Results for 'GOFAI'

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  1.  8
    Object Categorization in Gofai Knowledge Representation.Robert Skipper Jr - 1994 - Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (2):69-83.
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  2.  2
    Object Categorization in Gofai Knowledge Representation: The Cyc Project.Robert Skipper Jr - 1994 - Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (2):69-83.
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  3. The Language of Thought Hypothesis.Murat Aydede - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A comprehensive introduction to the Language of Though Hypothesis (LOTH) accessible to general audiences. LOTH is an empirical thesis about thought and thinking. For their explication, it postulates a physically realized system of representations that have a combinatorial syntax (and semantics) such that operations on representations are causally sensitive only to the syntactic properties of representations. According to LOTH, thought is, roughly, the tokening of a representation that has a syntactic (constituent) structure with an appropriate semantics. Thinking thus consists in (...)
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  4. Interaction and Resistance: The Recognition of Intentions in New Human-Computer Interaction.Vincent C. Müller - 2011 - In Anna Esposito, Antonietta M. Esposito, Raffaele Martone, Vincent C. Müller & Gaetano Scarpetta (eds.), Towards autonomous, adaptive, and context-aware multimodal interfaces: Theoretical and practical issues. Springer. pp. 1-7.
    Just as AI has moved away from classical AI, human-computer interaction (HCI) must move away from what I call ‘good old fashioned HCI’ to ‘new HCI’ – it must become a part of cognitive systems research where HCI is one case of the interaction of intelligent agents (we now know that interaction is essential for intelligent agents anyway). For such interaction, we cannot just ‘analyze the data’, but we must assume intentions in the other, and I suggest these are largely (...)
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  5. Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence.Vincent C. Müller (ed.) - 2013 - Springer.
    [Müller, Vincent C. (ed.), (2013), Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence (SAPERE, 5; Berlin: Springer). 429 pp. ] --- Can we make machines that think and act like humans or other natural intelligent agents? The answer to this question depends on how we see ourselves and how we see the machines in question. Classical AI and cognitive science had claimed that cognition is computation, and can thus be reproduced on other computing machines, possibly surpassing the abilities of human intelligence. This (...)
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  6.  70
    Was Roboter nicht können. Die Roboterantwort als knapp misslungene Verteidigung der starken KI-These.Geert Keil - 1998 - In Andreas Engel & Peter Gold (eds.), Der Mensch in der Perspektive der Kognitionswissenschaften. Suhrkamp. pp. 98-131.
    Theoretiker der Künstlichen Intelligenz und deren Wegbegleiter in der Philosophie des Geistes haben auf unterschiedliche Weise auf Kritik am ursprünglichen Theorieziel der KI reagiert. Eine dieser Reaktionen ist die Zurücknahme dieses Theorieziels zugunsten der Verfolgung kleinerformatiger Projekte. Eine andere Reaktion ist die Propagierung konnektionistischer Systeme, die mit ihrer dezentralen Arbeitsweise die neuronalen Netze des menschlichen Gehirns besser simulieren sollen. Eine weitere ist die sogenannte robot reply. Die Roboterantwort besteht aus zwei Elementen. Sie enthält (a) das Zugeständnis, daß das Systemverhalten eines (...)
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  7.  18
    Response to Selinger on Dreyfus.Harry M. Collins - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):309-311.
    My claim is clear and unambiguous: no machine will pass a well-designed Turing Test unless we find some means of embedding it in lived social life. We have no idea how to do this but my argument, and all our evidence, suggests that it will not be a necessary condition that the machine have more than a minimal body. Exactly how minimal is still being worked out.
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  8. Fenomenologiczne I Eksperymentalne Badania Ucieleśnionego Doświadczenia.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - In Fenomenologia I Nauki Kognitywne. Wydawnictwo Rafal Marszalek.
    W sytuacjach, gdy powinniśmy mieć do czynienia ze wzajemnym oświecaniem, w rzeczywistości często spotykamy się z obopólnym oporem między kognitywistyką a fenomenologią, gdzie ta druga rozumiana jest jako podejście metodologiczne, po raz pierwszy zarysowane przez Husserla. Filozofowie umysłu, z pierwszych szeregów kognitywistów, niejednokrotnie czynią lekceważące gesty w stosunku do fenomenologii, oparte na myleniu fenomenologii z niewykwalifikoną introspekcją psychologiczną (np. Dennett, 1991). Z kolei wielu fenomenologów podlega mylnemu wrażeniu, że kognitywistyce nie udało się wyjść poza tradycyjne modele komputacyjne (DSSI – „dobra (...)
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  9. Asking What's Inside the Head: Neurophilosophy Meets the Extended Mind. [REVIEW]Anthony Chemero - 2007 - Minds and Machines 17 (3):345-351.
    In their historical overview of cognitive science, Bechtel, Abraham- son and Graham (1999) describe the field as expanding in focus be- ginning in the mid-1980s. The field had spent the previous 25 years on internalist, high-level GOFAI (“good old fashioned artificial intelli- gence” [Haugeland 1985]), and was finally moving “outwards into the environment and downards into the brain” (Bechtel et al, 1999, p.75). One important force behind the downward movement was Patricia Churchland’s Neurophilosophy (1986). This book began a movement (...)
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  10. Reply to Clark and Van Gelder.Teed Rockwell - manuscript
    Clark ends his appendix with a description of what he calls "dynamic computationalism", which he describes as an interesting hybrid between DST and GOFAI. My 'horseLISP" example could be described as an example of dynamic computationalism. It is clearly not as eliminativist as Van Gelder's computational governor example, for I am trying to come up with something like identities between computational entities and dynamic ones. Thus unlike other dynamicists, I am not doing what Clark calls "embracing a different vocabulary (...)
     
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  11.  17
    Solipsism, Individualism and Cognitive Science.Saul Traiger - manuscript
    Solipsism, Individualism and Cognitive Science [1] "Artificial Intelligence cannot ignore philosophy" - John McCarthy I shall challenge the claim that Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence, or GOFAI is solipsistic while more recent neural or "brain-style" approaches to AI are not. After distinguishing GOFAI from connectionism, I will first show that GOFAI is not committed to solipsism but rather to what is more properly called individualism.
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