We generalize the concept of a cooperative non-transferable utility game by introducing a socially structured game. In a socially structured game every coalition of players can organize themselves according to one or more internal organizations to generate payoffs. Each admissible internal organization on a coalition yields a set of payoffs attainable by the members of this coalition. The strengths of the players within an internal organization depend on the structure of the internal organization and are represented by (...) an exogenously given power vector. More powerful players have the power to take away payoffs of the less powerful players as long as those latter players are not able to guarantee their payoffs by forming a different internal organization within some coalition in which they have more power.We introduce the socially stable core as a solution concept that contains those payoffs that are both stable in an economic sense, i.e., belong to the core of the underlying cooperative game, and stable in a social sense, i.e., payoffs are sustained by a collection of internal organizations of coalitions for which power is distributed over all players in a balanced way. The socially stable core is a subset and therefore a refinement of the core. We show by means of examples that in many cases the socially stable core is a very small subset of the core.We will state conditions for which the socially stable core is non-empty. In order to derive this result, we formulate a new intersection theorem that generalizes the KKMS intersection theorem. We also discuss the relationship between social stability and the wellknown concept of balancedness for NTU-games, a sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core. In particular we give an example of a socially structured game that satisfies social stability and therefore has a non-empty core, but whose induced NTU-game does not satisfy balancedness in the general sense of Billera. (shrink)

Both economists and psychologists are interested in understanding decision making under uncertainty. Yet, they rely on different concepts to analyse human behaviour: economists use economic preference parameters rooted in utility theory, while psychologists use personality traits to describe responses to uncertain situations. Using a large sample of university students, this study examines and contrasts five economic preference parameters and six psychological personality traits that are commonly used to study individuals’ attitudes towards uncertainty. A novelty of this paper is including both (...) the economic concept of ambiguity aversion as well as the personality trait of ambiguity intolerance. We find that standard economic preference measures based on incentivized choice tasks seem to capture rather different characteristics than psychological personality traits. In contrast, economic preference measures obtained from self-assessment questions appear more related to personality traits, especially ambiguity intolerance. (shrink)

Adaptive learning dynamics have been widely studied in monotone games. By assuming that players eventually choose undominated responses to past play, these processes are intrinsically backwards-looking. However, it is also reasonable to assume that players are able to anticipate the backwards-looking behavior of their opponents, resulting in forward-looking dynamics which have largely been ignored in this literature. Using a cognitive hierarchy framework, we show that the limits of all k-level adaptive learning dynamics, which allow for k levels of such forward-looking (...) behavior and subsume adaptive dynamics when $$k=1$$, fall within the smallest interval containing all serially undominated strategies, and hence converge to the unique serially undominated equilibrium in dominance solvable games. Using over 1200 rounds of experimental duopoly data from Oechssler et al. (J Econ Sci Assoc 2:13–21, 2016a; From imitation to collusion: a replication [dataset], 2016b. https://doi.org/10.11588/data/10075 ), we find not only that the k-level model is highly consistent with observed behavior, but our findings also suggest that allowing for higher levels of reasoning has an explanatory advantage over traditional adaptive dynamics. (shrink)

In this paper, we provide a detailed review of previous classifications of 2 × 2 games and suggest a mathematically simple way to classify the symmetric 2 × 2 games based on a decomposition of the payoff matrix into a cooperative and a zero-sum part. We argue that differences in the interaction between the parts is what makes games interesting in different ways. Our claim is supported by evolutionary computer experiments and findings in previous literature. In addition, we provide a (...) method for using a stereographic projection to create a compact 2-d representation of the game space. (shrink)

This study analyses the sensitivity of public goods contributions through the lens of psychological motives. We report the results of a public goods experiment in which subjects were induced with the motives of care and anger through autobiographical recall. Subjects’ preferences, beliefs, and perceptions under each motive are compared with those of subjects experiencing a neutral autobiographical recall control condition. We find, but only for those subjects with the highest comprehension of the game, that care elicits significantly higher contributions (...) than anger, with the control treatment in between. This positive influence of the care motive on unconditional giving is accounted for partly by preferences for giving and partly by beliefs concerning greater contributions by others. Anger also affects attention to own and other’s payoffs and perceptions of the game’s incentive structure. (shrink)

This paper investigates the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous and nonquasiconcave games. We introduce a new notion of continuity, called weakly continuous security, which is weaker than the most known weak notions of continuity, including the surrogate point secure of SSYM game of Carbonell-Nicolau and Mclean (Econ Theory, 2018a), the continuous security of Barelli and Meneghel (Econometrica 81:813–824, 2013), C-security of McLennan et al. (Econometrica 79:1643–1664 2011), generalized weakly transfer continuity of Nessah (Economics 47:659–662, 2011), generalized (...) better-reply security of Carmona (Econ Theory 48:1–4, 2011), Barelli and Soza (On the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous and qualitative games, 2009), Barelli and Meneghel (Econometrica 81:813–824, 2013), lower single deviation property of Reny (Further results on the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games. University of Chicago, 2009), better-reply security of Reny (Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999) and the results of Prokopovych (Econ Theory 48:5–16, 2011, Econ Theory 53:383–402, 2013) and Carmona (J Econ Theory 144:1333–1340, 2009). We show that a compact, convex and weakly continuous secure Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, it holds in a large class of discontinuous games. (shrink)

