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Geoffrey Lee
University of California, Berkeley
  1. Temporal Experience and the Temporal Structure of Experience.Geoffrey Lee - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    I assess a number of connected ideas about temporal experience that are introspectively plausible, but which I believe can be argued to be incorrect. These include the idea that temporal experiences are extended experiential processes, that they have an internal structure that in some way mirrors the structure of the apparent events they present, and the idea that time in experience is in some way represented by time itself. I explain how these ideas can be developed into more sharply defined (...)
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  2. Experiences and Their Parts.Geoffrey Lee - 2014 - In Bennett Hill (ed.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. MIT Press.
    I give an account of the difference between "Holistic" and "Atomistic" views of conscious experience. On the Holistic view, we enjoy a unified "field" of awareness, whose parts are mere modifications of the whole, and therefore owe their existence to the whole. There is some tendency to saddle those who reject the Holistic field model with a (perhaps) implausible "building block" view. I distinguish a number of different theses about the parts of an experience that are suggested by the "building (...)
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  3. Materialism and the Epistemic Significance of Consciousness.Geoffrey Lee - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 222.
  4. The Experience of Left and Right.Geoffrey Lee - 2006 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
  5. Alien Subjectivity and the Importance of Consciousness.Geoffrey Lee - forthcoming - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Themes from Block. MIT Press.
  6. Making Sense of Subjective Time.Geoffrey Lee - 2017 - In Ian Phillips (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge. pp. 157–168.
    Overview of some of the key philosophical problems encountered making sense of the notion of "subjective time", with a focus on the experience of duration. The paper unpacks some of the assumptions behind an intuitive picture of duration experience I call the "simple flow" view, highlighting the availability of alternative models. It then considers a number of obstacles to providing an account of the individuation of subjective features of duration experience.
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  7. Consciousness in a Space-Time World.Geoffrey Lee - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):341–374.
  8. Selfless Experience.Geoffrey Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):207-243.
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    Does Experience Have Phenomenal Properties?Geoffrey Lee - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):201-230.
    What assumptions are built into the claim that experience has “phenomenal properties,” and could these assumptions turn out to be false? I consider the issue specifically for the similarity relations between experiences: for example, experiences of different shades of red are more similar to each other than an experience of red and an experience of green. It is commonly thought that we have a special kind of epistemic access to experience that is more secure than our access to the external (...)
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    Unity and Essence in Chalmers' Theory of Consciousness.Geoffrey Lee - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):763-773.
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    Commentary on Dan Lloyd:“Neural Correlates of Temporality”.Geoffrey Lee - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):707-710.
  12. Explaining Away Temporal Flow – Thoughts on Prosser’s ‘Experiencing Time’.Geoffrey Lee - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):315-327.
    I offer some responses to Prosser’s ‘Experiencing Time’, one of whose goals is to debunk a view of temporal experience somewhat prevalent in the metaphysics literature, which I call ‘Perceptualism’. According to Perceptualism: it is part of the content of perceptual experience that time passes in a metaphysically strong sense: the present has a metaphysically privileged status, and time passes in virtue of changes in which events this ‘objective present’ highlights, and moreover this gives us evidence in favor of strong (...)
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  13. Subjective Duration.Geoffrey Lee - manuscript
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    The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience. [REVIEW]Geoffrey Lee - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):163-167.
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    Worlds, Voyages and Experiences: Commentary on Pelczar’s Sensorama. [REVIEW]Geoffrey Lee - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):453-461.