Regulations designed to prevent global inequalities in the use of genetic resources apply to both commercial and non-commercial research. Conflating the two may have unintended consequences for collaboration between the Global North and biodiverse countries in the Global South, which may promote global injustice rather than mitigate it.

This work is the first monograph devoted to the interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of chance in Physics II 4-6 and its implications and projections in other treatises, including an original and comprehensive account of the Aristotelian conception of chance, of accidental causality in the realm of nature, and of accidental causality in the realm of human action. One of the main interpretative issues around Aristotle’s discussion of chance is its relation to the four causes and to teleology. In this sense, (...) it is particularly difficult to find the common features which fortune (tyche) and spontaneity (automaton) share. This work, offers such an interpretation of Aristotle’s general concept of chance (i.e. common to fortune and spontaneity), which shows clearly its relation with his theory of causality (Phys. II 3), with teleology, and with the application of this theory to the study of nature. It also shows how fortune and spontaneity can be interpreted consistently with this general characterization of chance, and how the specific differences between them can be accounted for paying attention to the different structures of causality in the realm of nature and in the realm of human action. Regarding the specific concept of spontaneity (automaton), a crux interpretum, the book offers one of the few independent discussions this issue in Aristotelian literature, and proposes a sub-classification in two kinds of spontaneity based on an analysis of Aristotle’s different examples and characterizations: ‘mixed spontaneity’ (which shares some features with fortune), and ‘pure spontaneity’ (which takes place strictly in the realm of nature). These different structures had not been recognized in specialized literature before. The problem of chance has projections into Aristotle’s natural philosophy, as well as into Aristotle’s theory of action and practical philosophy. This ample perspective of Aristotle’s work, and of the different explanatory models and ontological structures therein involved, constitutes an interesting groundwork for future developments in some or many of these realms of investigation. (shrink)

José Benardete developed a famous paradox involving a beginningless set of items each member of which satisfies some predicate just in case no earlier member satisfies it. The Grim Reaper version of this paradox has recently been employed in favor of various finitist metaphysical theses, ranging from temporal finitism to causal finitism to the discrete nature of time. Here, I examine a new challenge to these finitist arguments—namely, the challenge of implying that the future cannot be endless. In particular, I (...) develop future-oriented Benardete paradoxes and examine their epistemic symmetry with past-oriented paradoxes. (shrink)

I defend a new argument for causal finitism, the view that nothing can have an infinite causal history. I begin by defending a number of plausible metaphysical principles, after which I explore a host of novel variants of the Littlewood-Ross and Thomson’s Lamp paradoxes that violate such principles. I argue that causal finitism is the best solution to the paradoxes.

Benardete paradoxes involve a beginningless set each member of which satisfies some predicate just in case no earlier member satisfies it. Such paradoxes have been wielded on behalf of arguments for the impossibility of an infinite past. These arguments often deploy patchwork principles in support of their key linking premise. Here I argue that patchwork principles fail to justify this key premise.

"Social ontology, conventionally defined, is not primarily about us. Rather, it is about the social world (or worlds), about social reality (or realities), or about the domain(s) of social facts. Social ontology aims at providing an inventory of the basic kinds of entities that make up the social world(s) - items such as norms, institutions, social practices, status positions, power structures, and artifacts. It is the study of the basic kinds of properties of these entities, and of how the social (...) world exists, how it is constituted, or constructed"--. (shrink)

This volume outlines a model of language that can be characterized as functionalist, usage-based, dynamic, and complex-adaptive. The core idea is that linguistic structure is not stable and uniform, but continually refreshed by the interaction between three components: usage, the communicative activities of speakers; conventionalization, the social processes triggered by these activities and feeding back into them; and entrenchment, the individual cognitive processes that are also linked to these activities in a feedback loop. Hans-Joerg Schmid explains how this multiple (...) feedback system works by extending his Entrenchment-and-Conventionalization Model, showing how the linguistic system is created, sustained, and continually adapted by the ongoing interaction between usage, conventionalization, and entrenchment. Fulfilling the promise of usage-based accounts, the model explains how exactly usage is transformed into collective and individual grammar and how these two grammars in turn feed back into usage.0The book is exceptionally broad in scope, with insights from a wide range of linguistic subdisciplines. It provides a coherent account of the role of multiple factors that influence language structure, variation, and change, including frequency, economy, identity, multilingualism, and language contact. (shrink)

