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Gary Ebbs [39]Gary Martin Ebbs [1]
  1. Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention.Gary Ebbs - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):193-237.
    According to the standard story W. V. Quine ’s criticisms of the idea that logic is true by convention are directed against, and completely undermine, Rudolf Carnap’s idea that the logical truths of a language L are the sentences of L that are true-in- L solely in virtue of the linguistic conventions for L, and Quine himself had no interest in or use for any notion of truth by convention. This paper argues that and are both false. Carnap did not (...)
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  2.  63
    Rule-Following and Realism.Gary Ebbs - 1997 - Harvard University Press.
    Through detailed and trenchant criticism of standard interpretations of some of the key arguments in analytical philosophy over the last sixty years, this book ...
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  3.  20
    Pursuit of Truth.Gary Ebbs - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (3):535.
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  4.  38
    Truth and Words.Gary Ebbs - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Gary Ebbs shows that this appearance is illusory.
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  5.  49
    Rule-Following and Realism.David Hunter & Gary Ebbs - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (3):425.
    Ebbs’s aim is to “come to terms with and move beyond currently entrenched ways of looking at central topics in the philosophy of language and mind”. The entrenched perspectives are Metaphysical Realism, the view that “we can make ‘objective’ assertions only if we can ‘grasp’ metaphysically independent ‘truth conditions”’, and Scientific Naturalism, “Quine’s view that ‘it is within science itself that reality is to be identified and described”’. Ebbs intends to replace these with what he calls the “Participant Perspective,” from (...)
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  6. The Very Idea of Sameness of Extension Across Time.Gary Ebbs - 2000 - American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (3):245 - 268.
  7.  67
    Can We Take Our Words at Face Value?Gary Ebbs - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):499-530.
  8.  75
    Quine Gets The Last Word.Gary Ebbs - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (11):617-632.
  9.  19
    Satisfying Predicates: Kleene's Proof of the Hilbert–Bernays Theorem.Gary Ebbs - 2015 - History and Philosophy of Logic 36 (4):346-366.
    The Hilbert–Bernays Theorem establishes that for any satisfiable first-order quantificational schema S, one can write out linguistic expressions that are guaranteed to yield a true sentence of elementary arithmetic when they are substituted for the predicate letters in S. The theorem implies that if L is a consistent, fully interpreted language rich enough to express elementary arithmetic, then a schema S is valid if and only if every sentence of L that can be obtained by substituting predicates of L for (...)
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  10.  23
    Quine’s “Predilection” for Finitism.Gary Ebbs - 2016 - Metascience 25 (1):31-36.
  11.  86
    Vagueness, Sharp Boundaries, and Supervenience Conditions.Gary Ebbs - 2001 - Synthese 127 (3):303-323.
  12. Why Scepticism About Self-Knowledge is Self-Undermining.Gary Ebbs - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):237-244.
    In two previous papers I explained why I believe that a certain sort of argument that seems to support skepticism about self-knowledge is actually self-undermining, in the sense that no one can justifiably accept all of its premises at once. Anthony Brueckner has recently tried to show that even if the central premises of my explanation are true, the skeptical argument in question is not self-undermining. He has also suggested that even if the skeptical argument is self-undermining, it can still (...)
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  13.  42
    Realism and Rational Inquiry.Gary Ebbs - 1992 - Philosophical Topics 20 (1):1-33.
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  14.  10
    Can We Take Our Words at Face Value?Gary Ebbs - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):499-530.
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  15.  89
    Is Skepticism About Self-Knowledge Coherent?Gary Ebbs - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (1):43-58.
    In previous work I argued that skepticism about the compatibility ofanti-individualism with self-knowledge is incoherent. Anthony Brueckner isnot convinced by my argument, for reasons he has recently explained inprint. One premise in Brueckner's reasoning is that a person'sself-knowledge is confined to what she can derive solely from herfirst-person experiences of using her sentences. I argue that Brueckner'sacceptance of this premise undermines another part of his reasoning – hisattempt to justify his claims about what thoughts our sincere utterances ofcertain sentences would (...)
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  16.  27
    Davidson's Explication of Meaning.Gary Ebbs - 2012 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press. pp. 76.
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  17. Conditionalization and Conceptual Change: Chalmers in Defense of a Dogma.Gary Ebbs - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (12):689-703.
    David Chalmers has recently argued that Bayesian conditionalization is a constraint on conceptual constancy, and that this constraint, together with “standard Bayesian considerations about evidence and updating,” is incompatible with the Quinean claim that every belief is rationally revisable. Chalmers’s argument presupposes that the sort of conceptual constancy that is relevant to Bayesian conditionalization is the same as the sort of conceptual constancy that is relevant to the claim that every belief is rationally revisable. To challenge this presupposition I explicate (...)
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  18.  48
    Learning From Others.Gary Ebbs - 2002 - Noûs 36 (4):525–549.
  19.  6
    Realism and Rational Inquiry.Gary Ebbs - 1992 - Philosophical Topics 20 (1):1-33.
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  20.  22
    A Puzzle About Doubt.Gary Ebbs - 2003 - In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
  21.  70
    Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social Reality.Frederick F. Schmitt, Gary Ebbs, Margaret Gilbert, Sally Haslanger, Kevin Kimble, Ron Mallon, Seumas Miller, Philip Pettit, Abraham Sesshu Roth, John Searle, Raimo Tuomela & Edward Witherspoon - 2003 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Socializing Metaphysics supplies diverse answers to the basic questions of social metaphysics, from a broad array of voices. It will interest all philosophers and social scientists concerned with mind, action, or the foundations of social theory.
