83 found
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  1.  56
    Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart.Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd & A. B. C. Research Group - 1999 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press USA. Edited by Peter M. Todd.
    Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart invites readers to embark on a new journey into a land of rationality that differs from the familiar territory of cognitive science and economics. Traditional views of rationality tend to see decision makers as possessing superhuman powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and all of eternity in which to ponder choices. To understand decisions in the real world, we need a different, more psychologically plausible notion of rationality, and this book provides it. It is about (...)
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  2.  46
    Rationality for Mortals: How People Cope with Uncertainty.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2008 - Oup Usa.
    This volume collects Gigerenzer's recent articles on the psychology of rationality. This volume should appeal, like the earlier volumes, to a broad mixture of cognitive psychologists, philosophers, economists, and others who study decision making.
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  3.  54
    The Empire of Chance: How Probability Changed Science and Everyday Life.Gerd Gigerenzer, Zeno Swijtink, Theodore Porter, Lorraine Daston, John Beatty & Lorenz Kruger - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
    The Empire of Chance tells how quantitative ideas of chance transformed the natural and social sciences, as well as daily life over the last three centuries. A continuous narrative connects the earliest application of probability and statistics in gambling and insurance to the most recent forays into law, medicine, polling and baseball. Separate chapters explore the theoretical and methodological impact in biology, physics and psychology. Themes recur - determinism, inference, causality, free will, evidence, the shifting meaning of probability - but (...)
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  4.  29
    Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2000 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
    Together, these collected papers develop the idea that human thinking - from scientific creativity to simply understanding what a positive HIV test means - "happens" partly outside the mind.".
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  5. Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel Goldstein - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (4):650-669.
    Humans and animals make inferences about the world under limited time and knowledge. In contrast, many models of rational inference treat the mind as a Laplacean Demon, equipped with unlimited time, knowledge, and computational might. Following H. Simon's notion of satisficing, the authors have proposed a family of algorithms based on a simple psychological mechanism: one-reason decision making. These fast and frugal algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical rationality: They neither look up nor integrate all information. By computer simulation, the (...)
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  6.  85
    How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats.Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage - 1995 - Psychological Review 102 (4):684-704.
  7. (1 other version)Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences.Gerd Gigerenzer & Henry Brighton - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (1):107-143.
    Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes that ignore information. In contrast to the widely held view that less processing reduces accuracy, the study of heuristics shows that less information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy. We review the major progress made so far: the discovery of less-is-more effects; the study of the ecological rationality of heuristics, which examines in which environments a given strategy succeeds or fails, and why; an advancement from vague labels to computational models of heuristics; the (...)
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  8. Domain-specific reasoning: Social contracts, cheating, and perspective change.Gerd Gigerenzer & Klaus Hug - 1992 - Cognition 43 (2):127-171.
    What counts as human rationality: reasoning processes that embody content-independent formal theories, such as propositional logic, or reasoning processes that are well designed for solving important adaptive problems? Most theories of human reasoning have been based on content-independent formal rationality, whereas adaptive reasoning, ecological or evolutionary, has been little explored. We elaborate and test an evolutionary approach, Cosmides' social contract theory, using the Wason selection task. In the first part, we disentangle the theoretical concept of a “social contract” from that (...)
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  9. Heuristic decision making.Gerd Gigerenzer & Wolfgang Gaissmaier - 2011 - Annual Review of Psychology 62:451-482.
  10.  51
    Probabilistic mental models: A Brunswikian theory of confidence.Gerd Gigerenzer, Ulrich Hoffrage & Heinz Kleinbölting - 1991 - Psychological Review 98 (4):506-528.
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  11.  78
    On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky.Gerd Gigerenzer - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (3):592-596.
  12.  60
    Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles.Arie W. Kruglanski & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (1):97-109.
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  13.  54
    Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic.Daniel G. Goldstein & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2002 - Psychological Review 109 (1):75-90.
    [Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 109 of Psychological Review. Due to circumstances that were beyond the control of the authors, the studies reported in "Models of Ecological Rationality: The Recognition Heuristic," by Daniel G. Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer overlap with studies reported in "The Recognition Heuristic: How Ignorance Makes Us Smart," by the same authors and with studies reported in "Inference From Ignorance: The Recognition Heuristic". In addition, Figure 3 in the Psychological Review article (...)
