39 found
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  1.  15
    Fictional Immorality and Immoral Fiction.Garry Young - 2021 - Lexington Books.
    This book examines what, if anything, makes a depiction of fictional immorality—such as the murder, torture, or sexual assault of a fictional character—an example of immoral fiction, and therefore something that should be morally criticized and possibly prohibited.
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  2.  46
    The gamer’s dilemma: an expressivist response.Garry Young - 2024 - Ethics and Information Technology 26 (2):1-12.
    In this paper, I support a hybrid form of expressivism called constructive ecumenical expressivism (CEE) which I have previously used (to attempt) to resolve the gamer’s dilemma. (Young, 2016. Resolving the gamer’s dilemma. London: Palgrave Macmillan.) In support of CEE, I argue that the various other attempts at either resolving, dissolving or resisting the dilemma are consistent with CEE’s moral framework. That is, with its way of explaining what a claim to morality is, with how moral norms are established, with (...)
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  3. Violent video games and morality: a meta-ethical approach.Garry Young - 2015 - Ethics and Information Technology 17 (4):311-321.
    This paper considers what it is about violent video games that leads one reasonably minded person to declare “That is immoral” while another denies it. Three interpretations of video game content are discussed: reductionist, narrow, and broad. It is argued that a broad interpretation is required for a moral objection to be justified. It is further argued that understanding the meaning of moral utterances—like “x is immoral”—is important to an understanding of why there is a lack of moral consensus when (...)
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  4.  27
    An Expressivist Account of the Difference between Poor Taste and Immorality.Garry Young - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (2):465-482.
    This paper considers whether proposition – “x is not immoral but it is in poor taste” – is morally contradictory when considered from the standpoint of constructive ecumenical expressivism. According to CEE, pronouncements about poor taste and immorality have the following in common: they each convey a negative attitude towards x and intimate that x ought not to be done. Given this, P1 is vulnerable to a charge of contradiction, as it intimates that x is both something and not something (...)
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  5.  89
    Enacting taboos as a means to an end; but what end? On the morality of motivations for child murder and paedophilia within gamespace.Garry Young - 2013 - Ethics and Information Technology 15 (1):13-23.
    Video games are currently available which permit the virtual murder of children. No such games are presently available which permit virtual paedophilia. Does this disparity reflect a morally justifiable position? Focusing solely on different player motivations, I contrast two version of a fictitious game—one permitting the virtual murder of children, the other virtual paedophilia—in order to establish whether the selective prohibition of one activity over the other can be morally justified based on player motivation alone. I conclude that it cannot, (...)
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  6. The Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example.Garry Young - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):961-969.
    The aim of this paper is to present a version of the principle of alternate possibilities which is not susceptible to the Frankfurt-style counter-example. I argue that PAP does not need to be endorsed as a necessary condition for moral responsibility and, in fact, presenting PAP as a sufficient condition maintains its usefulness as a maxim for moral accountability whilst avoiding Frankfurt-style counter-examples. In addition, I provide a further sufficient condition for moral responsibility – the twin world condition – and (...)
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  7.  51
    A meta-ethical approach to single-player gamespace: introducing constructive ecumenical expressivism as a means of explaining why moral consensus is not forthcoming.Garry Young - 2014 - Ethics and Information Technology 16 (2):91-102.
    The morality of virtual representations and the enactment of prohibited activities within single-player gamespace (e.g., murder, rape, paedophilia) continues to be debated and, to date, a consensus is not forthcoming. Various moral arguments have been presented (e.g., virtue theory and utilitarianism) to support the moral prohibition of virtual enactments, but their applicability to gamespace is questioned. In this paper, I adopt a meta-ethical approach to moral utterances about virtual representations, and ask what it means when one declares that a virtual (...)
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  8.  51
    Objections to Ostritsch’s argument in “The amoralist challenge to gaming and the gamer’s moral obligation”.Garry Young - 2017 - Ethics and Information Technology 19 (3):209-219.
    This paper raises three objections to the argument presented by Ostritsch in The amoralist challenge to gaming and the gamer’s moral obligation, in which the amoralist’s mantra “it’s just a game” is viewed as an illegitimate rebuttal of all moral objections to video games. The first objection focuses on Ostritsch’s ‘strong sense’ of player enjoyment, which I argue is too crude, given the moral work it is meant to be doing. Next, I question the legitimacy of Ostritsch’s claim that certain (...)
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  9.  95
    Capgras delusion: An interactionist model.Garry Young - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):863-876.
