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Giacomo Bonanno [48]Giacomo A. Bonanno [2]
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Profile: Giacomo Bonanno (University of California, Davis)
  1.  75
    A Simple Modal Logic for Belief Revision.Giacomo Bonanno - 2005 - Synthese 147 (2):193-228.
    We propose a modal logic based on three operators, representing intial beliefs, information and revised beliefs. Three simple axioms are used to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the qualitative part of Bayes’ rule. Some theorems of this logic are derived concerning the interaction between current beliefs and future beliefs. Information flows and iterated revision are also discussed.
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  2.  64
    Axiomatic Characterization of the AGM Theory of Belief Revision in a Temporal Logic.Giacomo Bonanno - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence 171 (2-3):144-160.
    Since belief revision deals with the interaction of belief and information over time, branching-time temporal logic seems a natural setting for a theory of belief change. We propose two extensions of a modal logic that, besides the next-time temporal operator, contains a belief operator and an information operator. The first logic is shown to provide an axiomatic characterization of the first six postulates of the AGM theory of belief revision, while the second, stronger, logic provides an axiomatic characterization of the (...)
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  3.  38
    Rational Choice and Agm Belief Revision.Giacomo Bonanno - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence 173:1194-1203.
    We establish a correspondence between the rationalizability of choice studied in the revealed preference literature and the notion of minimal belief revision captured by the AGM postulates. A choice frame consists of a set of alternatives , a collection E of subsets of (representing possible choice sets) and a function f : E ! 2 (representing choices made). A choice frame is rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order R on..
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  4.  43
    Memory and Perfect Recall in Extensive Games.Giacomo Bonanno - 2004 - Games and Economic Behavior 47 (2):237-256.
    The notion of perfect recall in extensive games was introduced by Kuhn (1953), who interpreted it as "equivalent to the assertion that each player is allowed by the rules of the game to remember everything he knew at previous moves and all of his choices at those moves''. We provide a characterization and axiomatization of perfect recall based on two notions of memory: (1) memory of past knowledge and (2) memory of past actions.
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  5.  86
    Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework.Giacomo Bonanno - 2008 - In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press.
    The theory of belief revision deals with (rational) changes in beliefs in response to new information. In the literature a distinction has been drawn between belief revision and belief update (see [6]). The former deals with situations where the objective facts describing the world do not change (so that only the beliefs of the agent change over time), while the letter allows for situations where both the facts and the doxastic state of the agent change over time. We focus on (...)
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  6.  86
    Modal Logic and Game Theory: Two Alternative Approaches.Giacomo Bonanno - 2002 - Risk Decision and Policy 7:309-324.
    Two views of game theory are discussed: (1) game theory as a description of the behavior of rational individuals who recognize each other’s rationality and reasoning abilities, and (2) game theory as an internally consistent recommendation to individuals on how to act in interactive situations. It is shown that the same mathematical tool, namely modal logic, can be used to explicitly model both views.
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  7.  28
    The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information.Giacomo Bonanno - 1991 - Economics and Philosophy 7 (1):37-65.
    For the past 20 years or so the literature on noncooperative games has been centered on the search for an equilibrium concept that expresses the notion of rational behavior in interactive situations. A basic tenet in this literature is that if a “rational solution” exists, it must be a Nash equilibrium. The consensus view, however, is that not all Nash equilibria can be accepted as rational solutions. Consider, for example, the game of Figure 1.
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  8.  40
    A Syntactic Approach to Rationality in Games with Ordinal Payoffs.Giacomo Bonanno - 2008 - In Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek & Michael Wooldridge (eds.), Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory. Amsterdam University Press.
    We consider strategic-form games with ordinal payoffs and provide a syntactic analysis of common belief/knowledge of rationality, which we define axiomatically. Two axioms are considered. The first says that a player is irrational if she chooses a particular strategy while believing that another strategy is better. We show that common belief of this weak notion of rationality characterizes the iterated deletion of pure strategies that are strictly dominated by pure strategies. The second axiom says that a player is irrational if (...)
