The conference explored an extraordinary diversity of aging strategies in organisms ranging from short‐lived species to “immortal” animals and plants. Research on the biological processes of aging is at the brink of a revolution with respect to our understanding of its underlying mechanisms as well as our ability to prevent and cure a wide variety of age‐related pathologies.

The early discovery of cis‐regulatory elements able to promote transcription of genes over large distances led to the postulate that elements, termed insulators, should also exist that would limit the action of enhancers, LCRs and silencers to defined domains. Such insulators were indeed found during the past fifteen years in a wide range of organisms, from yeast to humans. Recent advances point to an important role of transcription factors in insulator activity and demonstrate that the operational observation of an insulator (...) effect relies on a delicate balance between the “efficiency” of the insulator and that of the element to be counteracted. In addition, genuine insulator elements now appear less common than initially envisaged, and they are only found at loci displaying a high density of coding or regulatory information. Where this is not the case, chromatin domains of opposing properties are thought to confront each other at “fuzzy” boundaries. In this article, we propose models for both fixed and fuzzy boundaries that incorporate probabilistic and dynamic parameters. BioEssays 26:523–532, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

DNA repetitions may provoke heterochromatinization. We explore here a model in which multiple cis‐acting sequences that display no silencing activity on their own (protosilencers) may cooperate to establish and maintain a heterochromatin domain efficiently. Protosilencers, first defined in budding yeast, have now been found in a wide range of genomes where they appear to stabilize and to extend the propagation of heterochromatin domains. Strikingly, isolated or moderately repeated protosilencers can also be found in promoters where they participate in transcriptional activation (...) and have insulation functions. This suggests that the proper juxtaposition of a threshold number of protosilencers converts them from neutral or transactivating elements into ones that nucleate heterochromatin. Interactions might be transient or permanent, and are likely to occur over distances by looping. This model provides a conceptual framework for as varied phenomena as telomere‐driven silencing in Drosophila, X inactivation in mammals, and rDNA silencing in S. cerevisiae. It may also account for the silencing that occurs when multiple copies of a transgene are inserted in tandem. BioEssays 24:828–835, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Je suis celui qui suis : tel est le Nom de Dieu révélé par le livre de l'Exode. " Dieu est Amour " affirme par ailleurs saint Jean. Comment concilier l'Etre suprême et la Miséricorde infinie, la transcendance du Dieu de Moïse et sa proximité en Jésus-Christ? Telle est la question abordée par Etienne Gilson dans ce livre méconnu, réédité pour la première fois depuis sa parution à Montréal, en 1947. Prenant appui notamment sur les Confessions, les Sermons 6 (...) et 7, le Traité 38 sur Jean, ainsi que le Commentaire du Psaume 51, Etienne Gilson montre que pour saint Augustin, Dieu n'est pas " que " l'Etre pur, subsistant comme intouchable : Il est encore le " Dieu d'Abraham, d'Isaac et de Jacob ", comme le révèle également le récit de l'Exode, le Dieu qui Est, mais " qui est avec toi ". En Dieu, le nom de la substance et le nom de la miséricorde coïncident. Ce n'est plus seulement la tradition aristotélicienne qui voit son entreprise philosophique confirmée, mais aussi la voie platonicienne, pour laquelle Dieu est le Bien. Etre et Bien que saint Augustin voit réunis dans une Personne : le Verbe divin ; dans un Nom : Jésus-Christ. Deux textes de saint Augustin viennent compléter cet essai d'Etienne Gilson : la Lettre 18, traduite par Marie-Anne Vannier, et le sermon Contre les païens, retrouvé par François Dolbeau en 1990 à Mayence, traduit ici pour la première fois en français par Eric Rebillard, chercheur au CNRS. (shrink)

The important work, exquisitely translated by Mark Wauck, brings the essential elements of philosophy into view as a cohesive, readily understandable, and erudite structure, and does so rigorously in the best tradition of St. Thomas.