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  14. On the Supposed Evidence for Libertarian Paternalism.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):361-383.
    Can the general public learn to deal with risk and uncertainty, or do authorities need to steer people’s choices in the right direction? Libertarian paternalists argue that results from psychological research show that our reasoning is systematically flawed and that we are hardly educable because our cognitive biases resemble stable visual illusions. For that reason, they maintain, authorities who know what is best for us need to step in and steer our behavior with the help of “nudges.” Nudges are nothing (...)
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  15.  73
    From tools to theories: A heuristic of discovery in cognitive psychology.Gerd Gigerenzer - 1991 - Psychological Review 98 (2):254-267.
  16. How (far) can rationality be naturalized?Gerd Gigerenzer & Thomas Sturm - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):243-268.
    The paper shows why and how an empirical study of fast-and-frugal heuristics can provide norms of good reasoning, and thus how (and how far) rationality can be naturalized. We explain the heuristics that humans often rely on in solving problems, for example, choosing investment strategies or apartments, placing bets in sports, or making library searches. We then show that heuristics can lead to judgments that are as accurate as or even more accurate than strategies that use more information and computation, (...)
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  17. Why heuristics work.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2008 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 3 (1):20-29.
     
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  18.  55
    “Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles”: Correction to Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011).Arie W. Kruglanski & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (3):522-522.
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  19.  50
    The priority heuristic: Making choices without trade-offs.Eduard Brandstätter, Gerd Gigerenzer & Ralph Hertwig - 2006 - Psychological Review 113 (2):409-432.
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  20. Précis of simple heuristics that make us Smart.Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):727-741.
    How can anyone be rational in a world where knowledge is limited, time is pressing, and deep thought is often an unattainable luxury? Traditional models of unbounded rationality and optimization in cognitive science, economics, and animal behavior have tended to view decision-makers as possessing supernatural powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and endless time. But understanding decisions in the real world requires a more psychologically plausible notion of bounded rationality. In Simple heuristics that make us smart (Gigerenzer et al. 1999), we (...)
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  21.  65
    Axiomatic rationality and ecological rationality.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3547-3564.
    Axiomatic rationality is defined in terms of conformity to abstract axioms. Savage limited axiomatic rationality to small worlds, that is, situations in which the exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of future states S and their consequences C are known. Others have interpreted axiomatic rationality as a categorical norm for how human beings should reason, arguing in addition that violations would lead to real costs such as money pumps. Yet a review of the literature shows little evidence that violations are actually (...)
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  22. Moral Satisficing: Rethinking Moral Behavior as Bounded Rationality.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):528-554.
    What is the nature of moral behavior? According to the study of bounded rationality, it results not from character traits or rational deliberation alone, but from the interplay between mind and environment. In this view, moral behavior is based on pragmatic social heuristics rather than moral rules or maximization principles. These social heuristics are not good or bad per se, but solely in relation to the environments in which they are used. This has methodological implications for the study of morality: (...)
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  23.  45
    How to Explain Behavior?Gerd Gigerenzer - 2020 - Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (4):1363-1381.
    Unlike behaviorism, cognitive psychology relies on mental concepts to explain behavior. Yet mental processes are not directly observable and multiple explanations are possible, which poses a challenge for finding a useful framework. In this article, I distinguish three new frameworks for explanations that emerged after the cognitive revolution. The first is called tools‐to‐theories: Psychologists' new tools for data analysis, such as computers and statistics, are turned into theories of mind. The second proposes as‐if theories: Expected utility theory and Bayesian statistics (...)
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  24.  70
    Environments That Make Us Smart Ecological Rationality.Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2007 - Current Directions in Psychological Science 16 (3):167-171.
    Traditional views of rationality posit general-purpose decision mechanisms based on logic or optimization. The study of ecological rationality focuses on uncovering the “adaptive toolbox” of domain-specific simple heuristics that real, computationally bounded minds employ, and explaining how these heuristics produce accurate decisions by exploiting the structures of information in the environments in which they are applied. Knowing when and how people use particular heuristics can facilitate the shaping of environments to engender better decisions.
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  25.  51
    Teaching Bayesian reasoning in less than two hours.Peter Sedlmeier & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2001 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 130 (3):380.