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  9.  74
    The Logic of Belief Persistence.Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giacomo Bonanno - 1997 - Economics and Philosophy 13 (1):39-59.
    The principle of belief persistence, or conservativity principle, states that ’\Nhen changing beliefs in response to new evidence, you should continue to believe as many of the old beliefs as possible' (Harman, 1986, p. 46). In particular, this means that if an individual gets new information, she has to accommodate it in her new belief set (the set of propositions she believes), and, if the new information is not inconsistent with the old belief set, then (1) the individual has to (...)
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  10.  87
    A Characterization of Von Neumann Games in Terms of Memory.Giacomo Bonanno - 2004 - Synthese 139 (2):281 - 295.
    An information completion of an extensive game is obtained by extending the information partition of every player from the set of her decision nodes to the set of all nodes. The extended partition satisfies Memory of Past Knowledge (MPK) if at any node a player remembers what she knew at earlier nodes. It is shown that MPK can be satisfied in a game if and only if the game is von Neumann (vN) and satisfies memory at decision nodes (the restriction (...)
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  11.  30
    Temporal Interaction of Information and Belief.Giacomo Bonanno - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (3):375-401.
    The temporal updating of an agent’s beliefs in response to a flow of information is modeled in a simple modal logic that, for every date t, contains a normal belief operator B t and a non-normal information operator I t which is analogous to the ‘only knowing’ operator discussed in the computer science literature. Soundness and completeness of the logic are proved and the relationship between the proposed logic, the AGM theory of belief revision and the notion of plausibility is (...)
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  12.  40
    Rational Beliefs in Extensive Games.Giacomo Bonanno - 1992 - Theory and Decision 33 (2):153-176.
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  13.  6
    On the Logic of Common Belief.Giacomo Bonanno - 1996 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 42 (1):305-311.
    We investigate an axiomatization of the notion of common belief that makes use of no rules of inference and highlight the property of the set of accessibility relations that characterizes each axiom.
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  14.  27
    Synchronic Information, Knowledge and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games.Giacomo Bonanno - 1999 - Research in Economics 53 (1):77-99.
    Restricting attention to the class of extensive games defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern with the added assumption of perfect recall, we specify the information of each player at each node of the game-tree in a way which is coherent with the original information structure of the extensive form. We show that this approach provides a framework for a formal and rigorous treatment of questions of knowledge and common knowledge at every node of the tree. We construct a particular information (...)
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  15.  31
    On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games.Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (3):291-295.
    Counterexamples to two results by Stalnaker (Theory and Decision, 1994) are given and a corrected version of one of the two results is proved. Stalnaker's proposed results are: (1) if at the true state of an epistemic model of a perfect information game there is common belief in the rationality of every player and common belief that no player has false beliefs (he calls this joint condition ‘strong rationalizability’), then the true (or actual) strategy profile is path equivalent to a (...)
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  16.  28
    Branching Time, Perfect Information Games and Backward Induction.Giacomo Bonanno - 2001 - Games and Economic Behavior 36 (1):57-73.
    The logical foundations of game-theoretic solution concepts have so far been explored within the con¯nes of epistemic logic. In this paper we turn to a di®erent branch of modal logic, namely temporal logic, and propose to view the solution of a game as a complete prediction about future play. The branching time framework is extended by adding agents and by de¯ning the notion of prediction. A syntactic characterization of backward induction in terms of the property of internal consistency of prediction (...)
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  17.  53
    Can Good News Lead to a More Pessimistic Choice of Action?Giacomo Bonanno - 1988 - Theory and Decision 25 (2):123-136.
    Adapting a definition introduced by Milgrom (1981) we say that a signal about the environment is good news relative to some initial beliefs if the posterior beliefs dominate the initial beliefs in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (the assumption being that higher values of the parameter representing the environment mean better environments). We give an example where good news leads to the adoption of a more pessimistic course of action (we say that action a, reveals greater pessimism than action (...)
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  18.  64
    Common Belief with the Logic of Individual Belief.Giacomo Bonanno - 2000 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 46 (1):49-52.
