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Galen Strawson [140]Galen J. Strawson [11]G. Strawson [5]Gallen Strawson [3]
Gale Strawson [1]
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  1. Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - MIT Press.
    Introduction -- A default position -- Experience -- The character of experience -- Understanding-experience -- A note about dispositional mental states -- Purely experiential content -- An account of four seconds of thought -- Questions -- The mental and the nonmental -- The mental and the publicly observable -- The mental and the behavioral -- Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- Conclusion: The three questions -- Agnostic materialism, part 1 -- Monism -- The linguistic argument (...)
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  2. Against Narrativity.Galen Strawson - unknown
    I argue against two popular claims. The first is a descriptive, empiri- cal thesis about the nature of ordinary human experience: ‘each of us constructs and lives a “narrative” . . . this narrative is us, our identities’ (Oliver Sacks); ‘self is a perpetually rewritten story . . . in the end, we become the autobiographical narratives by which we “tell about” our lives’ (Jerry Bruner); ‘we are all virtuoso novelists. . . . We try to make all of our (...)
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  3. The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
  4. Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2006 - In A. Freeman (ed.), Consciousness and its place in nature: does physicalism entail panpsychism? pp. 3-31.
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  5. Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics.Galen Strawson - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    What is the self? Does it exist? If it does exist, what is it like? It's not clear that we even know what we're asking about when we ask these large, metaphysical questions. The idea of the self comes very naturally to us, and it seems rather important, but it's also extremely puzzling. As for the word "self"--it's been taken in so many different ways that it seems that you can mean more or less what you like by it and (...)
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  6. Realistic Monism - Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):3-31.
  7. Real Materialism: And Other Essays.Galen Strawson - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Real Materialism is a collection of highly original essays on a set of related topics in philosophy of mind and metaphysics: consciousness and the mind-body problem; our knowledge of the world; the nature of the self or subject; free will and moral responsibility; the nature of thought and intentionality; causation and David Hume.
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  8. Freedom and Belief.Galen Strawson - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
    On the whole, we continue to believe firmly both that we have free will and that we are morally responsible for what we do. Here, the author argues that there is a fundamental sense in which there is no such thing as free will or true moral responsibility (as ordinarily understood). Devoting the main body of his book to an attempt to explain why we continue to believe as we do, Strawson examines various aspects of the "cognitive phenomenology" of freedom--the (...)
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  9. The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume.Galen Strawson - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
    It is widely supposed that David Hume invented and espoused the "regularity" theory of causation, holding that causal relations are nothing but a matter of one type of thing being regularly followed by another. It is also widely supposed that he was not only right about this, but that it was one of his greatest contributions to philosophy. Strawson here argues that the regularity theory of causation is indefensible, and that Hume never adopted it in any case. Strawson maintains that (...)
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  10. The Identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional.Galen Strawson - 2008 - Analysis 68 (4):271-282.
    Suppose that X and Y can’t possibly exist apart in reality; then—by definition—there’s no real distinction between them, only a conceptual distinction. There’s a conceptual distinction between a rectilinear figure’s triangularity and its trilaterality, for example, but no real distinction. In fundamental metaphysics there is no real distinction between an object’s categorical properties and its dispositional properties. So too there is no real distinction between an object and its properties. And in fundamental metaphysics, for X and Y to be such (...)
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  11. ‘The Self’.Galen Strawson - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5-6):405-428.
    Recommends an approach to the philosophical problem about the existence and nature of the self in which the author models the problem of the self rather than attempting to model the self. It is suggested that the sense of the self is the source in experience of the philosophical problem of the self. The first question to ask is the phenomenological question: What is the nature of the sense of the self? But this, in the first instance, is best taken (...)
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  12.  42
    Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment.Galen Strawson - 2011 - Princeton University Press.
    This book argues that in fact it is Locke 's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid.
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  13.  55
    Causation and Universals.The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume.Causation: A Realist Approach.Evan Fales, Galen Strawson & Michael Tooley - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):494-498.
  14. The Subject of Experience.Galen Strawson - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Does the self exist? If so, what is its nature? How long do selves last? Galen Strawson draws on literature and psychology as well as philosophy to discuss various ways we experience having or being a self. He argues that it is legitimate to say that there is such a thing as the self, distinct from the human being.
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  15. The Bounds of Freedom.Galen Strawson - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 441-460.
    The shortest form of the Basic Argument against free will and moral responsibility runs as follows: [1] When you act, you do what you do—in the situation in which you find yourself—because of the way you are. [2] If you do what you do because of the way you are, then in order to be fully and ultimately responsible for what you do you must be fully and ultimately responsible for the way you are. But [3] You cannot be fully (...)
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  16.  17
    The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. 2nd edition. Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 5-24.
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  17. Cognitive Phenomenology: Real Life.Galen Strawson - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 285--325.
