13 found
  1. Disagreement Behind the Veil of Ignorance.Ryan Muldoon, Chiara Lisciandra, Mark Colyvan, Carlo Martini, Giacomo Sillari & Jan Sprenger - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):377-394.
    In this paper we argue that there is a kind of moral disagreement that survives the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. While a veil of ignorance eliminates sources of disagreement stemming from self-interest, it does not do anything to eliminate deeper sources of disagreement. These disagreements not only persist, but transform their structure once behind the veil of ignorance. We consider formal frameworks for exploring these differences in structure between interested and disinterested disagreement, and argue that consensus models offer us a (...)
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  2. Rule-Following as Coordination: A Game-Theoretic Approach.Giacomo Sillari - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):871-890.
    Famously, Kripke has argued that the central portion of the Philosophical Investigations describes both a skeptical paradox and its skeptical solution. Solving the paradox involves the element of the community, which determines correctness conditions for rule-following behavior. What do such conditions precisely consist of? Is it accurate to say that there is no fact to the matter of rule following? How are the correctness conditions sustained in the community? My answers to these questions revolve around the idea that a rule (...)
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  3. Common Knowledge and Convention.Giacomo Sillari - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):29-39.
    This paper investigates the epistemic assumptions that David Lewis makes in his account of social conventions. In particular, I focus on the assumption that the agents have common knowledge of the convention to which they are parties. While evolutionary analyses show that the common knowledge assumption is unnecessary in certain classes of games, Lewis’ original account (and, more recently, Cubitt and Sugden’s reconstruction) stresses the importance of including it in the definition of convention. I discuss arguments pro et contra to (...)
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  4.  64
    A Logical Framework for Convention.Giacomo Sillari - 2005 - Synthese 147 (2):379-400.
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  5.  36
    A Rational Way of Playing: Revision Theory for Strategic Interaction.Riccardo Bruni & Giacomo Sillari - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):419-448.
    Gupta has proposed a definition of strategic rationality cast in the framework of his revision theory of truth. His analysis, relative to a class of normal form games in which all players have a strict best reply to all other players’ strategy profiles, shows that game-theoretic concepts have revision-theoretic counterparts. We extend Gupta’s approach to deal with normal form games in which players’ may have weak best replies. We do so by adapting intuitions relative to Nash equilibrium refinements to the (...)
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  6. Quantified Logic of Awareness and Impossible Possible Worlds.Giacomo Sillari - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):514-529.
    Among the many possible approaches to dealing with logical omniscience, I consider here awareness and impossible worlds structures. The former approach, pioneered by Fagin and Halpern, distinguishes between implicit and explicit knowledge, and avoids logical omniscience with respect to explicit knowledge. The latter, developed by Rantala and by Hintikka, allows for the existence of logically impossible worlds to which the agents are taken to have access; since such worlds need not behave consistently, the agents’ knowledge is fallible relative to logical (...)
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  7.  95
    You Better Play 7: Mutual Versus Common Knowledge of Advice in a Weak-Link Experiment.Giovanna Devetag, Hykel Hosni & Giacomo Sillari - 2013 - Synthese 190 (8):1351-1381.
    This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with random matching. Our experimental subjects play in pairs for thirteen rounds. After a brief learning phase common to all treatments, we vary the knowledge levels associated with external advice given in the form of a suggestion to pick the strategy supporting the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Our results are somewhat surprising and can be summarized as follows: in all our treatments both (...)
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  8.  56
    Binmore, Ken . Rational Decisions . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009 . Pp. 224. $40.00 (Cloth).Giacomo Sillari - 2010 - Ethics 120 (2):387-391.
  9. «Seguire la regola» e coordinazione: la prospettiva della teoria dei giochi.Giacomo Sillari - 2010 - Rivista di Filosofia 101 (3):355-385.
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  10.  31
    Rule-Following and Coordination: A Game-Theoretic Perspective.Giacomo Sillari - 2010 - Rivista di Filosofia 101 (3):355-386.
  11.  44
    Natural Justice, Ken Binmore. Oxford University Press, 2005, XIII + 207 Pages. [REVIEW]Giacomo Sillari - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (2):287-295.
  12.  5
    Review of Natural Justice. [REVIEW]Giacomo Sillari - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (2):287-295.
  13.  1
    No Title Available: Reviews.Giacomo Sillari - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (2):287-295.