We appreciate the opportunity to respond to Schneiderman and colleagues’ opinions on the recent Multiorganization Policy Statement, “An Official ATS/AACN/ACCP/ESICM/SCCM Policy Statement: Responding to Requests for Potentially Inappropriate Treatments in Intensive Care Units”. We will first point out three areas in which Schneiderman and colleagues seem to perceive a disagreement where there is none, then we will respond to their main criticisms of the Multiorganization Policy Statement. In doing so, we will point out areas in which we believe Schneiderman and (...) colleagues have either misunderstood or misrepresented the statement. First, we agree with Schneiderman and... (shrink)

The advent of prenatal genetic diagnosis has sparked debates among ethicists and philosophers regarding parental responsibility towards potential offspring. Some have attempted to place moral obligations on parents to not bring about children with certain diseases in order to prevent harm to such children. There has been no rigorous evaluation of cystic fibrosis in this context. This paper will demonstrate cystic fibrosis to have unique properties that make it difficult to categorise among other diseases with the goal of promulgating a (...) reproductive rule. Once this is established, it will be demonstrated that procreative rules that appeal to future health are inadequate in the era of advancing genetic knowledge. Utilising a specification of Joel Feinberg's ‘open future’ concept outlined by Matteo Mameli, it will offer an analysis of parental obligation that does not constrain parents of potential children with cystic fibrosis with a moral obligation not to bring them about. (shrink)

In this article I ask what recent moral psychology and neuroscience can and can’t claim to have discovered about morality. I argue that the object of study of much recent work is not morality but a particular kind of individual moral judgment. But this is a small and peculiar sample of morality. There are many things that are moral yet not moral judgments. There are also many things that are moral judgments yet not of that particular kind. If moral things (...) are various and diverse, then empirical research about one kind of individual moral judgment doesn’t warrant theoretical conclusions about morality in general. If that kind of individual moral judgment is a peculiar and rare thing, then it is not obvious what it tells us about other moral things. What is more, it is not obvious what its theoretical importance is to begin with—that is, why we should care about it at all. In light of these arguments, I call for a pluralism of methods and objects of inquiry in the scientific investigation of morality, so that it transcends its problematic overemphasis on a particular kind of individual moral judgment. (shrink)

In his book Gabriele Lolli discusses the notion of proof, which is, according to him, the most important and at the same time the least studied aspect of mathematics. According to Lolli, a theorem is a conditional sentence of the form ‘if T then A’ such that A is a logical consequence of T, where A is a sentence and T is a sentence or a conjunction or set of sentences. Verifying that A is a consequence of T generally involves (...) considering infinitely many interpretations; so it is something which is impossible to do in finite terms. Proofs may serve as ‘shortcuts’ in this respect. A proof is defined by Lolli as any finite argument certifying that A is a consequence of T. A proof is a shortcut in the sense that it spares us considering infinitely many interpretations.The reason for such a very general definition of proof is Lolli's strong belief that mathematics is not a rigid system of explicit rules, but rather a set of tools; as a consequence, there is no prescription as to what a proof should or should not be. Actually, mathematics is historically situated and not timeless, and the history of mathematics is the …. (shrink)

Fictionalism and deflationism are two moderate meta-ontological positions that try to occupy a middle ground between the extremes of heavy-duty realism and hard-line eliminativism. Deflationists believe that the existence of certain entities (e.g.: numbers) can be established by means of ‘easy’ arguments—arguments that, supposedly, rely solely on uncontroversial premises and trivial inferences. Fictionalists, however, find easy arguments unconvincing. Amie Thomasson has recently argued that, in their criticism of easy arguments, fictionalists beg the question against deflationism and that the fictionalist alternative (...) interpretation of easy arguments is untenable. In this paper, I argue that both charges are unsubstantiated. Properly understood, the fictionalist’s objection to ‘easy’ arguments takes the form of a dilemma—either the premises of ‘easy’ arguments are not truly uncontroversial or the inferences on which they rely are not truly trivial. Moreover, I argue not only that, contrary to what Thomasson claims, the fictionalist’s interpretation of easy argument is tenable but that the fictionalist might, in fact, have a better explanation of the seemingly trivial nature of the inferences involved in easy arguments than the deflationist’s. (shrink)

