Gillian Brock develops a model of global justice that takes seriously the moral equality of all human beings notwithstanding their legitimate diverse identifications and affiliations. She addresses concerns about implementing global justice, showing how we can move from theory to feasible public policy that makes progress toward global justice.

Many of the most skilled and educated citizens of developing countries choose to emigrate. How may those societies respond to these facts? May they ever legitimately prevent the emigration of their citizens? Gillian Brock and Michael Blake debate these questions, and offer distinct arguments about the morality of emigration.

By executive order, the US adopted an immigration policy that looks remarkably similar to a Muslim ban, and threatened to deport long-settled residents, such as the so-called Dreamers. Our defunct refugee system has not dealt adequately with increased refugee flows, forcing desperate people to undertake increasingly risky measures in efforts to reach safe havens. Meanwhile increased migration flows over recent years appear to have contributed to a rise in right-wing populism, apparently driving phenomena such as Brexit and Trumpism. In this (...) original and insightful book Gillian Brock offers answers and tools that assist us in evaluating current migration policy and in helping to determine which policies may be permissible and which are normatively indefensible. She offers a comprehensive framework for responding to the many challenges which have recently emerged, and for delivering justice for people on the move along with those affected by migration. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Preface; Introduction; Part I. Global Health, Definitions and Descriptions: 1. What is global health? Solly Benatar and Ross Upshur; 2. The state of global health in a radically unequal world: patterns and prospects Ron Labonte and Ted Schrecker; 3. Addressing the societal determinants of health: the key global health ethics imperative of our times Anne-Emmanuelle Birn; 4. Gender and global health: inequality and differences Lesley Doyal and Sarah Payne; 5. Heath systems and health Martin McKee; Part (...) II. Global Health Ethics, Responsibilities and Justice: Some Central Issues: 6. Is there a need for global health ethics? For and against David Hunter and Angus Dawson; 7. Justice, infectious disease and globalisation Michael Selgelid; 8. International health inequalities and global justice: toward a middle ground Norman Daniels; 9. The human right to health Jonathan Wolff; 10. Responsibility for global health? Allen Buchanan and Matt DeCamp; 11. Global health ethics: the rationale for mutual caring Solly Benatar, Abdallah Daar and Peter Singer; Part III. Analyzing Some Reasons for Poor Health: 12. Trade and health: the ethics of global rights, regulation and redistribution Meri Koivusalo; 13. Debt, structural adjustment and health Jeff Rudin and David Sanders; 14. The international arms trade and global health Salahaddin Mahmudi-Azer; 15. Allocating resources in humanitarian medicine Samia Hurst, Nathalie Mezger and Alex Mauron; 16. International aid and global health Anthony Zwi; 17. Climate change and health: risks and inequities Sharon Friel, Colin Butler and Anthony McMichael; 18. Animals, the environment and global health David Benatar; 19. The global crisis and global health Stephen Gill and Isabella Bakker; Part IV. Shaping the Future: 20. Health impact fund: how to make new medicines accessible to all Thomas Pogge; 21. Biotechnology and global health Hassan Masun, Justin Chakma and Abdallah Daar; 22. Food security and global health Lynn McIntyre and Krista Rondeau; 23. International taxation Gillian Brock; 24. Global health research: changing the agenda Tikki Pang; 25. Justice and research in developing countries Alex John London; 26. Values in global health governance Kearsley Stewart, Gerald T. Keusch and Arthur Kleinman; 27. Poverty, distance and two dimensions of ethics Jonathan Glover; 28. Teaching global health ethics James Dwyer; 29. Towards a new common sense: the need for new paradigms of global health Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill; Index. (shrink)

In a period of rapid internationalization of trade and increased labor mobility, is it relevant for nations to think about their moral obligations to others? Do national boundaries have fundamental moral significance, or do we have moral obligations to foreigners that are equal to our obligations to our compatriots? The latter position is known as cosmopolitanism, and this volume brings together a number of distinguished political philosophers and theorists to explore cosmopolitanism: what it consists in, and the positive case which (...) can be made for it. Their essays provide a comprehensive overview of both the current state of the debate and the alternative visions of cosmopolitanism with which we can move forward, and they will interest a wide range of readers in philosophy, political theory, and law. (shrink)

I examine how reforming our international tax regime could be an important vehicle by which we can begin to realize global justice. For instance, eliminating tax havens, tax evasion, and transfer pricing schemes are all important to ensure accountability and to support democracies. I argue that the proposals concerning taxation reform are likely to be more effective in tackling global poverty than Thomas Pogge's global resources dividend because they target some of the central issues more effectively. I also discuss many (...) particular proposals for global taxes that have already been floated and implementation prospects and successes. (shrink)

Do any needs defensibly make claims on anyone? If so, which needs and whose needs can defensibly do this? What are the grounds for our responsibilities to meet others' needs, when we have such responsibilities? The distinguished contributors to this volume consider these questions as they evaluate the moral force of needs. They approach questions of obligation and moral importance from a variety of different theoretical perspectives, including contractarian, Kantian, Aristotelian, rights-based, egalitarian, liberal, and libertarian perspectives.