Empirical research in bioethics has developed rapidly over the past decade, but has largely eschewed the use of technology-driven methodologies. We propose “design bioethics” as an area of conjoined theoretical and methodological innovation in the field, working across bioethics, health sciences and human-centred technological design. We demonstrate the potential of digital tools, particularly purpose-built digital games, to align with theoretical frameworks in bioethics for empirical research, integrating context, narrative and embodiment in moral decision-making. Purpose-built digital tools can engender situated engagement (...) with bioethical questions; can achieve such engagement at scale; and can access groups traditionally under-represented in bioethics research and theory. If developed and used with appropriate rigor, tools motivated by “design bioethics” could offer unique insights into new and familiar normative and empirical issues in the field. (shrink)

Em sua obra O segundo sexo “fatos e mitos”, Simone de Beauvoir se propõe uma genealogia do ser mulher considerando a questão do que fez da mulher o “outro”. Isto porque, em sua análise existencial, a filósofa percebe a situação da mulher como a do inessencial e inautêntico. A mulher estranha a si mesma pois se constitui como o outro do homem. E, por sua vez, vista pelo olhar masculino, a mulher é o misterioso de duas faces, é tudo aquilo (...) que o homem não é e não pode ser, o que faria da mulher o angustiante inexplicável da existência. Nesta alteridade negativa, é construída uma história da mulher no mundo e diversos mitos sobre o que é ser mulher, que resultam em uma situação. Evidentemente, uma situação opressiva, para a qual a autora considera ainda soluções, como a possibilidade de não se encerrar no destino materno e o ganho de poder aquisitivo — que livrariam as mulheres de sua sujeição social. Assim, expomos neste artigo como Simone de Beauvoir caracteriza a situação e os mitos da mulher, a fim de compreender porquê seria a mulher o segundo sexo. (shrink)

Neste artigo pretendemos mostrar as diferentes implicações epistemológicas e éticas da ideia de princípio fisiológico do conhecimento nas filosofias de Schopenhauer e Nietzsche. Pois, se para o primeiro isto será a garantia de afirmação de um conhecimento irracional, para o segundo é a confirmação da não possibilidade de conhecimento. Assim, veremos como, para Schopenhauer, o princípio fisiológico do conhecimento nos liga a essência do mundo e nos torna capazes de atingir em certas vias a própria coisa em si, a vontade. (...) Na filosofia de Nietzsche, tal princípio é a justa prova de que todo o conhecimento não se liga a nada mais do que a manutenção da vida, de forma que a linguagem e a “verdade” são apenas construtos para a sobrevivência humana. Observaremos também qual valoração de vida ambos filósofos imputam em suas considerações, já que, em Schopenhauer, vislumbrar a verdade é se dar conta do quão pouco valor a vida possui, enquanto em Nietzsche a tragédia da vida se mostra sempre afirmativa. (shrink)

In this paper, I distinguish three claims, which I label individual intentional autonomy, individual intentional autarky, and intentional individualism. The autonomy claim is that under normal circumstances, each individual's behavior has to be interpreted as his or her own action. The autarky claim is that the intentional interpretation of an individual's behavior has to bottom out in that individual's own volitions, or pro-attitudes. The individualism claim is weaker, arguing that any interpretation of an individual's behavior has to be given in (...) terms of individual intentional states. I argue that individual intentional autonomy implies neither individual intentional autarky, nor intentional individualism, with which it is usually lumped together. I further argue that this insight is the key to an adequate view of an important class of actions, i.e., plural actions. Key Words: joint action • shared intentions • methodological individualism • intentional interpretation • collective agents • influence • autonomy. (shrink)

