This volume deals with the general theory of pleasure of Plato and his successors.The first part describes the two paradigms between which all theories of ...

In his discussion of pleasure, Aristotle assumes the thesis that a perfect activity always and necessarily yields pleasure. The occurrence of pleasure is even presented as a sign that the activity is perfect. But this assumption seems to be too easy. It is possible that we do feel pleasure in activities which are not perfectly performed, and on the other hand, it is not certain at all that I will enjoy a perfect activity. Pleasure falls into the category of what (...) J. Elster has called 'states that are essentially by-products'. Up to a point, Aristotle acknowledges this, but he does not follow this analysis to its final consequences. If one agrees, as Aristotle does, that there is a difference between the perfect activity and pleasure, it should be possible that an activity is perfect without yielding pleasure, or that pleasure will accompany even an activity which is not perfect. (shrink)

From an epistemological viewpoint, the Forms constitute the objects of true knowledge. From an ontological point of view, they are the principles that underlie the order of the universe.

Ethics of any kind basically assume that all human beings by nature aim at happiness. However, this general starting point has to be made concrete in order to be relevant for action, and hence suitable for moral appreciation. What does my happiness consist in? Contrary to what has often been taken for granted, the concrete aim is not instrumental or subsidiary to the overall aim of happiness. To me, my particular aim is rather identical with happiness. The choice I make (...) — if choice it is — indeed constitutes my happiness, i.e. the overall aim that directs my existential choices. This article is focused on the way Aristotelian ethics envisages the concreteness of this overall aim. This is not the concreteness of the means leading to the aim, which has often been discussed in Aristotelian scholarship, but happiness itself, taken as the specific but nevertheless universal aim that I seek to accomplish in my life. The main arguments are taken from Nicomachean Ethics VI and III. These texts, central to any discussion of Aristotle's views on the role of choice and deliberation in acquiring happiness, are re-interpreted, avoiding the deadlock of a debate between intellectualists and non-intellectualists. (shrink)

What is the 'good life'? Is it a life completely devoted to intellect, or should we take for granted the hedonistic position, which says that pleasure is the absolute good? The hedonist subordinates everything to pleasure, and tests anything in a rigorous calculus for the amount of pleasure it yields. It is against this hedonism that Plato turns himself in a unique manner in his dialogue Philebus. After having reached a deadlockin a sterile opposition between hedonism and intellectualism in his (...) former works, Platonow wants to dig deeper. He wants to criticize hedonism from within. In the first place, Plato investigates the proper nature of pleasure. It is to be situated within the continuous fluxus of our lives; a going back and forth between lack and replenishment. The limit that gives sense to this movement is the 'natural state', which we never attain in its purity. The role of intellect is hereby reduced to a strictminimum. It seems to be mainly a faculty which concerns the recognition and experience of pleasure as pleasure. In this way, Plato strives to establish a certain degree of consensus of opinion with hedonism, in order to be able to refute it afterwards. This refutation is supported by the formal structure of the dialogue: it consists in a gradual 'conversion' of a hedonist, who will eventually be brought into the intellectualist camp of Socrates. The critique to which Socrates' interlocutor yields is based on three main ideas. 1.Hedonism pretends to know what the good is. Plato counters this with a moderate intellectualism, taking the good to be undecided, and providing a place also for pleasure within the good life. 2. Moreover, Plato reveals an internal contradiction in hedonism: every hedonist will, if possible, prefer a 'pure' pleasure, in which the mixture with its contrary, pain, is as small as possible. However, this purity cannot be reduced to the hedonistic calculus. 3. Finally, the choice of the title of this dialogue is to be seenas a part of Plato's critique against hedonism. The main character Philebus refuses to engage in the debate. Plato suggests by this that he who proclaimspleasure to be the only intrinsic good is unable to partake in a discussion about pleasure. For he would, before any argument whatever, subordinate pleasure to truth and reason. If a hedonist is willing to argue he has already surrendered, and will be 'converted' whether he wants it or not. (shrink)

According to Plato, pleasure consists in the replenishment of a lack, i.e., in restoring the natural condition. At first sight, this might seem to mean that pleasure is always linked to previous pain. However Plato stresses the importance of so-called ‘true’ or ‘pure’ pleasure, which is not paired by pain. The acceptance of this type of pleasure depends on a dissociation of the definition of pleasure and pain from the physiological condition that underlies them . The latter are inescapable: our (...) condition is subject to an everlasting whirl of lack and replenishment, although they are not always perceptible. Pleasure is, then, the experienced replenishment of a lack. This qualification allows one to introduce important nuances in the theory of pleasure: ‘pure’ or ‘true’ pleasure occurs in those cases where the preceding lack was not felt, and thus did not give rise to pain. ‘Mixed’ or ‘impure’ pleasures, on the other hand, refer to cases where both the lack and the replenishment are perceptible. A third situation is the so-called ‘neutral state’, which consists in a coincidence of unfelt lack and imperceptible replenishment. According to Aristotle, who disagrees with Plato on almost every detail of the doctrine of pleasure, pleasure consists in the unimpaired activity of a disposition in its natural condition, i. e., pleasure is a sign of nature indicating that the situation is all right, when any faculty operates as it should. In this model, pleasure is not a ‘movement’ or a process, and neither can it be excessive in se. These two models are criticized for accepting a necessary link between pleasure and the conditions described in the definitions. This seems to misrepresent an essential characteristic of pleasure: pleasure can always fail to occur, even if the concrete situation completely fits the terms set by the definition. Or, conversely, it can suddenly occur, even if the conditions outlined in the definition are not met. (shrink)

The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity comprises over forty specially comissioned essays by experts on the philosophy of the period 200-800 C.E. Designed as a successor to The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy , it takes into account some forty years of scholarship since the publication of that volume. The contributors examine philosophy as it entered literature, science and religion, and offer new and extensive assessments of philosophers who until recently have been mostly ignored. (...) The volume also includes a complete digest of all philosophical works known to have been written during this period. It will be an invaluable resource for all those interested in this rich and still emerging field. (shrink)

Carolingian Biblical Culture John J. CONTRENI Qui sim nosse uolens, scito Bibliotheca dicor El ueteris legis ius ueho siue nouae. Ne me sperne, precor, ...