In epistemology and in philosophy of language there is fierce debate about the role of context in knowledge, understanding, and meaning. Many contemporary epistemologists take seriously the thesis that epistemic vocabulary is context-sensitive. This thesis is of course a semantic claim, so it has brought epistemologists into contact with work on context in semantics by philosophers of language. This volume brings together the debates, in a set of twelve specially written essays representing the latest work by leading figures in the (...) two fields. All future work on contextualism will start here. Contributors: Kent Bach, Herman Cappelen, Andy Egan, Michael Glanzberg, John Hawthorne, Ernest Lepore, Peter Ludlow, Peter Pagin, Georg Peter, Paul M. Pietroski, Gerhard Preyer, Jonathan Schaffer, Jason Stanley, Brian Weatherson, Timothy Williamson. (shrink)
Pre-reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind delves into the relations between the current debates on consciousness within analytical philosophy and the debates taking place in continental philosophy in the twentieth century and in particular within the work of Sartre. Examining the return of the problem of subjectivity in philosophy of mind and the idea that phenomenal consciousness could not be reduced to functional or cognitive properties this volume aims to rethink borders between what counts as ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ (...) when the nature of the mental is at stake. (shrink)
Many of the things we do, we do together with other people. Think of carpooling and playing tennis. In the past two or three decades it has become increasingly popular to analyze such collective actions in terms of collective intentions. This volume brings together ten new philosophical essays that address issues such as how individuals succeed in maintaining coordination throughout the performance of a collective action, whether groups can actually believe propositions or whether they merely accept them, and what kind (...) of evidence, if any, disciplines such as cognitive science and semantics provide in support of irreducibly collective states.The theories of the Big Four of collective intentionality -- Michael Bratman, Raimo Tuomela, John Searle, and Margaret Gilbert -- and the Big Five of Social Ontology -- which in addition to the Big Four includes Philip Pettit -- play a central role in almost all of these essays. Drawing on insights from a wide range of disciplines including dynamical systems theory, economics, and psychology, the contributors develop existing theories, criticize them, or provide alternatives to them.Several essays challenge the idea that there is a straightforward dichotomy between individual and collective level rationality, and explore the interplay between these levels in order to shed new light on the alleged discontinuities between them. These contributions make abundantly clear that it is no longer an option simply to juxtapose analyses of individual and collective level phenomena and maintain that there is a discrepancy. Some go as far as arguing that on closer inspection the alleged discontinuities dissolve. (shrink)
Seventeen specially written essays by eminent philosophers and linguists appear for the first time in this anthology, all with the central theme of logical form -- a fundamental issue in analytic philosophy and linguistic theory. Logical Form and Language brings together exciting new contributions from diverse points of view, which illuminate the lively current debate about this topic.
This volume offers a reappraisal of Donald Davidson's influential philosophy of thought, meaning, and language, Twelve specially written essays by leading philosophers in the field illuminate a range of themes and problems relating to these ...
Reality and Humean Supervenience confronts the reader with central aspects in the philosophy of David Lewis, whose work in ontology, metaphysics, logic, probability, philosophy of mind, and language articulates a unique and systematic foundation for modern physicalism.
The circle between belief and meaning has revolutionized our understanding of communication. In this article I will sketch from the triangulation model of radical interpretation an answer to the question: “How does semantics take effect in social science?”, that is, it is to show “How do we link the mental, language, and the social?” I resystemize the principle of charity by the principle of natural epistemic justice and complete triangulation with the social frame of reference. Therefore, to break into the (...) circle between belief and meaning leads us to the structure of elementary systems of communication as the framework within which we ascribe attitudes and actions. In this framework, together with the reformulation of the task of RI, we find an answer of the Burge-problem that the intelligible redescription and explanation of behavior take also effects on social considerations. In the procedure of RI also the problem of background theories emerges, and we border on the epistemic capacity of speakers that limits our understanding in general. In the last step it is shown – looking back to the controversy between individualism and holism in social science – that group-predicates can not instantiate ontologically to individual entities. (shrink)
Understanding human action is framed in a picture of the rational person. Protosociology identifies - in a hypothetical approach - generalized presuppositions of the "objects" and "experience" of social science. Protosociology studies society and human action from the basis of the following levels: Decentralisation and universalisation of world- picturing; Lifeworld-background and systemprocesses; Properties of structural evolution of societies; Interpersonality, structure of communicative acting and collective identity and Personality.Theorizing on these levels means mapping pictures of structural dimension of action process and (...) the limitation of agency through culturalsocial, personal, and natural resources. So it is recognition, that no absolute disposition is given about the limitation of action and elementary social regulation, norms, and institutions. However, break-downs in these spheres can be identified.The basic-principle of Protosociology is that all creatures who have propositional attitudes and the ability to act intentionally are examples of application of the standard of rationality. Hypothesizing about other persons viz. understanding their utterance and ascription of all attitudes are mediated, and given on the level of language behaviour and their utilitarized competences and abilities. The focus of mapping are such examples to whom to ascribe the procedure of any social intercourse.This level is the basis for methodical construction and reconstruction of Protosociology and the Frankfurt version of action theory. This version starts from cognition, that the concept of meaning cannot be understood completely, independent of propositional truth, normative correctness and person as primitive concept. Beliefs, illocutionary acts and propositional structure of language are fundamental features of the basic knowledge of this approach. But Protosociology does not claim that understanding social reality is committed to a sociologism or linguistic community semantic as overall viewpoint of agency, reasoning, and understanding. (shrink)
For understanding human action rationality is a fundamental poin of point. A prototheory of social science elaborate the types of social action under the conceptualization of rationalization and human freedom in societies. On this way it must be distinguished two - not interchangeable - concepts of rationalization: the rationality of purpose e.g. the rational choice of means and the rationality of understanding. Language behaviour has for this conceptualization the status of the frametheory. But actions are not identical with language behaviour (...) and are based on language external ressources. The conceptualizations of concepts of rationality are basic-assumptions for the construction of a structure-model of societal rationalization. (shrink)
In the contemporary research on cooperation we find mathematical, game-, moraltheoretical, experimental and ethological investigations. These approaches are individualistic in principle. Raimo Tuomela introduces a correction of the conceptualization of the standard game theory because this proposal lacks an account of collective commitments and acting for a reason, we need for explaining many cases. The essay sketches Tuomela’s proposal with regard to his new turn of analyzing cooperation. A substantial problem in social theory emerges from this framework understanding the social. (...) The questtion is whether there is something like a basic consensus in social systems or a normative notion of collective commitments. This leads us to a re-interpretation of the function of social norms, I will sketch. (shrink)
In recent years Donald Davidson has outlined main features of a "unified theory" of language and action. The article tries to lay open the central theoretical steps one has to take from his "radical interpretation" to his theory of rationality and his triangulation model of externalism. It is argued that Davidson's reinterpretation of Tarski's T - sentences can be used to show a fundamental symmetry between representation and expression of propositional contents. Yet, his theoretical framework has to be enriched to (...) deal with the problem of contextualism that arises from his redescription of utterance meanings. The paper shows in order to elaborate Davidson's claim that rationality is a normative concept one has to address the question of an internal relationship between radical interpretation, rationality and externalism. (shrink)