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Georges Rey
University of Maryland, College Park
  1. Concepts and Stereotypes.Georges Rey - 1983 - Cognition 15 (1-3):237-62.
  2. When Other Things Aren’T Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws From Vacuity.Paul Pietroski & Georges Rey - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):81-110.
    A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ?real? laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, in a sense we make explicit. Ceteris paribus laws will carry a plethora (...)
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  3.  55
    Concepts and Conceptions: A Reply to Smith, Medin and Rips.Georges Rey - 1985 - Cognition 19 (3):297-303.
  4.  91
    Sensational Sentences Switched.Georges Rey - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.
  5.  52
    A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness.Georges Rey - 1982 - In Richard J. Davidson, Gary E. Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation. New York: Plenum. pp. 1--39.
  6. Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach.Georges Rey - 1997 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind. In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and desires.
     
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  7. Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach.Georges Rey - 1998 - Mind 107 (425):246-250.
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  8. What's Really Going on in Searle's 'Chinese Room'.Georges Rey - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (September):169-85.
  9.  14
    The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution.Georges Rey & Colin McGinn - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (2):274.
  10.  78
    A Naturalistic A Priori.Georges Rey - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2):25 - 43.
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  11.  25
    Remembering Jerry Fodor and His Work.Georges Rey - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (4):321-341.
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  12. A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Experience.Georges Rey - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:435-58.
  13.  28
    Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-Deception.Georges Rey - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie O. Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 264--296.
  14.  67
    Toward a Projectivist Account of Conscious Experience.Georges Rey - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 123--42.
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  15.  63
    Conventions, Intuitions and Linguistic Inexistents.Georges Rey - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):549-569.
    Elsewhere I have argued that standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking seriously talk of “representations of” standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”), such as NPs, VPs, morphemes, phonemes, syntactic and phonetic features. However, it is very doubtful there are tokens of these “things” in space and time. Moreover, even if were, their existence would be completely inessential to the needs of either communication or serious linguistic theory. Their existence is an illusion: an extremely stable perceptual state we regularly enter (...)
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  16. Innateness.Steven Gross & Georges Rey - forthcoming - In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.
    A survey of innateness in cognitive science, focusing on (1) what innateness might be, and (2) whether concepts might be innate.
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  17. A Question About Consciousness.Georges Rey - 1986 - In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  18.  32
    Chomsky, Intentionality, and a CRTT.Georges Rey - 2003 - In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden Ma: Blackwell. pp. 105--139.
  19. The Intentional Inexistence of Language — but Not Cars.Georges Rey - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 237-55.
  20. Resisting Normativism in Psychology.Georges Rey - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    “Intentional content,” as I understand it, is whatever serves as the object of “propositional” attitude verbs, such as “think,” “judge,” “represent,” “prefer” (whether or not these objects are “propositions”). These verbs are standardly used to pick out the intentional states invoked to explain the states and behavior of people and many animals. I shall take the “normativity of the intentional,” or “Normativism,” to be the claim that any adequate theory of intentional states involves considerations of value not essentially involved in (...)
     
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  21. Intentional Content and a Chomskian Linguistics.Georges Rey - 2003 - In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 140--186.
  22.  44
    Innate and Learned: Carey, Mad Dog Nativism, and the Poverty of Stimuli and Analogies (Yet Again).Georges Rey - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (2):109-132.
    In her recent (2009) book, The Origins of Concepts, Susan Carey argues that what she calls ‘Quinean Bootstrapping’ and processes of analogy in children show that the expressive power of a mind can be increased in ways that refute Jerry Fodor's (1975, 2008) ‘Mad Dog’ view that all concepts are innate. I argue that it is doubtful any evidence about the manifestation of concepts in children will bear upon the logico-semantic issues of expressive power. Analogy and bootstrapping may be ways (...)
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  23. The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Georges Rey - 2003 - In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  24. Externalism and Inexistence in Early Content.Georges Rey - 2012 - In R. Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. de Gruyter.
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  25.  12
    Holism: A Consumer Update.Georges Rey (ed.) - 1993 - Amsterdam: Rodopi.
  26. Sensational Sentences.Georges Rey - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Blackwell.
     
