Die Beitrage des Sammelbandes widmen sich aus theologisch-philosophischer Perspektive der historischen Rezeption und der systematischen Relevanz des Freiheitsstreits zwischen Martin Luther und Erasmus von Rotterdam. Im systematischen Zentrum steht das jeweilige freiheitstheoretische Verstandnis des Menschen, seiner epistemischen und voluntativen Vermogen und seines metaphysischen Ortes innerhalb der Schopfung, besonders sein Verhaltnis zu Gott. Aus historischer Perspektive wird die Rezeption von Luthers Freiheitsbegriff durch Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Schelling und in der analytischen Philosophie untersucht. Mit Beitragen von Christine Axt-Piscalar, Frank Dettinger, Thomas Frisch, (...) Volker Gerhardt, Friedrich Hermanni, Amit Kravitz, Jorg Noller, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Birgit Recki, Georg Sans SJ, Ruben Schneider und Gunther Wenz. (shrink)

Lehren und Lernen, verstanden als komplexe Vermittlung und Verarbeitung von Inhalten, finden immer in räumlichen Kontexten statt, die hinderlich oder förderlich sein können. Diese Räume können von ganz verschiedener Art sein und sie müssen sich keineswegs auf den Hörsaal und Seminarraum beschränken. Der Sammelband, der aus zwei Symposien des Münchner-Dozierenden-Netzwerks in den Jahren 2020 und 2021 hervorgegangen ist, möchte diese Räume erkunden, medial reflektieren und zugleich neue Räume für die Lehre eröffnen. Folgende Fragen stehen dabei im Zentrum: Welche Lehr- und (...) Lernräume innerhalb und außerhalb der Hochschule haben sich bislang bewährt? Wo liegen ihre Grenzen, wo ihre Möglichkeiten? Wie lassen sich Lehr- und Lernräume gestalten? Welche Materialien, welche Technik und welche Medien haben sich bewährt oder bieten neue Möglichkeiten? Die Herausgebenden PD Dr. Jörg Noller lehrt Philosophie an der LMU München. Dr. Christina Beitz-Radzio ist Tierärztin und Trainerin (Sprachraum eG)und arbeitet im Studiendekanat der Tierärztlichen Fakultät der LMU München. Melanie Förg, M.A., promoviert in Philosophie an der Universität zu Kielund arbeitet an der Technischen Universität München (TUM) im Team der TUM Talent Factory. Dr. Sandra Eleonore Johst ist Philosophin, wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin der FernUniversität in Hagen und selbstständige Beraterin. Dr. Daniela Kugelmann ist akademische Oberrätin am Lehrstuhl für vegetative Anatomie und Zellbiologie an der LMU München. Dr. Sabrina Sontheimer ist freiberufliche Trainerin für Hochschuldidaktik, E-Learning, wissenschaftliches Schreiben und Kommunikation. Am Schreibzentrum der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München ist sie für die Weiterbildung der Lehrenden zuständig. Dr. Sören Westerholz ist Biologe und lehrt am Biomedizinischen Centrum der LMU München. (shrink)

Die Beitrage des Sammelbandes beleuchten die begriffliche Komplexitat der Geist-Konzeptionen in klassischen Bereichen idealistischen und nachidealistischen Philosophierens von Kant bis Adorno. Dabei wird auf die Dimensionen von Theorie und Praxis, Subjektivitat und Intersubjektivitat, Epistemologie, Asthetik, Metaphysik und Theologie naher eingegangen. Auch wird dabei untersucht, welche systematische Relevanz diesen Konzeptionen angesichts der Moderne noch innewohnt.

What constitutes personhood? How are persons and their bodies related? What is the relationship between personhood and value? The Unity of a Person: Philosophical Perspectives explores the current debates surrounding the philosophy of personal identity and offers a fresh approach to this important topic. It is original in bringing together three approaches to personal identity that are traditionally treated separately: the metaphysical, the phenomenological and the social. By examining these three areas this volume establishes connections between the underlying metaphysical issues (...) surrounding personal identity and the specific forms of personal existence such as self-consciousness, action, and normativity. Topics discussed include personhood and animalism, process ontology, self-identity over time, sociality and personhood, and the normative status of personhood. With chapters by an outstanding international roster of contributors, this collection will be of great interest to those studying personal identity and the nature of the self in metaphysics, philosophy of mind and phenomenology. (shrink)

This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.

Der alle drei Jahre tagende Kongress der „Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie“ (DGPhil) ist der größte Kongress für Philosophie in Deutschland. Vom 11.-15. September fand er diesmal an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in München statt. Mit rund 1600 Teilnehmern und über 400 philosophischen Vorträgen fiel er, auch durch den Veranstaltungsort bedingt, wesentlich umfangreicher aus als der XXI. Kongress in Essen.