    In this paper I discuss the role played by disturbed phenomenology in accounting for the formation and maintenance of the Capgras delusion. Whilst endorsing a two-stage model to explain the condition, I nevertheless argue that traditional accounts prioritise the role played by some form of second-stage cognitive disruption at the expense of the significant contribution made by the patient’s disturbed phenomenology, which is often reduced to such uninformative descriptions as “anomalous” or “strange”. By advocating an interactionist model, I argue that (...)
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  10.  42
    On how a child’s awareness of thinking informs explanations of thought insertion.Garry Young - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):848-862.
    Theories of thought insertion have tended to favour either the content of the putatively alien thought or some peculiarity within the experience itself as a means of explaining why the subject differentiates one thought from another in terms of personal ownership. There are even accounts that try to incorporate both of these characteristics. What all of these explanations share is the view that it is unexceptional for us to experience thought as our own. The aim of this paper is to (...)
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  11.  57
    Bodily knowing : Re-thinking our understanding of procedural knowledge.Garry Young - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (1):37 – 54.
    This paper questions the view that knowledge must be articulable or at least experiential. It asserts that what distinguishes habitual yet intentional action from a mechanistic response is its grounding in a suitable claim to knowledge. However, it denies that a necessary condition for knowing how to perform an action is the ability of the subject to either articulate the particulars of that act, or experience it as appropriate.
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  12.  37
    Clarifying" familiarity": Examining differences in the phenomenal experiences of patients suffering from prosopagnosia and capgras delusion.Garry Young - 2007 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (1):29-37.
  13.  49
    In what sense 'familiar'? Examining experiential differences within pathologies of facial recognition.Garry Young - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):628-638.
    Explanations of Capgras delusion and prosopagnosia typically incorporate a dual-route approach to facial recognition in which a deficit in overt or covert processing in one condition is mirror-reversed in the other. Despite this double dissociation, experiences of either patient-group are often reported in the same way – as lacking a sense of familiarity toward familiar faces. In this paper, deficits in the facial processing of these patients are compared to other facial recognition pathologies, and their experiential characteristics mapped onto the (...)
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  14. Restating the role of phenomenal experience in the formation and maintenance of the capgras delusion.Garry Young - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):177-189.
    In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion, I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played by the (...)
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  15.  33
    Ethics in the Virtual World: The Morality and Psychology of Gaming.Garry Young - 2013 - Durham, UK: Routledge.
    Ethics in the Virtual World examines the gamer's enactment of taboo activities in the context of both traditional and contemporary philosophical approaches to morality. The book argues that it is more productive to consider what individuals are able to cope with psychologically than to determine whether a virtual act or representation is necessarily good or bad. The book raises pertinent questions about one of the most rapidly expanding leisure pursuits in western culture: should virtual enactments warrant moral interest? Should there (...)
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  16.  84
    Case study evidence for an irreducible form of knowing how to: An argument against a reductive epistemology.Garry Young - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (2):341-360.
    Over recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in arguments favouring intellectualism—the view that Ryle’s epistemic distinction is invalid because knowing how is in fact nothing but a species of knowing that. The aim of this paper is to challenge intellectualism by introducing empirical evidence supporting a form of knowing how that resists such a reduction. In presenting a form of visuomotor pathology known as visual agnosia, I argue that certain actions performed by patient DF can be distinguished (...)
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  17.  34
    How Would We Know If Moral Enhancement Had Occurred?Garry Young - 2018 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 32 (4):587-606.
    The aim of this essay is to question the coherence of debates on moral enhancement by neurophysical or pharmaceutical means in the absence of a cogent conception of the object of moral scrutiny: namely, moral enhancement. I present two conceptions of moral enhancement—weak and strong—and argue that given the problem of acquiring a standard measure of moral enhancement, regardless of whether enhancement is present in its weak or strong form and regardless of whether one endorses moral realism or different forms (...)
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  18.  93
    Knowledge how, ability, and the type-token distinction.Garry Young - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2):593-607.
    This paper examines the relationship between knowing how to G and the ability to G, which is typically presented in one of the following ways: knowing how to G entails the ability to G; knowing how to G does not entail the ability to G. In an attempt to reconcile these two putatively opposing positions, I distinguish between type and token actions. It is my contention that S can know how to G in the absence of an ability to \, (...)
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  19.  24
    On the gradability of knowledge how, and its relationship to motor representations and ability.Garry Young - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):1-20.