  26.  87
    Children can solve Bayesian problems: the role of representation in mental computation.Liqi Zhu & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2006 - Cognition 98 (3):287-308.
  27.  27
    Overcoming difficulties in Bayesian reasoning: A reply to Lewis and Keren (1999) and Mellers and McGraw (1999).Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage - 1999 - Psychological Review 106 (2):425-430.
  28.  61
    Natural frequencies improve Bayesian reasoning in simple and complex inference tasks.Ulrich Hoffrage, Stefan Krauss, Laura Martignon & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
  29.  58
    A signal-detection analysis of fast-and-frugal trees.Shenghua Luan, Lael J. Schooler & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (2):316-338.
  30.  28
    Do intuitive and deliberate judgments rely on two distinct neural systems? A case study in face processing.Laura F. Mega, Gerd Gigerenzer & Kirsten G. Volz - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9:148721.
    Arguably the most influential models of human decision-making today are based on the assumption that two separable systems – intuition and deliberation – underlie the judgments that people make. Our recent work is among the first to present neural evidence contrary to the predictions of these dual-systems accounts. We measured brain activations using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while participants were specifically instructed to either intuitively or deliberately judge the authenticity of emotional facial expressions. Results from three different analyses revealed (...)
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  31.  91
    The power of simplicity: a fast-and-frugal heuristics approach to performance science.Markus Raab & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
  32.  44
    On cognitive illusions and rationality.Gerd Gigerenzer - 1991 - In Probability and Rationality. Amsterdam: Rodopi. pp. 225-249.
  33.  60
    Content-blind norms, no norms, or good norms? A reply to Vranas.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2001 - Cognition 81 (1):93-103.
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  34.  36
    The reiteration effect in hindsight bias.Ralph Hertwig, Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage - 1997 - Psychological Review 104 (1):194-202.
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  35.  83
    I think, therefore I err.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2005 - Social Research: An International Quarterly 72 (1):1-24.
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  36.  29
    Cassandra’s regret: The psychology of not wanting to know.Gerd Gigerenzer & Rocio Garcia-Retamero - 2017 - Psychological Review 124 (2):179-196.
  37.  24
    The Psychology of Good Judgment Frequency Formats and Simple Algorithms.Gerd Gigerenzer - 1996 - Medical Decision Making 16 (3):273-280.
    Mind and environment evolve in tandem—almost a platitude. Much of judgment and decision making research, however, has compared cognition to standard statistical models, rather than to how well it is adapted to its environment. The author argues two points. First, cognitive algorithms are tuned to certain information formats, most likely to those that humans have encountered during their evolutionary history. In par ticular, Bayesian computations are simpler when the information is in a frequency format than when it is in a (...)
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  38.  38
    Fast and frugal heuristics are plausible models of cognition: Reply to Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, and Thomas (2008).Gerd Gigerenzer, Ulrich Hoffrage & Daniel G. Goldstein - 2008 - Psychological Review 115 (1):230-239.
  39. The role of representation in bayesian reasoning: Correcting common misconceptions.Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):264-267.
    The terms nested sets, partitive frequencies, inside-outside view, and dual processes add little but confusion to our original analysis (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995; 1999). The idea of nested set was introduced because of an oversight; it simply rephrases two of our equations. Representation in terms of chances, in contrast, is a novel contribution yet consistent with our computational analysis System 1.dual process theory” is: Unless the two processes are defined, this distinction can account post hoc for almost everything. In contrast, (...)
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  40.  22
    From perception to preference and on to inference: An approach–avoidance analysis of thresholds.Shenghua Luan, Lael J. Schooler & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2014 - Psychological Review 121 (3):501-525.
  41.  28
    Discovery in Cognitive Psychology: New Tools Inspire New Theories.Gerd Gigerenzer - 1992 - Science in Context 5 (2):329-350.
    The ArgumentScientific tools—measurement and calculation instruments, techniques of inference—straddle the line between the context of discovery and the context of justification. In discovery, new scientific tools suggest new theoretical metaphors and concepts; and in justification, these tool-derived theoretical metaphors and concepts are morelikely to be accepted by the scientific community if the tools are already entrenched in scientific practice.Techniques of statistical inference and hypothesis testing entered American psychology first as tools in the 1940s and 1950s and then as cognitive theories (...)
