The paper attempts to give a solution to the Fitch's paradox though the strategy of the reformulation of the paradox in temporal logic, and a notion of knowledge which is a kind of ceteris paribus modality. An analogous solution has been offered in a different context to solve the problem of metaphysical determinism.

In this paper, we introduce a new approach to independent quantifiers, as originally introduced in Informational independence as a semantic phenomenon by Hintikka and Sandu [9] under the header of independence-friendly languages. Unlike other approaches, which rely heavily on compositional methods, we shall analyze independent quantifiers via equilibriums in strategic games. In this approach, coined equilibrium semantics, the value of an IF sentence on a particular structure is determined by the expected utility of the existential player in any of the (...) game’s equilibriums. This approach was suggested in Henkin quantifiers and complete problems by Blass and Gurevich [2] but has not been taken up before. We prove that each rational number can be realized by an IF sentence. We also give a lower and upper bound on the expressive power of IF logic under equilibrium semantics. (shrink)

The so-called New Theory of Reference (Marcus, Kripke etc.) is inspired by the insight that in modal and intensional contexts quantifiers presuppose nondescriptive unanalyzable identity criteria which do not reduce to any descriptive conditions. From this valid insight the New Theorists fallaciously move to the idea that free singular terms can exhibit a built-in direct reference and that there is even a special class of singular terms (proper names) necessarily exhibiting direct reference. This fallacious move has been encouraged by a (...) mistaken belief in the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers, by the myth of thede re reference, and a mistaken assimilation of direct reference to ostensive (perspectival) identification. Thede dicto vs.de re contrast does not involve direct reference, being merely a matter of rule-ordering (scope).The New Theorists' thesis of the necessity of identities of directly referred-to individuals is a consequence of an unmotivated and arbitrary restriction they tacitly impose on the identification of individuals. (shrink)

We shall introduce in this paper a language whose formulas will be interpreted by games of imperfect information. Such games will be defined in the same way as the games for first-order formulas except that the players do not have complete information of the earlier course of the game. Some simple logical properties of these games will be stated together with the relation of such games of imperfect information to higher-order logic. Finally, a set of applications will be outlined.

We introduce several senses of the principle ofcompositionality. We illustrate the difference between them with thehelp of some recent results obtained by Cameron and Hodges oncompositional semantics for languages of imperfect information.

Independence‐Friendly logic introduced by Hintikka and Sandu studies patterns of dependence and independence of quantifiers which exceed those found in ordinary first‐order logic. The present survey focuses on the game‐theoretical interpretation of IF‐logic, including connections to solution concepts in classical game theory, but we shall also present its compositional interpretation together with its connections to notions of dependence and dependence between terms.

This paper is a short survey of different languages with imperfect information introduced in. The imperfect information concerns both quantifiers and connectives. At the end, I will sketch a connection between these languages and linear logic.

We show that a coherent theory of partially ordered connectives can be developed along the same line as partially ordered quantification. We estimate the expressive power of various partially ordered connectives and use methods like Ehrenfeucht games and infinitary logic to get various undefinability results.

In this paper we show that first-order languages extended with partially ordered connectives and partially ordered quantifiers define, under a certain interpretation, their own truth-predicate. The interpretation in question is in terms of games of imperfect information. This result is compared with those of Kripke and Feferman.

The paper argues that there are two main kinds of joint action, direct joint bringing about (or performing) something (expressed in terms of a DO-operator) and jointly seeing to it that something is the case (expressed in terms of a Stit-operator). The former kind of joint action contains conjunctive, disjunctive and sequential action and its central subkinds. While joint seeing to it that something is the case is argued to be necessarily intentional, direct joint performance can also be nonintentional. Actions (...) performed by social groups are analyzed in terms of the notions of joint action (basically DO and Stit).A precise semantical analysis of the aforementioned kinds of joint action is given in terms of time-trees. With each participant a tree is connected, and the trees are joined defining joint possible worlds in terms of state-expressing nodes from the trees. Sentences containing DO and Stit are semantically evaluated with respect to such joint possible worlds. Intentional joint actions are characterized in terms of the notion of we-intention (joint intention), characterized formally by means of a special operator. (shrink)

It is far from clear what is meant by logic or what should be meant by it. It is nevertheless reasonable to identify logic as the study of inferences and inferential relations. The obvious practical use of logic is in any case to help us to reason well, to draw good inferences. And the typical form the theory of any part of logic seems to be a set of rules of inference. This answer already introduces some structure into a discussion (...) of the nature of logic, for in an inference we can distinguish the input called a premise or premises from the output known as the conclusion. The transition from a premise or a number of premises to the conclusion is governed by a rule of inference. If the inference is in accordance with the appropriate rule, it is called valid. Rules of inference are often thought of as the alpha and omega of logic. Conceiving of logic as the study of inference is nevertheless only the first approximation to the title question, in that it prompts more questions than it answers. It is not clear what counts as an inference or what a theory of such inferences might look like. What are the rules of inference based on? Where do we find them? The ultimate end. (shrink)