Advances in genomics have led to calls for developing population-based preventive genomic sequencing programs with the goal of identifying genetic health risks in adults without known risk factors. One critical issue for minimizing the harms and maximizing the benefits of PGS is determining the kind and degree of control individuals should have over the generation, use, and handling of their genomic information. In this article we examine whether PGS programs should offer individuals the opportunity to selectively opt out of the (...) sequencing or analysis of specific genomic conditions or whether PGS should be implemented using an all-or-nothing panel approach. We conclude that any responsible scale-up of PGS will require a menu approach that may seem impractical to some, but that draws its justification from a rich mix of normative, legal, and practical considerations. (shrink)

Automatized scalable healthcare support solutions allow real-time 24/7 health monitoring of patients, prioritizing medical treatment according to health conditions, reducing medical appointments in clinics and hospitals, and enabling easy exchange of information among healthcare professionals. With recent health safety guidelines due to the COVID-19 pandemic, protecting the elderly has become imperative. However, state-of-the-art health wearable device platforms present limitations in hardware, parameter estimation algorithms, and software architecture. This paper proposes a complete framework for health systems composed of multi-sensor wearable health (...) devices, high-resolution parameter estimation, and real-time monitoring applications. The framework is appropriate for real-time monitoring of elderly patients' health without physical contact with healthcare professionals, maintaining safety standards. The hardware includes sensors for monitoring steps, pulse oximetry, heart rate, and temperature using low-power wireless communication. In terms of parameter estimation, the embedded circuit uses high-resolution signal processing algorithms that result in an improved measure of the HR. The proposed high-resolution signal processing-based approach outperforms state-of-the-art HR estimation measurements using the photoplethysmography sensor. (shrink)

The death of George Floyd in May 2020 sparked an unprecedented global wave of protests that appeared to mark a turning point in the battle against racial injustice. But protests against racism are not new; each comes and soon passes into the archives of history, leaving few lasting changes in its wake. What was different about the death of Floyd was that the graphic manner of its unfolding was captured on film: the slow act of wilful suffocation, and how the (...) entire world was seemingly invited to witness the torment and the execution of this man, in broad daylight, even as he cried I can't breathe. However, this discussion attempts to move beyond that moment of death, the protests that followed and the distracting debate about statues and monuments to argue that the death of Floyd must be seen as the culmination of the process of systemic and structural racism. It aims to show how racism shifted from the black body as the visible and material target of racial oppression to air/breath, and how suffocation became the characteristic feature as well as the weapon of contemporary racial injustice. (shrink)

The Historical Dictionary of Philosophy, the _Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie,_ is distinguished by its particular presentation of philosophical terms, ideas and concepts. Rather than providing mere defintions or descriptive and analytical explanantions the _HWPh _strictly applies the critical method of history of concepts developed by the eminent German scholar and philosopher Joachim Ritter. By means of precise and detailed references it documents the origin, first occurrence, the historical evolution and the changes of meaning of each concept, from Ancient Greek to (...) contemporary philosophy. For the reader this presentation is of unique value: it makes traceable the importance of terms and concepts at certain periods or for a particular philosopher, as well as its changes and development of meaning. (shrink)

I make a contribution to the sociology of epistemologies by examining the neuroscience literature on love from 2000 to 2016. I find that researchers make consequential assumptions concerning the production or generation of love, its temporality, its individual character, and appropriate control conditions. Next, I consider how to account for these assumptions’ being common in the literature. More generally, I’m interested in the ways in which epistemic communities construe, conceive of, and publicly represent and work with their objects of inquiry—and (...) what’s thereby assumed about them and about the world. I argue that these implicit or explicit assumptions are a distinct type of explanandum, whose distinctiveness sociology hasn’t adequately appreciated and taken advantage of. I think it should and I hope it will. (shrink)