When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three (...) Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory. (shrink)

This note addresses 3 issues that seem to pervade much of economic thought about individual decisions among uncertain alternatives: (1) Restricting primitives to just orderings of first-order gambles and not admitting, e.g., compound acts or joint receipt of consequences and gambles. (2) Great resistance to experimental findings that strongly suggest that most current theories fail descriptively. (3) Taking for granted the innocence of some assumptions when, in fact, they are not innocent, e.g., that constant acts are idempotent. My conclusion is (...) that these restrictions have greatly inhibited developments in utility theory. (shrink)

Replying to Queen Elizabeth II who in November 2008 asked why so few economists had warned about the emerging financial crisis, a group of eminent economists of the British Academy, claimed that while this failure had many causes, the most important was principally a failure of the collective imagination of many bright people, to understand the risks to the system as a whole. The paper suggests that this failure is due also to the still heavy influence of the paradigm of (...) rational expectations, that did not provide the intellectual tools to grasp the signs of the impending financial crisis. The paper explores the development of Muth’s rational expectations hypothesis and the parallel development of Simon’s idea of bounded rationality—two opposite views about economic behavior that originated in the same context, during the early 1960s at Carnegie Mellon. It is shown that the latter, while marginalized for decades from the core economic ideas, generated a wide development in cognitive psychology, problem solving and experimental economics that grew up in the last decades and now permit a more profound analysis of human behavior in economic and organizational contexts, that can be the seed of a new thinking in economics. The challenge for economists is to use this new toolbox to incorporate in their models real human behaviors, getting out from the economy of wishful thinking. (shrink)

This article contributes to the debate around the abilities of large language models such as GPT-3, dealing with: firstly, evaluating how well GPT does in the Turing Test, secondly the limits of such models, especially their tendency to generate falsehoods, and thirdly the social consequences of the problems these models have with truth-telling. We start by formalising the recently proposed notion of reversible questions, which Floridi & Chiriatti propose allow one to ‘identify the nature of the source of their (...) answers’, as a probabilistic measure based on Item Response Theory from psychometrics. Following a critical assessment of the methodology which led previous scholars to dismiss GPT’s abilities, we argue against claims that GPT-3 completely lacks semantic ability. Using ideas of compression, priming, distributional semantics and semantic webs we offer our own theory of the limits of large language models like GPT-3, and argue that GPT can competently engage in various semantic tasks. The real reason GPT’s answers seem senseless being that truth-telling is not amongst them. We claim that these kinds of models cannot be forced into producing only true continuation, but rather to maximise their objective function they strategize to be plausible instead of truthful. This, we moreover claim, can hijack our intuitive capacity to evaluate the accuracy of its outputs. Finally, we show how this analysis predicts that a widespread adoption of language generators as tools for writing could result in permanent pollution of our informational ecosystem with massive amounts of very plausible but often untrue texts. (shrink)

This volume presents 38 classic texts in formal epistemology, and strengthens the ties between research into this area of philosophy and its neighbouring intellectual disciplines. The editors provide introductions to five subsections: Bayesian Epistemology, Belief Change, Decision Theory, Interactive Epistemology and Epistemic Logic. 'Formal epistemology' is a term coined in the late 1990s for a new constellation of interests in philosophy, the origins of which are found in earlier works of epistemologists, philosophers of science and logicians. It addresses a growing (...) agenda of problems concerning knowledge, belief, certainty, rationality, deliberation, decision, strategy, action and agent interaction - and it does so using methods from logic, probability, computability, decision and game theory. The volume also includes a thorough index and suggestions for further reading, and thus offers a complete teaching and research package for students as well as research scholars of formal epistemology, philosophy, logic, computer science, theoretical economics and cognitive psychology. (shrink)