_Freiheit nach Kant_ analyzes Kant’s conception of freedom from a historical and systematic point of view. It considers its position in the history of philosophy, its impact on German Idealism, and finally discusses the systematic relevance of Kant’s theory.

This novel contributed volume advances the current debate on free will by bridging the divide between analytic and historically oriented approaches to the problem. With thirteen chapters by leading academics in the field, the volume is divided into three parts: free will and determinism, free will and indeterminism, and free will and moral responsibility. The contributors aim to initiate a philosophical discourse that profits from a combination of the two approaches. On the one hand, the analytic tools familiar from the (...) debate – arguments, concepts, and distinctions – can be used to sharpen our understanding of classical philosophical positions. On the other hand, the rich philosophical tradition can be reconstructed so as to inspire new solutions. In recent years, the problem of free will has received special attention in the analytic arena. This is the first anthology to combine historical and analytic perspectives, significantly furthering the debate, and providing a crucial resource to academics and advanced students alike. (shrink)

In my paper, I shall take seriously Kant’s puzzling statements about the moral feeling of respect, which is, according to him, “a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different” from all common feelings. I will focus on the systematic position of the moral feeling of respect within the framework of Kant’s transcendental idealism. By considering its volitional structure, I argue for a compatibilist account of the moral feeling of respect, according to which both intellectualist and (...) affectivist interpretations are true. As such, respect can be understood in terms of a process of moral self-consciousness and self-formation, which means that the will must be freed from initial empirical motives, and finally be determined only by rational principles. (shrink)

The introduction to the volume situates the concept of drive in the history of classical German philosophy and in the history of biology. It outlines the recent state of research and provides an overview of the contributions.

This volume gathers a collection of fourteen original articles discussing the concept of drive in classical German philosophy. Its aim is to offer a comprehensive historical overview of the concept of drive at the turn of the 19th century and to discuss it both historically and systematically. From the 18th century onward, the concept of drive started to play an important role in emerging disciplines such as biology, anthropology, and psychology. In these fields, the concept of drive was used to (...) describe the inner forces of organic nature, or, more particularly, human urges and desires. But it was in the period of classical German philosophy that this concept developed into an important philosophical concept crucial to Kant’s and post-Kantian idealistic systems. Reflecting the complexity of this concept, the volume first discusses historical sources of drive theories in Leibniz, Reimarus, and Blumenbach. Afterwards, the volume presents the philosophical accounts of drives in Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and also gives a systematic overview of other important drive theories that were formed around 1800 by Herder, Goethe, Jacobi, Novalis, Reinhold, Schiller, and Schopenhauer. (shrink)

In his book “Schiller as Philosopher”, Frederick Beiser laments that “contemporary Kant scholars have been intent on ignoring him. If they know anything at all about Schiller, it is only as the author of an epigram satirizing Kant”. Therefore, Beiser calls us “to consider Schiller as a philosopher, to reconstruct and appraise the arguments of his philosophical writings” (Beiser, 2005, p. vii). In this paper, I shall argue that it is Schiller's conception of freedom of the will as “heautonomy” that (...) stands behind his critique and modification of Kant's ethics. However, the systematic significance of Schiller's theory of freedom is not obvious. Its argumentative structure must first be reconstructed—as Beiser has demanded—because it is concealed by an esthetic discourse. A reconstruction of Schiller's theory of freedom shows that he contrasts his concept of heautonomy as individual self‐determination with the Kantian concept of an autonomy or autocracy of reason by the universal moral law. Schiller's own philosophical contribution to the debate on freedom after Kant must therefore not be understood as a mere esthetic balancing and softening of Kant's ethical rigorism. Rather, it shows serious transformations of Kant's approach, which justifies understanding it as a critical step beyond Kant's theory of the autonomy of reason. (shrink)

Contrary to Karl Leonhard Reinhold's theoretical critique of Kant's philosophy, his practical critique has been almost unknown. In my paper, I shall reconstruct Reinhold's practical philosophy after Kant. I will concentrate on the so‐called Reinhold's dilemma, which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of immoral actions in Kant. Also, I shall explain how Reinhold tried to escape this dilemma by introducing a new action theory and by sharply distinguishing between reason and will. Finally, I shall evaluate Reinhold's (...) practical significance by relating his conception of individual freedom to recent theories of volitional self‐determination. (shrink)

