Social Facts and Collective Intentionality is a combination of terms that refers to a new field of basic research. Written mainly in the mood and by means of analytical philosophy, at the very heart of this new approach is conceptual explication of all the various versions of social facts and collective intentionality and its ramifications. This approach tackles the topics of traditional social philosophy using new conceptual methods, including techniques of formal logic, computer simulations, and artificial intelligence. Such research also (...) addresses careful research relating to ontological, epistemological, normative and--last but not least-- methodological questions. This volume represents the state of the art in this new field. The volume and its contributors tackle a series of vexing issues in the social sciences: (1) the sense of affiliation to large in contrast to small groups, (2) whether collective membership is the same as common knowledge, (3) the worth of information exchange based on faulty data, (4) the difference between standards of information and transfer of information, and (5) whether reliability is grounded in personal experience or as members in epistemic communities or networks. Contributors to this volume have a strong commitment to the social or collective character and mutual interplay of scientific information. "Collective Intentionality" is the term chosen by researchers working in this cross-disciplinary field. The group is currently conducting research in areas such as artificial intelligence, linguistics, logic, and the philosophy of the social sciences. Its work is distinguished by issues of collective behavior such as jointness, groupness, we and us. The present volume covers the state of the art of collective analysis, while fully appreciating that it is a stepping stone, albeit an important one, in redirecting the attention of basic philosophy away from the individual to the collective mode of exact analysis. Georg Meggle is professor for philosophical foundations of anthropology and of cognitive sciences at the University of Leipzig, Germany. He is a key contributor to Realism in Action with a study of Common Belief and Common Knowledge, and author of an earlier study of theoretical foundations of semantics. (shrink)
There is a long tradition in the philosophy of explaining the concept of meaning in terms of reference of the thing that our sign signifies. At the latest since Wittgenstein, meaning has been explained with the formula meaning=use, where one distinguishes between how one uses something and for what purpose one uses something. The author shows that this dichotomy between the how and the purpose of use can be unified. He does this by first investigating the concept of the purpose (...) of use and then reconstructs the use-how by means of the concept of convention. Finally, the author demonstrates how to traditional referential semantics can be justified on the basis of the theory developed here.". (shrink)
And, much worse, nearly nobody cares about this conceptual disaster -- the main thing being, whether or not you are taking sides with the good guys. This volume is an analytical attempt to end this disaster. What is Terrorism?
According to Tuomela, comunicative actions are a special case of social actions. As to the relevant differentia, he gives us different proposals. How are these proposals to be judged from the perspective of a communication theory formulated in strictly intentionalistic terms?
Dient Kunst der Erkenntnis? Vermittelt sie Einsichten oder Wissen? Und wenn ja: auf welche Weise? Sind ästhetische Urteile wahr oder falsch? Beruht unsere Wertschätzung von Kunst auf ihren kognitiven Funktionen? Zu diesen Fragen, die zu den klassischen Themen der Kunstphilosophie gehören, beziehen zehn Philosophen aus dem deutschen Sprachraum in Originalbeiträgen Position. Der Band dokumentiert den gegenwärtigen Stand der Kontroversen zwischen kognitivistischen und nichtkognitivistischen Theorien der Kunst und der Kunstbewertung. Mit Beiträgen von Rüdiger Bittner, Sabine A. Döring, Christoph Jäger, Bernd Kleimann, (...) Dirk Koppelberg, Jens Kulenkampff, Franz von Kutschera, Alexander Piecha, Jakob Steinbrenner und Henning Tegtmeyer. (shrink)
v. 1. Logic, epistemology, philosophy of science -- v. 2. Philosophy of language, metaphysics -- v. 3. Philosophy of mind, practical philosophy, miscellanea.
Ausgewahlte Beitrage zum 1. KOngreSS der Gesellschaft fur Analytische Philosophie (GAP); Saarbrucken, 9-12. OKtober 1991 Aus dem Inhalt: 1. ERkenntnistheorie 2. WIssenschaftstheorie - historisch und systematisch 3. SPrachphilosophie 4. PHilosophie des Geistes 5. PRaktische Philosophie 6. OFfene Sektion.
Ausgewahlte Beitrage zum 1. KOngreSS der Gesellschaft fur Analytische Philosophie ; Saarbrucken, 9-12. OKtober 1991 Aus dem Inhalt: 1. ERkenntnistheorie 2. WIssenschaftstheorie - historisch und systematisch 3. SPrachphilosophie 4. PHilosophie des Geistes 5. PRaktische Philosophie 6. OFfene Sektion.
Proceedings of the von Wright conference at the Center for Intedisciplinary Studies in Bielefeld, April 26 to 27, 1996. Georg Henrik von Wright, born 1916, is an important analytical philosopher of the 20th century.
These are the questions proposed in this book; therefore, it is concerned with problems of semantics (part 1), problems of moral assessment (part 2) and with the moral, legal and political conclusions we draw from our experiences with the ...
Bei normalen Täuschungen verträgt sich die Erwartung des Täuschers auf Erfolg nicht mit der Erwartung, daß der Täuschungsversuch auf Seiten des Täuschungsadressaten als solcher erkannt werden wird. Ist Täuschung überhaupt mit Offenheit verträglich? Bei nicht-normalen Täuschungen: Ja. Nicht-normale Täuschungen sind solche, bei denen der Täuscher nur dann mit einem Täuschungserfolg rechnen zu können glaubt, wenn ihm seine Täuschungs-Adressatin außer seiner Täuschungsabsicht auch noch einen Irrtum unterstellt. Wie sieht die Logik solcher Täuschungsversuche aus? Und was sind deren Grenzen?