The article aims to demonstrate that the nudge theory suffers from three main weaknesses stemming from its theoretical dependence on behavioural economics. The first two weaknesses endanger the paternalistic goal, whereas the third does not justify the libertarian attribute. The first weakness lies in the incomplete realistic characterisation of behavioural economics theory that is the central theoretical pillar of Nudge theory. The second weakness is even more relevant. The normative model of behavioural economics is neoclassical rationality. It can be applied (...) to choices in conditions of risk, when it is possible to forecast the probability of the outcomes of one’s choices. On the contrary the real life problems are inside a complex and uncertain environment. In an uncertain environment the neoclassical algorithms are no longer valid, in that they postulate the knowledge of the probability of the outputs. Thus errors and bias, as observed in behavioural economics, are not such in many instances, but they are instead adaptive and therefore rational responses to the context of decision-making. Therefore nudge theory that pursues the normative paternalistic objective of neutralising the bias and judgement errors discovered by behavioural economics and putting paternalistically the citizen on the right track, is in fact proceeding in the wrong direction. The last weakness concerns an assumption of Nudge theory about the duality of mind. System 1 represents the intuitive mind, while System 2 corresponds to the analytical one. System 1 tends to make decisions quickly and unconsciously, while System 2 follows a slow and conscious process. Biases and judgement errors are mainly generated by System 1. However, System 2 may later intervene to correct them. From this premise, the Nudge theory affirms its libertarian character. In this paper I will argue that the dualism of the mind would not entail the reversibility of some nudges, particularly of default states. In this way the fundamental pillar is weakened to justify the libertarian character of the nudge theory. (shrink)

This essay aims to explore imitation in social contexts. The argument that summarizes my claim is that the perception of other people’s behaviour conditions the agent in imitating that behaviour, as evidence from social psychology holds (Bargh and Chartrand in J Pers Soc Psychol 76(6):893–910, 1999; Bargh and Ferguson in Psychol Bull 126(6):925–945, 2000; Bargh and Ferguson in Trends Cogn Sci 8(1):33–39, 2004), but what the agent perceives and experiences becomes potential motives for her actions only through her (...) identification with a particular way of being and acting. Therefore, although the agent’s actions are conditioned by perceptual stimuli, the latter are not the cause of the actions. The agent is the ultimate cause. That is, a convergence between perceptual stimuli and conscious will. I take this latter conclusion to suggest a compatibilist approach whereby action in a social situation would require the perceptual conditioning as much as the freedom and consciousness of the agent. (shrink)

This volume reflects the ‘philosophy of science in practice’ approach and takes a fresh look at traditional philosophical problems in the context of natural, social, and health research. Inspired by the work of Nancy Cartwright that shows how the practices and apparatuses of science help us to understand science and to build theories in the philosophy of science, this volume critically examines the philosophical concepts of evidence, laws, causation, and models and their roles in the process of scientific reasoning. (...) Each chapter is an important one in the philosophy of science, while the volume as a whole deals with these philosophical concepts in a unified way in the context of actual scientific practice. This volume thus aims to contribute to this new direction in the philosophy of science.​. (shrink)

This volume reflects the ‘philosophy of science in practice’ approach and takes a fresh look at traditional philosophical problems in the context of natural, social, and health research. Inspired by the work of Nancy Cartwright that shows how the practices and apparatuses of science help us to understand science and to build theories in the philosophy of science, this volume critically examines the philosophical concepts of evidence, laws, causation, and models and their roles in the process of scientific reasoning. (...) Each chapter is an important one in the philosophy of science, while the volume as a whole deals with these philosophical concepts in a unified way in the context of actual scientific practice. This volume thus aims to contribute to this new direction in the philosophy of science.​. (shrink)

The theoretical literature on vertical relationships usually assumes that beliefs about secret contracts take specific forms. In a recent paper, Eguia et al. (Games Econ Behav 109:465–483,2018) propose a new selection criterion that does not impose any restriction on beliefs. In this article, we extend their criterion by generalizing it to risk-averse retailers, and we show that risk aversion modifies the size of the belief subsets that support each equilibrium. We conduct an experiment which revisits that of Eguia et al. (...) (Games Econ Behav 109:465–483,2018). We design a new treatment effect on equilibrium selection depending on the retailers’ risk sensitivity. Experimental results confirm the treatment effect: the more sensitivity there is towards risk, the more the equilibrium played is consistent with passive beliefs. In addition, extending Eguia et al.’s (Games Econ Behav 109:465–483,2018) criterion to risk-averse retailers improves its predictive power on the equilibria played, especially for a population of retailers with moderate to extreme risk aversion. (shrink)

Escalation of commitment causes people to continue a failing course of action. We study the role of construal level in such escalation of commitment. Consistent with the widely held view of construal level as a primed effect, we employed a commonly used prime for manipulating this construct in a laboratory experiment. Our findings revealed that the prime failed to produce statistically significant differences in construal level, which was measured using the Behavior Identification Form. Furthermore, there was no effect of the (...) prime on escalation of commitment, or on constructs that have previously been linked to construal level such as the perceived importance of feasibility considerations relative to desirability considerations, and the number of pros and cons that subjects can think of.Interestingly, however, subjects’ actual construal level scores on the BIF were found to significantly affect escalation. Specifically, our findings show that people with a low construal level are less willing to continue a failing project. This relation is mediated by the perceived importance of the feasibility of the project relative to its desirability. For people with a low construal level, the perceived importance of feasibility relative to desirability is higher, which in turn makes escalation of commitment less likely.Our findings are consistent with prior research suggesting that priming construal level may not always be effective. Thus, while construal level has typically been regarded as a state-like variable that can be primed, in this study, we show that construal level may also be considered as a trait. (shrink)