    In this paper I defend the traditional anti-intellectualist claim that a form of knowing how to Φ (e.g., knowing how to play the guitar) exists that entails the ability to Φ (play the guitar), and that this knowledge cannot be reduced to propositions (such as ‘S knows a way _w_ to Φ’, where _w_ is a means of Φing). I also argue that S can know how to Φ in the absence of the ability to Φ, and for this knowledge (...)
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  20.  49
    A Response to Coren’s Objections to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility.Garry Young - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1365-1380.
    In this paper I respond to Coren’s argument against my 2016 paper in which I present a case for the principle of alternate possibilities as sufficient but not necessary for the ascription of moral responsibility ). I concede that Coren has identified aspects of my original position that are vulnerable to counter-examples. Nevertheless, through a simple amendment to my original argument I am able to respond to these counter-examples without undermining the foundations on which my 2016 paper was built. Moreover, (...)
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  21.  21
    Philosophical psychopathology: philosophy without thought experiments.Garry Young - 2013 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This book uses rare pathologies to inform questions on topics such as consciousness and rationality. Rather than trying to answer these by inventing far-fetched scenario or 'thought experiments', it is better to utilize a rich but under-used clinical resource.
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  22.  33
    Knowledge How, Procedural Knowledge, and the Type-Token Action Clause.Garry Young - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (3):327-343.
    This paper argues that the propositions “S knowing how to Φ entails that S has the ability to Φ” and “S knowing how to Φ does not entail the ability to Φ” can both be true and non-contradictory when true, so long as one distinguishes between Φ as an action-type and Φ as an action-token. In order to defend this claim, recent work by Young, Levy, and Gaultier is discussed with a view to integrating into a coherent and novel position (...)
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  23.  81
    Kant and the phenomenon of inserted thoughts.Garry Young - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837.
    Phenomenally, we can distinguish between ownership of thought (introspective awareness) and authorship of thought (an awareness of the activity of thinking), a distinction prompted by the phenomenon of thought insertion. Does this require the independence of ownership and authorship at the structural level? By employing a Kantian approach to the question of ownership of thought, I argue that a thought being my thought is necessarily the outcome of the interdependence of these two component parts (ownership and authorship). In addition, whilst (...)
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  24.  41
    (1 other version)Delusions of Death and Immortality: A Consequence of Misplaced Being in Cotard Patients.Garry Young - 2012 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 19 (2):127-140.
    Discussion on the Cotard delusion often focuses on the patient’s delusional belief that he/she is dead. Of interest to this paper, however, is the little referred to claim made by some Cotard patients that they are immortal. How might one explain the juxta-position of death and immortality evident in patients sharing the same clinical diagnosis, and how might these delusional beliefs inform our understanding of patient phenomenology, particularly regarding experiences of existential change? This paper sets out to explain delusions of (...)
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  25. Amending the revisionist model of the Capgras delusion: A further argument for the role of patient experience in delusional belief formation.Garry Young - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):89-112.
  26.  5
    On the Morality of Enjoying Simulated Rape with Robots and by Other Fictional Means.Garry Young - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    I argue that there is no morally relevant difference, based solely on motivation for enjoyment, between enjoying simulated rape with a sexbot compared to other media. In defence of this claim, I distinguish between two types of enjoyment – enjoyment qua simulation and enjoyment qua substitution – and further claim that each type of enjoyment shares corresponding similarities with either idle or surrogate fantasies. Given this, the enjoyment of one's rape fantasy is, I contend, immoral if one enjoys qua substitution (...)
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  27. Igniting the flicker of freedom: Revisiting the Frankfurt scenario.Garry Young - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (2):171-180.
    This paper aims to challenge the view that the sign present in many Frankfurt-style scenarios is insufficiently robust to constitute evidence for the possibility of an alternate decision, and therefore inadequate as a means of determining moral responsibility. I have amended Frankfurt’s original scenario, so as to allow Jones, as well as Black, the opportunity to monitor his (Jones’s) own inclination towards a particular decision (the sign). Different outcome possibilities are presented, to the effect that Jones’s awareness of his own (...)
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  28.  24
    In defense of estrangement.Garry Young - 2007 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (1):51-56.
  29.  85
    Ecological perception affords an explanation of object permanence.Garry Young - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):189-208.
    In this paper I aim to present an explanation of object permanence that is derived from an ecological account of perceptually based action. In understanding why children below a certain age do not search for occluded objects, one must first understand the process by which these children perform certain intentional actions on non-occluded items; and to do this one must understand the role affordances play in eliciting retrieval behaviour. My affordance-based explanation is contrasted with Shinskey and Munakata's graded representation account; (...)