In this article we argue that the concept of need is as vital for moral theory as it is for moral life. In II we analyse need and its normativity in public and private moral practice. In III we describe simple cases which exemplify the moral demandingness of needs, and argue that the significance of simple cases for moral theory is obscured by the emphasis in moral philosophy on unusual cases. In IV we argue that moral theories are inadequate if (...) they cannot describe simple needs-meeting cases. We argue that the elimination or reduction of need to other concepts such as value, duty, virtue or care is unsatisfactory, in which case moral theories that make those concepts fundamental will have to be revised. In conclusion, we suggest that if moral theories cannot be revised to accommodate needs, they may have to be replaced with a fully needs-based theory. Correspondence:c1 [email protected] g. brock @auckland.ac.nz. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that needs are tremendously salient in developing any plausible account of global justice. I begin by sketching a normative thought experiment that models ideal deliberating conditions. I argue that under such conditions we would choose principles of justice that ensure we are well positioned to be able to meet our needs. Indeed, as the experiment aims to show, any plausible account of distributive justice must make space for the special significance of our needs. I go (...) on to offer some empirical support for this view by looking at the important work of Frohlich and Oppenheimer. I then present an account of our basic needs that can meet a number of goals: for instance, it provides a robust theoretical account of basic needs which can enjoy widespread support, and it can also provide an adequate framework for designing policy about needs, and thus help us to discharge our global obligations. I then briefly discuss the relationship between basic needs and human rights, arguing why the basic needs standard is more fundamental than—and required by—the human rights approach. Finally, I tackle a few important sets of objections to my view, especially some objections concerning distributing our responsibilities for meeting needs. (shrink)

There is much current and growing interest in theorizing about global justice. Contemporary events in the world probably account for most of this, but if any philosophical text can be identified as igniting theorists' relatively newly found interest, it must be John Rawls's influential book, The Law of Peoples . There is a lively debate between critics and advocates of Rawls's approach, and much theorizing about global justice is framed in terms of that exchange. Because of its enormous influence in (...) shaping the terms of discussion, familiarity with this work is important for being able to participate in the current theoretical conversations about global justice. In this article I examine that debate and assess the state of play. I briefly outline the central themes of Law of Peoples in section 2 and criticism these ideas attracted in 3. In section 4 I cover some defenses of Rawls's account. In section 5, I assess the state of play and implications for debates about global justice. (shrink)

How are we to navigate between duties to compatriots and duties to non-compatriots? Within the literature there are two important kinds of accounts that are thought to offer contrasting positions on these issues, namely, cosmopolitanism and statism. We discuss these two rival accounts. I then outline my position on global justice and how to accommodate insights from both the cosmopolitan and statist traditions within it. Having outlined my ideal theory account of what global justice requires, I discuss the far more (...) pressing question of what our remedial responsibilities are in our decidely non-ideal world: what does the developed world owe to the developing world and what are our responsibilities to non-compatriots, given our situation here and now? I argue that we have considerable responsibilities and I sketch some of the supporting grounds for this view. Finally, I consider how the general account of global justice and remedial responsibilities developed here applies to the case of responsibilities for migrants’ and refugees’ healthcare. (shrink)

Cosmopolitans believe that all human beings have equal moral worth and that our responsibilities to others do not stop at borders. Various cosmopolitans offer different interpretations of how we should understand what is entailed by that equal moral worth and what responsibilities we have to each other in taking our equality seriously. Two suggestions are that a cosmopolitan should endorse a 'global difference principle' and a 'principle of global equality of opportunity'. In the first part of this paper I examine (...) whether these two suggestions are compelling. I argue against a global difference principle, but for an alternative 'needs-based minimum floor principle' (where these are not coextensive, as I explain). I develop a model of cosmopolitan justice, which allows us to address not only matters of global distributive justice, but other global justice issues as well. Though I support what I refer to as a negative version of the global equality of opportunity principle, I argue that a more positive version of the ideal remains elusive. In the second part of this paper, I reflect on what bearing these results have on two central sets of questions: First, what kind of ideal are we after in the domain of cosmopolitan justice and what practical implications can we reasonably expect from it? Second, what sort of ideal of egalitarianism is compelling and does my model of cosmopolitan justice adequately reflect the legitimate concerns of egalitarians? (shrink)

