While the incarnation is often invoked as part of a response to the problem of evil (as by the early Kenneth Surin), affirming something like an orthodox view of the incarnation also seems to accentuate the problem of evil by incorporating belief in miraculous divine action. I suggest a possible line of response that allows for the incarnation to be understood as historically particular but non-miraculous.
Defends my proposed account of lying (framed in terms of new classical natural law theory) against Chris Tollefsen's objections, centering on the objection that, whatever else it involves, lying necessarily involves an attack on the basic good of self-integration.
Lodges a number of challenges to the threshold argument on the basis of which some consequentialists have objected to consumer meat purchases. Maintains that the argument misunderstands relevant market dynamics.
This book is a critical examination of John Rawls's account of the normative grounds of international law, arguing that Rawls unjustifiably treats groups - rather than particular persons - as foundational to his model of international justice.
Mark Murphy contends that, whatever the merits of any philosophical argument for anarchism, most people are obligated to obey the law. Murphy defends a moral argument designed to show that most people in reasonably just political communities are obligated to obey the law. And he advances epistemological arguments calculated to support two key claims. First, people who believe they are obligated to obey the law are entitled to retain their belief in the face of anarchist criticism. Second, a credible account (...) of political obligation can accommodate the concerns that drive anarchist arguments in such a way that no anarchist argument against political obligation could, in principle, be successful. I argue that Murphy's moral argument yields relatively limited results, and that his epistemological arguments do not succeed in showing that anarchists could not convict folk-believers in political obligation of unreasonableness. (shrink)
A normatively appropriate response to the exploitation of sweatshop labor in developing countries should center on labor rights. Satisfactorily secured labor rights will help workers to craft adequate compensation packages and workplace standards that keep them safe while allowing them to compete effectively in the global marketplace. Labor rights provide a more flexible and economically reasonable alternative to trade barriers as sources of protection for workers.
The new classical natural law theorists have been decidedly skeptical about claims that non-human animals deserve serious moral consideration. Their theory features an array of incommensurable, nonfungible basic aspects of welfare and a set of principles governing participation in and pursuit of these goods. Attacks on animals’ interests seem to be inconsistent with one or more of these principles. But leading natural law theorists maintain that animals do not participate in basic aspects of well being in ways that merit protection, (...) that the so-called “argument from marginal cases” is unsuccessful as a basis for claims that animals have moral standing, and that affirming that animals have rights leaves one with no basis for maintaining that humans do as well. In response, I suggest that animals can be understood to participate in some aspects of well being, defend the argument from marginal cases, and offer reasons why we might believe that affirming that animals have rights does not undermine the claim that humans have rights. (shrink)
I argue that that the suffering of non-human animals poses some potentially knotty difficulties for process theodicy. To respond satisfactorily to the problem of evil as it involves animals, process theists will, I argue, need either to defend some form of consequentialism or make a number of potentially plausible but certainly contestable empirical claims. I begin this internal critique by explaining the nature of the process response to the problem of evil. I explain how process thought can respond with reasonable (...) effectiveness to the general problem of the suffering of non-human animals while highlighting the special difficulty predation might be thought to pose for the process thinker. Then, I elaborate alternative consequentialist and non-consequentialist process accounts of divine goodness in the face of the harm to non-human animals caused by predation. After summarizing my analyses in the conclusion, I underscore the costs associated with these alternatives. (shrink)
Many anarchists believe that a stateless society could and should feature laws. It might appear that, in so believing, they are caught in a contradiction. The anarchist objects to the state because its authority does not rest on actual consent, and using force to secure compliance with law in a stateless society seems objectionable for the same reason. Some people in a stateless society will have consented to some laws or law-generating mechanisms and some to others – while some will (...) have consented to none. Someone’s obedience to a legal requirement could be justly enforceable absent the state, nonetheless, given either her actual consent to the requirement or to a mechanism responsible for generating it or the coextensiveness of the legal requirement with a moral requirement. And it could thus be just on the anarchist’s own terms to enforce a narrow range of positive legal requirements even against outlaws who had declined to consent to them. (shrink)
This book develops an account of freedom of expression rooted in a broader understanding of human flourishing. It is intended to highlight reasons for not only political institutions but also noncoercive social institutions—employers, churches, clubs—to value and safeguard expressive freedom. It emphasizes a set of overlapping and mutually reinforcing considerations supportive of this kind of freedom, including property rights, class-analytic and public-choice-theoretic understandings of state and institutional decision-making, the limits on the capacity of expressive activity to injure or cause injury, (...) the independent importance of autonomy, and the various ways in which expressive freedom can foster insight, discovery, and various other aspects of flourishing. It stresses the importance of a social ecosystem as the necessary precondition for many of the benefits yielded by freedom of expression. (shrink)
A Good Life in the Market develops a framework for thinking about business ethics, examining the nature and potential of markets before crisply exploring a set of important issues—from immigration to intellectual property to boycotts to workplace governance. Provocative, engaging, and conversational, Gary Chartier offers tools and perspectives that will help you flourish in the world of business.
