This paper covers the history of the development of various epsilon calculi, and their applications, starting with the introduction of epsilon terms by Hilbert and Bernays. In particular it describes the Epsilon Substitution Method and the First and Second Epsilon Theorems, the original Epsilon Calculus of Bourbaki, several Intuitionistic Epsilon Calculi, and systems that have been constructed to incorporate epsilon terms in modal, and general intensional structures. Standard semantics for epsilon terms are discussed, with application to Arithmetic, and it is (...) shown how epsilon terms give distinctive theories of descriptions and identity, through providing complete individual terms for individuals, which are rigid across possible worlds. The Epsilon Calculus' problematic thereby extends that of the predicate calculus primarily through its applicability to anaphoric reference, both in extensional and also intensional constructions. There are higher-order applications, as well, some of which resolve paradoxes in contemporary logic through allowing for indeterminacy of reference. (shrink)

This chapter explores if androids like Ash in Alien have rights. Philosophers have tried to answer this type of question in several ways. The chapter looks at a few of these different ways, thinking about some cases that might be surprisingly difficult to explain, like why babies matter, whether animals have moral status, and what we should think about synthetics in this regard. Australian philosopher, Peter Singer argues that it is speciesist to treat human beings as the only things worthy (...) of moral status. He thinks speciesism, like racism and sexism, is morally abhorrent. Animals, aliens, or androids might be in the class of things having moral status. Autonomy is one trait some philosophers, have thought is a good candidate for conferring moral status. One reason people might think of autonomy as the supreme notion of moral status is the role it plays in fixing the meaning of other moral ideas. (shrink)

Despite decades of concerted efforts to communicate to the public on important scientific issues pertaining to the environment and public health, gaps between public acceptance and the scientific consensus on these issues remain stubborn. One strategy for dealing with this shortcoming has been to focus on the existence of scientific consensus on the relevant matters. Recent science communication research has added support to this general idea, though the interpretation of these studies and their generalizability remains a matter of contention. In (...) this paper, we describe results of a qualitative interview study on different models of scientific consensus and the relationship between such models and trust of science, finding that familiarity with scientific consensus is rarer than might be expected. These results suggest that consensus messaging strategies may not be effective. (shrink)

In the modern world, progress in the art and science of living has not kept pace with progress in the other arts and sciences. Man does not lead a better and a happier life than he used to do. There are many indications that human conduct is getting worse, and that men are more discontented, more miserable than they used to be. One means of moral progress would be to provide a sound and universally accepted code of ethics. The world (...) would then have, at least, a moral standard by which human actions could be judged. It would go a long way toward forming a healthy public opinion on all moral questions. The Christian religion furnishes the highest moral standard ever manifested to the world. Unfortunately, there are two fundamentally different conceptions of Christian morality the Catholic and the Protestant conception. Perhaps if we put them side by side the truth will appear.This book begins: “Is man a moral or a merely physical agent? Are all man's thoughts, words, and actions determined by merely physical and necessary laws like those of electricity or steam? If man is a merely physical agent, then morality is only a department of physics, and, without doubt, it will be an important department of physics. It is important for us to know the laws which govern the action of gravitation, or of electricity, or of steam, but it is still more important for us to know the laws which govern the action of men. If man is nothing but matter and force, by patient study we shall be able to predict his every thought, word, and action with as much certainty as we can predict the action of a steam-engine or of a motor-car. Such knowledge would be invaluable for governments, employers, and parents. It would not be less valuable for the private citizen, the employed, and for children still under parental sway.“But is man a merely physical agent, a mere natural machine? Is man's action determined solely by the antecedents and conditions of action, so that if we knew them all we could predict infallibly what that action would be? Or is there something in man which clearly distinguishes his action from that of merely physical causes?”. (shrink)

Do the laws of nature supervene on ordinary, non-nomic matters of fact? Lange's criticism of Humean supervenience (HS) plays a key role in his account of natural laws. Though we are sympathetic to his account, we remain unconvinced by his criticism. We focus on his thought experiment involving a world containing nothing but a lone proton and argue that it does not cast sufficient doubt on HS. In addition, we express some concern about locating the lawmakers in an ontology of (...) primitive subjunctive facts and suggest that a 'mixed' metaphysics to the lawmaker question might be attractive. (shrink)

Joe Campbell has identified an apparent flaw in van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument. It apparently derives a metaphysically necessary conclusion from what Campbell argues is a contingent premise: that the past is in some sense necessary. I criticise Campbell’s examples attempting to show that this is not the case (in the requisite sense) and suggest some directions along which an incompatibilist could reconstruct her argument so as to remain immune to Campbell’s worries.

J. К. Galbraith begins his book on the history and current problems of money with the following statement: “There is much that is diverting in the history of money, but even more that provides a rich reflection of human behavior and human folly.”.