    The logic of common belief does not always reflect that of individual beliefs. In particular, even when the individual belief operators satisfy the KD45 logic, the common belief operator may fail to satisfy axiom 5. That is, it can happen that neither is A commonly believed nor is it common belief that A is not commonly believed. We identify the intersubjective restrictions on individual beliefs that are incorporated in axiom 5 for common belief.
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  19.  46
    Belief Change in Branching Time: AGM-Consistency and Iterated Revision. [REVIEW]Giacomo Bonanno - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):201-236.
    We study belief change in the branching-time structures introduced in Bonanno (Artif Intell 171:144–160, 2007 ). First, we identify a property of branching-time frames that is equivalent (when the set of states is finite) to AGM-consistency, which is defined as follows. A frame is AGM-consistent if the partial belief revision function associated with an arbitrary state-instant pair and an arbitrary model based on that frame can be extended to a full belief revision function that satisfies the AGM postulates. Second, we (...)
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  20.  12
    Introduction to the Special Issue.Thomas Ågotnes, Giacomo Bonanno & Wiebe van der Hoek - 2016 - Synthese 193 (3):659-662.
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  21.  19
    Players' Information in Extensive Games.Giacomo Bonanno - 1992 - Mathematical Social Sciences 24 (1):35-48.
    This paper suggests a way of formalizing the amount of information that can be conveyed to each player along every possible play of an extensive game. The information given to each player i when the play of the game reaches node x is expressed as a subset of the set of terminal nodes. Two definitions are put forward, one expressing the minimum amount of information and the other the maximum amount of information that can be conveyed without violating the constraint (...)
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  22.  27
    Vertical Separation.Giacomo Bonanno & John Vickers - 1988 - Journal of Industrial Economics 36 (3):257-265.
    behaviour from the rival manufacturer. We consider the case where franchise fees can be used to extract retailers' surplus. We show that vertical separation is in the collective, as well as individual, interest of manufacturers, and hence facilitates some collusion in the simple setting..
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  23.  44
    Introduction to the Special Issue of Economics and Philosophy on Neuroeconomics.Giacomo Bonanno, Christian List, Bertil Tungodden & Peter Vallentyne - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):301-302.
    ABSTRACT The past fifteen years or so have witnessed considerable progress in our understanding of how the human brain works. One of the objectives of the fast-growing field of neuroscience is to deepen our knowledge of how the brain perceives and interacts with the external world. Advances in this direction have been made possible by progress in brain imaging techniques and by clinical data obtained from patients with localized brain lesions. A relatively new field within neuroscience is neuroeconomics, which focuses (...)
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  24.  18
    Editorial Introduction to the Special Issue LOFT Sevilla.Giacomo Bonanno, Hans van Ditmarsch & Wiebe van der Hoek - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (6):795-798.
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  25.  12
    Reply to `Social Cost and Groves Mechanisms'.Giacomo Bonanno - 2002 - Economic Notes 31:173-176.
    In my 1992 paper in Economic Notes, I argued that the traditional heuristic interpretation of taxes in the pivotal mechanism (in terms of the utility loss imposed by the taxed individual on the rest of society) is not correct, since it takes into account only the effect that the individual has on the decision concerning the project and disregards the effect that the same individual has on the taxes paid by the other members of society. Campbell criticizes my observation on (...)
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  26.  15
    Reply to Vilks.Giacomo Bonanno - 1994 - Economics and Philosophy 10 (1):115.
    In his note Arnis Vilks raises two criticisms concerning my paper "The Logic of Rational Play in Extensive Games". The author gives two examples: one to show that my logic "is inconsistent.
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  27. The Logic of Rational Play in Extensive Games.Giacomo Bonanno - 1987 - Nuffield College.
     
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  28.  33
    Introduction to the Special Issue of Economics and Philosophy on Ambiguity Aversion.Giacomo Bonanno, Martin van Hees, Christian List & Bertil Tungodden - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):247-248.
