_Understanding Plato’s Republic_ is an accessible introduction to the concepts of justice that inform Plato’s Republic, elucidating the ancient philosopher's main argument that we would be better off leading just lives rather than unjust ones Provides a much needed up to date discussion of _The Republic_'s fundamental ideas and Plato's main argument Discusses the unity and coherence of _The Republic_ as a whole Written in a lively style, informed by over 50 years of teaching experience Reveals rich insights into a (...) timeless classic that holds remarkable relevance to the modern world. (shrink)
_The Blackwell Guide to Plato’s Republic_ consists of thirteen new essays written by both established scholars and younger researchers with the specific aim of helping readers to understand Plato’s masterwork. This guide to Plato’s _Republic_ is designed to help readers understand this foundational work of the Western canon. Sheds new light on many central features and themes of the Republic. Covers the literary and philosophical style of the _Republic_; Plato’s theories of justice and knowledge; his educational theories; and his treatment (...) of the divine. Will be of interest to readers who are new to the _Republic_, and those who already have some familiarity with the book. (shrink)
This volume explores Plato and Aristotle's theories about good things, goodness, and the best life for human beings, and draws comparisons between ancient and modern theories of good and justice.
What is love? Why do we idealize those whom we love? How do we choose whom to love? Are some kinds of love better than others? Each age returns to these questions with renewed perplexity. Gerasimos Santas examinees the two greatest theoretical architectures of love, side by side. It provides a thorough critical description and comparison of these theories, allowing a sophisticated dialogue to emerge between the two thinkers. In the first half of the book Professor Santas reconstructs and explains (...) Plato's theories of eros and philia: erotic love, familial love and friendship. He attempt to show that Plato's was a unified theory in which erotic love has a special connecion with creativity and beauty. He then discusses Freud's notion of love as distinct from, though based on, his general theory of sexuality. He discusses in detail Freud's explanations, before and after narcissism, of idealization and choice of beloved. Freud too, it emerges, had a unified theory of love: all love has its origins in the libidinal instincts of infancy and childhood. The book concludes by showing that, despite Freud's claim that his theory of love is 'Platonic', the two theories are instructively different. (shrink)
Plato's antidemocratic theory of social justice is instructive once we distinguish between the abstract parts of his theory and the empirical or other assumptions he uses in applying that theory. His application may have contained empirical mistakes, and it may have been burdened too much with a prolific metaphysics and a demanding epistemology. An attempt is made to look at his theory of social justice in imaginary isolation from empirical mistakes and from his metaphysics and epistemology. It is then argued (...) that some of Plato's proposals and criticisms of democracy are well worth our attention, especially in the case of governing. His attempt to separate ruling and wealth and to establish economic floors and ceilings for his ideal city seems especially instructive in view of problems in these areas that modern democracies have experienced. Isolating his theory of social justice from his epistemology and metaphysics may be more problematic. Still, Plato's insistence that superior wisdom is the central virtue of rulers is instructive, and in this respect some modern defenders of democratic justice, such as J. S. Mill and John Rawls, have leaned some in Plato's direction. Finally, Plato's criticism of democratic free choice of occupation is less persuasive. Footnotesa I wish to thank the other contributors to this volume, and its editors, for many helpful comments. (shrink)
The original essays in this volume discuss ideas relating to democracy, political justice, equality and inequalities in the distribution of resources and public goods. These issues were as vigorously debated at the height of ancient Greek democracy as they are in many democratic societies today. Contributing authors address these issues and debates about them from both philosophical and historical perspectives. Readers will discover research on the role of Athenian democracy in moderating economic inequality and reducing poverty, on ancient debates about (...) how to respond to inborn and social inequalities, and on Plato’s and Aristotle’s critiques of Greek participatory democracies. Early chapters examine Plato’s views on equality, justice, and the distribution of political and non-political goods, including his defense of the abolition of private property for the ruling classes and of the equality of women in his ideal constitution and polis. Other papers discuss views of Socrates or Aristotle that are particularly relevant to contemporary political and economic disputes about punishment, freedom, slavery, the status of women, and public education, to name a few. This thorough consideration of the ancient Greeks' work on democracy, justice, and equality will appeal to scholars and researchers of the history of philosophy, Greek history, classics, as well as those with an interest in political philosophy. (shrink)
