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  1.  16
    Rejecting Beliefs, or Rejecting Believers? On the Importance and Exclusion of Women in Philosophy.Geoffrey S. Holtzman - 2016 - Hypatia 31 (2):293-312.
    Why has gender equality progressed so much more slowly in philosophy than in other academic disciplines? Here, I address both factual and theoretical matters relating to the causes, effects, and potential redress of the lack of women in philosophy. First, I debunk extant claims that women are more likely than men to disagree with their philosophy professors and male peers; that women are more sensitive to disagreements in the philosophy classroom than men are; and that the gender imbalance in philosophy (...)
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  2.  18
    Famine, Affluence and Intuitions: Evolutionary Debunking Proves Too Much.Geoffrey S. Holtzman - 2018 - Disputatio 10 (48):57-70.
    Moral theorists like Singer and Greene argue that we should discount intuitions about ‘up-close-and-personal’ moral dilemmas because they are more likely than intuitions about ‘impersonal’ dilemmas to be artifacts of evolution. But by that reasoning, it seems we should ignore the evolved, ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuition to save a drowning child in light of the too-new-to-be-evolved, ‘impersonal’ intuition that we need not donate to international famine relief. This conclusion seems mistaken and horrifying, yet it cannot be the case both that ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuitions (...)
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  3.  18
    A Neuropsychological Challenge to the Sentimentalism/Rationalism Distinction.Geoffrey S. Holtzman - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):1873-1889.
    Critical reflection on the available neuropsychological evidence suggests that the roles of emotion and reason in moral judgment may not be distinct. This casts significant doubt on our current understanding of moral judgment, and therefore also on all philosophical theories based on that understanding. Most notably, it raises doubts about both sentimentalism and rationalism, which historically have often been treated as exclusive and exhaustive theories regarding the nature of moral concepts. As an alternative, I endorse pluralism with regard to the (...)
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  4.  15
    Neuromoral Diversity: Individual, Gender, and Cultural Differences in the Ethical Brain.Geoffrey S. Holtzman - 2017 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 11.
  5.  18
    Normative Moral Neuroscience: The Third Tradition of Neuroethics.Geoffrey S. Holtzman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3):411-431.
    Neuroethics is typically conceived of as consisting of two traditions: the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of moral judgment. However, recent work has sought to draw philosophical and ethical implications from the neuroscience of moral judgment. Such work, which concernsnormative moral neuroscience, is sufficiently distinct and complex to deserve recognition as a third tradition of neuroethics. Recognizing it as such can reduce confusion among researchers, eliminating conflations among both critics and proponents of NMN.This article identifies and unpacks some of (...)
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  6.  16
    The Agency-Last Paradigm: Free Will as Moral Ether.Geoffrey S. Holtzman - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):435-458.
    I argue that free will is a nominal construct developed and deployed post hoc in an effort to provide cohesive narratives in support of a priori moral-judgmental dispositions. In a reversal of traditional course, I defend the view that there are no circumstances under which attributions of moral responsibility for an act can, should, or do depend on prior ascriptions of free will. Conversely, I claim that free will belief depends entirely on the apperceived possibility of moral responsibility. Orthodoxy dictates (...)
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  7.  9
    Adjudicating Adjudication and the Problem of Epistemic Caution.Geoffrey S. Holtzman - 2016 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 7 (3):179-184.
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  8.  7
    Morality for Humans: Ethical Understanding From the Perspective of Cognitive Science. [REVIEW]Geoffrey S. Holtzman - 2016 - Review of Metaphysics 69 (4):819-821.
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