In this chapter, I will address the philosophical ambivalence of the concept of Willkür in and after Kant. The aim of my chapter is to defend it against the charge of irrationality and mere chance, and to rehabilitate it from a historical and analytic point of view. I will analyze Kant’s use of the word “Willkür”, and chronologically follow the semantic and systematic changes in his philosophical work. Finally, I address recent attempts to revitalize the concept of Willkür in the (...) analytic debate by referring to the work of Harry Frankfurt and Robert Kane. I shall argue that we need to distinguish between two kinds of libera arbitria. Whereas the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae can be interpreted in terms of the pejorative sense of “Willkür”—as mere chance—the liberum arbitrium voluntatis equals a reflective kind of Willkür—literal Will-kür —which involves freedom of the will. (shrink)

In this paper, I will reconstruct Kant’s theory of illusion from the perspective of his transcendental philosophy. I argue that it is Kant’s theory of dialectic as the “logic of illusion” that grounds both theoretical and practical error and that traces them back to a common root: the operation of rationalizing by theoretical and practical reason. I analyze different kinds of theoretical and practical errors and show how they are grounded in reason’s general propensity to rationalize. The paper exposes this (...) common root and shows which rules Kant develops in order to avoid rationalizing. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze Schelling’s compatibilist account of freedom of the will particularly in his Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. I shall argue that against Kant’s transcendental compatibilism Schelling proposes a “volitional compatibilism,” according to which the free will emerges out of nature and is not identical to practical reason as Kant claims. Finally, I will relate Schelling’s volitional compatibilism to more recent accounts of free will in order to better understand what he (...) means by his concept of a “higher necessity.”. (shrink)

Betrachtet man das breite Spektrum an produktiven Wechselwirkungen zwischen den beiden Kulturnationen Italien und Deutschland, so ist es verwunderlich, dass die italienische Philosophie in Deutschland immer noch als „terra incognita“ (Ugo Perone) gelten darf. Darum bringt dieser Band das ‚transalpine‘ Wechselspiel von Rezeption und Transformation im deutsch-italienischen Denken exemplarisch zur Sprache. Im Zentrum stehen die Bereiche der Aufklärung (Vico, Herder), der klassischen deutschen Philosophie (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), der Philosophie des Risorgimento (Rosmini, Gioberti) und der Philosophie der Gegenwart (Luigi Pareyson (...) und die Turiner Schule). (shrink)

Wie kann Europa politisch und gesellschaftlich durch die Möglichkeiten der Digitalisierung profitieren und seine Krisen überwinden, von denen es in der letzten Zeit so geplagt wurde? Wie kann es ein „Humanprojekt“ und die Einheit von „grüner“ Ökologie und „blauer“ Informationstechnik realisieren? In diesem Band präsentiert Luciano Floridi eine Zusammenfassung seiner Thesen, wie sich die Digitalisierung ganz konkret auf politische und soziale Phänomene auswirkt, und wie nun weniger die Dinge als ihre Relationen an Bedeutung gewinnen.Mit kritischen Beiträgen von Manfred Broy, Markus (...) Gabriel, Armin Grunwald, Ruth Hagengruber, Alexander Kriebitz, Christoph Lütge, Raphael Max, Catrin Misselhorn und Malte Rehbein. (shrink)

Kant’s critique/doctrine distinction tracks the difference between a canon for the understanding’s proper use and an organon for its dialectical misuse. The latter reflects the dogmatic use of reason to attain a doctrine of knowledge with no antecedent critique. In the 1790s, Fichte collapses Kant’s distinction and redefines dogmatism. He argues that deriving a canon is essentially dialectical and thus yields an organon: critical idealism is properly a doctrine of science or Wissenschaftslehre. Criticism is furthermore said to refute dogmatism, by (...) which Fichte means Spinozism. Schelling repudiates Fichte’s position in his Philosophical Letters by reviving Kant’s distinction. First, ‘critique’ for Schelling names a canon that is valid for all systems—including Spinozism—and thus favours none—not even the Wissenschaftslehre. Second, Schelling coins ‘dogmaticism’ to refer to what Kant calls ‘dogmatism’: reason’s uncritical claim to doctrine. Hence, he says all systems—even Fichte’s—are susceptible to the ‘enthusiasm’ of mistaking themselves for doctrines or ‘objects of knowledge’, instead of subjectively valid ‘objects of freedom’. I reconstruct Schelling’s argument for reviving Kant’s distinction, while noting two consequences for German idealism. First, if criticism favours no system, a system’s origin cannot be an act of knowledge, e.g., intellectual intuition, but only an act of endorsement. Second, if dogmaticism entails enthusiasm, a system’s goal cannot be absolute knowledge, but only infinite striving. Hence, by retrieving Schelling’s notion of dogmaticism, we can both gain a better understanding of the Letters and register the impact of a core Kantian distinction on the German idealist project. (shrink)