    The paradigm for modelling decision-making under uncertainty has undoubtedly been the theory of Expected Utility, which was first developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and later extended by Savage (1954) to the case of subjective uncertainty. The inadequacy of the theory of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) as a descriptive theory was soon pointed out in experiments, most famously by Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961). The observed departures from SEU noticed by Allais and Ellsberg became known as “paradoxes”. The Ellsberg (...)
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  29.  32
    Varieties of Interpersonal Compatibility of Beliefs.Giacomo Bonanno - 1999 - In Jelle Gerbrandy, Maarten Marx, Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema (eds.), Essays dedicated to Johan van Benthem on the occasion of his 50th birthday. Amsterdam University Press.
    Since Lewis’s (1969) and Aumann’s (1976) pioneering contributions, the concepts of common knowledge and common belief have been discussed extensively in the literature, both syntactically and semantically1. At the individual level the difference between knowledge and belief is usually identified with the presence or absence of the Truth Axiom ( iA → A), which is interpreted as ”if individual i believes that A, then A is true”. In such a case the individual is often said to know that A (thus (...)
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  30.  22
    Guest Editors' Introduction.Giacomo Bonanno, James Delgrande & Hans Rott - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):1-5.
    The contributions to the Special Issue on Multiple Belief Change, Iterated Belief Change and Preference Aggregation are divided into three parts. Four contributions are grouped under the heading "multiple belief change" (Part I, with authors M. Falappa, E. Fermé, G. Kern-Isberner, P. Peppas, M. Reis, and G. Simari), five contributions under the heading "iterated belief change" (Part II, with authors G. Bonanno, S.O. Hansson, A. Nayak, M. Orgun, R. Ramachandran, H. Rott, and E. Weydert). These papers do not only pick (...)
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  31.  19
    Logic and the Foundations of the Theory of Games and Decisions: Introduction.Giacomo Bonanno - 2005 - Synthese 147 (2):189-192.
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  32.  22
    AGM Belief Revision in Dynamic Games.Giacomo Bonanno - 2011 - In Krzysztof Apt (ed.), Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK XIII).
    Within the context of extensive-form (or dynamic) games, we use choice frames to represent the initial beliefs of a player as well as her disposition to change those beliefs when she learns that an information set of hers has been reached. As shown in [5], in order for the revision operation to be consistent with the AGM postulates [1], the player’s choice frame must be rationalizable in terms of a total pre-order on the set of histories. We consider four properties (...)
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  33.  30
    Memory of Past Beliefs and Actions.Giacomo Bonanno - 2003 - Studia Logica 75 (1):7 - 30.
    Two notions of memory are studied both syntactically and semantically: memory of past beliefs and memory of past actions. The analysis is carried out in a basic temporal logic framework enriched with beliefs and actions.
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  34.  30
    How to Make Sense of the Com M on P Ri or Assumption Under Incomplete Information.Giacomo Bonanno - 1999 - International Journal of Game Theory 28 (3):409-434.
    The Common Prior Assumption (CPA) is central to the economics of information and the foundations of game theory. Recent contributions (Dekel and Gul, 1997, Gul, 1996, Lipman, 1995) have questioned its meaningfulness in situations of incomplete information where there is no ex ante stage and the primitives of the model are the individuals’ belief hierarchies. We address this conceptual issue by providing characterizations of two local versions of the CPA which are in terms of the primitives and, therefore, do not (...)
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  35. Controlling One's Stream of Thought Through Perceptual and Reflective Processing.Giacomo A. Bonanno & Jerome L. Singer - 1993 - In Daniel M. Wegner & J. Pennebaker (eds.), Handbook of Mental Control. Prentice-Hall.
  36.  20
    Rationality and Coordination, Bicchieri Cristina. Cambridge University Press, 1994, Xiii + 270 Pages. [REVIEW]Giacomo Bonanno - 1995 - Economics and Philosophy 11 (2):359.
  37.  24
    Intensity of Competition and the Choice Between Product and Process Innovation.Giacomo Bonanno - 1998 - International Journal of Industrial Organization 16 (4):495-510.