    Cognitive phenomenology starts from something that has been obscured in much recent analytic philosophy: the fact that lived conscious experience isn’t just a matter of sensation or feeling, but is also cognitive in character, through and through. This is obviously true of ordinary human perceptual experience, and cognitive phenomenology is also concerned with something more exclusively cognitive, which we may call propositional meaning-experience: occurrent experience of linguistic representations as meaning something, for example, as this occurs in thinking or reading or (...)
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  18. Real Materialism.Galen J. Strawson - 2003 - In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell. pp. 49--88.
    (1) Materialists hold that every real, concrete phenomenon in the universe is a wholly physical phenomenon. (2) Consciousness ('what-it's-likeness', etc.) is the most certainly existing real, concrete phenomenon there is. It follows that (3) all serious materialists must grant that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon. ‘How can consciousness possibly be physical, given what we know about the physical?’ To ask this question is already to have gone wrong. We have no good reason (as Priestley, Eddington, Russell and others observe) (...)
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  19. Mind and Being: The Primacy of Panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2016 - In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 000-00.
    I endorse a 12-word metaphysics. [1] Stoff ist Kraft ≈ being is energy. [2] Wesen ist Werden ≈ being is becoming. [3] Sein ist Sosein ≈ being is qualit[ativit]y. [4] Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein ≈ being is mind. [1]–[3] are plausible metaphysical principles and unprejudiced consideration of what we know about concrete reality obliges us to favor [4], i.e. panpsychism or panexperientialism, above all other positive substantive proposals. For [i] panpsychism is the most ontologically parsimonious view, given that the existence of (...)
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  20. Free Will.Galen Strawson - 2004 - In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
    ‘Free will’ is the conventional name of a topic that is best discussed without reference to the will. It is a topic in metaphysics and ethics as much as in the philosophy of mind. Its central questions are ‘What is it to act (or choose) freely?’, and ‘What is it to be morally responsible for one’s actions (or choices)?’ These two questions are closely connected, for it seems clear that freedom of action is a necessary condition of moral responsibility, even (...)
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  21. Real Intentionality 3: Why Intentionality Entails Consciousness.Galen Strawson - 2008 - In Real Materialism and Other Essays. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 279--297.
     
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  22. The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity.Galen Strawson - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    This lucid book is the first to be wholly dedicated to Hume's theory of personal identity, and presents a bold new interpretation which bears directly on ...
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  23. Mental Ballistics or the Involuntariness of Spontaniety.Galen Strawson - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):227-257.
    It is sometimes said that reasoning, thought and judgement essentially involve action. It is sometimes said that they involve spontaneity, where spontaneity is taken to be connected in some constitutive way with action-intentional, voluntary and indeed free action. There is, however, a fundamental respect in which reason, thought and judgement neither are nor can be a matter of action; and any spontaneity they involve can be connected with freedom only when the word 'freedom' is used in the Spinozan-Kantian sense according (...)
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  24. Self-Intimation.Galen Strawson - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):1-31.
    Aristotle, Dignāga, Descartes, Arnauld, Locke, Brentano, Sartre and many others are right about the nature of conscious awareness: all such awareness comports—somehow carries within itself—awareness of itself . This is a necessary condition of awareness being awareness at all: no ‘higher-order’ account of what makes conscious states conscious can be correct. But is very paradoxical: it seems to require that awareness be somehow already present, in such a way as to be available to itself as object of awareness, in order (...)
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  25. Free Will.Galen Strawson - 1998 - In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
    ‘Free will’ is the conventional name of a topic that is best discussed without reference to the will. It is a topic in metaphysics and ethics as much as in the philosophy of mind. Its central questions are ‘What is it to act (or choose) freely?’, and ‘What is it to be morally responsible for one’s actions (or choices)?’ These two questions are closely connected, for it seems clear that freedom of action is a necessary condition of moral responsibility, even (...)
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  26.  29
    Identity Metaphysics.Galen Strawson - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):60-90.
    Identity metaphysics finds identity or unity where other metaphysical theories find difference or diversity. It denies the fundamentality of ontological distinctions that other theories treat as fundamental. It’s opposed to separatism, which mistakes natural conceptual distinctions for ground-floor ontological differences. It proposes that the distinctions between the concepts substance, object, quality, property, process, state, and event are metaphysically superficial; so too the distinctions between the concepts energy, lawsofnature, force, causation, power, and naturalnecessity. So too the distinction between these two sets (...)
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  27. Panpsychism? Reply to Commentators with a Celebration of Descartes.Galen Strawson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):184-280.
  28. What is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of an Experience, and the Content of the Experience?Galen J. Strawson - unknown
    This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008) I take 'content' in a natural internalist way to refer to occurrent mental content. I introduce a 'thin' or ‘live’ notion of the subject according to which a subject of experience cannot exist unless there is an experience for it to be the subject of. I then argue, first, that in the case of a particular experience E, (...)