Examines the possibility of converging support for animal well being rendered by a non-standard version of new classical natural law theory and the kind of institutional framework suggested by spontaneous-order natural law theory. Argues that non-state mechanisms consistent with the latter kind of natural law theory could maintain the rights defended by the former.
Concerns with autonomy and privacy, among other factors (including the potential to move toward a basic income scheme), could give progressives reason to favor replacing the personal income tax with a universal transaction tax (so named to distinguish it from transaction taxes just applied to consumer sales, for instance).
Considers the ways in which alternative moral positions—consequentialism, natural law theory (adjusted to incorporate recognition of non-human animals' moral standing), and Stephen Clark's version of Aristotelian virtue ethics—respond to the question whether a boycott of the meat industry is morally obligatory. Investigates the likely responses of the various positions to a range of casuistic concerns.
Examines how new classical natural law theory might respond to the question what kind of personal giving in support of international development efforts might be morally obligatory. Examines a range of examples offered by natural law thinkers.
Examines Applbaum's elaboration, on contractualist grounds, of a plausible understanding of adversarial ethics, primarily but not exclusively in the contest of the legal system. Raises criticisms of what are arguably unnecessary concessions and offers the behavior of US government lawyers in the Korematsu case as an example for consideration.
Suggests that there is an integral relationship between support for civil rights and support for a cluster of practices that might be characterized under the heading off "economic democracy." These include participatory workplace governance schemes and basic income schemes as alternatives to conventional income support programs.
Is divorce reasonable, given that marital promises are often apparently unqualified? I explain a variety of ways in which one can take promises seriously and recognize the value of genuinely unqualified love in marriage while recognizing that it may be reasonable in particular cases to treat marital promises as non-binding.
Gary Chartier elaborates a particular version of economic justice rooted in the natural law tradition, explaining how it is relevant to economic issues and developing natural law accounts of property, work, and economic security. He examines a range of case studies related to ownership, production, distribution, and consumption, using natural law theory as a basis for staking positions on a number of contested issues related to economic life and highlighting the potentially progressive and emancipatory dimension of natural law theory.
This book elaborates, illuminates, and illustrates a confident and attractive account of social and political liberalism in light of a rich understanding of flourishing and fulfilment rooted in a version of natural law theory. Examining issues in ethics, law, and politics - including consumer responsibility, the assignment of grades by teachers, deception by lawyers, war and empire, and the use of victim-impact statements in parole decisions - Gary Chartier shows how natural law theory can effectively support pluralism, diversity, social equality, (...) integrity, peace, and freedom. (shrink)
Updates earlier arguments for the plausibility of the thesis that basic aspects of well being are incommensurable, a thesis central to new classical natural law theory. Responds to objections from Jonathan Crowe and Jason Brennan.
Develops a model of marriage as the chosen institutionalization of love. Builds on a phenomenological account of love to make sense of marital promises and to identify the kinds of promises it makes sense for marriage partners to make.
Critically examines Peter Beinart's attempt to articulate a muscular liberalism with parallels to Cold War liberalism. Challenges Beinart's position as risking inconsistency with just war norms, among others.
Argues that natural law theory provides no credible basis for objecting to the legal recognition of same-sex marriage and offers a two-fold defense of marriage equality: natural-law arguments against marriage equality are unsuccessful; and, even if they are; proponents of new classical natural law theory should still see legally recognizing same-sex marriages as reasonable.
An essay review of Kevin Carson's massive, interdisciplinary Organization Theory, which argues that flat organizations are preferable to hierarchical ones on economic grounds and that hierarchical organizations are competitive with flatter ones, on balance, because of state-secured privilege.
Argues that the reasons Rawls offers in The Law of Peoples for rejecting cosmopolitanism are unpersuasive and that Rawls's resistance to cosmopolitanism is associated with other problematic features of his approach, including his stance regarding justice in warfare; an individualist, cosmopolitan approach would resolve evident difficulties in Rawls's position.
Marriage is ordinarily a public practice, supported by, as well as supportive of, society. But it need not fall within the purview of the state. Public Practice, Private Law articulates a conception of marriage as a morally rich and important institution that ought to be subject to private rather than legislative or judicial ordering. It elaborates a robust understanding of marriage that captures what both different-sex and same-sex couples might see as valuable about their relationships. It explains why sexual ethics (...) won't yield a normative model of marriage, and why the kind of marital love worth wanting, can. It goes on to show how an understanding of marriage as rooted in demanding commitments can allow for divorce before arguing that the state should cease to sponsor marriages. It concludes by suggesting that both state and non-state institutions should acknowledge the marriages of same-sex couples. (shrink)