insertion, and Mental Unity.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 1994 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (2):115-116.
  19.  10
    Defining delusion.G. Lynn Stephens - 1999 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):25-25.
  20.  25
    Noumenal Qualia: C.S. Peirce on Our Epistemic Access to Feelings.G. Lynn Stephens - 1985 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 21 (1):95 - 108.
  21.  46
    Peirce on Psychological Self-Knowledge.G. Lynn Stephens - 1980 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 16 (3):212 - 224.
    Discusses the psychological self-knowledge of philosopher G. Lynn Stephens who contends that both the overarching assertion that humans have psychological stress at all and each specific ascription of a psychological state to oneself requires justification by inference. Objectivity of moral and aesthetic values and the analysis of modal discourse; Role of certain qualities of objects in interactions among objects; Irrefragable reasons requirement of each psychological self-ascription.
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  22.  3
    Philosophical Psychopathology and Self‐Consciousness.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 2017 - In Susan Schneider & Max Velmans (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Chichester, UK: Wiley. pp. 484–499.
    This chapter is about susceptibility to one type of division within our selves that can occur within self‐conscious experience and is present in certain mental disorders. This is the separation between experiencing oneself as subject and as agent. The chapter considers some disorders of self‐consciousness and examines the role that this particular division may play in those disorders. Companion to consciousness studies is not completed without attention to the philosophical psychopathology of self‐consciousness. The chapter also examines the case of verbal (...)
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  23.  26
    Ultimate differences.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):698-699.
    Gray unwisely melds together two distinguishable contributions of consciousness: one to epistemology, the other to evolution. He also renders consciousness needlessly invisible behaviorally.
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  24.  14
    Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology: Preliminary Studies for Part II of Philosophical Investigations. By Ludwig Wittgenstein. [REVIEW]G. Lynn Stephens - 1985 - Modern Schoolman 63 (1):81-82.
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  25.  6
    Review: Are Colors in the Head? [REVIEW]G. Lynn Stephens - 1991 - Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):83 - 85.
  26.  20
    The Metaphysics of G. E. Moore. By David O'Connor. [REVIEW]G. Lynn Stephens - 1984 - Modern Schoolman 61 (4):272-272.
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