Henkin quantifiers have been introduced in Henkin (1961). Walkoe (1970) studied basic model-theoretical properties of an extension $L_{*}^{1}$ (H) of ordinary first-order languages in which every sentence is a first-order sentence prefixed with a Henkin quantifier. In this paper we consider a generalization of Walkoe's languages: we close $L_{*}^{1}$ (H) with respect to Boolean operations, and obtain the language L¹(H). At the next level, we consider an extension $L_{*}^{2}$ (H) of L¹(H) in which every sentence is an L¹(H)-sentence prefixed with (...) a Henkin quantifier. We repeat this construction to infinity. Using the (un)definability of truth - in - N for these languages, we show that this hierarchy does not collapse. In addition, we compare some of the present results to the ones obtained by Kripke (1975), McGee (1991), and Hintikka (1996). (shrink)

This chapter explores logical semantics, that is, the structural meaning of logical expressions like connectives, quantifiers, and modalities. It focuses on truth-theoretical semantics for formalized languages, a tradition emerging from Carnap's and Tarski's work in the first half of the last century that specifies the meaning of these expressions in terms of the truth-conditions of the sentences in which they occur. It considers Tarski-style definitions of the semantics of a given language in a stronger metalanguage, Tarski's impossibility results, and attempts (...) to overcome them in the post-Tarskian tradition. (shrink)

I introduce a formal language called the language of informational independence (IL-language, for short) that extends an ordinary first-order language in a natural way. This language is interpreted in terms of semantical games of imperfect information. In this language, one can define two negations: (i) strong or dual negation, and (ii) weak or contradictory negation. The latter negation, unlike the former, can occur only sentence-initially. Then I argue that, to a certain extent, the two negations match the distinction existing in (...) natural languages between sentential and constituent negation. As a corollary, I derive the fact that there are no mechanical rules for forming the contradictory negation of an English sentence. (shrink)

Tarski has exerted enormous influence not only on the development of mathematical logic, but on twentieth-century philosophy and philosophical analysis. This influence has been twofold, with the two components pulling in a sense in opposite directions. A comparison with the influence of the Vienna Circle provides an instructive vantage point in viewing Tarski’s influence. On the one hand, Tarski has provided powerful tools for logical analysis in philosophy. His first and most important contribution was to show that — and how (...) — the crucial semantical concept of truth can be defined for various formal languages. They include the most central types of language used and studied by twentieth century logicians and philosophers. The subsequent work by Tarski and his school in creating contemporary model theory in its narrow sense as a branch of technical logic has likewise enriched tremendously the conceptual arsenal of philosophers. The extent and depth of Tarski’s influence is in fact easily underestimated. In comparison, Carnap’s well-known books in logical syntax and logical semantics did not in the same way contribute to the logical techniques that philosophers might find useful. A large part of Tarski’s influence lies in facilitating a switch of emphasis from purely syntactical to model-theoretical, semantical methods. It was Gödel’s and Tarski’s early work that forced logicians and philosophers for the first time to take seriously the distinction between semantical and syntactical concepts and methods. The general theoretical implications of the distinction were not realized at once. In the light of hindsight, it is for instance quite striking that Tarski still in his classical monograph repeatedly assimilates to each other the task of defining truth for some part of mathematics or logic and axiomatizing its truths in a sense that involves explicit syntactical rules of inference. It was nevertheless Tarski more than anyone else who began to develop and exploit systematically model-theoretical concepts in logical theory. In comparison, Gödel never developed systematically the model-theoretical aspects of logic. Others, for instance Quine, stubbornly remained within the syntactical tradition. Carnap, who did switch his attention from the syntactical to a semantical approach, was not powerful enough a logician to create a sufficiently rich store of model-theoretical techniques and ideas to be equally helpful in philosophical analysis. In contrast, several major developments in analytic philosophy have had their starting points in Tarski’s ideas. Well-known cases in point are Davidson’s truth-conditional semantics and the possible worlds semantics developed by Tarski’s favorite former student Richard Montague. (shrink)