From the time of Locke, discussions of personal identity have often ignored the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we human people are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. The result of this neglect has been centuries of wild proposals and clashing intuitions. What Are We? is the first general study of this important question. It beings by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as (...) questions of personal identity and the mind-body problem. It then examines in some depth the main possible accounts of our metaphysical nature, detailing both their theoretical virtues and the often grave difficulties they face. The book does not endorse any particular account of what we are, but argues that the matter turns on more general issues in the ontology of material things. If composition is universal--if any material things whatever make up something bigger--then we are temporal parts of organisms. If things never compose anything bigger, so that there are only mereological simples, then we too are simples--perhaps the immaterial substances of Descartes--or else we do not exist at all (a view Olson takes very seriously). The intermediate view that some things compose bigger things and others do not leads almost inevitably to the conclusion that we are organisms. So we can discover what we are by working out when composition occurs. (shrink)

Consider the following three claims. (i) There are no truths of the form ‘p and ~p’. (ii) No one holds a belief of the form ‘p and ~p’. (iii) No one holds any pairs of beliefs of the form {p, ~p}. Irad Kimhi has recently argued, in effect, that each of these claims holds and holds with metaphysical necessity. Furthermore, he maintains that they are ultimately not distinct claims at all, but the same claim formulated in different ways. I find (...) his argument suggestive, if not entirely transparent. I do think there is at least an important kernel of truth even in (iii), and that (i) ultimately explains what’s right about the other two. Consciousness of an impossibility makes belief in the obtaining of the corresponding state of affairs an impossibility. Interestingly, an appreciation of this fact brings into view a novel conception of inference, according to which it consists in the consciousness of necessity. This essay outlines and defends this position. A central element of the defense is that it reveals how reasoners satisfy what Paul Boghossian calls the Taking Condition and do so without engendering regress. (shrink)

Concepts: Core Readings traces the develoment of one of the most active areas of investigation in cognitive science. This comprehensive volume brings together the essential background readings on concepts from philosophy, psychology, and linguistics, while providing a broad sampling of contemporary research. The first part of the book centers around the fall of the Classical Theory of Concepts in the face of attacks by W.V.O. Quine, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Eleanor Rosch, and others, emphasizing the emergence and development of the Prototype Theory (...) and the controversies it spurred. The second part surveys a broad range of contemporary theories—Neoclassical Theories, the Prototype Theory, the Theory-Theory, and Conceptual Atomism. (shrink)

I argue that to have an attitude is, primarily, (1.) to have a dispositional profile that matches, to an appropriate degree and in appropriate respects, a stereotype for that attitude, typically grounded in folk psychology, and secondarily, (2.) in some cases also to meet further stereotypical attitude-specific conditions. To have an attitude, on the account I will recommend here, is mainly a matter of being apt to interact with the world in patterns that ordinary people would regard as characteristic of (...) having that attitude. I contrast this view with alternative views that treat having an attitude as a matter of possessing some particular internally stored representational content or some other "deep" structural feature. (shrink)

The meaning of Christian rationalism -- The handmaiden of theology -- The doctrine of double truth -- Appendix : Texts of John the Jandun on the relations between reason and faith -- The historical significance of Thomism -- Reasoning by analogy in Campanella -- Theology and Cartesian innatism -- Descartes, Harvey, and scholasticism -- Appendix: William Harvey's critique of the Cartesian theory of the movement of the heart -- Cartesian and scholastic meteors.

Etienne Gilson Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, first delivered as the Richard Lectures in 1937, was published in 1938 and became an immediate success. Not only does it contribute to a major question of debate in Christian, Jewish, and Islamic philosophy and religion in the medieval period but it also insists on the validity of truth obtainable through reason as well as revelation, on rational argument alongside religious faith. This message is as important in the twenty-first century (...) as it was in the fourth century of the young Augustine, the thirteenth of St Thomas Aquinas, and the twentieth of the mature Gilson. (shrink)

Rationalization, in our intended sense of the term, occurs when a person favors a particular conclusion as a result of some factor (such as self-interest) that is of little justificatory epistemic relevance, if that factor then biases the person’s subsequent search for, and assessment of, potential justifications for the conclusion. Empirical evidence suggests that rationalization is common in people’s moral and philosophical thought. We argue that it is likely that the moral and philosophical thought of philosophers and moral psychologists is (...) also pervaded by rationalization. Moreover, although rationalization has some benefits, overall it would be epistemically better if the moral and philosophical reasoning of people, including professional academics, were not as heavily influenced by rationalization as it likely is. We discuss the significance of our arguments for cognitive management and epistemic responsibility. (shrink)

