It is well known that the process of scientific inquiry, according to Peirce, is drivenby three types of inference, namely abduction, deduction, and induction. What isbehind these labels is, however, not so clear. In particular, the common identificationof abduction with Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) begs the question,since IBE appears to be covered by Peirce's concept of induction, not that of abduction.Consequently, abduction ought to be distinguished from IBE, at least on Peirce's account. The main aim of the paper, (...) however, is to show that this distinction is most relevant with respect to current problems in philosophy of science and epistemology (like attempts to supply suitable notions of realism and truth as well as related concepts like coherence and unification). In particular, I also try to show that (and in what way) Peirce's inferential triad can function as a method that ensures both coherence and correspondence. It is in this respect that his careful distinction between abduction and induction (or IBE) ought to be heeded. (shrink)
This paper reviews an ongoing debate about moral standards for vocational education in German speaking countries. At the centre of the controversy is the question of universalistic versus domain‐specific moral orientations, namely the question of whether business people ought to develop different moral points of view in different situations (such as ‘private’ versus ‘professional’). Of pivotal importance in this context is also a prominent ethical approach (by Karl Homann, a philosopher in the tradition of liberal economists) which serves as a (...) foundation for those who advocate domain specificity and which is strongly criticized by their counterparts. This approach is also presented, since the author believes that it does not entail all of what its protagonists claim. Moreover, as argued in the last section, the purported dichotomy of universalism versus domain specificity may even be entirely overcome. The point is that Homann's ethics perhaps do not fit into the framework of Kohlberg's six stages and might therefore be reconstructed as entailing moral segmentation. However, it is well accommodated by a more comprehensive stage taxonomy suggested by the author. (shrink)
“Selective abduction” is a notion coined by L. Magnani, who contrasts it with the more common notion of “creative abduction”. However, selective abduction may easily be confused with inference to the best explanation. This constitutes a problem, if IBE is reconstructed as an inductive inference. For on the one hand, abduction and induction must be distinct. On the other hand, Gabbay and Woods, but also Hintikka and Kapitan, even include hypothesis selection as part and parcel of the abductive inference per (...) se. Consequently, there seems to be a riddle about what selective abduction clearly means and how it could be distinguished from other forms of reasoning. The contribution tries to solve this problem by explicating selective abduction and embedding it in an overall taxonomy of inferences. (shrink)
Kohlberg basamakları çerçevesine uymayan ahlâkî yargı sıklıkla geçiş basamaklarında değerlendirilmektedir. Bu konuların bir denge basamağında olmayıp, daha çok iç çatışma düzeyinde oldukları farz edilmektedir. Bu makalede, sözü edilen görüşe karşı çıkılmakta, 4 1/2 yargısının diğer herhangi bir ahlakî yargı tipinden daha tutarsız olmadığı ve Basamak 4 1/2'un ayrı bir basamak olarak kabulü gerektiği savunulmaktadır. Bu kabul ancak; ahlakî biliş mimarisinde ayrı bir köşe taşı olarak Basamak 4 1/2' u içine alan yeni bir basamak sınışandırması çerçevesi içinde mümkün olacaktır.