The present volume contains a selection of papers presented at the Fifth Conference on Collective Intentionality held at the University of Helsinki August 31 to September 2, 2006 and two additional contributions. The common aim of the papers is to explore the structure of shared intentional attitudes, and to explain how they underlie the social, cultural and institutional world. The contributions to this volume explore the phenomenology of sharedness, the concept of sharedness, and also various aspects of the structure of (...) collective intentionality in general, and of the intricate relations between sharedness and normativity in particular. Concepts of Sharedness shows how rich and lively the philosophical research focused on the analysis of collective intentionality has become, and will provide further inspiration for future work in this rapidly evolving field. (shrink)

Abstract:In this article, we present a pragmatic approach to neuroethics, referring back to John Dewey and his articulation of the “common good” and its discovery through systematic methods. Pragmatic neuroethics bridges philosophy and social sciences and, at a very basic level, considers that ethics is not dissociable from lived experiences and everyday moral choices. We reflect on the integration between empirical methods and normative questions, using as our platform recent bioethical and neuropsychological research into moral cognition, action, and experience. Finally, (...) we present the protocol of a study concerning teenagers’ morality in everyday life, discussing our epistemological choices as an example of a pragmatic approach in empirical ethics. We hope that this article conveys that even though the scope of neuroethics is broad, it is important not to move too far from the real life encounters that give rise to moral questions in the first place. (shrink)

This chapter investigates the idea of collective epistemic commonality suggested by Charles Taylor's example, and contrasts it with a distributive notion of epistemic commonality. It describes a number of accounts of collective epistemic commonality, and then argues that, contrary to what Taylor suggests, conversation is not constitutive of collective epistemic commonality as such, but rather presupposes basic forms of collective epistemic commonality. Taylor's remarks indicate that understanding the consensus is insufficient as whatever proposition people rationally and openly accept in conversation. (...) It is suggested that joint attitudes are irreducible, relational, and pre-reflective, and that such attitudes are joint, in the respect that the participants are aware of themselves as a ‘we’. Highly inferential beliefs need some form of communication, and are probably really some form of joint commitment. (shrink)

Critical Realism and the Objective Value of Sustainability contributes to the growing discussion surrounding the concept of sustainability, using a critical realist approach within a transdisciplinary theoretical framework to examine how sustainability objectively occurs in the natural world and in society. The book develops an ethical theory of sustainability as an objective value, rooted not in humans' subjective preferences but in the holistic web of relationships, interdependencies, and obligations existing among living things on Earth, a web believed to have maintained (...) life on Earth over the last 3.7 billion years. It proposes three pillars of sustainability ethics: contentment for the human existence given to us; justice (beyond distributive justice); and meaningful freedom (within ecological and moral limits). Using abductive reasoning, the book infers that there is an out-of-this-world Sustainer behind the Earth's sustainability acting as a metaphysical source of all being and value. It argues that sustainability value, accepted as a shared understanding of the common good, must guide individual decisions and socio-economic development efforts as a matter of deliberate choice, as well as be built on the awareness that there are non-negotiable, pre-established conditions for our planet's sustainability. This book will be of interest to students and scholars across fields of inquiry, including sustainability, sustainable development, environmental philosophy and ethics, philosophy of science, ecological economics, and to whoever may wonder why seasons exists and why humans have creative minds. (shrink)

Residence of unauthorized immigrants is a stable feature of the Global North’s liberal democracies. This article asks how liberal-democratic policymakers should respond to this phenomenon, assuming both that states have incontrovertible rights and interests to assert control over immigration and that unauthorized residence is nevertheless an entrenched fact. It argues that a set of liberal-democratic commitments gives policymakers strong reason to implement both so-called ‘firewall’ and ‘regularization’ policies, thereby protecting unauthorized immigrants’ basic needs and interests and officially incorporating many of (...) them in society. It then explains that the background imperative of immigration control creates a dilemmatic tension between these policies, as regularization is envisaged alongside the removal of the ineligible, which is in turn hindered by the implementation of firewalls. This creates a dilemma between the pursuit of two policy goals that are both underwritten by the same value commitments. Though it cannot be entirely dissolved, I argue that the best way to mitigate this dilemma is to design regularization policy in a way that leaves only a small number of unauthorized immigrants subject to removal. (shrink)

