Richard Heck has contested my argument that the equation of the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition implies deflationism, on the ground that the argument does not go through if truth-conditions are understood, in Davidson's style, to be stated by T-sentences. My reply is that Davidsonian theories of meaning do not equate the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition, and thus that Heck's point does not actually obstruct my argument.
Museums and their practices—especially those involving collection, curation and exhibition—generate a host of philosophical questions. Such questions are not limited to the domains of ethics and aesthetics, but go further into the domains of metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of religion. Despite the prominence of museums as public institutions, they have until recently received surprisingly little scrutiny from philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition. By bringing together contributions from philosophers with backgrounds in a range of traditional areas of philosophy, this volume demonstrates (...) how their work can enhance our understanding of museums and shed light on the philosophical questions raised by museum practices. Many of the essays in this volume make the case that the philosophy of museums is of vital concern, not only to those philosophers at work in the emerging field but also to practitioners within the museum world and to anyone who enjoys visiting museums. (shrink)
Davidson's paratactic account of indirect quotation preserves the apparent relational structure of indirect speech but without assuming, in the Fregean manner, that the thing said by a sayer is a proposition. I argue that this is a mistake. As has been recognised by some critics, Davidson's account suffers from analytical shortcomings which can be overcome by redeploying the paratactic strategy as a means of referring to propositions. I offer a quick and comprehensive survey of these difficulties and a concise propositional (...) solution. Further, I argue that Davidson's more general philosophical commitments provide no reason not to embrace the propositional strategy: despite appearances, to invoke propositions in the way suggested is consistent with Davidson's holism and consequent doctrine of semantic indeterminacy. (shrink)
_Critical Thinking_ is a much-needed guide to thinking skills and above all to thinking critically for oneself. Through clear discussion, students learn the skills required to tell a good argument from a bad one. Key features include: *jargon-free discussion of key concepts in argumentation *how to avoid confusions surrounding words such as 'truth', 'knowledge' and 'opinion' *how to identify and evaluate the most common types of argument *how to spot fallacies in arguments and tell good reasoning from bad *topical examples (...) from politics, sport, medicine, music *chapter summaries, glossary and exercises _Critical Thinking_ is essential reading for anyone, student or professional, seeking to improve their reasoning and arguing skills. (shrink)
In the seventh chapter of his extraordinary book The Objective Eye, John Hyman offers various criticisms of Richard Wollheim’s theory of pictorial depiction.1 My immediate purpose in this short piece is to make the case that these criticisms fail. By no means do I claim that there are not other criticisms to be made against Wollheim’s theory or that Hymans’s book as a whole fails—not in its overarching attempt to rescue the objectivity of art from subjectivist views or, more narrowly, (...) that Hyman’s theory of depiction fails. My claim is merely that Wollheim’s theory emerges relatively unscathed by the criticisms in Hyman’s Chapter 7, even if it is vulnerable on other grounds or incompatible with Hyman’s... (shrink)
A response to certain parts of Rumfitt : I defend Davidson's project in semantics, suggest that Rumfitt's use of sentential quantification renders his definition of truth needlessly elaborate, and pose a question for Rumfitt's handling of the strengthened Liar.
I argue against Hume and Kant, who maintain that ‘beauty’ expresses a state of the subject, rather than describes features of the object. The word ‘beauty’ is far from being alone in having an expressive dimension, and that which it has falls short of individuating it semantically. Instead, I propose a theory of linguistic idealism with respect to ‘beauty’.
I attempt to explain Frege's handling of the Julius Caesar issue in terms of his more general philosophical commitments. These only became fully explicit in his middle‐period writings, but his earlier moves are best explained, I suggest, if we suppose them to be implicit in his earlier thinking. These commitments conditionally justify Frege in rejecting Hume's Principle as either a definition or axiom but in accepting Axiom V. However, the general epistemological picture they constitute has serious problems in accounting for (...) how knowledge is possible at all of such propositions as that Julius Caesar is not a number. (shrink)
Landy’s book (OUP 2004; 255 pp.+ x) delivers what has gone long and scandalously missing: a philosophical analysis of Proust’s incomparable book that is muscular, concise, philosophically informed and sophisticated; logically rigorous, explanatorily fruitful, and meticulously answerable to its data, namely the text. The philosophy here is not, as often the case in writing about Proust, mere rhetoric or window-dressing, but substantive and literally believable. The book should for a long time be inescapable for anyone writing philosophically about Proust, and (...) perhaps for anyone writing philosophically about imaginative literature, full stop. It is that good, its themes that wide. (shrink)
Featuring essays from leading philosophical scholars, __12 Modern Philosophers__ explores the works, origins, and influences of twelve of the most important late 20th Century philosophers working in the analytic tradition. Draws on essays from well-known scholars, including Thomas Baldwin, Catherine Wilson, Adrian Moore and Lori Gruen Locates the authors and their oeuvre within the context of the discipline as a whole Considers how contemporary philosophy both draws from, and contributes to, the broader intellectual and cultural milieu.