In this article, we survey some current debates among cosmopolitans and their critics. We begin by surveying some distinctions typically drawn among kinds of cosmopolitanisms, before canvassing some of the diverse varieties of cosmopolitan justice, exploring positions on the content of cosmopolitan duties of justice, and a prominent debate between cosmopolitans and defenders of statist accounts of global justice. We then explore some common concerns about cosmopolitanism – such as whether cosmopolitan commitments are necessarily in tension with other affiliations people (...) typically have and how we should deal with issues concerning a perceived lack of authority in the global domain – and whether these can be addressed. We also look briefly at how the concern with feasibility has led some to take up the challenge of devising public policy that is cosmopolitan in outlook, before offering some concluding remarks on future directions in these debates. (shrink)

Opponents of cosmopolitanism often dismiss the position on the grounds that cosmopolitan proposals are completely unrealistic and that they fly in the face of our human nature. We have deep psychological needs that are satisfied by national identification and so all cosmopolitan projects are doomed, or so it is argued. In this essay we examine the psychological grounds claimed to support the importance of nationalism to our wellbeing. We argue that the alleged human needs that nationalism is said to satisfy (...) are: (i) either more complex than initially one might think or (ii) do not necessarily provide very strong grounds for the theses advocated by nationalists or (iii) can be well met in alternate ways than through national identification. Moreover, commitment to cosmopolitanism is not antithetical to meeting these needs: rather, more cosmopolitan worldviews can do quite well in meeting the needs of interest. Moreover, we argue that since nationalism is a fluid and socially constructed phenomenon, quite open to the influence of other factors, the current evidence suggests that central aspects of cosmopolitanism are quite feasible and realistic. (shrink)

Frankfurt argues that there are two categories of needs that are at least prima facie morally important (relative to other claims). In this paper I examine Frankfurt's suggestion that two categories of needs, namely, nonvolitional and constrained volitional needs, are eligible for (at least prima facie) moral importance. I show both these categories to be defective because they do not necessarily meet Frankfurt's own criteria for what makes a need morally important. I suggest a further category of needs as being (...) a more promising 'moral importance indicator'. -/- . (shrink)

Hidalgo1 argues that, contrary to widespread belief, active recruitment of health workers ‘generally refrains from enabling harm or facilitating wrongdoing’. In this commentary, I argue that the case is not yet convincing. There are a number of problems with the argument, only some of which I can sketch here. These include: Hidalgo gives an insufficient account of the relevant harms that are inflicted when healthcare workers emigrate. Relatedly, he does not take account of the underlying causes of migration and what (...) might assist in remedying the situation. He thus fails to catalogue a wide range of losses that are born when health workers emigrate from developing countries and fails to appreciate how his recommendations undermine some of the constructive initiatives that might assist poor, developing countries. Hidalgo misrepresents the situation in developing countries, incorrectly describing government funding of tertiary education as some kind of gift, rather than an investment in creating important human capital to provide for citizens’ needs, which can mean that fair returns on investment are quite justified. With the correct descriptions in place, the grounding for various duties to reciprocate is rendered secure. There are some important problems with the empirical studies cited such that they do not provide support for Hidalgo's argument.I begin with the case for . There are large disparities in life prospects between developing and developed countries. Indeed, this wide disparity is one of the main reasons healthcare workers want to leave in the first place. If that is the main reason healthcare workers seek to exit, it is not insignificant what would address the causal, underlying problems. How do we promote prosperity in developing countries? A lively debate on this topic flourishes. However, one factor that has widespread support from all sides of the debate is that the quality of …. (shrink)

David Miller offers us a sophisticated account of how we can reconcile global obligations and duties to co?nationals. In this article I focus on four weaknesses with his account such as the following two. First, there remains considerable unclarity about the strength of the positive duties we have to non?nationals and how these measure up relative to other positive duties, such as the ones Miller believes we have to co?nationals to implement civil, political, or social rights. Second, just how responsibilities (...) for enacting our global commitments will be assigned still needs further development. A unifying theme of my criticisms concerns Miller?s account of how we are to mediate responsibilities to fellow?nationals and the partiality we may defensibly show co?nationals. In the final section I sketch an alternative way of conceptualizing our duties to fellow?nationals and duties to non?nationals, which can give more systematic advice about the partiality we may defensibly show co?nationals. (shrink)