The specter of the ‘group mind’ or ‘collective subject’ plays a crucial and fateful role in the current debate on collective intentionality. Fear of the group mind is one important reason why philosophers of collective intentionality resort to individualism. It is argued here that this measure taken against the group mind is as unnecessary as it is detrimental to our understanding of what it means to share an intention. A non-individualistic concept of shared intentionality does not necessarily have to get (...) stuck with some collectivist super-agent. Rather, the specter of the group mind arises from a deep-seated ‘Cartesian’ preconception concerning intentionality, which we should try to overcome. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Sade, Nietzsche, and Brady at the Gates of Janus Brady's Life and Crimes Philosophy and the Moors Murders Brady's Library A Little Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing Nietzsche Sade The Sadean Hero and the Serial Killer Opening the Gates of Janus Brady Evaluates Other Serial Killers.

Worldwide interest in understanding art and creative practices as valid forms of knowledge production has led to the establishment of research-creation as an interdisciplinary academic field in the last twenty years in Canada as elsewhere. Its establishment relates to a growing interest in critical making and technological innovation and to the legacies of feminism(s) and its critique of the power dynamics of knowledge production within academia. This article outlines a series of interactive projects that bring visibility to Latin American women (...) in art, science and technology and speculates on the legacies of feminism(s) in the emergence of research-creation. The four projects discussed build on each other and explore re-mediation, re-activation and re-enactment as part of a collaborative feminist research-creation methodology. I theorize their potential to activate political memory by highlighting how these three approaches to creation share a preoccupation for revisiting the past through repetition, iteration and the facilitation of intergenerational encounters among humans, non-humans and across media and technologies. While discussing the feminist orientation of these approaches, I suggest a critique of dominant modes of knowledge production that have obscured the contributions of Latin American women and offer four research-creation interventions in the media arts archive. (shrink)

In this article the relations between philosophy and applied ethics are considered. The presented deliberation is concentrated on the question whether philosophy has contributed to applied ethics, especially to business ethics. Trying to find an answer to this question I will refer to the discussion which was started by R. Rorty in which he presented his own point of view on the issues related to moral development and the role of philosophy and philosophers in the modern world. Rorty points at (...) proper tools which, in his opinion, can be helpful to business ethicists and formulates the goal they should try to aim at. His opinions has started a vivid discussion. Patricia H. Werhane, Daryl Koehn and Richard T. De George try to discuss with Rorty’s statement. They oppose Rorty’s argument that philosophy is not more relevant to applied ethics than any other academic disciplines. They point to the facts which document philosophers’ contribution in forming business ethics. This article presents their arguments as well as an attempt of their critical assessment. (shrink)

The effects of non-standard Philosophy on Epistemelogy.

Unlike many other early modern philosophers, Spinoza was not particularly troubled by scepticism. Spinoza's disdain for skeptics is backed up by remarkable epistemic confidence. Spinoza is thus concerned with at least three kinds of skeptics: with the methodological skeptic; the philosophical skeptic; with the fideist who gives epistemic priority to scripture or revelation over reason. The skeptic's recommendation to suspend one's judgment relies on a flawed metaphysical view of the thinking subject and its ideas. Spinoza has epistemological concerns about methodological (...) skepticism. Descartes's strategy of employing methodological skepticism in order to convince his readers of the existence of certain truths is risky. Spinoza's dismissal of the skeptics is bolstered by a demanding notion of ideas as acts of understanding, which presuppose and explain the existence of their objects. (shrink)

