7 found
Gary Gigliotti [5]Gary Anthony Gigliotti [3]
  1.  36
    Intransitive Cycles: Rational Choice or Random Error? An Answer Based on Estimation of Error Rates with Experimental Data.Barry Sopher & Gary Gigliotti - 1993 - Theory and Decision 35 (3):311-336.
  2.  24
    Comment on Craven.Gary Anthony Gigliotti - 1986 - Theory and Decision 21 (1):89-95.
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  3.  36
    Violations of Present-Value Maximization in Income Choice.Gary Gigliotti & Barry Sopher - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (1):45-69.
    We report results of an experiment testing for present-value maximization in intertemporal income choice. Two-thirds of subjects did not maximize present value. Through a series of experimental manipulations that impose costs on non-present value maximizers, we are able to reduce the level of violations substantially. We find, however, that a sizeable proportion of subjects continue to systematically violate present-value principles. Our interpretation is that these subjects either cannot or choose not to distinguish between t income and t expenditure in making (...)
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  4.  26
    A Test of Generalized Expected Utility Theory.Barry Sopher & Gary Gigliotti - 1993 - Theory and Decision 35 (1):75-106.
  5.  40
    Analysis of Intertemporal Choice: A New Framework and Experimental Results.Gary Gigliotti & Barry Sopher - 2003 - Theory and Decision 55 (3):209-233.
    This paper reports the results of a series of experiments examining intertemporal choice. The paper makes three contributions: First, it presents a new analytic device, the intertemporal choice triangle, which is analogous to the Marschak--Machina choice triangle used in the analysis of choice under risk. Second, we have developed a new experimental design based on the intertemporal choice triangle which allows subjects greater flexibility in making choices, and which allows the researcher to make more subtle inferences, than are possible with (...)
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  6.  27
    The Conflict Between Naive and Sophisticated Choice as a Form of The?Liberal Paradox?Gary Anthony Gigliotti - 1988 - Theory and Decision 24 (1):35-42.
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  7.  69
    The Testing Principle: Inductive Reasoning and the Ellsberg Paradox.Gary Gigliotti - 1996 - Thinking and Reasoning 2 (1):33 – 49.
    We postulate the Testing Principle : that individuals ''act like statisticians'' when they face uncertainty in a decision problem, ranking alternatives to the extent that available evidence allows. The Testing Principle implies that completeness of preferences, rather than the sure-thing principle , is violated in the Ellsberg Paradox. In the experiment, subjects chose between risky and uncertain acts in modified Ellsberg-type urn problems, with sample information about the uncertain urn. Our results show, consistent with the Testing Principle, that the uncertain (...)
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