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  29.  24
    Mental Ballistics: The Involuntariness of Spontaneity.Galen J. Strawson - unknown
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  30. Real Intentionality.Galen Strawson - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (3):287-313.
    This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008).
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  31. The Unhelpfulness of Indeterminism.Galen Strawson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):149-155.
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  32.  16
    Mental Ballistics Or The Involuntariness Of Spontaneity.Gale Strawson - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):227-256.
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  33. Realism and Causation.Galen Strawson - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (148):253-277.
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  34.  80
    David Hume: Objects and Power.Galen Strawson - 2000 - In Stewart Duncan & Antonia LoLordo (eds.), Debates in Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses. Routledge. pp. 231.
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  35. Red and 'Red'.Galen Strawson - 1989 - Synthese 78 (February):193-232.
    THIS PAPER ARGUES FOR THE CLAIM THAT ALTHOUGH COLOUR WORDS LIKE 'RED' ARE, ESSENTIALLY, 'PHENOMENAL-QUALITY' WORDS—I.E., WORDS FOR PROPERTIES WHOSE WHOLE AND ESSENTIAL NATURE CAN BE AND IS FULLY REVEALED IN SENSORY EXPERIENCE, GIVEN ONLY THE QUALITATIVE CHARACTER THAT THAT EXPERIENCE HAS—STILL 'RED' CANNOT BE SUPPOSED TO BE A WORD THAT PICKS OUT OR DENOTES ANY PARTICULAR PHENOMENAL QUALITY. THE ARGUMENT RESTS ESSENTIALLY ON THE SUPPOSITION, OFTEN DISCUSSED UNDER THE HEADING OF THE 'COLOR-SPECTRUM INVERSION ARGUMENT', THAT TWO PEOPLE COULD POSSIBLY (...)
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  36.  28
    Panpsychism? Reply to Commentators, with a Celebration of Descartes.Galen Strawson - 2006 - In A. Freeman (ed.), Consciousness and its place in nature: does physicalism entail panpsychism? pp. 184–280.
    Reply to commentators on the paper 'Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism'.
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  37.  40
    Underestimating the Physical.G. Strawson - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):228-240.
    Many hold that (1) consciousness poses a uniquely hard problem. Why is this so? Chalmers considers 12 main answers in 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness'. This paper focuses on number 11, and is principally addressed to those who endorse (1) because they think that (2) consciousness can't possibly be physical. It argues that to hold (2) is to make the mistake of underestimating the physical, and that almost all who make this mistake do so because they think they know more about (...)
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  38.  69
    The Self.Galen Strawson - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
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  39. Real Naturalism.Galen Strawson - 2012 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 86 (2).
     
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  40. Episodic Ethics.Galen Strawson - 2007 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60:85-116.
    I guess I wont send that note now, for the mind is such a new place, last night feels obsolete.
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  41.  50
    The Unhelpfulness of Determinism. [REVIEW]Galen Strawson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):149-56.
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  42. The Self and the SESMET.Galen Strawson - 2002 - In Journal of Consciousness Studies. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. pp. 99-135.
    Response to commentaries on keynote article.
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  43.  13
    XI-Mental BallisticsorThe Involuntariness of Spontaneity.Galen Strawson - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):227-256.
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  44. The Phenomenology and Ontology of the Self.Galen Strawson - 2000 - In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self. John Benjamins. pp. 23--39.
  45.  5
    Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):433-435.
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  46. Realistic Materialist Monism.Galen Strawson - 1999 - In S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & D. Chalmers (eds.), Towards a Science of Consciousness III.
    Short version of 'Real materialism', given at Tucson III Conference, 1998. (1) physicalism is true (2) the qualitative character of experience is real, as most naively understood ... so (3) the qualitative character of experience (considered specifically as such) is wholly physical. ‘How can consciousness possibly be physical, given what we know about the physical?’ To ask this question is already to have gone wrong. We have no good reason (as Priestley and Russell and others observe) to think that we (...)
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  47.  31
    Radical Self-Awareness.Galen Strawson - 2010 - In Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (eds.), Self, No Self?: Perspectives From Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press.
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  48.  5
    The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 2003 - In G. Watson (ed.), Free Will. 2nd Edition. pp. 212-228.
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  49.  21
    Conceivability and the Silence of Physics.G. Strawson - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (11-12):167-192.
    According to the ‘conceivability argument’ [1] it’s conceivable that a conscious human being H may have a perfect physical duplicate H* who isn’t conscious, [2] whatever is conceivable is possible, therefore [3] H* may possibly exist. This paper argues that the conceivability argument can’t help in discussion of the ‘mind–body problem’ even if [2] is allowed to be true. This is not because [1] is false, but because we don’t and can’t know enough about the nature of the physical to (...)
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  50. We Live Beyond Any Tale That We Happen to Enact.Galen Strawson - 2012 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (1):73-90.
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