In this review, we present some ethical imperatives observed in this pandemic from a data ethics perspective. Our exposition connects recurrent ethical problems in the discipline, such as, privacy, surveillance, transparency, accountability, and trust, to broader societal concerns about equality, discrimination, and justice. We acknowledge data ethics role as significant to develop technological, inclusive, and pluralist societies. - - - Resumen: En esta revisión, exponemos algunos de los imperativos éticos observados desde la ética de datos en esta pandemia. Nuestra exposición (...) busca conectar problemas éticos típicos dentro de esta disciplina, a saber, privacidad, vigilancia, transparencia, responsabilidad y confianza, con preocupaciones a nivel social relacionadas con la igualdad, discrimi nación y justicia. Consideramos que la ética de datos tiene un rol significativo para desarrollar sociedades tecnificadas, inclusivas y pluralistas. (shrink)

Patentowanie ludzkich genów jest zjawiskiem, które w obecnych czasach nabrało intensywności i znaczenia. Jest jedną z kluczowych form zabezpieczania praw własności przemysłowej, zwłaszcza dla ośrodków badawczych i koncernów farmaceutycznych. Ze względu na naturę produktu podlegającego opatentowaniu, pomysł patentowania genów budzi wiele kontrowersji i rodzi spory na różnych płaszczyznach. Celem artykułu jest naszkicowanie ram prawnych dla tego zjawiska (m.in. porównanie regulacji europejskich i amerykańskich) oraz krytyczne omówienie argumentów przemawiających zarówno w obronie tej procedury, jak i przeciwko niej, wysuwane z różnych perspektyw: (...) prawnej (kwestia posiadania przez geny tzw. zdolności patentowej, kontrowersje związane z prawem własności do ludzkiego ciała), społeczno-ekonomicznej (wpływ zjawiska na rozwój badań naukowych oraz na ceny leków i dostępność różnych terapii) oraz etycznej (omówionej na podstawie wybranych kazusów). Artykuł zarysowuje również kilka propozycji rozwiązań praktycznych, które mają usuwać przynajmniej niektóre kontrowersje związane z patentowaniem genów. (shrink)

The series of psychological explanations for the atrocities of Hitler’s Germany followed a development that started with the personality of the perpetrators and subsequently focused on the situation, almost to the exclusion of the person component. Milgram’s experimental series marks a turning point. His construct of destructive obedience claims a validity that transcends the Nazi context and has far-reaching implications for human behavior in hierarchies, irrespective of the political system. The merits of his approach can be understood in comparison and (...) in connection with other theoretical and empirical venues that each provide a unique insight into the mechanisms underlying the Holocaust. (shrink)

Practical reasoning is an agent's capacity to determine her course of behavior on the base of some evaluation of available alternatives. Reasoning is instrumental insofar as an agent decides over available alternatives by aiming to choose the best means to realize her own goals. Reasoning is strategic if the agent assumes that what the best means to realize her own goals is depends on what other agents will do. Strategic reasoning still plays a central role in influential accounts of social (...) action. This paper first argues for the view that purely strategic reasoners are unable to achieve even the most basic and unproblematic forms of mutually beneficent coordination, and then gathers some elements of a richer account of relevant forms of practical reasoning. (shrink)

El objetivo de esta reseña es presentar un libro que reflexiona acerca de los procesos históricos de constitución de la identidad masculina y femenina, buscando explicaciones posibles para la desigualdad de género y la dominación sexista que se ha evidenciado a lo largo de la historia y en distintas sociedades.