Third-party punishment (TPP) has been shown to be an effective mechanism for maintaining human cooperation. However, it is puzzling how third-party punishment can be maintained, as punishers take on personal costs to punish defectors. Although there is evidence that punishers are preferred as partners because third-party punishment is regarded by bystanders as a costly signal of trustworthiness, other studies show that this signaling value of punishment can be severely attenuated because third-party helping is viewed as a stronger signal of trustworthiness (...) than third-party punishment. Third-party helpers donate their payoffs to victims of defection in games instead of punishing defectors as third-party punishers do. Then, under what circumstances can third-party punishment be maintained by costly signaling when helping is also present? We show that punishers are preferred over helpers by fourth-party individuals as their delegates to deter potential exploitation. This suggests that costly signaling can facilitate the maintenance of third-party punishment in partner choice with delegation interactions. (shrink)

There is a great deal of literature on matching, theoretical, and empirical, concerning stable assignments and mechanisms that achieve them. The starting point of this study is an interesting question about assignment procedures: given a situation where some agents (the senior workers) on one side have a priority status, which changes the classical theory. The core of game may not be stable. We prove the existence of a quasi stable constrained core. This constrained core may not be a lattice (...) but it is a finite and disjoint union of complete lattices that check the properties of the core’s classical assignment game. We study the manipulability questions that derive. (shrink)

We introduce possibilistic beliefs into strategic games, describing a player’s belief about his opponents’ strategies as the set of their strategies he regards as possible. We formulate possibilistic strategic games where each player has preferences over his own strategies conditional on his possibilistic belief about his opponents’ strategies. We define several solution concepts for possibilistic strategic games such as (strict) equilibria, rationalizable sets, iterated elimination of never-best responses, and iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, and we study their properties and (...) relationships. We develop a class of possibilistic strategic games called possibilistic supermodular games to relate supermodular games to possibilistic strategic games. Lastly, we discuss a direction of extending our possibilistic framework to games with incomplete information. (shrink)

This paper examines preferences among uncertain prospects when the decision maker is uneasy about his assignment of subjective probabilities. It proposes a two-stage lottery framework for the analysis of such prospects, where the first stage represents an assessment of the vagueness (ambiguity) in defining the problem's randomness and the second stage represents an assessment of the problem for each hypothesized randomness condition. Standard axioms of rationality are prescribed for each stage, including weak ordering, continuity, and strong independence. The ‘Reduction of (...) Compound Lotteries' axiom is weakened, however, so that the two lottery stages have consistent, but not collapsible, preference structures. The paper derives a representation theorem from the primitive preference axioms, and the theorem asserts that preference-consistent decisions are made as if the decision maker is maximizing a modified expected utility functional. This representation and its implications are compared to alternative decision models. Criteria for assigning the relative empirical power of the alternative models are suggested. (shrink)

In the paper, the role of a citizen, a public official, and an observer in the reproduction of bribery as a social norm are each analyzed. To make the analysis of this cellular-social form of corruption, three variables are incorporated: the agent’s perception of how widespread the corruption is, the agent’s available resources with which to act, and the role of moral values. Later, some scenarios of normalization and denormalization of corruption are explored, making different assumptions regarding the (...) analysis and assignment of agents to different roles in the interactions. What was found is that power relations among corrupt and non-corrupt agents are key for understanding the social reproduction of bribery, where inequality might facilitate the social reproduction of corruption. The role of the observer of the interaction of bribe-givers, bribe-takers, and bribe-resisting agents was also found to potentially tip the balance in the direction of normalization or denormalization of bribery. Hence, giving the observer tools to intervene in these interactions becomes essential to combat corruption. (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of a social evaluation functional in the case of an arbitrary set of alternatives. In the first part, a characterization of projective social evaluations functionals is shown whenever the common restricted domain is the set of all bounded utility functions equipped with the supremum norm topology. The result makes a crucial use, among others, of a continuity axiom. In the second part, a comparison meaningful property is introduced for a social evaluation functional (...) which allows us for obtaining a more general result with no continuity requirements. Finally, an impossibility theorem, which is reminiscent of that is obtained by Chichilnisky in (Q J Econ 97:337–352, 1982) but without using topological conditions, is offered. (shrink)

