Anglo-Saxon schools of metascience.--Continental schools of metascience.--Toward a theory of research that is neither logical reconstruction nor psychology or sociology of science.--References (p. 420-438).

(1) What may be gained by applying concepts generalised from economics to methodological problems? The perspective of cost-benefit analysis ('CBA' for short) may help the researcher to see what sorts of questions he should take into account when dealing with particular methodological problems. This claim is supported by applying generalised CBA-thinking to two standard problems of methodology. (2) In the practice of research the handling of basic statements does not normally constitute any problem, and no conscious decision is involved. In (...) the methodological reconstruction the key questions are: 'How can a particular basic statement be criticised?' and 'What are the costs of defending a statement that is "problematic"?' The problem of the empirical 'base' is an investment problem: whether or not to invest time and effort into processing a particular basic statement into a falsifying hypothesis for the theory we wish to test. The valuation of the costs of rejecting or, as the case may be, of defending a basic statement, are objective. (3) With respect to theories, in basic science, the issue is not one of acceptance or rejection of a single theory, but rather of theory preference. Both the rational response to a falsification and rational theory preference are governed by CBA-considerations. The option for one of two competing theories is based upon a CBA where the valuation of benefits and costs is objective. Theory change is an objective process, at least in those fields, where theorising is closely controlled by empirical testing: the better theory drives out the less good theory. The costs of defending a theory that is less good than its competitor are mainly epistemic resources forgone. The use of CBA in methodology not only is compatible with Popper's position, but it may pay to view Popper's methodology as an application of CBA to epistemic situations. (shrink)

Summary Popper's methodology does not entail any playing down of the various indispensible distinctions such as the distinction between knowing and guessing, the distinction between myth and science, the distinction between the observational and the theoretical, and between the vernacular and technical sublanguages or technical vocabulary. By avoiding both the totalization that led to the foundationalist position and the scepticist reactions to these frustrated foundationalist hopes, Popper's methodology makes it possible to combine fallibilism with a realist view of theories. It (...) combines the perennial willingness to re-examine positions, statements, etc. with the claim that a particular theory (as an item of knowledge in the objective sense) constitutes cognitive progress over its rivals. However, some of his formulations have been deliberately provocative and in this way have given rise to certain misgivings about possible paradoxical implications, even in philosophers congenial with Popper's approach. The concept of knowledge in the objective sense is, of course, an explicatum which Popper proposes primarily for use in methodology and epistemology. The concept is an expression of the acknowledgment of fallibility in principle. The phrasing that ‘knowledge is conjectural’ or ‘knowledge is fallible’, even when it refers to knowledge in the objective sense, is but an abbreviation for: since our methods for ascertaining the truth-value of a particular statement about empirical reality are fallible in principle, there cannot be any certain knowledge about reality. In everyday life and in politics tolerance will be possible to the extent to which the recognition of this fallibility is more than a declaration. (shrink)

Summary Research is regarded as transformations of complexes composed of knowledge, problems and (hardware and software) instruments. Sequences of such transformations are embedded in human settings in which they are given directions. Problems and the work of solving them are divided into empirical and theoretical ones. In an advanced science like physics empirical and theoretical work are interrelated by means of flows of problem-generating information. Empirical and theoretical researchers work also on problems of their own making. Residuals of knowledge which (...) cannot be systematized at the same rate as it is produced as well as clashes between new and old knowledge are potential starting points of new lines of research. (shrink)

O. The idea of scientific progress in contemporary philosophy of science. Explicating the concept of cognitive progress means at the same time articulating an ideal of science. A desirable ideal: explain a lot and offer certainty. 1. Working out the ideal with the "foundationalist-positivist" approach. If the question, "When is it rational to accept a theory?" is answered, "When it has sufficient inductive support," this leads to insoluble problems. Reactions to the collapse of this approach - especially relativism and theory (...) instrumentalism. 2. The Popperian alternative: rational theory preference despite fallibility of methods for determining truth or greater accuracy of representations. What good reasons can there be for the conjecture that one theory is superior to a competing theory in its achievement as a description? Achievements to date as fallible but objective indicators of strength in describing. The sorts of risks for a theory differ in explanation and in prediction. Corresponding to the risks are the chances for cognitive progress. Instead of a cumulative index, itemized indication of success and failure in explanation and prediction with regard for importance of the questions at issue. On the concept of the "scientific importance" of questions. Postscript: On the political consequences of the sceptical position in philosophy of science. (shrink)