The thesis that a temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence characterizes our world plays a central role in Lewis’s philosophy, as. among other things, it underpins one of Lewis most renowned theses—that causation can be analyzed in terms of counterfactual dependence. To maintain that a temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence characterizes our world, Lewis committed himself to two other theses. The first is that the closest possible worlds at which the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional is true is one in which (...) a small miracle occurs—i.e. one whose laws differ from the actual laws in a small spatiotemporal region. The second is that our world is characterized by a temporal asymmetry of miracles. In this paper, I will argue, first, that the latter thesis is either false or incompatible with the picture of the relations among temporal asymmetries endorsed by Lewis and, second, that former thesis conflicts with some of the intuitions which seem to guide us when engaging in counterfactual reasoning. If there is any fact of the matter as to which possible worlds in which the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional is true are closest to the actual world, these are not worlds at which a small miracle occurs. (shrink)

The thesis that a temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence characterizes our world plays a central role in Lewis’s philosophy, as, among other things, it underpins one of Lewis most renowned theses – that causation can be analyzed in terms of counterfactual dependence. To maintain that a temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence characterizes our world, Lewis committed himself to two other theses. The first is that the closest possible worlds at which the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional is true is one (...) in which a small miracle occurs – i.e. one whose laws differ from the actual laws in a small spatiotemporal region. The second is that our world is characterized by a temporal asymmetry of miracles. In this paper, I will argue, first, that the latter thesis is either false or incompatible with the picture of the relations among temporal asymmetries endorsed by Lewis and, second, that former thesis conflicts with some of the intuitions which seem to guide us when engaging in counterfactual reasoning. If there is any fact of the matter as to which possible worlds in which the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional is true are closest to the actual world, these are not worlds at which a small miracle occurs. (shrink)

The position advocated in the target article should be called “absurd environmentalism.” Literature showing that general intelligence is related to musical ability is not cited. Also ignored is the heritability of musical talent. Retrospective studies supporting practice over talent are incapable of showing differences in talent, because subjects are self-selected on talent. Reasons for the popularity of absurd environmentalism are discussed.

Carnap’s seminal ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ makes important use of the notion of a framework and the related distinction between internal and external questions. But what exactly is a framework? And what role does the internal/external distinction play in Carnap’s metaontology? In an influential series of papers, Matti Eklund has recently defended a bracingly straightforward interpretation: A Carnapian framework, Eklund says, is just a natural language. To ask an internal question, then, is just to ask a question in, say, English. (...) To try to ask an external question is to try, absurdly, to ask a question in no language at all. Finding that so trivial an I/e distinction can’t help to explain Carnap’s deflationary metaontology, Eklund is led to attribute to Carnap a view he calls ontological pluralism. In this paper, I show that Eklund misreads Carnap, and I argue that this misreading obscures fundamental features of Carnap’s philosophy. I then defend an account of frameworks as what Carnap called semantical systems, and I place this account in the context of Carnap’s philosophical program of explication. Finally, I discuss the role that frameworks and the I/e distinction play in ESO, showing that ESO provides no reason to attribute the doctrine of ontological pluralism to Carnap. (shrink)

My two daughters would love to go tobogganing down the hill by themselves, but they are just toddlers and I am an apprehensive parent, so, before letting them do so, I want to ensure that the toboggan won’t go too fast. But how fast will it go? One way to try to answer this question would be to tackle the problem head on. Since my daughters and their toboggan are initially at rest, according to classical mechanics, their final velocity will (...) be determined by the forces they will be subjected to between the moment the toboggan will be released at the top of the hill and the moment it will reach its highest speed. The problem is that, throughout their downhill journey, my daughters and the toboggan will be subjected to an incredibly large number of forces—from the gravitational pull of any massive object in the universe to the weight of the snowflake that is sitting on the tip of one of my youngest daughter’s hairs—so that any attempt to apply the theory directly to the real-world system in all its complexity seems to be doomed to failure. (shrink)

