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George Sher [83]George A. Sher [1]George Allen Sher [1]
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George Sher
Rice University
  1.  76
    Who Knew?: Responsiblity Without Awareness.George Sher - 2009 - Oxford University Press USA.
    To be responsible for their acts, agents must both perform those acts voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. In Who Knew? George Sher seeks to rectify that imbalance. The book is divided in two halves, the first of which criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition, while the second seeks to develop a more (...)
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  2.  43
    In Praise of Blame.George Sher - 2007 - Oup Usa.
    Blame is an unpopular and neglected notion: it goes against the grain of a therapeutically-oriented culture and has been far less discussed by philosophers than such related notions as responsibility and punishment. This book seeks to show that neither the opposition nor the neglect is justified. The book's most important conclusion is that blame is inseperable from morality itself - that any considerations that justify us in accepting a set of moral principles must also call for the condemnation of those (...)
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  3. Women and Moral Theory.Eva Feder Kittay, Carol Gilligan, Annette C. Baier, Michael Stocker, Christina H. Sommers, Kathryn Pyne Addelson, Virginia Held, Thomas E. Hill Jr, Seyla Benhabib, George Sher, Marilyn Friedman, Jonathan Adler, Sara Ruddick, Mary Fainsod, David D. Laitin, Lizbeth Hasse & Sandra Harding - 1989 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    To find more information about Rowman and Littlefield titles, please visit www.rowmanlittlefield.com.
     
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  4. In Praise of Blame.George Sher - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):19-30.
    In his In Praise of Blame, George Sher aims to provide an analysis and defense of blame. In fact, he aims to provide an analysis that will itself yield a defense by allowing him to argue that morality and blame "stand or fall together." He thus opposes anyone who recommends jettisoning blame while preserving morality. In this comment, I examine Sher's defense of blame. Though I am much in sympathy with Sher's strategy of defending blame by providing an analysis that (...)
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  5. But I Could Be Wrong.George Sher - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):64.
    My aim in this essay is to explore the implications of the fact that even our most deeply held moral beliefs have been profoundly affected by our upbringing and experience—that if any of us had had a sufficiently different upbringing and set of experiences, he almost certainly would now have a very different set of moral beliefs and very different habits of moral judgment. This fact, together with the associated proliferation of incompatible moral doctrines, is sometimes invoked in support of (...)
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  6.  41
    Desert.George Sher - 1989 - Princeton University Press.
    "--Jeffrie Murphy, The Philosophical Review (forthcoming).
  7. Out of Control.George Sher - 2006 - Ethics 116 (2):285-301.
  8.  68
    Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics.George Sher - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
    Many people, including many contemporary philosophers, believe that the state has no business trying to improve people's characters, elevating their tastes, or preventing them from living degraded lives. They believe that governments should remain absolutely neutral when it comes to the consideration of competing conceptions of the good. One fundamental aim of George Sher's book is to show that this view is indefensible. A second complementary aim is to articulate a conception of the good that is worthy of promotion by (...)
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  9.  88
    A Wild West of the Mind.George Sher - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):483-496.
    abstractThis paper addresses the relation between morality and private thought. It is widely agreed that government and society have no business trying to control our thoughts—that, as long as we d...
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  10. Transgenerational Compensation.George Sher - 2005 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2):181-200.
  11.  22
    Liberal Purposes by William A. Galston. [REVIEW]George Sher - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):49-52.
  12.  18
    Desert.Jeffrie G. Murphy & George Sher - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (2):280.
  13.  9
    Morality Within the Limits of Reason.George Sher - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):682.
  14. Perfectionism and Neutrality: Essays in Liberal Theory.Bruce Ackerman, Richard J. Arneson, Ronald W. Dworkin, Gerald F. Gaus, Kent Greenawalt, Vinit Haksar, Thomas Hurka, George Klosko, Charles Larmore, Stephen Macedo, Thomas Nagel, John Rawls, Joseph Raz & George Sher - 2003 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Editors provide a substantive introduction to the history and theories of perfectionism and neutrality, expertly contextualizing the essays and making the collection accessible.
     
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  15. Diversity.George Sher - 1999 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (2):85-104.
  16. Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights.George Sher - 1981 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1):3-17.
  17.  3
    Teleology.George Sher - 1977 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (1):136-137.
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  18.  43
    Responsibility Matters.Retribution Reconsidered: More Essays in the Philosophy of Law.Desert.Michael J. Zimmerman, Peter A. French, Jeffrie G. Murphy & George Sher - 1995 - Noûs 29 (2):248.
  19.  11
    Punishment as Societal Defense.George Sher - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):548-550.
  20. What Makes a Lottery Fair?George Sher - 1980 - Noûs 14 (2):203-216.
  21. Justifying Reverse Discrimination in Employment.George Sher - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (2):159-170.
  22.  25
    Political Philosophy.George Sher & Jean Hampton - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):87.
    This book, which was completed just before Jean Hampton’s untimely death in April 1996, is an admirable hybrid. Although it successfully achieves its stated purpose of “acquaint[ing] the student of political philosophy both with [its] questions and with the various answers to them proposed by philosophers since the ancient Greeks”, it is, at the same time, quite an original work—one that can be read with real profit by professional philosophers as well as students.
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  23. Effort, Ability, and Personal Desert.George Sher - 1979 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (4):361-376.
  24. Equality for Inegalitarians.George Sher - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book offers a new and compelling account of distributive justice and its relation to choice. Unlike luck egalitarians, who treat unchosen differences in people's circumstances as sources of unjust inequality to be overcome, Sher views such differences as pervasive and unavoidable features of the human situation. Appealing to an original account of what makes us moral equals, he argues that our interest in successfully negotiating life's ever-shifting contingencies is more basic than our interest in achieving any more specific goals. (...)
     