Attempts to persuade us - to believe something, to do something, to buy something - are everywhere. What is less clear is how to think critically about such attempts and how to distinguish those that are sound arguments. _Critical Thinking: A Concise Guide_ is a much needed guide to argument analysis and a clear introduction to thinking clearly and rationally for oneself. Accessibly written, this book equips students with the essential skills required to tell a good argument from a bad (...) one. Key features of the book include: * clear, jargon-free discussion of key concepts in argumentation * how to avoid common confusions surrounding words such as 'truth', 'knowledge' and 'opinion' * how to identify and evaluate the most common types of argument * how to spot fallacies and tell good reasoning from bad * chapter summaries, exercises, examples and a glossary. The second edition has been updated to include topical new examples from politics, sport, medicine and music, as well as new exercises throughout. (shrink)
_Critical Thinking: A Concise Guide_ is a much-needed guide to argument analysis and a clear introduction to thinking clearly and rationally for oneself. Through precise and accessible discussion this book equips students with the essential skills required to tell a good argument from a bad one. Key features of the book are: clear, jargon-free discussion of key concepts in argumentation how to avoid common confusions surrounding words such as ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘opinion’ how to identify and evaluate the most common (...) types of argument how to spot fallacies in arguments and tell good reasoning from bad chapter summaries, glossaries and useful exercises. This third edition has been revised and updated throughout, with new exercises, and up-to-date topical examples, including: ‘real-world’ arguments; practical reasoning; understanding quantitative data, statistics, and the rhetoric used about them; scientific reasoning; and expanded discussion of conditionals, ambiguity, vagueness, slippery slope arguments, and arguments by analogy. The Routledge _Critical Thinking_ companion website, features a wealth of further resources, including examples and case studies, sample questions, practice questions and answers, and student activities. _Critical Thinking: A Concise Guide_ is essential reading for anyone, student or professional, at work or in the classroom, seeking to improve their reasoning and arguing skills. (shrink)
We are frequently confronted with _arguments_. Arguments are attempts to persuade us – to influence our beliefs and actions – by giving us reasons to believe this or that. _Critical Thinking: A Concise Guide_ will equip students with the concepts and techniques used in the identification, analysis and assessment of arguments. Through precise and accessible discussion, this book provides the tools to become a successful critical thinker, one who can act and believe in accordance with good reasons, and who can (...) articulate and make explicit those reasons. Key topics discussed include: core concepts in argumentation how language can serve to obscure or conceal the real content of arguments; how to distinguish argumentation from rhetoric how to avoid common confusions surrounding words such as ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘opinion’ how to identify and evaluate the most common types of argument how to distinguish good reasoning from bad in terms of deductive validly and induction. This fourth edition has been revised and updated throughout, with a new introduction for each chapter and up-to-date topical examples. Particular revisions include: practical reasoning; understanding quantitative data, statistics, and the rhetoric used about them; scientific reasoning; the connection to formal logic and the logic of probability; conditionals; ambiguity; vagueness; slippery slope arguments; and arguments by analogy. The dynamic Routledge _Critical Thinking_ companion website provides thoroughly updated resources for both instructors and students including new examples and case studies, flashcards, sample questions, practice questions and answers, student activities and a testbank of questions for use in the classroom. (shrink)
Containing three previously unpublished papers by W.V. Quine as well as historical, exegetical, and critical papers by several leading Quine scholars including Hylton, Ebbs, and Ben-Menahem, this volume aims to remedy the comparative lack of historical investigation of Quine and his philosophical context.
Davidson (1917-2003) was a brilliant but egotistical writer. His writing is vigorous and concise, and enviably refined. On the other hand, it is probably too concise, and sometimes too clever, for readers not already well-versed in logic, the philosophy of language, and the sorts of argumentative moves made in the highest circles of philosophy. So here is some help.
These are all indexicals (or each has an indexical use, as will emerge). Take the word ’I’. It is a singular term, but it would be wrong to say that the word ’I’ has a referent; it is not like ‘Rotterdam’, always having the same referent on each occasion of use. Rather, each utterance of the word has a referent. Its referent is the speaker, the one saying it.