In 1872, Emil du Bois-Reymond delivered an astonishing lecture entitled “The Limits of Science” at a Congress of German Scientists and Physicians in Leipzig. No stranger to polemic and bellicose oratory, and possessing among his generation of physiologists unmatched rhetorical abilities, du Bois-Reymond had already attracted much public recognition and acclaim for his denigration of French culture at a time when belligerence and competition between Prussia and France had peaked. Yet, the topic of his 1872 lecture had a signal significance (...) which not only would inform du Bois-Reymond’s subsequent public lectures on literature, art, civilization and science, and the place of Darwin in the modern world, but would also elaborate a mechanistic and fatalistic view of consciousness, one that denied scientific understanding of the phenomenon as even obtainable. Controversy exploded—and from all quarters. Renowned scientists accused him of pessimism and of failing to apprehend the progress of in .. (shrink)

Tracing the leading role of emotions in the evolution of the mind, a philosopher and a psychologist pair up to reveal how thought and culture owe less to our faculty for reason than to our capacity to feel. Many accounts of the human mind concentrate on the brain’s computational power. Yet, in evolutionary terms, rational cognition emerged only the day before yesterday. For nearly 200 million years before humans developed a capacity to reason, the emotional centers of the brain were (...) hard at work. If we want to properly understand the evolution of the mind, we must explore this more primal capability that we share with other animals: the power to feel. Emotions saturate every thought and perception with the weight of feelings. The Emotional Mind reveals that many of the distinctive behaviors and social structures of our species are best discerned through the lens of emotions. Even the roots of so much that makes us uniquely human—art, mythology, religion—can be traced to feelings of caring, longing, fear, loneliness, awe, rage, lust, playfulness, and more. From prehistoric cave art to the songs of Hank Williams, Stephen T. Asma and Rami Gabriel explore how the evolution of the emotional mind stimulated our species’ cultural expression in all its rich variety. Bringing together insights and data from philosophy, biology, anthropology, neuroscience, and psychology, The Emotional Mind offers a new paradigm for understanding what it is that makes us so unique. (shrink)

The Quran makes repentance an important element of piety and exhorts believers to repent of their sins. Numerous hadith also emphasize its importance, along with God’s merciful forgiveness of the repentant sinner. In his K. al-Tawwābīn, the Hanbali scholar Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī draws on a wide range of akhbār to present examples of repentance of angels, prophets, Companions of Muḥammad, pious mystics, and others, including non-Muslims. Ibn Qudāma’s treatise stands out for his frequent citation of accounts maligned by other scholars (...) as isrāʾīliyyāt. In addition, his willingness to highlight the sins of prophets and the Prophet’s Companions, while in line with other Hanbalis, challenges common notions of prophetic impeccability and the ethical qualities of the ṣaḥāba. In this article we argue that Ibn Qudāma is willing to challenge these notions because of his vision for the construction of the pious self. He sees human initiative in overcoming the self’s natural inclination to sinfulness as a necessary step toward spiritual excellence. In this regard his spiritual vision is shaped by certain Sufi notions. While divine grace still plays a role in the working of repentance, it does not eliminate the need for human initiative. This led Ibn Qudāma to construct a mythical past in which many of the great spiritual figures were involved with a spiritual struggle with their own immoral or impious instincts. (shrink)

We define a formula φ in a first-order language L , to be an equation in a category of L -structures K if for any H in K , and set p = {φ;i ϵI, a i ϵ H} there is a finite set I 0 ⊂ I such that for any f : H → F in K , ▪. We say that an elementary first-order theory T which has the amalgamation property over substructures is equational if every quantifier-free (...) formula is equivalent in T to a boolean combination of equations in Mod, the category of models of T with embeddings for morphisms. Thus, we develop a theory of independence with respect to equations in general categories of structures, which is similar to the one introduced in stability but which, in our context, has an algebraic character. (shrink)

This paper examines the interplay of semantics and pragmatics within the domain of film. Films are made up of individual shots strung together in sequences over time. Though each shot is disconnected from the next, combinations of shots still convey coherent stories that take place in continuous space and time. How is this possible? The semantic view of film holds that film coherence is achieved in part through a kind of film language, a set of conventions which govern the relationships (...) between shots. In this paper, we develop and defend a new version of the semantic view. We articulate it for a pair of conventions that govern spatial relations between viewpoints. One such rule is already well-known; sometimes called the "180° Rule," we term it the X-Constraint; to this we add a previously unrecorded rule, the T-Constraint. As we show, both have the effect, in different ways, of limiting the way that viewpoint can shift through space from shot to shot over the course of a film sequence. Such constraints, we contend, are analogous to relations of discourse coherence that are widely recognized in the linguistic domain. If film is to have a language, it is a language made up of rules like these. (shrink)

I finall am getting around to writing my short story. My name is Gabriel. Three years ago, I had a real problem. I was failing language arts. I liked the short stories and the novels that we read in class and at home, but I just couldn't write any stories of my own. And you had to write short stories, if you were going to pass language arts.