C'est avec la publication de l'etre et l'essence (1948) que Gilson fit veritablement irruption dans le debat philosophique contemporain, contraignant beaucoup de ceux qui n'avaient jamais entendu parler de l'etre autrement qu'a travers l'etre et le neant ou le premier chapitre de Wissenschaft der Logik, a admettre que ce petit mot etre, qu'une certaine tradition idealiste avait vainement tente de bannir du vocabulaire philosophique, abritait, sinon peut-etre le destin de l'Occident, du moins le lieu d'une de ses plus anciennes (...) et plus constantes querelles. Beaucoup se convainquirent alors, en lisant Gilson, que Saint Thomas occupait dans ce debat une place a tout le moins originale et importante, qu'il n'etait plus permis d'ignorer, meme et surtout si l'on voulait prendre parti dans la polemique que menait alors l'existentialisme contre l'essentialisme suppose de toute la tradition. Pierre Aubenque, Etienne Gilson et nous, p. 79. (shrink)

We present evidence that mainstream Anglophone philosophy is insular in the sense that participants in this academic tradition tend mostly to cite or interact with other participants in this academic tradition, while having little academic interaction with philosophers writing in other languages. Among our evidence: In a sample of articles from elite Anglophone philosophy journals, 97% of citations are citations of work originally written in English; 96% of members of editorial boards of elite Anglophone philosophy journals are housed in majority-Anglophone (...) countries; and only one of the 100 most-cited recent authors in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy spent most of his career in non-Anglophone countries writing primarily in a language other than English. In contrast, philosophy articles published in elite Chinese-language and Spanish-language journals cite from a range of linguistic traditions, as do non-English-language articles in a convenience sample of established European-language journals. We also find evidence that work in English has more influence on work in other languages than vice versa and that when non-Anglophone philosophers cite recent work outside of their own linguistic tradition it tends to be work in English. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

With Dostoyevsky's Idiot and Aquinas' Dumb Ox as guides, this book seeks to recover the elemental mystery of the natural law, a law revealed only in wonder. If ethics is to guide us along the way, it must recover its subordination; description must precede prescription. If ethics is to invite us along the way, it cannot lead, either as politburo, or even as public orthodoxy. It cannot be smugly symbolic but must be by way of signage, of directionality, of the (...) open realization that ethical meaning is en route, pointing the way because it is within the way, as only sign, not symbol, can point to the sacramental terminus. The courtesies of dogma and tradition are the road signs and guideposts along the longior via, not themselves the termini. We seek the dialogic heart of the natural law through two seemingly contradictory voices and approaches: St. Thomas Aquinas and his famous five ways, and Fyodor Dostoyevsky's holy idiot, Prince Myshkin. It is precisely the apparent miscellany of these selected voices that provide us with a connatural invitation into the natural law as subordinated, as descriptive guide, not as prescriptive leader. -- back cover. (shrink)

Philosophers tend to be pretty impressed by human self-knowledge. Descartes (1641/1984) thought our knowledge of our own stream of experience was the secure and indubitable foundation upon which to build our knowledge of the rest of the world. Hume – who was capable of being skeptical about almost anything – said that the only existences we can be certain of are our own sensory and imagistic experiences (1739/1978, p. 212). Perhaps the most prominent writer on self-knowledge in contemporary philosophy is (...) Sydney Shoemaker. The central aim of much of his work has been to show that certain sorts of error are impossible (1963, 1988, 1994). David Chalmers has likewise attempted to show that, for a suitably constrained class of beliefs about one’s own consciousness, error is impossible (2003, sec. 4.1). Even philosophers most of the community thinks of as pessimistic about self-knowledge of consciousness seem to me, really, to be fairly optimistic. Paul Churchland, famous for his disdain of ordinary people’s knowledge about the mind, compares the accuracy of introspection to the accuracy of sense perception – pretty good, presumably, about medium-sized, nearby matters (1985, 1988). Dan Dennett, often cited as a pessimist about introspective report, actually says that we can come close to infallibility when charitably interpreted (2002). The above references concern knowledge of the stream of conscious experience, but philosophers have also tended to be impressed with our self-knowledge of our attitudes, such as our beliefs and desires. Consider this: Although I can be wrong about its being sunny outside, I can’t in the same way be wrong, it seems, about the fact that I think it’s sunny outside. Some.. (shrink)