Kant’s moral philosophy is challenged by the so-called “Socratic Paradox”: If free will and pure practical reason are to be identified, as Kant argues, then there seems to be no room for immoral actions that are to be imputed to our individual freedom. The paper argues that Kant’s conception of rationalizing helps us to avoid the Socratic Paradox, and to understand how immoral actions can be imputed to our individual freedom and responsibility. In rationalizing, we misuse our capacity of reason (...) in order to construct the illusion according to which we are not bound to the absolute demand of the moral law, but rather subject to exceptions and excuses. Finally, the paper interprets the three rules of “common sense” in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment in terms of an antidote to rationalizing. (shrink)

The aim of the present volume is to advance the debate about free will by combining historical and analytic perspectives. In the discussion throughout the centuries, many problems have emerged that cast doubt on the assumption that we have free will. The aim of this introduction is, first, to present these problems as well as to present several strategies that have been proposed in order to solve these problems; second, to give an overview of the content of the present volume. (...) The contributions to this book aim, for the most part, to advance the debate about these problems by drawing on ideas that can be found in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

Der Begriff der Digitalität ist erst in jüngster Zeit ins Zentrum der Kultur- und Geisteswissenschaft gerückt. Er entspricht nicht dem Verständnis von Digitalisierung im Sinne der Entwicklung von Technologien, der Erfassung und Speicherung von Daten und der Automatisierung von Abläufen. Vielmehr reflektiert Digitalität auf kulturelle und gesellschaftliche Realitäten und Lebensformen, die mit der Digitalisierung einhergehen und diese im Wechselspiel wiederum ermöglichen. Ziel des Bandes ist es, das Phänomen der Digitalität näher zu bestimmen und den Blick auf kulturelle, philosophische, didaktische und (...) soziologische Aspekte des Lebens in einer digitalisierten Welt zu richten. Folgende Fragen stehen dabei im Zentrum: In welchem Verhältnis stehen die Phänomene „Digitalisierung“ und „Digitalität“? Wie verändern sich Lehr- und Lernprozesse im Kontext von Digitalisierung und Digitalität? Welche Herausforderungen, Chancen und Probleme ergeben sich aus der Digitalität für die Zukunft der Gesellschaft und der Universitäten? Wie lässt sich die Kultur der Digitalität gezielt gestalten und vermitteln? (shrink)

This volume collects thirteen original essays that address the concept of will in Classical German Philosophy from Kant to Schopenhauer. During this short, but prolific period, the concept of will underwent various transformations. While Kant identifies the will with pure practical reason, Fichte introduces, in the wake of Reinhold, an originally biological concept of drive into his ethical theory, thereby expanding on the Kantian notion of the will. Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer take a step further and conceive the will either (...) as a primal being, as a socio-ontological entity, or as a blindly striving, non-rational force. Thus, the history of the will is marked by a complex set of tensions between rational and non-rational aspects of practical volition. The book outlines these transformations from a historical and systematic point of view. It offers an overview of the most important theories of the will by the major figures of Classical German Philosophy, but also includes interpretations of conceptions developed by lesser-studied philosophers such as Maimon, Jacobi, Reinhold, and Bouterwek. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 66 Heft: 2 Seiten: 162-182.

In this paper, I will shed light on Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s and Friedrich Schiller’s conceptions of practical self-determination after Kant. First, I outline Kant’s conception of freedom as autonomy. I then explain the so-called “Reinhold’s dilemma,” which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of immoral actions, which arises from Kant’s theory of autonomy. I then show how Reinhold and Schiller tried to escape this dilemma by developing an elaborated theory of individual freedom. I will argue that Reinhold’s (...) and Schiller’s symmetrical account of freedom to act according and against the moral law is not to be confused with freedom of indifference but can be reconstructed in terms of practical self-determination on the basis of first-order desires and second-order volitions. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct Kant’s theory of error in theoretical and practical terms, not only from a moral-psychological perspective, but also from the broader perspective of his transcendental philosophy. Kant’s theory of error will be interpreted as a central part of his transcendental philosophy, insofar as it is related to his doctrine of reason. For it is precisely Kant’s theory of dialectic as the »logic of appearance« that deals with the reasons that concern theoretical error as (...) well as moral misconduct and that traces theoretical and practical error back to a common root: the phenomenon of rational self-deception. (shrink)

