Theories of face-to-face interaction employ a concept of spatial presence and view communication via digital technologies as an inferior version of interaction, often with pathological implications. Current studies of mediatized communication challenge this notion with empirical evidence of “telepresence”, suggesting that users of such technologies experience their interactions as immediate. We argue that the phenomenological concepts of the lived body and mediated immediacy combined with the concept of embodied space can help overcome the pathologizing of digital communication in social theory (...) and enable descriptions which are truer to the experience of using said technology. From this perspective it appears as an ethnocentric premise to restrict interaction to human actors being present in local space. This restricted understanding of interaction does not allow for an appropriate empirical analysis of the emerging structures of digital communication. (shrink)
The lived body (Leib) in the phenomenological tradition tends to be thought as the living body of the acting and perceiving subject, which is then analyzed by way of subjective self-reflection. This is true for Husserl (1970) as well as for Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Sartre (1992). When, however, the lived body is made the starting point of analysis in this way, it becomes a general and thus transhistorical condition of experience, and it is only in a second step that social (...) relations and historical formation can be inscribed into it. Plessner’s concept of the lived body (Leib) differs in two ways from this view predominant in phenomenology. First, Plessner does not approach the lived body in terms of a .. (shrink)
In order to delimit the realm of social phenomena, sociologists refer implicitly or explicitly to a distinction between living human beings and other entities, that is, sociologists equate the social world with the world of living humans. This consensus has been questioned by only a few authors, such as Luckmann, and some scholars of science studies. According to these approaches, it would be ethnocentric to treat as self-evident the premise that only living human beings can be social actors. The methodological (...) consequence of such critique is a radical deanthropologization of sociological research. It must be considered an open question whether or not only living human can be social actors. The paper starts with a discussion of the methodological problems posed by such an analysis of the borders of the social world, and presents the results of an empirical analysis of these borders in the fields of intensive care and neurological rehabilitation. Within these fields it must be determined whether a body is a living human body or a symbol using human body. The analysis of these elementary border phenomena challenges basic sociological concepts. The relevant contemporary sociological theories refer to a dyadic constellation as the systematic starting point of their concept of sociality. The complex relationship between at least two entities is understood as the basis of the development of a novel order that functions as a mediating structure between the involved parties. Based upon empirical data, I argue that it is necessary to change this foundational assumption. Not the dyad but the triad must be understood as the foundational constellation. This implies a new understanding of the third actor, which is distinct from the concepts developed by Simmel and Berger and Luckmann. (shrink)
Die empirische Ethik sieht ihre eigene Aufgabe darin, soziale und kulturelle Aspekte der Medizin zu berücksichtigen. Damit trennt sie den wissenschaftlich kognitiven Aspekt der Medizin von kulturell normativen Aspekten, die einzig sozialwissenschaftlich zu erforschen wären. Wenn Medizin aber als gesellschaftliche Praxis begriffen wird, wird die saubere Trennung zwischen naturwissenschaftlicher Medizin, kulturell-normativen Aspekten und ethischer Reflexion durchbrochen. Wir schlagen vor, ethische Reflexion und empirische sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung in mehrstufiger Weise aufeinander zu beziehen. Den Sozialwissenschaften kommt dabei die Funktion einer ersten Reflexionsinstanz der (...) medizinischen Praxis zu, an die in einem zweiten Schritt die Medizinethik reflexiv anschließt und sich dabei wieder einer soziologischen Kritik stellen muss. (shrink)
This article argues that understanding everyday practices in neurobiological labs requires us to take into account a variety of different action positions: self-conscious social actors, technical artifacts, conscious organisms, and organisms being merely alive. In order to understand the interactions among such diverse entities, highly differentiated conceptual tools are required. Drawing on the theory of the German philosopher and sociologist Helmuth Plessner, the paper analyzes experimenters as self-conscious social persons who recognize monkeys as conscious organisms. Integrating Plessner’s ideas into the (...) stock of concepts used in science and technology studies provides richer descriptions of laboratory life. In particular, this theory allows an understanding of a crucial feature of neurobiological brain research: the construction of the brain as the epistemic object of brain research. As such, the brain must be isolated from the acting and interacting organism in a complicated process. (shrink)
Die Buchreihe "Philosopische Anthropologie" wird mit einem Band eröffnet, der die Philosophische Anthropologie im Streit vorstellt. Geführt wird dieser Streit um das Paradigma der Philosophischen Anthropologie und um ihre Methoden im Unterschied sowohl zu anderen Philosophien als auch zu den verschiedenen Erfahrungswissenschaften. Ihre Grenzbestimmungen und Grenzübergänge finden schließlich anhand ausgewählter Themen eine exemplarische Erprobung.