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  30.  58
    Individually Sufficient and Disjunctively Necessary Conditions for Moral Responsibility.Garry Young & Daniel Coren - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):501-515.
    In this paper, we motivate, propose and defend the following two conditions as individually sufficient and disjunctively necessary for moral responsibility: PODMA —originally proposed by Coren, Acta Analytica, 33, 145–159,, now cast as sufficient rather than necessary—and the TWC*, which amends versions presented by Young, 961–969, 2016; Philosophia, 45, 1365–1380, 2017). We explain why there is a need for new necessary and sufficient conditions, how these build on and improve existing ideas, particularly in relation to Frankfurt-style counterexamples and the continuing (...)
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  31.  29
    Should Autonomous Weapons Need a Reason to Kill?Garry Young - 2022 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 39 (5):886-900.
    Purves et al. argue against deploying automated weapons because they fail to act for the right reason. Given that soldiers do not necessarily act in an ideal way, I argue that it is morally preferable to deploy autonomous weapons that are incapable of acting for the wrong reason over combatants that are likely (although not guaranteed) to act for the right reason (i.e. regular troops). Preference for regular troops based solely on reasons for acting is justified only in the case (...)
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  32.  56
    Objections to the God Machine Thought Experiment and What they Reveal about the Intelligibility of Moral Intervention by Technological Means.Garry Young - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):831-846.
    The first aim of the paper is to proffer a series of objections to the God machine thought experiment, as presented by Savulescu and Persson, The Monist, 95, 399-421,. The second aim is to show that these objections must be overcome by any form of direct moral intervention by technological means, not just the God machine. The objections raised against the god machine involve questioning its intelligibility in light of established views on the relationship between beliefs, desires, intention and intentional (...)
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  33.  34
    On the indignity of killer robots.Garry Young - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (3):473-482.
    Recent discussion on the ethics of killer robots has focused on the supposed lack of respect their deployment would show to combatants targeted, thereby causing their undignified deaths. I present two rebuttals of this argument. The weak rebuttal maintains that while deploying killer robots is an affront to the dignity of combatants, their use should nevertheless be thought of as a pro tanto wrong, making deployment permissible if the affront is outweighed by some right-making feature. This rebuttal is, however, vulnerable (...)
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  34.  53
    Progressive embodiment within cyberspace: Considering the psychological impact of the supermorphic persona.Garry Young & Monica Whitty - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (4):537 - 560.
    This paper is premised on the idea that cyberspace permits the user a degree of somatic flexibility?a means of transcending the physical body but not, importantly, embodiment. Set within a framework of progressive embodiment (the assumption that individuals seek to exploit somatic flexibility so as to extend the boundaries of their own embodiment?what we call the supermorphic persona), we examine the manner of this progression. Specifically, to what extent do components of embodiment?the self-as-object, the phenomenal self, and the body-schema?find authentic (...)
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  35.  24
    Coping with offline prohibited actions in gamespace: A psychological approach to moral well-being in gamers.Garry Young & Monica Whitty - 2012 - Ethics 8 (3).
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  36. Do Carruthers’ examples of absent-mindedness show arbitrariness with regard to phenomenal content?Garry Young - 2005 - Anthropology and Philosophy 6 (1-2):89-101.
  37.  22
    In Defense of Misplaced Being and the Interactionist Account.Garry Young - 2012 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (2):149-152.
  38.  89
    Virtually real emotions and the paradox of fiction: Implications for the use of virtual environments in psychological research.Garry Young - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):1-21.
    Many of the psychological studies carried out within virtual environments are motivated by the idea that virtual research findings are generalizable to the non-virtual world. This idea is vulnerable to the paradox of fiction, which questions whether it is possible to express genuine emotion toward a character (or event) known to be fictitious. As many of these virtual studies are designed to elicit, broadly speaking, emotional responses through interactions with fictional characters (avatars) or objects/places, the issue raised by the paradox (...)
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  39.  91
    Beliefs, experiences and misplaced being: an interactionist account of delusional misidentification. [REVIEW]Garry Young - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):195-215.
    This paper contrasts an interactionist account of delusional misidentification with more traditional one- and two-stage models. Unlike the unidirectional nature of these more traditional models, in which the aetiology of the disorder is said to progress from a neurological disruption via an anomalous experience to a delusional belief, the interactionist account posits the interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes to better explain the maintenance of the delusional belief. In addition, it places a greater emphasis on the patient’s underlying phenomenal experience (...)
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