Unconscious logical inference seems to rely on the syntactic structures of mental representations (Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum 2018). Other transitions, such as transitions using iconic representations and associative transitions, are harder to assimilate to syntax-based theories. Here we tackle these difficulties head on in the interest of a fuller taxonomy of mental transitions. Along the way we discuss how icons can be compositional without having constituent structure, and expand and defend the “symmetry condition” on Associationism (the idea that associative links and (...) transitions are perfectly symmetric). In the end, we show how a BIT (“bare inferential transition”) theory can cohabitate with these other non-inferential mental transitions. (shrink)

On an intellectualist approach to belief, the intellectual endorsement of a proposition (such as “The working poor deserve as much respect as the handsomely paid”) is sufficient or nearly sufficient for believing it. On a pragmatic approach to belief, intellectual endorsement is not enough. Belief is behaviorally demanding. To really, fully believe, you must also “walk the walk.” This chapter argues that the pragmatic approach is preferable on pragmatic grounds: It rightly directs our attention to what matters most in thinking (...) about belief. (shrink)

This chapter explores the possibility of an alliance between Deleuze’s philosophy and feminist philosophy with respect to ethics. I begin by specifying some of the general points of convergence between Deleuzian ethics and feminist ethics. In the second section, I turn away from feminist ethics in particular to consider feminist engagement with Deleuze’s (and Deleuze and Guattari’s) work; in this section of the paper, I describe the central criticisms of Deleuze offered by feminist philosophers and point out the aspects of (...) his thought that have been valuable for feminist theorizing. In order to respond to what I take to be the overarching concern feminists have about Deleuze’s philosophy, the third section develops a proposal for a Deleuzian conception of ethics that is able to do (much of) what feminists require of an ethical theory. (shrink)

In On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World from 1975, Quine formulated a thesis of underdetermination roughly to the effect that every scientific theory has an empirically equivalent but logically incompatible rival, one that cannot be discarded merely as a terminological variant of the former. For Quine, the truth of this thesis was an open question. If true, some would argue that it undermines any belief in scientific theories that is based purely on their empirical success. But despite its potential (...) significance, surprisingly little has been done by way of establishing or refuting it. My aim is to establish the thesis for as large a class of theories as possible. Under various precisifications of the concepts involved, I show that it holds for all consistent and recursively axiomatizable theories that postulate infinitely many theoretical entities. (shrink)

As concerns about violence, war, terrorism, sexuality, and embodiment have garnered attention in philosophy, the concept of vulnerability has become a shared reference point in these discussions. As a fundamental part of the human condition, vulnerability has significant ethical import: how one responds to vulnerability matters, whom one conceives as vulnerable and which criteria are used to make such demarcations matters, how one deals with one’s own vulnerability matters, and how one understands the meaning of vulnerability matters. Yet, the meaning (...) of vulnerability is commonly taken for granted and it is assumed that vulnerability is almost exclusively negative, equated with weakness, dependency, powerlessness, deficiency, and passivity. This reductively negative view leads to problematic implications, imperiling ethical responsiveness to vulnerability, and so prevents the concept from possessing the normative value many theorists wish it to have. When vulnerability is regarded as weakness and, concomitantly, invulnerability is prized, attentiveness to one’s own vulnerability and ethical response to vulnerable others remain out of reach goals. Thus, this book critiques the ideal of invulnerability, analyzes the problems that arise from a negative view of vulnerability, and articulates in its stead a non-dualistic concept of vulnerability that can remedy these problems. (shrink)

Once again available in paperback, Plato is the first half of Eric Voegelin's Plato and Aristotle, the third volume of his five-volume Order and History, which ...

