The paper explores the relation between Kierkegaard’s concept of a “life-view,” understood as a certain quality of a person’s character, and his early account of Christian faith. To claim the need for such an exploration is motivated by two observations: First, defining a “life-view” as “an unshakable certainty in oneself won from all experience” (Kierkegaard’s formula in his debut book From the Papers of One Still Living [1838]) essentially conforms with his characterization of faith as an “a priori certainty.” Second, (...) the relation between Kierkegaard’s notion of “life-view” and his concept of faith has been interpreted in different, at times in-compatible ways by Kierkegaard-scholars. Thus, after outlining the overall argument in Kierkegaard’s debut book, I will compare in detail the notions of “life-view” and faith, and this by using as a vantage point and paradigmatic example the opposing accounts of Emanuel Hirsch and Ulrich Klenke. (shrink)
Who are the real targets of Kierkegaard’s critique of characterizing faith as “the immediate”? A decisive factor in answering this question is the interpretation and dating of the note Pap. I A 273 / Papir 92, in which Kierkegaard equates that which Friedrich Schleiermacher calls ‘religion’ and “the Hegelian dogmaticians” call ‘faith’ with “the first immediate.” After deli-neating the factual context of the expression “the first immediate” in Section I, I will question to what extent this critique of Schleiermacher is (...) justified in Section II. Sections III-V will look at the problem of identifying “the Hegelian dogmaticians.” Here I hope to show that it is not Philipp Konrad Marheineke, but rather Kierkegaard’s contemporaries in Copenhagen, Hans Lassen Martensen and Johan Ludvig Heiberg, who should be considered the particular targets of Kierkegaard’s critique. (shrink)
