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Geoff Keeling
Stanford University
  1. Why Trolley Problems Matter for the Ethics of Automated Vehicles.Geoff Keeling - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (1):293-307.
    This paper argues against the view that trolley cases are of little or no relevance to the ethics of automated vehicles. Four arguments for this view are outlined and rejected: the Not Going to Happen Argument, the Moral Difference Argument, the Impossible Deliberation Argument and the Wrong Question Argument. In making clear where these arguments go wrong, a positive account is developed of how trolley cases can inform the ethics of automated vehicles.
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  2.  57
    Legal Necessity, Pareto Efficiency & Justified Killing in Autonomous Vehicle Collisions.Geoff Keeling - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (2):413-427.
    Suppose a driverless car encounters a scenario where harm to at least one person is unavoidable and a choice about how to distribute harms between different persons is required. How should the driverless car be programmed to behave in this situation? I call this the moral design problem. Santoni de Sio defends a legal-philosophical approach to this problem, which aims to bring us to a consensus on the moral design problem despite our disagreements about which moral principles provide the correct (...)
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  3. On Algorithmic Fairness in Medical Practice.Thomas Grote & Geoff Keeling - 2022 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 31 (1):83-94.
    The application of machine-learning technologies to medical practice promises to enhance the capabilities of healthcare professionals in the assessment, diagnosis, and treatment, of medical conditions. However, there is growing concern that algorithmic bias may perpetuate or exacerbate existing health inequalities. Hence, it matters that we make precise the different respects in which algorithmic bias can arise in medicine, and also make clear the normative relevance of these different kinds of algorithmic bias for broader questions about justice and fairness in healthcare. (...)
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    Autonomy, Nudging and Post-Truth Politics.Geoff Keeling - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (10):721-722.
    In his excellent essay, ‘Nudges in a post-truth world’, Neil Levy argues that ‘nudges to reason’, or nudges which aim to make us more receptive to evidence, are morally permissible. A strong argument against the moral permissibility of nudging is that nudges fail to respect the autonomy of the individuals affected by them. Levy argues that nudges to reason do respect individual autonomy, such that the standard autonomy objection fails against nudges to reason. In this paper, I argue that Levy (...)
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  5. A Dilemma for Reasons Additivity.Geoff Keeling - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-23.
    This paper presents a dilemma for the additive model of reasons. Either the model accommodates disjunctive cases in which one ought to perform some act \phi just in case at least one of two factors obtains, or it accommodates conjunctive cases in which one ought to \phi just in case both of two factors obtains. The dilemma also arises in a revised additive model that accommodates imprecisely weighted reasons. There exist disjunctive and conjunctive cases. Hence the additive model is extensionally (...)
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  6. Building Machines That Learn and Think About Morality.Christopher Burr & Geoff Keeling - 2018 - In Proceedings of the Convention of the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour (AISB 2018). Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour.
    Lake et al. propose three criteria which, they argue, will bring artificial intelligence (AI) systems closer to human cognitive abilities. In this paper, we explore the application of these criteria to a particular domain of human cognition: our capacity for moral reasoning. In doing so, we explore a set of considerations relevant to the development of AI moral decision-making. Our main focus is on the relation between dual-process accounts of moral reasoning and model-free/model-based forms of machine learning. We also discuss (...)
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  7.  26
    Against Leben’s Rawlsian Collision Algorithm for Autonomous Vehicles.Geoff Keeling - 2017 - In Vincent Müller (ed.), Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017. Springer. pp. 259-272.
    Suppose that an autonomous vehicle encounters a situation where (i) imposing a risk of harm on at least one person is unavoidable; and (ii) a choice about how to allocate risks of harm between different persons is required. What does morality require in these cases? Derek Leben defends a Rawlsian answer to this question. I argue that we have reason to reject Leben’s answer.
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  8.  12
    Commentary: Using Virtual Reality to Assess Ethical Decisions in Road Traffic Scenarios: Applicability of Value-of-Life-Based Models and Influences of Time Pressure.Geoff Keeling - forthcoming - Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience.
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  9.  3
    Against Leben’s Rawlsian Collision Algorithm for Autonomous Vehicles.Geoff Keeling - 2017 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2017. Springer.
    Suppose that an autonomous vehicle encounters a situation where imposing a risk of harm on at least one person is unavoidable; and a choice about how to allocate risks of harm between different persons is required. What does morality require in these cases? Derek Leben defends a Rawlsian answer to this question. I argue that we have reason to reject Leben’s answer.
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  10. The Sensitivity Argument Against Child Euthanasia.Geoff Keeling - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (2):143-144.
    Is there a moral difference between euthanasia for terminally ill adults and euthanasia for terminally ill children? Luc Bovens considers five arguments to this effect, and argues that each is unsuccessful. In this paper, I argue that Bovens' dismissal of the sensitivity argument is unconvincing.
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    Proper functions: etiology without typehood.Geoff Keeling & Niall Paterson - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (3):1-17.
    The proper function of the heart is pumping the blood. According to what we call the type etiological view, this is because previous tokens of the type HEART were selected for pumping the blood. Nanay :412–431, 2010) argues that the type etiological view is viciously circular. He claims that the only plausible accounts of trait type individuation use proper functions, such that whenever the type etiological view is supplemented with a plausible account of trait type individuation, the result is a (...)
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