Can large language models produce expert‐quality philosophical texts? To investigate this, we fine‐tuned GPT‐3 with the works of philosopher Daniel Dennett. To evaluate the model, we asked the real Dennett 10 philosophical questions and then posed the same questions to the language model, collecting four responses for each question without cherry‐picking. Experts on Dennett's work succeeded at distinguishing the Dennett‐generated and machine‐generated answers above chance but substantially short of our expectations. Philosophy blog readers performed similarly to the experts, while ordinary (...) research participants were near chance distinguishing GPT‐3's responses from those of an “actual human philosopher”. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Acosta, José de (1539–1600) Alberdi, Juan Bautista (1810–84) Bello, Andrés (1781–1865) Bilbao, Francisco (1823–65) Bolkvar, Simón (1783–1830) Casas, Bartolomé de las (1484–1566) Caso, Antonio (1883–1946) Cruz, Sor Juana Inés de la (1651–95) da Costa, Newton Carneiro Affonso (b. 1929) Dussel, Enrique (b. 1934) Frondizi, Risieri (1910–83) Gaos, José (1900–69) González Prada, Manuel (1848–1918) Gracia, Jorge J. E. (b. 1942) Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl (1895–1979) Hostos, Eugenio Marka de (1839–1903) Ingenieros, José (1877–1925) Korn, Alejandro (...) (1860–1936) Lastarria, José Victorino (1817–88) Lemos, Miguel (1854–1917) Mariátegui, José Carlos (1895–1930) Martk, José (1853–95) Méndez Sierra, Justo (1848–1912) Mora, José Maria Luis (1794–1850) Miró Quesada, Francisco (b. 1918) Rabossi, Eduardo (1930–2005) Ramos, Samuel (1897–1959) Rodó, José Enrique (1872–1917) Romero, Francisco (1891–1962) Sahagún, Fray Bernardino de (1499–1590) Salazar Bondy, Augusto (1925–74) Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino (1811–88) Ofelia Schutte (b. 1945) Sepslveda, Juan Ginés de (ca. 1494–1573) Torretti, Roberto (b. 1930) Vasconcelos, José (1882–1959) Vaz Ferreira, Carlos (1872–1958) Villoro, Luis (b. 1922) Vitoria, Francisco de (ca. 1483–1546) Zea Aguilar, Leopoldo (1912–2004) Acknowledgment Further Reading. (shrink)

In this book, Eric Havelock presents a challenging account of the development of the idea of justice in early Greece, and particularly of the way justice changed as Greek oral tradition gradually gave way to the written word in a literate society. He begins by examining the educational functions of poets in preliterate Greece, showing how they conserved and transmitted the traditions of society, a thesis adumbrated in his earlier book Preface to Plato. Homer, he demonstrates, has much to (...) say about justice, but since that idea is nowhere in the epics directly stated or expressed, it must be deduced from the speech and actions of the characters. Havelock's careful reading of the Iliad and the Odyssey is original and revealing; it sheds light both on Homeric notions of justice and on the Archaic Greek society depicted in the poems. As Havelock continues his inquiry from Hesiod to Aeschylus, his findings become more complex. The oral Greek world shades into a literate one. Words lose some kinds of meanings, gain others, and steadily become more suited to the conceptualization that Plato strove for and achieved. This evolution of language itself, Havelock shows, was one of the principal accomplishments of the Greek world. Lucidly written and forcefully argued, this book is a major contribution to our knowledge of ancient Greece--its politics, philosophy, and literature, from Homer to Plato. (shrink)

One big question in biology is what life is, but another is how life divides into living things. This is the problem of biological individuality. Proposed statements of the problem have been vague and incomplete. And proposed theories of biological individuality are not detailed enough to solve the problem even if they are correct. The root of these troubles is that their authors have not recognized the metaphysical claims presupposed in their statement of the problem. Making these claims explicit will (...) enable us to see better what the problem is and what form a solution to it would need to have. (shrink)

Trust me: my chair isn't big enough for two. You may doubt that every rational, conscious being is a person; perhaps there are beings that mistakenly believe themselves to be people. If so, read ‘rational, conscious being’ or the like for 'person'.

Preface -- Introduction -- How to value democracy -- Paper stones, the ethics of participation -- Philosophers-citizens -- Superdeliberators -- What is it like to be a citizen? -- Democracy's ethics of belief -- The division of democratic labor -- Representing principles -- Democratic complicity -- Not in my name, macrodemocratic design.