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  27.  9
    A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Experience.Georges Rey - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):435-457.
  28. Physicalism and Psychology: A Plea for a Substantive Philosophy of Mind.Georges Rey - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  29.  35
    In Defense of Folieism.Georges Rey - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):177-202.
    According to the “Folieism” I have been recently defending, communication is a kind of folie à deux in which speakers and hearers enjoy a stable and innocuous illusion of producing and hearing standard linguistic entities (“SLE”s) that are seldom if ever actually produced. In the present paper, after summarizing the main points of the view, I defend it against efforts of Barber, Devitt and Miščević to rescue SLEs in terms of social, response-dependent proposals. I argue that their underlying error is (...)
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  30.  57
    Resisting Primitive CompulsionsA Study of Concepts. [REVIEW]Georges Rey - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):419.
    I’m sympathetic to a great deal of Peacocke’s project: that possession of a concept should require it playing a certain role in thought; that semantic determination should be treated separately from concept possession; that certain concepts are defective by virtue of eluding sufficient determination or specification: such claims seems to me right, important, and too little appreciated on my side of the Atlantic.
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  31.  48
    The Unavailability of What We Mean: A Reply to Quine, Fodor and Lepore.Georges Rey - 1993 - In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Amsterdam: Rodopi. pp. 61-101.
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...)
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  32.  32
    The Unavailability of What We Mean.Georges Rey - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:61-101.
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...)
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  33. Phenomenal Content and the Richness and Determinacy of Colour Experience.Georges Rey - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (9-10):112-131.
  34.  31
    (Even Higher-Order) Intentionality Without Consciousness.Georges Rey - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1:51-78.
  35. Functionalism and the Emotions Explaining Emotions.Georges Rey - 1980 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions. University of California Press.
     
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  36.  57
    A Not "Merely Empirical" Argument for the Language of Thought.Georges Rey - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:201-22.
  37. Searle's Misunderstandings of Functionalism and Strong AI.Georges Rey - 2003 - In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press. pp. 201--225.
     
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  38.  82
    Files and Singular Thoughts Without Objects or Acquaintance: The Prospects of Recanati’s “Actualism”.Carsten Hansen & Georges Rey - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):421-436.
    We argue that Recanati burdens his otherwise salutary “Mental File” account of singular thought with an “Actualist” assumption that he has inherited from the discussion of singular thought since at least Evans, according to which singular thoughts can only be about actual objects: apparent singular thoughts involving “empty” terms lack truth-valuable content. This assumption flies in the face of manifestly singular thoughts involving not only fictional and mistakenly postulated entities, such as Zeus and the planet Vulcan, but also “perceptual inexistents,” (...)
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  39.  72
    What Implicit Conceptions Are Unlikely to Do.Georges Rey - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:93-104.
  40. Transcending Transcendentalism.Michael Devitt & Georges Rey - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (June):87-100.
  41.  50
    XV—Semantic Externalism and Conceptual Competence.Georges Rey - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1):315-334.
    Supplements externalist "locking" theories of content with an account of internal "conceptions" by which thoughts lock onto environmental kinds, with that aid of dthat operators, thus solving various philosophical problems.
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  42.  45
    Concepts Versus Conceptions (Again).Georges Rey - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):221-222.
    Machery neglects the crucial role of concepts in psychological explanation, as well as the efforts of numerous of the last 40 years to provide an account of that role. He rightly calls attention to the wide variation in people's epistemic relations to concepts but fails to appreciate how externalist and kindred proposals offer the needed stability in concepts themselves that underlies that variation.
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  43.  70
    Fodor's Ingratitude and Change of Heart?Georges Rey - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):70-84.
  44.  38
    Dennett’s Unrealistic Psychology.Georges Rey - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):259-89.
  45.  23
    Constituent Causation and the Reality of Mind.Georges Rey - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):620-621.
  46.  40
    Role, Not Content: Comments on David Rosenthal's "Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments".Georges Rey - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):224-230.
  47.  17
    L4 The Possibility of a Naturalistic Cartesianism Regarding Intuitions and Introspection.Georges Rey - 2013 - In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. pp. 243.
  48.  5
    The Unavailability of What We Mean: A Reply to Quine, Fodor and LePore.Georges Rey - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:61-101.
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...)
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  49. Functionalism and the Emotions.Georges Rey - 1980 - In A. O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions. Univ of California Pr. pp. 21.
     
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  50. What Are Mental Images?Georges Rey - 1981 - In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol.
     
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