This paper has a twofold scope. The first one is to clarify and put in evidence the isomorphic character of two theories developed in quite different fields: on one side, threshold logic, on the other side, simple games. One of the main purposes in both theories is to determine when a simple game is representable as a weighted game, which allows a very compact and easily comprehensible representation. Deep results were found in threshold logic in the sixties and (...) seventies for this problem. However, game theory has taken the lead and some new results have been obtained for the problem in the past two decades. The second and main goal of this paper is to provide some new results on this problem and propose several open questions and conjectures for future research. The results we obtain depend on two significant parameters of the game: the number of types of equivalent players and the number of types of shift-minimal winning coalitions. (shrink)

We propose a new notion of coalitional equilibria, the strong $$\beta$$ -hybrid solution, which is a refinement of the hybrid solution introduced by Zhao. Zhao’s solution is well suited to study situations where people cooperate within coalitions but where coalitions compete with one another. This paper’s solution, as opposed to the hybrid solution, assigns to each coalition a strategy profile that is strongly Pareto optimal. Moreover, like the $$\beta$$ -core, deviations by subcoalitions of any existing coalition are deterred by the (...) threat of a unique counter-strategy available to the non-deviating players. Zhao proved the existence of existence of strong $$\beta$$ -hybrid solution for transferable utility games with compact and convex strategy spaces and concave continuous payoff functions. Here, we extend his result to non-transferable utility games. (shrink)

Accountability is present in many types of social relations; for example, the accountability of elected representatives to voters is the key characteristic of representative democracy. We distinguish between two institutional mechanisms of accountability, i.e., opportunity to punish and requirement of a justification, and examine the separate and combined effects of these mechanisms on individual behavior. For this purpose, we designed a decision-making experiment where subjects engage in a three-player trust game with two senders and one responder. We ask (...) whether holding the responder accountable increases senders’ and responders’ contributions in a trust game. When restricting the analysis to the first round, the requirement of justification seems to have a positive impact on senders’ contributions. When the game is played repeatedly, the experience of previous rounds dominates the results and significant treatment effects are no longer seen. We also find that responders tend to justify their choices in terms of reciprocity, which is in line with observed behavior. Moreover, the treatment combining punishment and justification hinders justifications that appeal to pure self-interest. (shrink)

The article discusses the process of “conceptual borrowing”, according to which, when a new discipline emerges, it develops its technical vocabulary also by appropriating terms from other neighbouring disciplines. The phenomenon is likened to Carl Schmitt’s observation that modern political concepts have theological roots. The authors argue that, through extensive conceptual borrowing, AI has ended up describing computers anthropomorphically, as computational brains with psychological properties, while brain and cognitive sciences have ended up describing brains and minds computationally and informationally, (...) as biological computers. The crosswiring between the technical languages of these disciplines is not merely metaphorical but can lead to confusion, and damaging assumptions and consequences. The article ends on an optimistic note about the self-adjusting nature of technical meanings in language and the ability to leave misleading conceptual baggage behind when confronted with advancement in understanding and factual knowledge. (shrink)

The note puts forward the idea of revealed desirability, a novel instrument, which like revealed preference is observable from choice and important for individual and social welfare. We provide the axiomatic underlying individual’s choice model, preliminary experimental results that support the idea, and an appealing allocation rule that uses the revealed desirability information along with the revealed-preference information.

We study questionnaire responses to situations in which sacrificing one life may save many other lives. We demonstrate gender differences in moral judgments: males are more supportive of the sacrifice than females. We investigate a source of the endorsement of the sacrifice: antisocial preferences. First, we measure individual proneness to spiteful behavior, using an experimental game with monetary stakes. We demonstrate that spitefulness can be sizable—a fifth of our participants behave spitefully—but it is not associated with gender. Second, we (...) find that gender is consistently associated with responses even when we account for individual differences in the propensity to spitefulness. (shrink)

We study cooperative games in which the set of feasible coalitions is determined by the winning coalitions of a simple game. This type of game models real-life situations where certain agents have production capacities, while others possess the legal authority required to produce. In this paper, we characterize the Myerson value for this class of games by using five independent axioms. We show that the Myerson value is the only allocation rule on the set of voting structures that (...) satisfies efficiency, additivity, modularity, the extra-null player property, and equal treatment of veto. (shrink)

This paper provides evidence for the following novel insights: (1) People’s economic decisions depend on their psychological motives, which are shaped predictably by the social context. (2) In particular, the social context influences people’s other-regarding preferences, their beliefs and their perceptions. (3) The influence of the social context on psychological motives can be measured experimentally by priming two antagonistic motives—care and anger—in one player towards another by means of an observance or a violation of a fairness norm. (...) Using a mediation approach, we find that the care motive leads to higher levels of cooperation which are driven by more optimistic beliefs, a different perception of the game as well as by a shift towards more pro-social preferences. (shrink)