L'introduction proposee par Etienne Gilson a l'etude de saint Augustin a pour vocation de cerner l'esprit meme de l'augustinisme en relevant ce qui, dans la doctrine, a imprime a la pensee medievale l'impulsion dont tant d'oeuvres profondes sont les temoins. Cette etude se propose ainsi de degager les quelques theses essentielles qui, commandant l'ensemble de la doctrine, permettent d'en interpreter le detail. La table systematique des matieres annexee a ce volume permettra d'ailleurs au lecteur de l'utiliser a la maniere (...) d'un inventaire; la bibliographie raisonnee competant cette table l'aidera en outre a s'orienter dans une vaste litterature historique. Cependant, a la place de l'ordre synthetique et lineaire des doctrines qui suivent la norme de l'intellect, nous trouvons dans l'augustinisme un mode d'exposition necessairement autre, approprie a une doctrine dont le centre est dans la grace et dans la charite. La methode est digressive: l'ordre naturel de la doctrine augustinienne est ce rayonnement autour d'un centre, qui est l'ordre meme de la charite. Et s'il s'agit la moins de savoir que d'aimer, la tache propre du philosophe est moins de fiare connaitre que de faire desirer... On concoit alors que cet ouvrage, publie pour la premiere fois en 1929, promette aujourd'hui encore une decouverte originale de saint Augustin. (shrink)

On ne comprend pas vraiment le thomisme tant qu'on n'y sent pas la presence de saint Thomas lui-meme, ou plutot de frere Thomas avant qu'il ne fut devenu un saint fete au calendrier, bref de l'homme avec son temperament, son caractere, ses sentiments, ses gouts et jusqu'a ses passions. Car il en eut au moins une. Au niveau de la nature humaine pure et simple, Thomas eut la passion de l'intelligence. Comprendre ensemble le philosophe et le croyant en Thomas, c'est (...) en ces termes qu'Etienne Gilson invite le lecteur a entrer dans la pensee complexe, mais incontournable, du Docteur angelique. Tel est aussi l'esprit qui anime cette etude systematique, visant au coeur meme du thomisme et guidee par le souci constant de manifester l'unite de la doctrine a travers le deploiement de cette passion de l'intelligence - cette puissance contemplative, qui embrasse dans un meme elan rationnel les grandes questions theologiques, ontologiques et anthropologiques: l'existence de Dieu, l'etre et l'essence, la nature et la causalite physique, la connaissance, la vie humaine. Dans l'oeuvre immense d'Etienne Gilson, cet ouvrage occupe une place centrale: non seulement parce que Le Thomisme aura accompagne son auteur durant toute sa carriere, a travers les remaniements et amplifications de six editions successives; mais encore, parce que cette magistrale introduction a la philosophie de saint Thomas aura contribue de maniere decisive a definir une methode historiographique: celle d'une histoire doctrinale unitaire et coherente, par dela tous les clivages philosophiques et theologiques. (shrink)

Many of the earliest books, particularly those dating back to the 1900s and before, are now extremely scarce and increasingly expensive. We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

How diverse is philosophy? In this paper we explore recent data on the racial, ethnic, and gender diversity of philosophy students and faculty in the United States. We have found that women are underrepresented in philosophy at all levels from first-year intention to major through senior faculty. The past four years have seen an increase in the percentage of women philosophy majors at the undergraduate level, but it remains to be seen if this recent increase in the percentage of women (...) will eventually also show at more advanced stages. Temporal trends since 2000 also show substantial increases in the racial and ethnic diversity of philosophy majors at all levels of education from first-year undergraduate through PhD, with substantial declines in the percentage of non-Hispanic White philosophy majors and substantial increases in all other commonly measured racial/ethnic groups except for Native American / Alaska Native. Despite generally increasing diversity, people who identify as Hispanic (any race), or non-Hispanic Native American, Alaska Native, or Black remain substantially underrepresented in philosophy at all levels compared to their presence in the U.S. population, and in some cases also as compared to other majors. (shrink)

Aristotle's treatment of the choice between the political and contemplative lives (in EN I 5 and X 7-8) can seem awkward. To offer one explanation of this, I argue that when he invokes self-sufficience (autarkeia) as a criterion for this choice, he appeals to two different and incompatible specifications of "lacking nothing." On one specification, suitable to a human being living as a political animal and thus seeking to realize his end as an engaged citizen of a polis, a person (...) lacks nothing by possessing a wide range of goods that directly require other people. On the other, more suitable to a god or a beast, a person lacks nothing by having no need of goods that directly require other people. The ambiguity of this criterion renders the choice between the political and contemplative lives difficult. (shrink)