By exploring and giving equal weight to transgendered subjectivities, however, Gayle Salamon upends these certainties.

This essay considers what is critical in critical phenomenology, and asks what features critical and phenomenological methods share. I suggest three fundamentally significant resonances between the critical and phenomenological enterprises. First is the suggestion that critique, like phenomenology, is an attempt to move beyond a dualism of inside and outside in order to extend into outer regions of what is known. Second is the insistence that what at first appears to be a purely negative endeavor, a finding of limit, is (...) incomplete if, upon finding that limit, it comes to a stop. Just as the reduction is not a means to banish or negate the world, but rather the condition through which it can more fully emerge, critique cannot be merely a cataloguing of the limitations of the present situation. Third is the openness to the possibilities of the world, a wonder or curiosity, that is revealed through the work of description in phenomenology, or Foucault’s characterization of philosophy not as an unmasking, but a making visible of what is visible. Finally I consider critical phenomenology’s futures: How is a newly enlivened kind of scholarship emerging from these two forms of thinking, both of which have been dismissed as outmoded or irrelevant? The new work currently emerging in phenomenology, with its emphasis on its own reflexive self-consideration and decolonization, offers hope that it might yet be capacious enough to simultaneously encompass the revelation of its limitations as well as the expansion of its reach. (shrink)

This volume is an introduction to both newer and more established ideas in the growing field of critical phenomenology from a number of disciplinary perspectives.

This paper charts the concepts of grip and the bodily auxiliary in Maurice Merleau-Ponty to consider how they find expression in disability narratives. Arguing against the notion of “maximal grip” that some commentators have used to explicate intentionality in Merleau-Ponty, I argue that grip in his texts functions instead as a compensatory effort to stave off uncertainty, lack of mastery, and ambiguity. Nearly without exception in Phenomenology of Perception, the mobilization of “grip” is a signal of impending loss, and is (...) offered as a strategy for managing failure rather than as an example of sure-footed mastery. I read Merleau-Ponty alongside Mary Felstiner's Out of Joint: A Public and Private Story of Arthritis to explore these other, attenuated dimensions of grip. Finally, the paper turns to Harriet McBryde Johnson's memoir Too Late to Die Young as an example of a way of thinking disabled embodiment otherwise. (shrink)

Phenomenology, the philosophical method that seeks to uncover the taken-for-granted presuppositions, habits, and norms that structure everyday experience, is increasingly framed by ethical and political concerns. Critical phenomenology foregrounds experiences of marginalization, oppression, and power in order to identify and transform common experiences of injustice that render “the familiar” a site of oppression for many. In Fifty Concepts for a Critical Phenomenology, leading scholars present fresh readings of classic phenomenological topics and introduce newer concepts developed by feminist theorists, critical race (...) theorists, disability theorists, and queer and trans theorists that capture aspects of lived experience that have traditionally been neglected. By centering historically marginalized perspectives, the chapters in this book breathe new life into the phenomenological tradition and reveal its ethical, social, and political promise. This volume will be an invaluable resource for teaching and research in continental philosophy; feminist, gender, and sexuality studies; critical race theory; disability studies; cultural studies; and critical theory more generally. (shrink)

This paper charts the concepts of grip and the bodily auxiliary in Maurice Merleau-Ponty to consider how they find expression in disability narratives. Arguing against the notion of “maximal grip” that some commentators have used to explicate intentionality in Merleau-Ponty, I argue that grip in his texts functions instead as a compensatory effort to stave off uncertainty, lack of mastery, and ambiguity. Nearly without exception in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, the mobilisation of “grip” is a signal of impending loss and (...) is offered as a strategy for managing failure rather than as an example of sure-footed mastery. I read Merleau-Ponty alongside Mary Felstiner’s Out of Joint: A Public and Private Story of Arthritis to explore these other, attenuated dimensions of grip as an example of a way of thinking disabled embodiment otherwise. (shrink)

In this interview, Judith Butler remembers her teacher, the phenomenologist Maurice Natanson. Natanson observed that learning how to see is central to both teaching and learning, and Professor Butler reflects on Natanson’s views of the relation between perception, pedagogy, and world-making. She discusses the possibilities and limits of phenomenology, and its engagements with intentionality, reason, and faith. Professor Butler also reflects on the influence of phenomenology on her theory of gender performativity as well as her recent work on bodies in (...) alliance. (shrink)

In this interview, Judith Butler remembers her teacher, the phenomenologist Maurice Natanson. Natanson observed that learning how to see is central to both teaching and learning, and Professor Butler reflects on Natanson’s views of the relation between perception, pedagogy, and world-making. She discusses the possibilities and limits of phenomenology, and its engagements with intentionality, reason, and faith. Professor Butler also reflects on the influence of phenomenology on her theory of gender performativity as well as her recent work on bodies in (...) alliance. (shrink)

This essay reads Iris Marion Young’s foundational essay “Throwing Like a Girl” as one of the first serious attempts to mount a critique of phenomenology’s universal aspirations using its own methods, in order to show that its humanism was deeply, if unknowingly, inflected by gender. I show how Young’s use of Erwin Straus’s and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological methods both extend and challenge their claims, and her how assertions about the particularity of feminine existence call into question some of phenome-nology’s deepest (...) convictions about bodily existence in general. Her argument thus uses phenomenology to call into question the phenomenological foundation on which it rests, in a feminist reconsideration of motility, space, intentionality, and transcendence. I conclude by turning to “Throwing Like a Girl: Twenty Years Later” twenty years after its publication and consider the phenomenology of action and relation that Young gestures toward there. Dans cet article, nous présenterons l’article révolutionnaire d’Iris Marion Young, « Lancer comme une fille », comme l’une des premières tentatives de critiquer les aspirations universelles de la phénoménologie en utilisant ses propres méthodes. Young démontre que l’humanisme de la phénoménologie est profondément (et mal-gré elle) influencé par le genre. Nous montrerons en quoi le recours par Young aux approches phénoménologiques d’Erwin Straus et de Maurice Merleau-Ponty permet de mettre à l’épreuve leurs thèses. Nous expliquerons ensuite comment son exploration de la spécificité de l’existence féminine met en question les convictions les plus profondes de la phénoménologie concernant l’existence corporelle en général. Ainsi, en examinant la motilité, l’intentionnalité et la transcendance dans une perspective féministe, Young fait appel à la phénoménologie pour questionner les fondements phénoménologiques sur lesquels il repose. Dans un deuxième temps, nous abor-derons, vingt ans après sa publication, l’article « Throwing Like a Girl : Twenty Years Later » pour présenter la phénoménologie de l’action et de la relation qui y est esquissée. (shrink)