Summary Research consists of choosing a problem, proposing and testing problem solutions, and presenting the results. In its central moment — conjectures and testing — science must be autonomous in order to be successful. Securing this autonomy by organizational means is one of the tasks of research policy. Research needs to justify itself only when the researcher makes a claim to the resources of others. To discuss problems of justification of governmental support, it is imperative to distinguish between basic and (...) applied research. In basic research the problem choice is guided only by considerations of scientific interest , while in applied research the problems emanate from extra-scientific concerns since applied research is by definition a means for tackling concrete practical problems. Deciding on external criteria (e.g. deciding whether to support more energy research or more cancer research) is a genuine political problem rather than a problem of research policy. Thus applied research can be justified by referring to the benefit the expected results will yield, but basic research requires a completely different justification. One such justification is the argument that applied research requires a certain overhead in basic research. Securing an adequate balance between funding basic and applied research within the problem area concerned is another task of research policy. (E.g. in the area of cancer whether to support more molecular biology research or more clinical research.) When the overhead argument is not applicable, there still remain several possible justifications for basic research. These are examined in the paper. When setting priorities for basic research within a certain discipline, one apparently must turn to the scientific community itself. It may well be that the researches, who constitute the only expertise available for this task, have to rely on tacit knowledge . If so, this remains afaute de mieux procedure since articulated criteria would be preferable to intuitive procedures. The purpose of methodological reflection on research policy making is to supply intellectual instruments for making the discussion about substantive problems more rational. The substantive problems can be tackled only through the close cooperation of research policy makers and researchers. Thus methodology should not limit the degrees of freedom of either but increase them. (shrink)

Popper's methodology does not entail any playing down of the various indispensible distinctions such as the distinction between knowing and guessing, the distinction between myth and science, the distinction between the observational and the theoretical, and between the vernacular and technical sublanguages or technical vocabulary. By avoiding both the totalization that led to the foundationalist position and the scepticist reactions to these frustrated foundationalist hopes, Popper's methodology makes it possible to combine fallibilism with a realist view of theories. It combines (...) the perennial willingness to re-examine positions, statements, etc. with the claim that a particular theory constitutes cognitive progress over its rivals. However, some of his formulations have been deliberately provocative and in this way have given rise to certain misgivings about possible paradoxical implications, even in philosophers congenial with Popper's approach. The concept of knowledge in the objective sense is, of course, an explicatum which Popper proposes primarily for use in methodology and epistemology. The concept is an expression of the acknowledgment of fallibility in principle. The phrasing that 'knowledge is conjectural' or 'knowledge is fallible', even when it refers to knowledge in the objective sense, is but an abbreviation for: since our methods for ascertaining the truth-value of a particular statement about empirical reality are fallible in principle, there cannot be any certain knowledge about reality. In everyday life and in politics tolerance will be possible to the extent to which the recognition of this fallibility is more than a declaration. (shrink)

Summary The theory of research under development at this Institute aims at systematically describing and evaluating research and its products. It conceives research as an innovative sytem in which knowledge, problems and instruments are produced and processed. It proceeds by tacking between case studies of research enterprises (past or on-going) and constructing models over such features as data generation, hypothesis checking, systematization of pieces of knowledge, etc. Its auxiliaries are systems-theory, information theory, etc. It results should make possible a critical (...) examination of the factors that steer research processes — such as the perspective, criteria, ideals of science. A criticism informed by the results of this type of theory of research ought to be of value both for active researchers and for others concerned with research. (shrink)

Relativism in its various forms has become the mainstream tendency in philosophy, from epistemology to the philosophy of science, and its influence on ethics and political philosophy has been considerable. What are its main tenets? How can its popularity be explained, and, most importantly, how do the key contentions of relativism withstand a critical examination? (1) Criticism of the Criticism of Tradition often Leads to Relativism. (2) The Objectivist and the Relativist Approach Lead to Different Positions with Respect to Explanation, (...) Probability, the Role of Logic, and Rational Theory Preference. (3) The Relevance of the Objectivism-Relativism Debate for Political Philosophy and for Politics. (shrink)

In his latest book Kritik und Wissenschaftsgeschichte (Criticism and the History of Science, 1988), Gunnar Andersson clarifies the logical aspects of falsification and metalogical relationships between falsification, prediction and explanation. By analyzing the case studies on which Kuhn and Feyerabend have based their arguments for the incommensurability thesis, he shows that thesis to be untenable. A decisive criticism of the "new philosophy of science" is given. In the process Popper's methodology is developed further. It is shown that the "Kuhn Revolution" (...) is indeed a pseudo-revolution. (shrink)