Value-sensitive design theorists propose that a range of values that should inform how future social robots are engineered. This article explores a new value: digital well-being, and proposes that the next generation of social robots should be designed to facilitate this value in those who use or come into contact with these machines. To do this, I explore how the morphology of social robots is closely connected to digital well-being. I argue that a key decision is whether (...) social robots are designed as embodied or disembodied. After exploring the merits of both approaches, I conclude that, on balance, there are persuasive reasons why disembodied social robots may well fare better with respect to the value of digital well-being. (shrink)

In current philosophy of information, different authors have been supporting the veridicality thesis (VT). According to this thesis, an epistemically-oriented concept of information must have truth as one of its necessary conditions. Two challenges can be raised against VT. First, some philosophers object that veridicalists erroneously ignore the informativeness of false messages. Secondly, it is not clear whether VT can adequately explain the information considered in hypothetical reasoning. In this sense, logical diagrams offer an interesting case of analysis: by manipulating (...) a logical diagram we can verify that a certain conclusion follows from a set of premises, but it cannot help us to determine the actual truth-value of a given set of propositions. Focusing on the latter challenge, in this paper I claim that logical diagrams set out potential counterexamples to VT and, consequently, pose a real challenge to this thesis. First, a veridicalist analysis of logical diagrams requires the assumption of metatheoretical properties which are not satisfied by some logical systems (and, consequently, are not satisfied by some systems of logical diagrams). So, VT does not fit well as a general framework for a theory of logical diagrammatic information. Secondly, based on semantic inferentialism, one can propose a normative interpretation of the inferential content of logical diagrams not exposed to the problems faced by VT. Moreover, there are several reasons to believe that veridicalism cannot accommodate such a normative interpretation. In other words, normativism represents a real (though still underexplored) alternative to veridicality. Due to these reasons, I conclude that, until further research, we should adopt a more parsimonious standpoint and say that logical diagrams provide inferential information simply. (shrink)

Recently quantum probability theory started to be actively used in studies of human decision-making, in particular for the resolution of paradoxes (such as the Allais, Ellsberg, and Machina paradoxes). Previous studies were based on a cognitive metaphor of the quantum double-slit experiment—the basic quantum interference experiment. In this paper, we report on an economics experiment based on a triple-slit experiment design, where the slits are menus of alternatives from which one can choose. The test of nonclassicality is based on the (...) Sorkin equality (which was only recently tested in quantum physics). Each alternative is a voucher to buy products in one or more stores. The alternatives are obtained from all disjunctions including one, two or three stores. The participants have to reveal the amount for which they are willing to sell the chosen voucher. Interference terms are computed by comparing the willingness to sell a voucher built as a disjunction of stores and the willingness to sell the vouchers corresponding to the singleton stores. These willingness to sell amounts are used to estimate probabilities and to test both the law of total probabilities and the Born Rule. Results reject neither classical nor quantum probability. We discuss this initial experiment and our results and provide guidelines for future studies. (shrink)

This paper develops an algebraic formulation summarizing various forms of socioeconomic interaction in and across individuals, groups, corporations, and states. The proposed articulation accelerates the understanding that coordination among economic agents leads to the efficient allocation of resources in society. The study considers an approach whereby the State has a regulatory role which helps attain responsible consumption and production choices (RCP). This study has the potential to encourage the use of resources in a way that promotes RCP decisions based on (...) an understanding of values. The fundamental structure of socioeconomic interaction is described in work using finite algebra. It presents how governance structure comprising intra- and interactions involving the State, corporation, groups, and the individual will attain (RCP). The prevailing economic structures functioned lower than the projected level, with enormous damage to the environment. It is deduced that the final level of the economy depends crucially on the initial injection of socioeconomic actions. Furthermore, diverse socioeconomic position patterns are possible depending on the nature of activity impulses undertaken at different levels. The world needs to decouple environmental degradation from economic growth to evolve towards a sustainable and collectively inclusive economy. For that purpose, mutual trust-based coordination among all stakeholders is vital to attain sustainable objectives. (shrink)

In this paper, we study solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs. we define four kinds of solution concepts, namely the most coalitional (marginal) stable solution and the fairest coalitional (marginal) solution, by minimizing the total variance of excesses of coalitions (individual players). All these four concepts are optimal solutions of corresponding optimal problem under the least square criterion. It turns out that the fairest coalitional (marginal) solution belongs to the set of the most coalitional (marginal) stable solutions. Inspired (...) by the definition of nucleolus, we propose various extended nucleolus based on lexicographic criterion. Furthermore, axiomatizations of the proposed solutions are exhibited through the linkage between the stochastic and deterministic models. (shrink)

Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the process of belief formation and evolution in a signaling game in which a common prior is not induced. Both prior and posterior beliefs of Receivers about Senders’ types are elicited, as well as beliefs of Senders about Receivers’ strategies. In the experiment, subjects often start with diffuse uniform beliefs and update them in view of observations. However, the speed of updating is influenced by the strength of initial beliefs. An interesting result is (...) that beliefs about the prior distribution of types are updated slower than posterior beliefs, which incorporate Senders’ strategies. In the medium run, for some specifications of game parameters, this leads to outcomes being significantly different from the outcomes of the game in which a common prior is induced. It is also shown that elicitation of beliefs does not considerably change the pattern of play in this game. (shrink)