Frege's achievement as the creator of contemporary logic should not blind us to the limitations of his approach to logic, language and mathematics. Frege accepted the universality of language and its corollaries, the ineffability of semantics, the one-world view of meaning, and the hypostatization of meanings into meaning entities (Sinne). He assumed compositionality and hence overlooked informationally independent quantifiers. His thesis of the ambiguity of words like "is" is unacceptable in the semantics of natural languages. In higher-order logic, he assumed (...) a nonstandard interpretation, which made it impossible for him to handle the important idea of arbitrary function. (shrink)

Both Frege's Grundgesetze, and Lagrange's treatises on analytical functions pursue a foundational purpose. Still, the former's program is not only crucially different from the latter's. It also depends on a different idea of what foundation of mathematics should be like . Despite this contrast, the notion of function plays similar roles in their respective programs. The purpose of my paper is emphasising this similarity. In doing it, I hope to contribute to a better understanding of Frege's logicism, especially in relation (...) to its crucial differences with a set-theoretic foundational perspective. This should also spread some light on a question arisen by J. Hintikka and G. Sandu in a widely discussed paper, namely whether Frege should or should not be credited with the notion of arbitrary function underlying our standard interpretation of second-order logic. In section 1, I account for Lagrange's notion of function. In section 2, I advance some remarks on connected historical matters. This will provide an appropriate framework for discussing the role played by the notion of function in Frege's Grundgesetze. Section 3 is devoted to this. Some concluding remarks will close the paper. (shrink)

We consider two versions of truth as grounded in verification procedures: Dummett's notion of proof as an effective way to establish the truth of a statement and Hintikka's GTS notion of truth as given by the existence of a winning strategy for the game associated with a statement. Hintikka has argued that the two notions should be effective and that one should thus restrict one's attention to recursive winning strategies. In the context of arithmetic, we show that the two notions (...) do not coincide: on the one hand, proofs in PA do not yield recursive winning strategies for the associated game; on the other hand, there is no sound and effective proof procedure that captures recursive GTS truths. We then consider a generalized version of Game Theoretical Semantics by introducing games with backward moves. In this setting, a connection is made between proofs and recursive winning strategies. We then apply this distinction between two kinds of verificationist procedures to a recent debate about how we recognize the truth of Gödelian sentences. (shrink)

In this paper I am going to inquire to what extent the main requirements of a minimalist theory of truth and falsity (as formulated, for example, by Horwich and Field) can be consistently implemented in a formal theory. I will discuss several of the existing logical theories of truth, including Tarski-type (un)definability results, Kripke’s partial interpretation of truth and falsity, Barwise and Moss’ theory based upon non-well-founded sets, McGee’s treatment of truth as a vague predicate, and Hintikka’s languages of imperfect (...) information, to see which axioms of the minimalist theory they satisfy or fail to satisfy. Finally, I will discuss the relation between the minimalist program and compositionality. (shrink)

Logics in which a relation R is semantically incomplete in a particular universe E, i.e. the union of the extension of R with its anti-extension does not exhaust the whole universe E, have been studied quite extensively in the last years. (Cf. van Benthem (1985), Blamey (1986), and Langholm (1988), for partial predicate logic; Muskens (1996), for the applications of partial predicates to formal semantics, and Doherty (1996) for applications to modal logic.) This is not so with semantically incomplete generalized (...) quantifiers which constitute the subject of the present paper. The only systematic study of these quantifiers from a purely logical point of view, is, to the best of my knowledge, that by van Eijck (1995). We shall take here a different approach than that of van Eijck and mention some of the abstract properties of the resulting logic. Finally we shall prove that the two approaches are interdefinable. (shrink)

numbers as in the following example ♦1,1♦1,2 2,3 5,4p We denote the set of formulas of this modal language by M L(k). For each modality type i, there will be an accessibility relation Ri. That is, an k-ary modal structure for the modal propositional language L will have the form..

This chapter begins with a discussion of the three phases of the interaction between logic and linguistics on the nature of universal grammar. It then attempts to reconstruct the dynamics and interactions between these approaches in logic and in linguistic theory, which represent the major landmarks in the quest for the individuation of the universal structure of language.

entities in mathematics There is a line of argument which keeps ontological commitments to the minimum by making use of conservativity results. The argument goes back to Hilbert who set its general frame. Hilbert’s concern was with certain abstract (ideal) entities in mathematics but the argument has been applied without discrimination to avoid ontological commitment to mathematical entities in physics (Field) or to avoid an ontological commitment to substantial properties in the case of truth (Horwich, Field, Williams).

There is a line of argument which aims to show that certain ontological claims are harmless by making use of conservativity results. The argument goes back to Hilbert who set its general frame. Hilbert’s concern was with certain abstract (ideal) entities in mathematics but the argument has been applied without discrimination to avoid ontological commitment to abstract entities in physics (Field) or to avoid ontological commitment to semantical properties like truth (Shapiro).