The relevance of Kant to Plessner’s work was long all but ignored and there is hardly any mention of Plessner in the Kant literature. The Plessner renaissance beginning in the 1990s, however, has brought with it a stronger focus on the methodological construction of his theory, so that the Kant connection has at least been acknowledged, but the particular relevance of Kant’s Critique of Judgement has not been systematically explicated. In this essay, I investigate the connection between Kant’s notion of (...) reflective—specifically teleological—judgment and Plessner’s theory. I begin by setting out the characteristics of teleological judgment, with two points being of particular importance: the temporal structure of the final cause and Kant’s reference to an understanding other than the human, that is, to an ordering power other than the human. In a second step, I work out Plessner’s conceptualization of the spatiotemporal appearance of organisms and the way he understands the other of human understanding as nature’s—or history’s—historically evolved and mutable capacity for self-order. He arrives at these conclusions by way of a methodologically controlled process of questioning derived from Kant, which he calls the “principle of the open question.”. (shrink)
Latour is widely considered a critic and renewer of research in the social sciences. The ecologically minded Left has also acclaimed him as a theorist interested in bringing nature back both into sociological theory and into society and politics. To enable a more detailed discussion of Latour’s claims, I will here outline his theory and the ways in which it is related to classical theory, such as Durkheim, and the methodology of the interpretive paradigm, such as Schütz. My thesis is (...) that Latour’s empirical studies may be read as unfolding the methodological consequences of the interpretive paradigm, and that his early work is a brilliant proof of Durkheim’s theory of the morphology of social facts. Latour has now elaborated the insights he gained from concrete laboratory studies toward a general theory of the social, of society, and of politics. These generalizations have made his theory at least partly problematic. The political implication of Latour’s theory of society is a generalization of the call for equality to encompass everything; in other words, Latour criticizes the exclusion of nonhuman entities from political representation. The paper closes by discussing the political consequences of this proposal. (shrink)
ZusammenfassungDie empirische Ethik sieht ihre eigene Aufgabe darin, soziale und kulturelle Aspekte der Medizin zu berücksichtigen. Damit trennt sie den wissenschaftlich kognitiven Aspekt der Medizin von kulturell normativen Aspekten, die einzig sozialwissenschaftlich zu erforschen wären. Wenn Medizin aber als gesellschaftliche Praxis begriffen wird, wird die saubere Trennung zwischen naturwissenschaftlicher Medizin, kulturell-normativen Aspekten und ethischer Reflexion durchbrochen. Wir schlagen vor, ethische Reflexion und empirische sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung in mehrstufiger Weise aufeinander zu beziehen. Den Sozialwissenschaften kommt dabei die Funktion einer ersten Reflexionsinstanz der (...) medizinischen Praxis zu, an die in einem zweiten Schritt die Medizinethik reflexiv anschließt und sich dabei wieder einer soziologischen Kritik stellen muss. (shrink)
The living body in the phenomenological tradition tends to be thought of as the living body of the acting and perceiving subject, which is then analyzed by way of subjective self-reflection. Plessner′s concept of the living body differs in two ways from this view predominant in phenomenology. First, Plessner does not approach the living body in terms of a reflection of subjective experience, but rather he seeks to understand from the outside the fact that there is an ego that experiences (...) his or her living body. Second, Plessner′s theory of excentric positionality regards the structure of bodily experience from the perspective of the Shared world , i.e., the relationship to the other. Thus the starting point of his analysis of experience is not the living body, but the living body as shaped by the Shared world . Plessner′s theoretical program can serve as a foundation for integrating social theory and the analysis of the history of the living body, as developed in Hermann Schmitz′ work on the history of bodily experience as well as in Barbara Duden and Thomas Laqueur′s work on the history of the body. (shrink)