What kinds of principles of justice should a cosmopolitan support? In recent years some have argued that a cosmopolitan should endorse a Global Difference Principle. It has also been suggested that a cosmopolitan should support a Principle of Global Equality of Opportunity. In this paper I examine how compelling these two suggestions are. I argue against a Global Difference Principle, but for an alternative Needs-Based Minimum Floor Principle (where these are not co-extensive, as I explain). Though I support a negative (...) version of the Global Equality of Opportunity Principle, I argue that a more positive version of the ideal remains elusive. (shrink)

Our aims in this paper are: (1) to indicate some of the many ways in which needs are an important part of the moral landscape, (2) to show that the dominant contemporary moral theories cannot adequately capture the moral significance of needs, indeed, that the dominant theories are inadequate to the extent that they cannot accommodate the insights which attention to needs yield, (3) to offer some sketches that should be helpful to future cartographers charting the domain of morally significant (...) needs, and (4) to consider some anticipated objections to our project and offer some replies. (shrink)

There has been much interest in cosmopolitan models of democracy in recent times. Arguably, the most developed of these is the model articulated by David Held, so it is not surprising that it has received the most attention and criticism. In this paper, I outline Held's model of cosmopolitan democracy and consider the objections Will Kymlicka raises to this account. I argue that Kymlicka's objections do not undermine Held's central claims and that Held's cosmopolitanism remains a very promising model that (...) deserves further attention. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for there being some deep connections between claims of desert and claims of need, despite the fact that these sorts of claims are frequently pitted against one another. I present an argument to show some conceptual links between desert and needs. Principles underlying why people are thought to be deserving entail principles which commit us to caring about others' needs. I also examine whether we can construct some coherent notion of desert and an argument for (...) why some can have goods on the basis of desert. Here again we find we are committed to a principle which entails that needs must be adequately accommodated if we care about desert. -/- . (shrink)

This volume demonstrates that the debate between cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitans has become increasingly sophisticated. It advances the discussion on many of the questions over which cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitans continue to disagree.

The fields of global ethics and global justice have expanded considerably over the last two decades and they now cover a wide variety of topics. Given this huge range there are many areas that are ripe for important developments. In this commentary I identify some useful directions for promising exploration in the field of global justice. I argue that expanded dialogue networks would considerably enhance work in philosophy and be beneficial to other disciplines as well. I indicate also how we (...) could develop work on allocating responsibilities for reducing global injustices in useful ways, by considering a wider range of considerations that give rise to responsibilities and expanding the scope of, and audience for, these discussions. I catalog some under-theorized topics that should get more philosophical attention . In addition, I draw attention to the ways in which a journal such as this one could facilitate a number of important dialogue .. (shrink)

Nationalism has been a cause of great misery in the world. In this century alone we have seen a number of hideous forms of nationalism leading to genocide, ethnic cleansing, forced relocations, and civil wars. The violent conflicts between Serbians, Croatians, and Muslims in the former Yugoslavia; the Hutus and the Tutsis in Central Africa; Palestinians and Jews in the Middle East; Afrikaners, Zulus, and Xhosas in Southern Africa; and the Nazis and non-Aryans, are just some of these.

The Ethics of Immigration is a wonderfully comprehensive and insightful journey through all the major contemporary ethical issues concerning immigration. Through this outstandingly well-crafted work, Carens builds a compelling case for many important positions on how we should treat migrants. Nevertheless, I believe there are some tensions in his arguments that could do with more analysis. I present some of these issues in this article. These include some important problems with arguments for the right to education for children of irregular (...) migrants and those concerning admission, his general position on refugees, and his views about what is required in order to treat temporary workers fairly. (shrink)

Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.

Justice and Needs -/- Is it somehow a requirement of justice that we meet people's needs? So, for instance, do people in need of certain goods necessary to sustain life deserve help from those not (similarly) in need because this is a requirement of justice? According to two recent arguments (one offered by Wiggins and the other offered by Braybrooke), justice requires that needs be met. Wiggins uses a rights-based argument and Braybrooke deploys an argument which relies pivotally on the (...) concept of respect. In this article I examine these two strategies for arguing for a connection between justice and meeting needs and show that both strategies not only fail to establish that needs should be met, but, moreover, both strategies face substantial challenges if they are ever to be successful. -/- . (shrink)