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  25. 10. Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, Eds., Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, Eds., Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Pp. 435-440). [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall, George Sher, Michael Ridge & François Schroeter - 2006 - Ethics 116 (2).
     
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  26.  87
    Kantian Fairness.George Sher - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):179–192.
    It is widely thought to be unfair to hold people responsible, or to blame or punish them, for wrongful acts or omissions that are beyond their control. Because this principle is often taken to support incompatibilism, and because it has led many to deny the possibility of moral luck, we might expect its normative underpinnings to have been carefully scrutinized. However, surprisingly, they have not. In the current paper, I will try to fill this gap by first reconstructing, and then (...)
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  27.  5
    Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point.George Sher - 1984 - Noûs 18 (1):179-184.
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  28. Real-World Luck Egalitarianism.George Sher - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (1):218-232.
    Luck egalitarians maintain that inequalities are always unjust when they are due to luck, but are not always unjust when they are due to choices for which the parties are responsible. In this paper, I argue that the two halves of this formula do not fit neatly together, and that we arrive at one version of luck egalitarianism if we begin with the notion of luck and interpret responsible choice in terms of its absence, but a very different version if (...)
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  29. Who’s in Charge Here?: Reply to Neil Levy.George Sher - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (2):223-226.
    In his response to my essay “Out of Control,” Neil Levy contests my claims that (1) we are often responsible for acts that we do not consciously choose to perform, and that (2) despite the absence of conscious choice, there remains a relevant sense in which these actions are within our control. In this reply to Levy, I concede that claim (2) is linguistically awkward but defend the thought that it expresses, and I clarify my defense of claim (1) by (...)
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  30. Desert.George Sher - 1989 - Ethics 99 (2):426-428.
     
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  31.  32
    Ethics, Character, and Action.George Sher - 1998 - Social Philosophy and Policy 15 (1):1.
    According to one long-standing tradition, the organizing question of ethics is “What are we morally obligated to do?” However, many philosophers, inspired by an even older tradition, now urge a return to the question “What kind of person is it best to be?” According to these philosophers, the proper locus of evaluation is character rather than action, and the basic evaluative concept is virtue rather than duty. Following what has become common usage, I shall refer to the first approach as (...)
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  32. On the Decriminalization of Drugs.George Sher - 2003 - Criminal Justice Ethics 22 (1):30-33.
  33.  76
    Blame for Traits.George Sher - 2001 - Noûs 35 (1):146–161.
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  34.  86
    Blameworthy Action and Character.George Sher - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):381 - 392.
    A number of philosophers from Hume on have claimed that it does not make sense to blame people for acting badly unless their bad acts were rooted in their characters. In this paper, I distinguish a stronger and a weaker version of this claim. The claim is false, I argue, if it is taken to mean that agents can only be blamed for bad acts when those acts are manifestations of character flaws. However, what is both true and important is (...)
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  35. Three Grades of Social Involvement.George Sher - 1989 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (2):133-157.
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  36. Desert.George Sher - 1991 - Ethics 101 (2):409-411.
     
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  37.  47
    Subsidized Abortion: Moral Rights and Moral Compromise.George Sher - 1981 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (4):361-372.
  38.  86
    Reverse Discrimination, the Future, and the Past.George Sher - 1979 - Ethics 90 (1):81-87.
  39.  75
    Compensation and Transworld Personal Identity.George Sher - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):378-391.
    A natural way of viewing compensation is to see it as the restoration of a good or level of well-being which someone would have enjoyed if he had not been adversely affected by the act of another. This view underlies Nozick’s assertion that “something fully compensates … person X for Y’s action A if X is no worse off receiving it, Y having done A, than X would have been without receiving it if Y had not done A”; and it (...)
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  40.  37
    Book Reviews Boonin, David . The Problem of Punishment . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp. X+299.George Sher - 2009 - Ethics 119 (4):761-764.
  41.  71
    Moral Education and Indoctrination.George Sher & William J. Bennett - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (11):665-677.
  42.  26
    Confessions of a Quidnunc.George Sher - 2018 - American Journal of Jurisprudence 63 (1):49-61.
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  43.  33
    Liberal Neutrality and the Value of Autonomy.George Sher - 1995 - Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1):136-159.
    Many liberals believe that government should not base its decisions on any particular conception of the good life. Many believe, further, that this principle of neutrality is best defended through appeal to some normative principle about autonomy. In this essay, I shall discuss the prospects of mounting one such defense. I say only “one such defense” because neutralists can invoke the demands of autonomy in two quite different ways. They can argue, first, that because autonomy itself has such great value, (...)
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  44.  25
    Right Violations and Injustices: Can We Always Avoid Trade-Offs?George Sher - 1984 - Ethics 94 (2):212-224.
  45. Effort and Imagination.George Sher - 2003 - In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice. Clarendon Press.
     
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  46.  90
    Talents and Choices.George Sher - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):400-417.
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  47.  79
    Moral Relativism Defended?George Sher - 1980 - Mind 89 (356):589-594.
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  48.  93
    Sentences in the Brain.George Sher - 1975 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (September):94-99.
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  49.  11
    On Event-Identity.George Sher - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):39 – 47.
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  50.  48
    Kripke, Cartesian Intuitions, and Materialism.George Sher - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):227-38.
    In his influential “Naming and Necessity,” Saul Kripke has deployed a new sort of analytical apparatus in support of the classical Cartesian argument that minds and bodies must be distinct because they can be imagined separately. In the initial section of this paper, I shall first paraphrase Kripke's version of that argument, and then suggest a way in which even one who accepts all of its philosophical presuppositions may avoid its conclusion. In the second section, I shall defend this suggestion (...)
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