Es wird als eine offene Frage behandelt, ob der Kreis sozialer Personen, die miteinander sozial handeln und dadurch eine normative gesellschaftliche Ordnung schaffen, mit dem Kreis der biologisch lebendigen Menschen identisch ist. Ein Blick in die historische und ethnographische Forschung lehrt: Es gibt Gesellschaften, in denen auch Tiere, Verstorbene, Götter oder Dämonen als soziale Personen auftreten können, die als verantwortliche Akteure und damit auch als Adressaten von normativen Erwartungen, d. h. als soziale Personen, angesehen werden. Dass nur lebende Menschen, aber (...) auch alle lebenden Menschen als soziale Personen, d. h. verantwortlich handelnde Subjekte, anerkannt werden, muss als ein Charakteristikum der modernen funktional differenzierten Gesellschaft gelten. Der biologisch lebendige Mensch, dem Menschenrechte zukommen, muss als eine soziale Institution begriffen werden. Diese ist im 18. Jahrhundert entstanden. Ihre gesellschaftliche Funktion besteht darin, die auseinanderfallenden Handlungsfelder moderner Gesellschaften zu integrieren. (shrink)
This article discusses the moral philosophical problem of recognizing the moral status of an entity from a sociological perspective. The problem of moral status is of direct practical relevance. It is not only a question in moral philosophy but also in the social practices of modern societies whether embryos, newborns, comatose patients or those suffering from dementia should have full moral status or not. Since it is a question of practical relevance it seems appropriate to me to discuss it from (...) the standpoint of a theory of society. I develop my sociological perspective based on the social theory of the co-world , into which I will integrate the theory of functional differentiation . This theoretical perspective in combination with preliminary empirical results leads to the hypothesis that it is a functional element of modern societies that they draw the borders between entities who have full moral status and other beings along the lines of the criterion: living human being. A criterion demanding the exacting quality of displaying at the time in question the properties associated with personhood would be dysfunctional for a modern society. This result requires that Luhmann′s theory of human dignity has to be revised implementing a sociological theory of society′s perspective. (shrink)
Plessner not only formulates a theory of positionality here but also a principle of how to construct this theory with respect to empirical research, a principle he calls the “deduction of the categories of life”. This is described in the literature as “reflexive deduction”. With reference to Plessner’s methodology of theory construction I unfold a new understanding of his theory of the shared world. At present, there are two understandings of the shared world. The traditional understanding of the shared world (...) is primarily concerned with relativizing particular individual selves, whose boundedness to their own standpoint is devalued by the we-form. I call this SWU-1. SWU-1 is not developed in accordance with the principle of reflexive deduction. The second understanding of the shared world, on the other hand, is developed, in accordance with that principle, as a reflexive turning upon the factual state of existing in relationships of touch. This leads to a different understanding of the shared world, which I call SWU-2, or the social undecidedness relation. Such an understanding of the shared world forces us to also reconsider our understanding of the inner and outer worlds. (shrink)
ZusammenfassungEs wird als eine offene Frage behandelt, ob der Kreis sozialer Personen, die miteinander sozial handeln und dadurch eine normative gesellschaftliche Ordnung schaffen, mit dem Kreis der biologisch lebendigen Menschen identisch ist. Ein Blick in die historische und ethnographische Forschung lehrt: Es gibt Gesellschaften, in denen auch Tiere, Verstorbene, Götter oder Dämonen als soziale Personen auftreten können, die als verantwortliche Akteure und damit auch als Adressaten von normativen Erwartungen, d. h. als soziale Personen, angesehen werden. Dass nur lebende Menschen, aber (...) auch alle lebenden Menschen als soziale Personen, d. h. verantwortlich handelnde Subjekte, anerkannt werden, muss als ein Charakteristikum der modernen funktional differenzierten Gesellschaft gelten. Der biologisch lebendige Mensch, dem Menschenrechte zukommen, muss als eine soziale Institution begriffen werden. Diese ist im 18. Jahrhundert entstanden. Ihre gesellschaftliche Funktion besteht darin, die auseinanderfallenden Handlungsfelder moderner Gesellschaften zu integrieren. (shrink)