Ancient Greek democracies, especially the one that flourished in Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries, were highly participatory—all decisions were directly made by the citizens themselves—and egalitarian—every citizen had an equal political share. This kind of democratic structure, considered by many a revolution in political thought and practice, appeared in the ancient Greek world after many centuries during which city-states were ruled by kingships, aristocracies, oligarchies, or tyrannies—all of them forms of ruling that extensively restricted citizen participation and were (...) strongly non-egalitarian. Democrats defended equal political shares among citizens by appealing to proportional distributive justice and taking as the relevant merit for distribution freedom, in which all citizens were supposedly equal. But even the most advanced of ancient democracies accepted many serious inequalities—in political participation, in freedom, and especially in resources and wealth —even though democracy itself may have been a catalyst for economic growth and for moderating wealth inequalities. The essays in this volume examine ancient debates about democracy, justice, and equality/inequality and often point to contemporary debates about these issues in present-day representative democracies. (shrink)
This paper argues that in Plato’s utopia the good of the ideal city-state is not identical with the good of the citizens, but it is nevertheless not independent of the good of the citizens. And similarly with the happiness of the city-state and the happiness of the citizens in it, something that can be more clearly seen once the happiness of the city and the happiness of the individual are analyzed in terms of the goods appropriate to each. Plato’s principle (...) of social justice distributes such goods proportionately so as to promote the good of the city as a whole. Popper and others have been mostly correct in criticizing Plato for his severe restrictions of various freedoms, but not correct in claiming that Plato’s ideal city-state is an organic super-entity with a good of its own separate and independent of the good of the citizens. (shrink)
The article discusses two puzzles about Plato''s account of the democratic person: (1) unlike his account of the democratic city, his characterization of a democratic person is markedly incorrect. (2) His criticism of a person so characterized is criticism of a straw man. The article argues that the first puzzle is resolved if we see it as a result of Plato''s assumption that a democratic person is a person whose soul is isomorphic to a democratic constitution. Such a person has (...) a desire satisfaction theory of good and adopts liberty and equality of desires as a basis for action. The article then argues that Plato''s criticism brings up two problems endemic to desire satisfaction theories of good, the problem of bad desires and the problem of conflicts of desires. The criticism is that the democratic person''s way of dealing with these problems, by applying the social principles of liberty and equality to his desires, is irrational. (shrink)
The paper focuses on Plato’s treatment of equality and inequalities in his best constitution in the Republic and in the second best constitution in the Laws. Plato was aware of the equality solution and various inequalities solutions to the problem of distributing political offices, the burdens of defense, other careers, and property and wealth. In his best constitution he rejected participatory democracy’s solution of equality of political offices, and also rejected inequality distributions of political office on the bases of courage (...) only or wealth only or on force only. He opted for proportional inequality in the distribution of all careers, including ruling, defense, and the provision of goods and services, on the basis of inborn inequalities in intelligence, spirit, abilities in the arts/crafts, and appropriate education. Such a distribution is directed by his principle of social or city justice and justified by his belief that only with such distributions would the city function best. In the economic domain he opted for radical inequality, the abolition of private property and wealth for the ruling classes and the military—a radical divorce between power and wealth, which is his solution to the political problem posed by Thrasymachus. For the remaining and largest class, the providers of basic goods and services, he proposed functional economic floors and ceilings—allowing farmers and craftsmen what they needed, and not more, for doing their jobs well. Later, in his second best constitution, Plato opted for democratic equality in the distribution of the main political offices, for absolute equality in the division of land, and very measured inequalities in other goods and other offices. Plato now seems to think that the very great inequalities of his best constitution/city would create conflicts and factions too difficult to assuage or overcome, since he now cites repeatedly the avoidance of faction as the main reason for his newly found political and economic equality and for the avoidance of extreme inequalities. At the same time, he lowers his earlier and very high standard of the knowledge required for ruling well, which allows many more citizens to participate in ruling the city well; they no longer need to know the form of the Good, but it is sufficient to know the goods of the soul, the goods of the body, the social goods, and the teleological priority of the goods of the soul over all other goods—all the others to be pursued for the sake of the goods of the soul. Looking at both books, it is rather remarkable that all the solutions to the distribution problem of social justice that Plato discusses—equality, proportional inequality, floors and ceilings, and distance between the best off and the worst off—find an echo in modern solutions to the distributions of similar social advantages and burdens. (shrink)