In his book Gabriele Lolli discusses the notion of proof, which is, according to him, the most important and at the same time the least studied aspect of mathematics. According to Lolli, a theorem is a conditional sentence of the form ‘if T then A’ such that A is a logical consequence of T, where A is a sentence and T is a sentence or a conjunction or set of sentences. Verifying that A is a consequence of T generally involves (...) considering infinitely many interpretations; so it is something which is impossible to do in finite terms. Proofs may serve as ‘shortcuts’ in this respect. A proof is defined by Lolli as any finite argument certifying that A is a consequence of T. A proof is a shortcut in the sense that it spares us considering infinitely many interpretations.The reason for such a very general definition of proof is Lolli's strong belief that mathematics is not a rigid system of explicit rules, but rather a set of tools; as a consequence, there is no prescription as to what a proof should or should not be. Actually, mathematics is historically situated and not timeless, and the history of mathematics is the …. (shrink)

We prove that if T is a complete theory with weak elimination of imaginaries, then there is an explicit bijection between strict independence relations for T and strict independence relations for Teq\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${T^{\rm eq}}$$\end{document}. We use this observation to show that if T is the theory of the Fraïssé limit of finite metric spaces with integer distances, then Teq\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${T^{\rm eq}}$$\end{document} has more than one (...) strict independence relation. This answers a question of Adler :1–20, 2009, Question 1.7). (shrink)

This volume advances discussions between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and opens new ways of thinking about force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. -/- The force-content dichotomy has shaped the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. Isn’t it obvious that, for example, the clauses of a conditional are not asserted and must therefore be propositions and propositions the forceless contents of forceful acts? But, others have recently asked in (...) response, how can a proposition be a truth value bearer if it is not unified through the forceful act of a subject that takes a position regarding how things are? Can we not instead think of propositions as being inherently forceful, but of force as being cancelled in certain contexts? And what do indicators of assertoric, but also of directive and interrogative force mean? (shrink)

It is acceptable to state that Foucault has always held a strong stand and a radical distance in front of Kant’s thoughts. Similarly, it is possible thinking that through the changes of Foucault’s thoughts, the sceptical outlook suffered changes in relation with Kantian philosophical critique. Consequently, as said by Jon Simmons in his Foucault and the Political “it is ironic that a writer with a reputation for anarchist, nihilistic, even apocalyptic opposition to rationality, humanism and the Enlightment turned to Kant (...) as a model for critique”. Despite the fact of trying to find a labelling reference for Foucault’s thought, that’s to say, where to put it?: modernity, post-modernity, anarchism, radical sceptical; the labelling duty would be very problematic; although the philosopher himself states that “if there is a need to label Foucault within the philosophical tradition, it is in Kant’s critical philosophical tradition and his stake (Foucault’s) would be named “a critique history of Western thought”. In fact, Foucault himself also writes that, “Every contemporary thought is, in certain way, neo-Kantian. In the same way, inquiries himself, “wasn’t Kant the one who said: one doesn’t learn philosophy, one learns how to philosophize?”. (shrink)

"Zones of Exception: Biopolitical Territories of the Neoliberal Era" explores the biopolitical in Roberto Esposito together with the notion of exception in Giorgio Agamben to think diverse scenarios of social, economic, and cultural conflict of the neoliberal era. Focusing on the Argentine piqueteros and the clandestini at the Centers of Temporary Permanence in Italy, we discuss how the economic rationality of neoliberal rule both produces "bare life" and is haunted by its disruption, in ways that neoliberalism can't fully contain. This (...) dislocation, its paradoxical and unstable nature between bodies and territories, may become the instance of an actual or potential resistance. (shrink)