Thus Hegel's philosophy did not, as it were, merely paint "gray on gray." Not surprisingly, however, contemporary interest in this "ultimate philosophy" is due chiefly to the suggestive expansion of its insights, rather than to any desire for systematic reconstruction. In a discretionary way, Hegelian problems and patterns have gained a new lease in the fields of social and religious thought and among those for whom classical political theory is not a dead exercise. One might say that Hegel remains vital (...) because he continues to raise polemical questions. When a giant structure of human speculation is superseded—a fate which some feel, wrongly I think, that Hegel tacitly acknowledged for his own philosophy—but survives in membris disjectis, anthologies tend to be compiled for partisan purposes. Karl Löwith reminds us that this was the destiny of the fragile Hegelian balance in the hands of the philosopher's immediate disciples. The last generation has seen a renewal of this Kulturkampf, but now on the far side of total war, Marxism, and religious crisis. The opposition of "What did Hegel mean?" and "What does Hegel mean for us?" is posed and reposed. I personally feel—as a historian of ideas—that some intellectual mischief is caused by the failure to raise the two questions in mutual rapport. (shrink)
Hegel introduced the Phenomenology of Mind as a work on the problem of knowledge. In the first chapter, entitled “Sense Certainty, or the This and Meaning,” he concluded that knowledge cannot consist of an immediate awareness of particulars ). The tradition discusses sense certainty in terms of this failure of immediate knowledge without, however, specifically addressing the problem of reference. Yet reference is distinct from knowledge in the sense that while there can be no knowledge of objects without reference, there (...) may be reference without knowledge. If that is the case, then the failure of immediate knowledge does not entitle us to conclude anything about the success or failure of reference. It is not surprising, then, that a few scholars have begun to examine sense certainty primarily as a thesis about reference. (shrink)
While I deeply appreciate the painstaking and often generous remarks in R.N. Berki’s review of my book Hegel’s Retreat From Eleusis, [OWL, September 1978], I should like to correct two of his misapprehensions. First, the point is not that I try to “steer a middle course between ‘antiquaries’ who relegate Hegel to history books and ‘renovators’ who believe that Hegel is directly relevant,” but between the former and those who warp Hegel out of context in support of their preferred vision (...) of social and political action and/or explanation. Second, I do not conclude negatively about “the contemporary value of Hegel’s doctrine of the state;” If I had, the book would scarcely have been worth writing. It is simply that, in line with the first point, I counsel caution and salutary “archaeological” reflection. Current reality is messy: Hegel guides us and teaches us, but he furnishes no coup de foudre for solving our institutional problems. If this is irresolute, so be it. Does Mr. Berki propose bringing back monarchy, estates, and early 19th century municipal life? My own position is stated on pp. 109, 142–144, 183, 222–223. Although this may be, in Hayden White’s language, a Rankean trope, my option is surely not for “the historical dustbin.”. (shrink)
The recently published volume of the proceedings of the Seventh Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America is devoted, grosso modo, to the philosophy of history. Its ten essays and eight shorter comments explore some fairly exotic latitudes, but manage, especially on second reading, to provide dialogue, which is to the credit of the organizers and the editor, Professor Perkins. The papers are mostly of high quality and the criticisms are both civil and apposite. Purchase of this book is (...) recommended, although with the caveat that anthologies, like history itself, are not made exactly as it might please each and all. Cosmetically, History and System could have benefited in two respects: the footnote numeration is disconcertingly garbled in one of the more difficult essays and flawed in a couple of others; the index could well have been restricted to proper names for all the good it does. (shrink)
The recently published volume of the proceedings of the Seventh Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America is devoted, grosso modo, to the philosophy of history. Its ten essays and eight shorter comments explore some fairly exotic latitudes, but manage, especially on second reading, to provide dialogue, which is to the credit of the organizers and the editor, Professor Perkins. The papers are mostly of high quality and the criticisms are both civil and apposite. Purchase of this book is (...) recommended, although with the caveat that anthologies, like history itself, are not made exactly as it might please each and all. Cosmetically, History and System could have benefited in two respects: the footnote numeration is disconcertingly garbled in one of the more difficult essays and flawed in a couple of others; the index could well have been restricted to proper names for all the good it does. (shrink)
Taken in the precise terms that its author recommends, there are two rubrics under which this book on Hegel’s social and political ideas should be considered: expository and introductory; and an interpretation with “distinctive” and critical features. I shall use these clues as a point of departure, and then add some specific comments about the method of analysis.