In free and open source software (FOSS), computer code is made freely accessible and can be modified by anyone. It is a creative domain with many unique features; the FOSS mode of creativity has also influenced many aspects of contemporary cultural production. In this article we identify a number of fundamental but unresolved general issues in the study of creativity, then examine the potential for the study of FOSS to inform these topics. Archival studies of the genesis of FOSS projects, (...) coupled with laboratory studies detailing the psychological processes involved in software creation, can provide converging evidence on the nature of creativity in software design. Such a research program has broad implications both for theories of creativity and for real-world innovation in software and other forms of digital cultural production. (shrink)

Canonical economic agents act so as to maximize a single, representative, utility function. However, there is accumulating evidence that heterogeneity in thought processes may be an important determinant of individual behavior. This paper investigates the implications of a vector-valued generalization of the Expected Utility paradigm, which permits agents either to deliberate as per Homo economics, or to act impulsively. This generalized decision theory is applied to explain the crowding-out effect, irrational educational investment decisions, persistent social inequalities, the pervasive influence (...) of non-cognitive ability on socio-economic outcomes, and the dynamic relationships between non-cognitive ability, cognitive ability, and behavioral biases. These results suggest that the generalized decision theory warrants further investigation. (shrink)

A number of citation indices have been proposed for measuring and ranking the research publication records of scholars. Some of the best known indices, such as those proposed by Hirsch and Woeginger, are designed to reward most highly those records that strike some balance between productivity (number of papers published) and impact (frequency with which those papers are cited). A large number of rarely cited publications will not score well, nor will a very small number of heavily cited papers. We (...) discuss three new citation indices, one of which was independently proposed in Fenner et al. (PLOS ONE 13(7): e0200098, 2018). Each rests on the notion of scale invariance, fundamental to John Nash’s solution of the two-person bargaining problem. Our main focus is on one of these—a scale-invariant version of the Hirsch index. We argue that it has advantages over the original; it produces fairer rankings within subdisciplines, is more decisive (discriminates more finely, yielding fewer ties) and more dynamic (growing over time via more frequent, smaller increments), and exhibits enhanced centrality and tail balancedness. Simulations suggest that scale invariance improves robustness under Poisson noise, with increased decisiveness having no cost in terms of the number of “accidental” reversals, wherein random irregularities cause researcher A to receive a lower index value than B, although A’s productivity and impact are both slightly higher than B’s. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the scale-invariant Hirsch index, via axioms that bear a close relationship, in discrete analogue, to those used by Nash (Econometrica 18(2):155–162, 1950). This argues for the mathematical naturality of the new index. (shrink)

The presence of intelligence and rationality in Artificial Intelligence and the Internet requires a new context of analysis in which Herbert Simon’s approach to the sciences of the artificial is surpassed in order to grasp the role of information in our contemporary setting. This new framework requires taking into account some relevant aspects. In the historical endeavor of building up AI and the Internet, minds and machines have interacted over the years and in many ways through the interrelation between (...) scientific creativity and technological innovation. Philosophically, minds and machines can have epistemological, methodological and ontological differences, which are based on the distinct configuration of human intelligence and artificial intelligence. Their comparison with rationality and its various forms is particularly relevant. Scientifically, AI and the Internet belong to the sciences of the artificial, because they work on designs that search for specific aims, following selected processes in order to achieve expected results. Technologically, AI and the Internet require the support of information and communication technologies. These have an instrumental role regarding the existence of AI and the Internet. Also ICT shape their diverse forms of configuration over the years.Within this framework, this paper offers a new context of analysis that goes beyond Simon’s and follows four main steps: the interaction between scientific creativity and technological innovation as the philosophico-methodological setting for Artificial Intelligence and the Internet; artificial intelligence and human intelligence as epistemological basis for machines and minds, where the differences between artificial intelligence and human intelligence are made explicit and the analysis of minds and machines is made from the perspective of rationality ; intention and its difference with design of machine learning are considered to distinguish human intelligence from artificial intelligence; and the internal and external aspects of artificial designs in contemporary society are considered through the perspective of rationality, which leads to the transition from intelligence to rationality in the Internet as well as to the historicity of information. (shrink)