Este artículo presenta una caracterización del proceso de autogestión laboral ocurrido en la Argentina en el período 1990-2006, apuntando especialmente sobre el universo de las Empresas Recuperadas por sus Trabajadores. En esta dirección, se argumenta sobre una serie de dimensiones analíticas que singularizan a este proceso con referencia a otras experiencias autogestionarias ocurridas antecedentemente. Esta singularidad descansa específicamente en que estas experiencias pueden ser estudiadas como procesos de recolectivización laboral, cuya emergencia y desarrollo se ubica en un escenario atravesado por (...) un profundo proceso de descolectivización social, económica y política. Las dimensiones destacadas y analizadas para aludir al proceso de recolectivización suponen la exposición de argumentos en torno a los siguientes elementos interpretativos: la reconstrucción de un espacio y una experiencia colectiva de trabajo que recuperó parte de la historia asalariada de los trabajadores, la reconfiguración de vínculos de sociabilidad al interior del espacio productivo, la relación con organizaciones sociales y gremiales que representaron los intereses de los trabajadores de estas empresas recuperadas. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay considers definitions of racism which emphasise its behavioural, motivational, and cognitive features. The behavioural definition (‘the failure to give equal consideration, based on the fact of race alone’) is rejected, primarily due to its inability to distinguish between ‘true’and ‘ordinary’racism. It is the former which is morally most objectionable — and which identifies the essence of the racist attitude and belief. The central part of the essay argues in favour of the motivational approach to the definition (‘the (...) infliction of unequal consideration, motivated by the desire to dominate, based on race alone’) and clarifies the way in which racism, thus understood, conflicts with the principle of human equality. Finally, the cognitivist definition (‘unequal consideration, out of a belief in the inferiority of another race’) is also rejected, despite its intuitive appeal. The overall discussion has important implications for moral philosophy. It is shown both that the principle of human equality does not strictly imply equal consideration, and that one may violate the principle of equal perception, yet not deny the principle which, from the perspective of this argument, is the more fundamental element in the principle of human equality, the principle of equal human worth. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that a) altruism is an inadequate label for human cooperative behavior, and b) an adequate account of cooperation has to depart from the standard economic model of human behavior by taking note of the agents' capacity to see themselves and act as team-members. Contrary to what Fehr et al. seem to think, the main problem of the conceptual limitations of the standard model is not so much the assumption of sel shness but rather the (...) atomistic conception of the individual. A much-neglected question of the theory of cooperation is how the agent's social identity is determined, i.e. how individuals come to think of themselves and act as members of a group. Considering as an example one of Fehr et al.'s third party punishment experiments, I shall argue that the agents' identities are strongly in uenced by the way the experiment is presented to the participants, especially by the collectivity-related vocabulary used in the instructions. (shrink)

In this paper I develop an account of Fichte’s conception of philosophical construction. Following the latter’s definition of philosophy as the ‘science of science’, philosophy is to be understood as a normative theory of what should qualify as science. In order to ground scientific knowledge-production as such, philosophy itself has to acquire a scientific method, through the application of which the constitution of scientific knowledge is secured. In systematic continuity to Kant’s account of geometrical construction, Fichte develops a philosophical method (...) that exploits the special epistemic conditions of performativity. Construction is then defined as an experimental, self-reflexive performance that exemplifies consciousness. Throughout its acts of exemplification this reflexive kind of self-observation yields a particular type of experience, which ultimately satisfies the Science of Knowledge’s demand for certainty, that is intellectual intuition. (shrink)

Este trabajo se propone mostrar cómo la Teoría Neoclásica de la Ley Natural fundamenta la existencia de normas morales absolutas, cuál es su relevancia para la filosofía moral, y qué críticas pueden ser formuladas a la argumentación de los autores. Ellos postulan que la ley natural, mediante normas, lleva a elegir y proteger bienes humanos básicos, correspondientes a los diversos aspectos de la naturaleza humana, evitando su destrucción, daño o impedimento. Aunque la mayoría de las normas morales admiten excepción, nunca (...) lo hacen las que prohíben realizar un acto que siempre daña directamente un bien básico, pues tal acto no puede compatibilizarse con la propia autorrealización, y atenta contra la dignidad humana. La división del trabajo tomará la siguiente forma: en los primeros cuatro apartados se abordarán los conceptos clave para la defensa de una norma absoluta en la Teoría Neoclásica, en el quinto se enlazarán los conceptos al modo que los autores lo hacen para demostrar la existencia de absolutos morales y someter el consecuencialismo a crítica, y en el sexto se hará una breve revisión crítica de los argumentos presentados. (shrink)