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  22.  24
    Can First-Order Logical Truth Be Defined in Purely Extensional Terms?Gary Ebbs - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (2):343-367.
    W. V. Quine thinks logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms, as follows: a logical truth is a true sentence that exemplifies a logical form all of whose instances are true. P. F. Strawson objects that one cannot say what it is for a particular use of a sentence to exemplify a logical form without appealing to intensional notions, and hence that Quine's efforts to define logical truth in purely extensional terms cannot succeed. Quine's reply to this criticism (...)
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  23.  7
    Belief and Meaning.Gary Ebbs - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):613-620.
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  24.  68
    Putnam and the Contextually A Priori.Gary Ebbs - unknown
    Nevertheless, when we cannot specify how a statement may actually be false it has a special methodological status for us, according to Putnam—it is contextually a priori . In these circumstances, he suggests, it is epistemically reasonable for us to accept the statement without evidence and hold it immune from disconfirmation.
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  25.  13
    9 Carnap's Logical Syntax.Gary Ebbs - 2001 - In Richard Gaskin (ed.), Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 218.
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  26.  56
    Bilgrami’s Theory of Belief and Meaning.Gary Ebbs & Akeel Bilgrami - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):613.
  27.  44
    Debating Self-Knowledge.Anthony Brueckner & Gary Ebbs - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
    Language users ordinarily suppose that they know what thoughts their own utterances express. We can call this supposed knowledge minimal self-knowledge. But what does it come to? And do we actually have it? Anti-individualism implies that the thoughts which a person's utterances express are partly determined by facts about their social and physical environments. If anti-individualism is true, then there are some apparently coherent sceptical hypotheses that conflict with our supposition that we have minimal self-knowledge. In this book, Anthony Brueckner (...)
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  28. Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Epistemic Possibility: Further Reflections on a Puzzle About Doubt.Gary Ebbs - 2008 - In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
  29.  74
    Carnap on Analyticity and Existence: A Clarification, Defense, and Development of Quine’s Reading of Carnap’s Views on Ontology.Gary Ebbs - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (5):1-31.
    Does Carnap’s treatment of philosophical questions about existence, such as “Are there numbers?” and “Are there physical objects?”, depend on his analytic–synthetic distinction? If so, in what way? I answer these questions by clarifying, defending, and developing the reading of Carnap’s paper “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” that W. V. Quine proposes, with little justification or explanation, in his paper “On Carnap’s Views on Ontology”. The primary methodological value of studying Quine’s reading of “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” is that it prompts (...)
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  30. Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on Methods of Inquiry.Gary Ebbs - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
    Carnap, Quine, and Putnam held that in our pursuit of truth we can do no better than to start in the middle, relying on already-established beliefs and inferences and applying our best methods for re-evaluating particular beliefs and inferences and arriving at new ones. In this collection of essays, Gary Ebbs interprets these thinkers' methodological views in the light of their own philosophical commitments, and in the process refutes some widespread misunderstandings of their views, reveals the real strengths of their (...)
     
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  31.  48
    Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science.Gary Ebbs - 2015 - History and Philosophy of Logic 36 (2):181-188.
  32.  47
    First‐Order Logical Validity and the Hilbert‐Bernays Theorem.Gary Ebbs & Warren Goldfarb - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):159-175.
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  33.  8
    Hilary Putnam’s Liberal Naturalism About Language Use, Reference, and Truth.Gary Ebbs - 2020 - The Monist 103 (4):357-369.
    Hilary Putnam observes that a typical competent English speaker who cannot tell an elm tree from a beech tree may nevertheless use the word “elm” to make assertions and ask questions about elm trees. Putnam also observes that scientists may be wrong about the phenomena they investigate, while still being able to use their words to identify and raise research questions about it. This prompts him to ask what “language use” means in these contexts. He proposes two closely related methods (...)
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  34. ¸ Iteconantzeglen:Ppr.Gary Ebbs - 2002
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  35. Mendola's Internalism.Gary Ebbs - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (2):248-257.
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  36.  14
    Putnam on Methods of Inquiry.Gary Ebbs - 2017 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 24:121-125.
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  37.  7
    Quine on the Norms of Naturalized Epistemology.Gary Ebbs - 2019 - In Robert Sinclair (ed.), Science and Sensibilia by W. V. Quine: The 1980 Immanuel Kant Lectures. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    My central goal in this paper is to interpret what Quine says in his Kant lectures about the norms of epistemology and the doctrinal and conceptual tasks of epistemology—the tasks, respectively, of constructing good theories and of clarifying meanings—in light of what he says about these topics in several of his earlier and later works. I argue that despite one puzzling passage in the Kant lectures that misleadingly suggests otherwise, the norms of Quine’s epistemology are exclusively doctrinal, not conceptual.
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  38. Skepticism, Objectivity, and Brains in Vats.Gary Ebbs - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):239-266.
     
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  39. Truth and Trans-Theoretical Terms.Gary Ebbs - 2002 - In ¸ Iteconantzeglen:Ppr. pp. 167--185.
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