Third generation prospect theory is a theory of choices and of judgments of highest buying and lowest selling prices of risky prospects, i.e., of willingness to pay and willingness to accept. The gap between WTP and WTA is sometimes called the “endowment effect” and was previously called the “point of view” effect. Third generation prospect theory combines cumulative prospect theory for risky prospects with the theory that judged values are based on the integration of price paid or price received with (...) the consequences of gambles. In TGPT, the discrepancy between WTP and WTA is due to loss aversion-losses have greater absolute utility than gains of the same value. TGPT was developed independently of similar developments by Birnbaum and Zimmermann :145–187, 1998) and Luce. This paper reviews theoretical and empirical findings, to show that TGPT fails as a descriptive model of both choices and judgments. Evidence refutes three implications of TGPT, but they are consistent with configural weight models in which loss aversion is not needed to describe the results. In the configural weight models, buyers place greater weight on lower consequences, attributes or estimates of value compared to sellers, who place greater configural weight on higher aspects of an object or prospect. (shrink)

Economics bases the choice theory on the mental experiment that introduces the choice correspondence, which associates to every set of possible actions the subset of preferred actions. If some conditions are satisfied, then the choice correspondence implies a binary preference ordering on actions and an ordinal utility function. This approach applies both to decisions under certainty and decisions under uncertainty. The preference ordering depends on the consequence of actions. Under certainty, there is only one consequence to every action, while, under (...) uncertainty, many consequences are possible, associated with the states of the world. These consequences are represented by the action itself, the states of the world, and the corresponding outcomes. Current theories consider only outcomes, but some theories include state dependent preference. Preference for the action itself is not considered, but it might be relevant. The rationality of the theory is a different question from the rationality of the decision-maker. Moreover, the rationality of the theory may imply the rationality of a preference ordering, but this does not require the rationality of the decision-maker. It is only assumed that he/she behaves according to the calculation made by the theorist. The rationality of the preference ordering requires the rationality of the preference on outcomes, of the expectations on the events, and of their connection with the preference ordering on actions. The normative relevance of rational preferences is removed by the introduction of many alternative rational theories, which justify contrasting behaviors in identical situations. (shrink)

How does present bias affect the propensity to forgive or punish? To explore this question, we employ quasi-hyperbolic discounting within the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The primary results from theoretical and simulation studies demonstrate that present bias impedes the sustainability of forgiving or lenient strategies (e.g., Tit-for-Tat with or without additional forgiveness, and Win-Stay, Lose-Shift) in a Nash equilibrium. However, this bias does not significantly impact the likelihood of sustaining cooperation for punitive strategies (e.g., the grim trigger).

Previous work by Diffo Lambo and Moulen [Theory and Decision 53, 313–325 (2002)] and Felsenthal and Machover [The Measurement of Voting Power, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (1998)], shows that all swap preserving measures of voting power are ordinally equivalent on any swap robust simple voting game. Swap preserving measures include the Banzhaf, the Shapley–Shubik and other commonly used measures of a priori voting power. In this paper, we completely characterize the achievable hierarchies for any such measure on a swap (...) robust simple voting game. Each possible hierarchy can be induced by a weighted voting game and we provide a constructive proof of this result. In particular, the strict hierarchy is always achievable as long as there are at least five players. (shrink)

In this study, we analyze choice in the presence of some conflict that affects the decision time, a subject that has been documented in the literature. We axiomatize a multiattribute decision time representation, which is a dynamic extension of the classic multiattribute expected utility theory that allows potentially incomplete preferences. Under this framework, one alternative is preferred to another in a certain period if and only if the weighted sum of the attribute-dependent expected utility induced by the former alternative is (...) larger than that induced by the latter for all attribute weights in a closed and convex set. MDT uniquely determines the decision time as the earliest period at which the ranking between alternatives becomes decisive. The comparative statics result indicates that the decision time provides useful information to locate indifference curves in a specific setting. MDT also explains various empirical findings in economics and other relevant fields. (shrink)

Scientific theories of consciousness identify its contents with the spatiotemporal structure of neural population activity. We follow up on this approach by stating and motivating Dynamical Emergence Theory, which defines the amount and structure of experience in terms of the intrinsic topology and geometry of a physical system’s collective dynamics. Specifically, we posit that distinct perceptual states correspond to coarse-grained macrostates reflecting an optimal partitioning of the system’s state space—a notion that aligns with several ideas and results from computational neuroscience (...) and cognitive psychology. We relate DET to existing work, offer predictions for empirical studies, and outline future research directions. (shrink)

In experimental economics one can confront a “don’t!”, as in “do not deceive your participants!”, as well as a “do!”, as in “incentivize choice making!”. Neither exists in experimental psychology. Further controversies exist in data collection methods, e.g., play strategy (vector) method in game experiments, and how to guarantee external and internal validity by describing experimental scenarios by field-related vignettes or by abstract, often formal, rules as it is used in decision and game theory. We emphasize that differences (...) between the experimental methodology of the two disciplines are minor rather than substantial and suggest that such differences should be resolved, as much as possible, through empirical research. Rather than focusing on familiar debates, we suggest to substitute the revealed-motive approach in experimental economics by designs whose data not only inform about choice, but also about the reasoning dynamics. (shrink)