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  42.  42
    Tools=Theories=Data? On Some Circular Dynamics in Cognitive Science.Gerd Gigerenzer & Thomas Sturm - 2007 - In Mitchell G. Ash & Thomas Sturm (eds.), Psychology’s Territories: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives from Different Disciplines. Erlbaum.
  43. We need statistical thinking, not statistical rituals.Gerd Gigerenzer - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2):199-200.
    What Chow calls NHSTP is an inconsistent hybrid of Fisherian and Neyman-Pearsonian ideas. In psychology it has been practiced like ritualistic handwashing and sustained by wishful thinking about its utility. Chow argues that NHSTP is an important tool for ruling out chance as an explanation for data. I disagree. This ritual discourages theory development by providing researchers with no incentive to specify hypotheses.
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  44. Axiomatizing bounded rationality: the priority heuristic.Mareile Drechsler, Konstantinos Katsikopoulos & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (2):183-196.
    This paper presents an axiomatic framework for the priority heuristic, a model of bounded rationality in Selten’s (in: Gigerenzer and Selten (eds.) Bounded rationality: the adaptive toolbox, 2001) spirit of using empirical evidence on heuristics. The priority heuristic predicts actual human choices between risky gambles well. It implies violations of expected utility theory such as common consequence effects, common ratio effects, the fourfold pattern of risk taking and the reflection effect. We present an axiomatization of a parameterized version of the (...)
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  45. The irrationality paradox.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):336-338.
    In the study of judgmental errors, surprisingly little thought is spent on what constitutes good and bad judgment. I call this simultaneous focus on errors and lack of analysis of what constitutes an error, the irrationality paradox. I illustrate the paradox by a dozen apparent fallacies; each can be logically deduced from the environmental structure and an unbiased mind.
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  46.  59
    Shepard's mirrors or Simon 's scissors?Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4):704-705.
    Shepard promotes the important view that evolution constructs cognitive mechanisms that work with internalized aspects of the structure of their environment. But what can this internalization mean? We contrast three views: Shepard's mirrors reflecting the world, Brunswik's lens inferring the world, and Simon 's scissors exploiting the world. We argue that Simon 's scissors metaphor is more appropriate for higher-order cognitive mechanisms and ask how far it can also be applied to perceptual tasks. [Barlow; Kubovy & Epstein; Shepard].
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  47. The Probabilistic Revolution, Volume 2.Lorenz Krüger, Gerd Gigerenzer & Mary S. Morgan (eds.) - 1987 - Mit Press: Cambridge.
    I PSYCHOLOGY 5 The Probabilistic Revolution in Psychology--an Overview Gerd Gigerenzer 7 1 Probabilistic Thinking and the Fight against Subjectivity Gerd Gigerenzer 11 2 Statistical Method and the Historical Development of Research Practice in American Psychology Kurt Danziger 35 3 Survival of the Fittest Probabilist: Brunswik, Thurstone, and the Two Disciplines of Psychology Gerd Gigerenzer 49 4 A Perspective for Viewing the Integration of Probability Theory in Psychology David J. Murray 73 II SOCIOLOGY 101 5 The Two Empirical Roots of (...)
     
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  48.  24
    "Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic": Clarification on Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002).Daniel G. Goldstein & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2002 - Psychological Review 109 (4):645-645.
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  49.  57
    How do narratives relate to heuristics?Gerd Gigerenzer - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e94.
    Narratives and heuristics are both tools for dealing with uncertainty, intractability, and incommensurability, that is, for all real-world situations outside the domain of Bayesian decision theory. But how do narratives and heuristics relate? I suggest two links: Heuristics select narratives to explain events, and “big” narratives select the heuristics that people live by, to execute their values and moral principles.
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  50. Towards Competitive Instead of Biased Testing of Heuristics: A Reply to Hilbig and Richter (2011).Henry Brighton & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (1):197-205.
    Our programmatic article on Homo heuristicus (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009) included a methodological section specifying three minimum criteria for testing heuristics: competitive tests, individual-level tests, and tests of adaptive selection of heuristics. Using Richter and Späth’s (2006) study on the recognition heuristic, we illustrated how violations of these criteria can lead to unsupported conclusions. In their comment, Hilbig and Richter conduct a reanalysis, but again without competitive testing. They neither test nor specify the compensatory model of inference they argue for. (...)
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