    Two questions are examined within a model of vertical differentiation. The first is whether cost-reducing innovations are more likely to be observed in regimes of more intense or less intense competition. Following Delbono and Denicolo (1990) and Bester and Petrakis (1993) we compare two identical industries that differ only in the regime of competition: Bertrand versus Cournot. Since Cournot competition leads to lower output and higher prices, it can be thought of as a regime of less intense competition. We find (...)
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  38.  22
    Review of Cristina Bicchieri's Rationality and Coordination. [REVIEW]Giacomo Bonanno - 1995 - Economics and Philosophy 11 (2):359-366.
    In her book Rationality and coordination (Cambridge University Press, 1994) Cristina Bicchieri brings together (and adds to) her own contributions to game theory and the philosophy of economics published in various journals in the period 1987-1992. The book, however, is not a collection of separate articles but rather a homogeneous unit organized around some central themes in the foundations of non-cooperative game theory. Bicchieri’s exposition is admirably clear and well organized. Somebody with a good knowledge of game theory would probably (...)
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  39.  17
    How to Make Sense of the Common Prior Assumption Under Incomplete Information.Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring - 1999 - International Journal of Game Theory 28 (3):409-434.
    The Common Prior Assumption (CPA) plays an important role in game theory and the economics of information. It is the basic assumption behind decision-theoretic justifications of equilibrium reasoning in games (Aumann, 1987, Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995) and no-trade results with asymmetric information (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). Recently several authors (Dekel and Gul, 1997, Gul, 1996, Lipman, 1995) have questioned whether the CPA is meaningful in situations of incomplete information, where there is no ex ante stage and where the primitives of (...)
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  40.  13
    Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms Have Local Knowledge of Demand.Giacomo Bonanno - 1988 - International Economic Review 29 (1):45-55.
    The notion of Nash equilibrium in static oligopoly games is based on the assumption that each firm knows its entire demand curve (and, therefore, its entire profit function). It is much more likely, however, that firms only have some idea of the outcome of small price variations within some relatively small interval of prices. This is because firms can only learn their demand functions through price experiments and if they are risk-averse and/or have a low discount factor, they will be (...)
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  41.  13
    Revising Predictions.Giacomo Bonanno - 2001 - In Johan van Benthem (ed.), Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge.
    Making a prediction is essentially expressing a belief about the future. It is therefore natural to interpret later predictions as revisions of earlier ones and to investigate the notion of belief revision in this context. We study, both semantically and syntactically, the following principle of minimum revision of prediction: “as long as there are no surprises, that is, as long as what actually occurs had been predicted to occur, then everything which was predicted in the past, if still possible, should (...)
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  42.  2
    Foreword.Giacomo Bonanno, Andreas Herzig, Wiebe van der Hoek & Jérôme Lang - 2011 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 21 (3-4):263-264.
  43.  1
    Memory of Past Beliefs and Actions.Giacomo Bonanno - 2003 - Studia Logica 75 (1):7-30.
    Two notions of memory are studied both syntactically and semantically: memory of past beliefs and memory of past actions. The analysis is carried out in a basic temporal logic framework enriched with beliefs and actions.
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  44. Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory.Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek & Michael Wooldridge (eds.) - 2008 - Amsterdam University Press.
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  45. Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory €“ Loft 8.Giacomo Bonanno, Benedikt Löwe & Wiebe Hoek (eds.) - 2010 - Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
     
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  46. Logic and the Foundations of the Theory of Games and Decisions.Giacomo Bonanno & W. van der Hoek - 2001 - Blackwell.
     
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  47. No Title Available: Reviews.Giacomo Bonanno - 1995 - Economics and Philosophy 11 (2):359-366.
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  48. Special Issue on Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents.Giacomo Bonanno, James Delgrande, Jérôme Lang & Hans Rott - 2009 - Journal of Applied Logic 7 (4):363.
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  49. Emotion Self-Regulation.Merold Westphal & Giacomo A. Bonanno - 2004 - In Simon C. Moore & Mike Oaksford (eds.), Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.