This is a collection of lectures and papers, written during the past ten years. They are all concerned with the logical properties of the Absolute and to this extent are a denial of the author's 1948 argument designed to disprove the existence of an Absolute Being. The first three lectures on Absolute-theory are a systematic account of the notion of a unique, necessary Existent and the repercussions such a notion has upon other philosophical problems such as space and time, substance (...) and causality, life and mind, value and evil, etc., and finally, the relation of logical necessity between this notion and a rational eschatology. The twelve remaining lectures cumulatively demonstrate the path toward a revisionary metaphysics which is logically founded upon Absolute-theory. Each is a complete essay in itself and the titles are largely descriptive of the contents. "The Teaching of Meaning" is an interchange between the author and other contemporary philosophers interested in the subject. "Some Reflections on Necessary Existence" concerns the propriety of affirming a categorically necessary existent and searches for a feasible ontological argument in the realm of value. "Freedom and Value" explores the relation between the two, while "Metaphysics and Affinity" explores the relation between thought and being, between the realities of our environment and our metaphysical approaches to them. "Hegel's Use of Teleology" is a thoroughgoing study of teleology in the works of Hegel. A description of our fragmentational approach to reality is contained in "The Diremptive Tendencies of Western Philosophy." The "Logic of Mysticism" is a refutation of Stace's account and a sketch of mysticism as a logical matter, i.e., as a frame of mind connected with some sort of absolute. "Essential Probabilities" is an attempt to formulate and connect the eidetic method in philosophy with modalities, especially probability, considering its role in an a priori framework. "The Logic of Ultimates" sets out the important theorems in an absolutist logic, refutes common candidates for absolute status, and finally proposes some sort of 'infinite' teleology as a viable form of absolutism. "The Systematic Unity of Value" is an analysis of the ways and means of asserting common values and of relating them to their logical keystone found in Absolute-theory. "Intentional Inexistence" establishes intentionality as categorical and defines its working mode which culminates in a picture of 'unitive logic'. The final paper, "Toward a Neo-Neo-Platonism," is the delineation of what a metaphysic ought to envisage through a unifying, living logic which embodies the absolute. All in all, this is a refreshing, meaty reconsideration of some very out-of-vogue topics.--G. M. K. (shrink)
SummaryThe reviewer welcomes Von Mises' book as a most valuable contribution to the nowadays so badly needed clarifying of philosophical terminology. The author confesses himself to positivism, but his work bears a far more psychological and significal stamp than those of most present positivists.SummaryReviewer objects to the in his opinion far too subjective, emotional and metaphorical way of reasoning, followed in some respects by the author, but appreciates nevertheless many sharp and critical remarks scattered all over the book.
This volume brings together sixteen of C. D. Broad’s valuable papers on moral philosophy written between 1914 and 1964. Unlike his widely read Five Types of Moral Theory where he was chiefly concerned to provide an accurate interpretation of various historically important moral philosophers, this volume contains essays which critically examine a variety of normative and meta-ethical issues. Broad never presented a developed moral position of his own, but his careful classifications of possible positions, subtle distinctions, and elaboration of logical (...) interrelationships have not only been significant in themselves but have served as models of good critical analysis for many contemporary theorists. Although some of the papers such as "Some of the Main Problems of Ethics" and "Some Reflections on Moral Sense Theories in Ethics" have been reprinted elsewhere and widely discussed, others have received little attention. Given current social and philosophical concerns, however, many readers will certainly find some of the less well-known papers of great interest. The current concern with the generalization argument should produce a renewed interest in Broad’s analysis of a version of it in "On the Function of False Hypotheses in Ethics", and the present debate regarding the justifiability of conscientious objection in wartime should renew interest in Broad’s attempt to clarify the underlying moral issues in "Ought We to Fight for Our Country in the Next War?". Included in this volume are "Self and Others," a paper dealing with ethical egoism which has not been previously published, "Reply to My Critics," excerpted from The Philosophy of C. D. Broad edited by Paul Schilpp, and a brief preface written by C. D. Broad shortly before his death. By bringing together these papers, many of which are not easily obtained, the editor has provided a valuable and needed volume.—M. G. (shrink)