This paper aims to philosophically analyze the concept of virtual reality, and to determine the concept from an ontological point of view. The term "virtual reality" is often used synonymously with "digital simulation". In his recent book Reality+, David Chalmers has argued that according to virtual digitalism, "if we're in a simulation, our world is still real". He calls this position "simula- tion realism". Against this view I will argue that virtual reality and simulation should not be identified. Rather, virtual (...) reality is a genuine kind of reality that has always been part of our life. To this end, I will analyze the ontology of virtual reality by using the example of banknotes and referring to Lynne Baker's "constitution view". (shrink)

This paper argues that Kant and Fichte develop a conception of “obscuring reason.” This conception allows us to explain our reasons for immoral actions although we are not able to cognize the original ground of evil. The paper analyzes Kant's conception of rationalizing (Vernünfteln) as obscuring reason. By rationalizing, we imputably misuse our faculty of reason in order to construct a viewpoint from which we are no longer bound to the absolute demand of the moral law. Fichte draws on Kant (...) and distinguishes three kinds of operations to obscure the moral law, namely (i) abstraction, (ii) delaying, and (iii) downgrading. (shrink)

This book presents G. A. Cohen's Gifford Lectures, delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1996. Focusing on Marxism and Rawlsian liberalism, Cohen draws a connection between these thought systems and the choices that shape a person's life. In the case of Marxism, the relevant life is his own: a communist upbringing in the 1940s in Montreal, which induced a belief in a strongly socialist egalitarian doctrine. The narrative of Cohen's reckoning with that inheritance develops through a series of sophisticated (...) engagements with the central questions of social and political philosophy. In the case of Rawlsian doctrine, Cohen looks to people's lives in general. He argues that egalitarian justice is not only, as Rawlsian liberalism teaches, a matter of rules that define the structure of society, but also a matter of personal attitude and choice. Personal attitude and choice are, moreover, the stuff of which social structure itself is made. Those truths have not informed political philosophy as much as they should, and Cohen's focus on them brings political philosophy closer to moral philosophy, and to the Judeo-Christian ethical tradition, than it has recently been. (shrink)

This paper aims to determine the ontology of virtual reality from a historical and systematic point of view. The term “virtual reality” is often used synonymously with “illusion”, “immersion”, “simulation” or “fiction”. Against this anti-realistic view, the paper argues that virtual reality is a genuine kind of reality that has always been part of our life. To this end, I will analyze the ontology of virtual reality by using the example of banknotes and referring to Lynne Baker’s “constitution view”. Finally, (...) I shall attempt to define the term “virtual reality” from a philosophical point of view by distinguishing it from the concepts of simulation and illusion. (shrink)

A highly original reading of Immanuel Kant that demonstrates his interest in the social realm of human interaction.

Containing selected papers on the fundamentals and applications of Complexity Science, this multi-disciplinary book presents new approaches for resolving complex issues that cannot be resolved using conventional mathematical or software models. Complex Systems problems can occur in a variety of areas such as physical sciences and engineering, the economy, the environment, humanities and social and political sciences. Complexity Science problems, the science of open systems consisting of large numbers of diverse components engaged in rich interaction, can occur in a variety (...) of areas such as physical sciences and engineering, the economy, the environment, humanities and social and political sciences. The global behaviour of these systems emerges from the interaction of constituent components and is unpredictable but not random. The key attribute of Complex Systems is the ability to self-organise and adapt to unpredictable changes in their environment. (shrink)

A leading figure in neuroaesthetics makes the case that aesthetic experience can be meaningfully measured by the tools of neuroscience.

G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of an External World (...) In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Fichte assigns ‘intellectual intuition’ a new meaning after Kant. But in 1799, his doctrine of intellectual intuition is publicly deemed indefensible by Kant and nihilistic by Jacobi. I propose to defend Fichte’s doctrine against these charges, leaving aside whether it captures what he calls the ‘spirit’ of transcendental idealism. I do so by articulating three problems that motivate Fichte’s redirection of intellectual intuition from being to acting: (1) the regress problem, which states that reflecting on empirical facts of consciousness leads (...) only to further facts and so cannot yield a first principle; (2) the rhapsody problem, which states that the categories form a haphazard set and so lack necessity unless they derive from a first principle; and (3) the nihilism problem, which states that a first principle cannot lie outside our cognition of it, lest it be the cause of our cognition and, being first, the cause of all our actions, reducing us to machines. Crucially, Fichte’s three motivating problems are in fact aspects of a single problem. Leaving any aspect unsolved spoils putative solutions to the other two. Consequently, Fichte requires a single unified solution to all three, which his doctrine of intellectual intuition provides. (shrink)