Are corporations morally defensible sorts of entities? How might we go about showing that they are? Thomas Donaldson offers us the most detailed contractarian justification for the moral defensibility of corporations. In this paper I show how we can significantly develop this sort of justification to yield a more compelling contractarian justification, though one that is importantly conditional. The primary points I take up in this paper are these:1. The question Donaldson poses to generate his contract is not quite as (...) simple as may appear. The sort of transformation we need to consider is more complex than the sort Donaldson describes.2. Partly because of considerations that arise in discussing the first point, the contract we are considering is a more conditionalagreement. The terms of the agreement will vary depending on the kind of state we are assuming prevails. The sort of contract we wantto draw up is at least a three-way contract: between society, productive organizations and the state. The sort of agreement we reach will have the following form: society a agrees to allow productive organizations of type b to exist if we assume state c will do various things (d1 to dn), productive organizations will do various things (e1 to en) and members of society will do various things (f1 to fn). Importantly, if state c is not doing d1 to dn, productive organizations may not be morally defensible.3. The terms of the contract that can be derived would benefit from the introduction of some of Rawls’s apparatus.4. When we consider the right questions, with more of the background institutions filled in, and when we include some more social contract apparatus, we get a better contract which fills in for us not only the obligations of business but, importantly, many obligationsfor government as well. (shrink)

Many people believe in what can be described as a 'concentric circles model of responsibilities to others' in which responsibilities are generally stronger to those physically or affectively closer to us - those who, on this model, occupy circles nearer to us. In particular, it is believed that we have special ties to compatriots and, moreover, that these ties entail stronger obligations than the obligations we have to non-compatriots. While I concede that our strongest obligations may generally be to those (...) family and friends with whom we have close personal relationships, those often thought to occupy the inner core, what I want to challenge is the idea that our obligations diminish in strength when we move beyond the boundary of the circles occupied by compatriots and proceed to those more geographically or culturally distant from us. The weight that is typically placed on the boundary between compatriots and non-compatriots in determining the strength of our obligations to others cannot withstand critical scrutiny. In this paper I show that arguments that are supposed to work to justify stronger obligations to compatriots than non-compatriots do not succeed in the ways imagined. I also present the framework of a contractarian-style model which aims to give us a more systematic way to think about our obligations to 'non-core' others, both distant and near. While we can certainly have different kinds of obligations, my analysis shows that our basic obligations to others do not diminish with distance. In addition, my account aims to flesh out what our basic obligations to others are. (shrink)

Liberal nationalists have been trying to argue that a suitably sanitized version of nationalism - namely, one that respects and embodies liberal values - is not only morally defensible, but also of great moral value, especially on grounds liberals should find very appealing. Although there are plausible aspects to the idea and some compelling arguments are offered in defense of this position, one area still proves to be a point of considerable vulnerability for this project and that is the issue (...) of what, according to the liberal nationalists, we owe both members of our nation, our co-nationals, and what we owe those who are not members of our nation. It is here that we see the project still has some distance to go if a version of liberal nationalism is, indeed, to be morally defensible. In this paper I examine leading liberal nationalist accounts of our obligations to co-nationals and non-nationals. I argue that liberal nationalists have not yet given us an adequate account of our obligations to non-nationals for a number of reasons. For instance, on the issue of the priority we may give co-nationals' interests over non-nationals', the theorists' view show significant tension, they seem to be confused about what their positions entail, the views are unhelpful, ad hoc, or the positions are quite unclear. Liberal nationalists also have a misleading impression that their positions better capture the relation between personal identity and duty, but this turns out to be false. Other defects with their specific projects are highlighted. I go on to offer a more promising method for determining our obligations to non-nationals. Rather than this alternative precluding any scope for nationalism, it actually makes clearer to us how there might be some defensible space for nationalism once our obligations to put in place appropriate institutions and sets of rules have been fulfilled. (shrink)

Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitans maintain that no national categories of people deserve special weight and that, instead, all people everywhere should be objects of moral concern. Arguably, the most developed of these accounts is the cosmopolitan democracy model articulated by David Held, so it is not surprising that it has received the most attention and criticism. In this paper, I outline Held’s model of cosmopolitan democracy and consider the objections Will Kymlicka raises to (...) this account. I argue that Kymlicka’s objections do not undermine Held’s central claims and that Held’s cosmopolitanismremains a very promising model that deserves further attention. (shrink)

In this paper I raise three challenges for Moellendorf's account of cosmopolitan justice. First, I argue that in a reconstructed cosmopolitan original position we would choose a 'needs-based minimum floor principle' rather than a 'global difference principle', if these are not co-extensive. Second, I argue that Moellendorf's version of the 'equality of opportunity principle' is too vulnerable to criticisms of cultural insensitivity, though I also note that there are problems with versions of the ideal that aim for a more general (...) formulation. I argue that those trying to develop an ideal of global equality of opportunity thus face a dilemma concerning how best to develop that ideal. Third, I review Moellendorf's account of justified intervention and indicate how we could make space for the importance of gaining proper authority under appropriate circumstance, without formally including it as a further necessary condition for justified interventions. (shrink)