Review of extant research on the corporate environmental performance (CEP) and corporate financial performance (CFP) link generally demonstrates a positive relationship. However, some arguments and empirical results have demonstrated otherwise. As a result, researchers have called for a contingency approach to this research stream, which moves beyond the basic question “does it pay to be green?” and instead asks “when does it pay to be green?” In answering this call, we provide a meta-analytic review of CEP–CFP literature in which we (...) identify potential moderators to the CEP–CFP relationship including environmental performance type (e.g., reactive vs. proactive performance), firm characteristics (e.g., large vs. small firms), and methodological issues (e.g., self-report measures). By analyzing these contingencies, this study attempts to provide a basis on which to draw conclusions regarding some inconsistencies and debates in the CEP–CFP research. Some of the results of the moderator analysis suggest that small firms benefit from environmental performance as much or more than large firms, US firms seem to benefit more than international counterparts, and environmental performance seems to have the strongest influence on market-measures of financial performance. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre, in describing the realization of his freedom, was often inclined to say mysterious things like ‘I am what I am not’, ‘I am not what I am’ (‘as I am already what I will be …, I am the self which I will be, in the mode of not being it’, ‘I make myself not to be the past … which I am’.) He was therefore plainly contradicting himself, but was this merely a playful literary figure (paradox), or (...) was he really being incoherent? By the latter judgment I do not mean to reject his statements entirely (like many of his Anglo-Saxon contemporaries); for I believe there is an intimate link between contradiction and freedom, as I shall explain in this paper. But a minor thing we must first have out of the way is the suggestion that Sartre's language was just a rhetorical trope, designed merely to express some banal platitude in a bemusing way: ‘I am not yet what I will be’, ‘I am no longer what I was’ are sane and sensible, for instance, but cannot be the meant content of Sartre's sayings, since, while they would indeed describe the reform of some character, they would be appropriate only before or after some metamorphosis, not, as Sartre clearly intended, in the midst of some process of riddance and conversion, whether radical or otherwise. Yet, in the turmoil of such a change, ‘I am not what I am’ (or the everyday ‘I am not myself’) still, surely, cannot be true, and if that is the case, Sartre must be being inocherent, and therefore, obfuscating and deliberately obscure, and hence, it seems, must properly be rejected by all right and clear thinking men. (shrink)

In a previous issue of Philosophical Investigations Professor Radford provides a counterexample to the equation1: a word is on the tip of a man's tongue IFF (a) he can recognize the word and (b1) he believes he may be able to produce It (fairly soon).

Two uses of ‘if are discussed which do not involve conditions. The first is illustrated in the example ‘If he's here, I don't see him’, the second in ‘He's not a dunce, if a trifle stupid’. A third non‐conditional use, cognate with the first is also mentioned: it would be illustrated in the example ‘If he's a Dutchman, I'll eat my hat’. It is argued that recent attempts to formulate a logic of conditionals have distorted our understanding of ‘if, by (...) ignoring these uses, sometimes deliberately. Specifically, as a result, many arguments involving ‘if have been misjudged as invalid, because the expectation has been that ‘if expresses a condition. It is suggested that the traditional analysis of ‘necessary and sufficient conditions’ in terms of ‘if and only if, is partly to blame for these misunderstandings. And the proper understanding of ‘if’ which emerges shows it is quite fully captured in the propositional calculus. (shrink)

One of the claims made for C. S. Peirce's existential graphs has been that they are a deductively complete formulation of first-order logic with identity. As Peirce presented them, this is true only for certain versions of first-order logic :those which do not include terms for individuals. I amend Peirce's rules here, showing, in particular, how they are capable of demonstrating that, for instance, ?Jack is in the kitchen? contradicts ?Jack is not in the kitchen?

Routley?s Formula says, for instance, that if it is believed there is a man then there is something which is believed to be a man. In this paper I defend the formula; first directly, but then by looking at work by Gensler and Hintikka against it, and at the original work of Routley, Meyer and Goddard for it. The argument ultimately reduces to a central point about the extensionality of objects in Routley, Meyer and Goddard?s intensional system, i.e. in its (...) formulation of transparency. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics was poorly received by the critics when it was first published, and only a few sympathetic commentators have made much of it since then. The book has not had a great success, because the majority of people interested in the philosophy of mathematics these days have a quite different approach to the subject from Wittgenstein. But not only that, they have a quite different logic from Wittgenstein. I believe one of the main sources (...) of the antipathy felt towards the Remarks lies in the foreignness of the logic Wittgenstein develops there. I hope, in what follows, to make that logic more understandable, and with it the philosophy of mathematics it supports. (shrink)

Idealist philosopher Georg Hegel defied the traditional epistemological distinction of objective from subjective and developed his own dialectical alternative. Remarkable for its breadth and profundity, this work combines aspects of psychology, logic, moral philosophy, and history to form a comprehensive view that encompasses all forms of civilization. Its three divisions consist of the subjective mind (dealing with anthropology and psychology), the objective mind (concerning philosophical issues of law and morals), and the absolute mind (covering fine arts, religion, and philosophy). Wide-ranging (...) in its influence, this survey of the evolution of consciousness is essential reading for all students of philosophy and history. (shrink)

The topic of a priori knowledge is approached through the theory of evidence. A shortcoming in traditional formulations of moderate rationalism and moderate empiricism is that they fail to explain why rational intuition and phenomenal experience count as basic sources of evidence. This explanatory gap is filled by modal reliabilism -- the theory that there is a qualified modal tie between basic sources of evidence and the truth. This tie to the truth is then explained by the theory of concept (...) possession: this tie is a consequence of what, by definition, it is to possess (i.e., to understand) one’s concepts. A corollary of the overall account is that the a priori disciplines (logic, mathematics, philosophy) can be largely autonomous from the empirical sciences. (shrink)

TRANSLATORS PREFACE THE PRESENT TRANSLATION OF GEORG SIMMEL'S Schopen- hauer und Nietzsche: Ein Vortragszyklus (1907), ...

"This book is a sorely needed corrective. Animal Spirits is an important--maybe even a decisive--contribution at a difficult juncture in macroeconomic theory.