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Giovanni Mion
Istanbul Technical University
  1.  34
    On Certainty: Wittgenstein and Einstein.Giovanni Mion - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (2):163-170.
    The paper focuses on the role of relativistic ideas in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. In particular, it focuses on On Certainty (1969), where in (305), Wittgenstein explicitly invokes Einstein’s theory of relativity: “Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.” The aim of the paper is to establish a connection between Wittgenstein and Einstein that is both theoretically and exegetically sound. In particular, the paper argues that Wittgenstein’s reaction to scepticism closely resembles Einstein’s reaction to (...)
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  2.  10
    Wittgenstein and Cassirer on Hinges and Relativity.Giovanni Mion - 2020 - Philosophical Investigations 43 (3):214-222.
    Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.
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  3. The Mind-Independence of Contexts for Knowledge-Attributions.Giovanni Mion & Christopher Gauker - 2017 - In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 455-464.
    If we say that the truth of a statement of the form “S knows that p” depends on the pertinent context, that raises the question, what determines the pertinent context? One answer would be: the speaker. Another would be: the speaker and the hearer jointly somehow. Yet a third answer would be: no one gets to decide; it is a matter of what the conversation is supposed to achieve and how the world really is, and it can happen that all (...)
     
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  4. Epistemic Disagreements: A Solution for Contextualists.Giovanni Mion - 2013 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 6 (1):15-23.
    My paper aims to account for the possibility of disagreements concerning what we know; for clearly, people disagree about what they know. More precisely, my goal is to explain how a contextualist theory of knowledge attributions can explain the existence of disagreement among speakers. My working hypothesis is that genuine epistemic disagreement is possible only under the assumption that the meaning of the word “knowledge” is governed by contexts that are objective, in the sense that the content of the word (...)
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  5. Where The Evidence Is Not Needed.Giovanni Mion - 2013 - The Reasoner 7 (11):128-129.
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  6.  22
    The Square of Opposition: From Russell's Logic to Kant's Cosmology.Giovanni Mion - 2014 - History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (4):377-382.
    In this paper, I will show to what extent we can use our modern understanding of the Square of Opposition in order to make sense of Kant 's double standard solution to the cosmological antinomies. Notoriously, for Kant, both theses and antitheses of the mathematical antinomies are false, while both theses and antitheses of the dynamical antinomies are true. Kantian philosophers and interpreters have criticized Kant 's solution as artificial and prejudicial. In the paper, I do not dispute such claims, (...)
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  7.  49
    Tractatus 5.1362.Giovanni Mion - 2017 - Philosophical Inquiries 5 (1):27-32.
    The paper analyzes the conception of free will defended by the Tractatus, and in contrast to Pasquale Frascolla’s recent verificationist reading of 5.1362, it argues that Wittgenstein’s conception of free will squarely places future contingencies within the boundaries of truth-conditional semantics.
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  8.  91
    God, Ignorance and Existence.Giovanni Mion - 2012 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (2):85-88.
    In Theory and Problems of Logic, Nolt et al. (1998, p. 203) claim that the following argument forms are fallacious: (a) It has not been proved that p. Therefore, ∼p. (b) It has not been proved that ∼p. Therefore, p. Accordingly, they argue that the following instances of (a) and (b) are also fallacious. (ai) No one has ever proved that God exists. Therefore, God does not exist. (bi) No one has ever proved that God does not exist. Therefore, God (...)
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  9.  18
    Hintikka on the “Kant–Frege View”: A Critical Assessment.Giovanni Mion - 2019 - Logica Universalis 13 (2):171-178.
    In “Kant on Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument”, Hintikka argues that the so-called “Kant–Frege view” is wrong, for its supporters erroneously assume that for Kant ‘is’ is ambiguous. In this paper, I will first critically evaluate Hintikka’s arguments against the Kant–Frege view. Then, I will attempt to prove that Kant’s claim that existence is not a real predicate and Frege’s claim that existence is a quantifier are in fact logically interdependent. Finally, I will use the Kant–Frege view in order (...)
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  10.  51
    Skepticism and Objective Contexts: A Critique of DeRose.Giovanni Mion - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2):119-129.
    In the paper, I contrast my contextualist account of Cartesian skepticism with Keith DeRose’s account. I agree with DeRose that when the Cartesian skeptic and her opponent meet in the same context, their claims are truth-value-less. But I agree with him on the basis of different conception of context sensitivity. According to DeRose, the content of context sensitive expressions in general, and of knowledge in particular, is personally indicated. Instead, for me, the content of context sensitive expressions in general, and (...)
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  11.  20
    Does 'Knowledge' Function Like a Quantifier? A Critique of Stanley.Giovanni Mion - 2015 - Philosophical Inquiries 3 (2):9-16.
    In “Elusive Knowledge” (1996), David Lewis deduces contextualism about 'knowledge' from an analysis of the nature of knowledge. For Lewis, the context relativity of 'knowledge' depends upon the fact that knowledge that p implies the elimination of all the possibilities in which ~p. But since 'all' is context relative, 'knowledge' is also context relative. In contrast to Lewis, in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley argues that since all context sensitive expressions can have different interpretations within the same discourse, (...)
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  12.  20
    Grueing Gettier.Giovanni Mion - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (4):467-470.
    The paper aims to stress the structural similarities between Nelson Goodman’s ‘new riddle of induction’ and Edmund Gettier’s counterexamples to the standard analysis of knowledge.
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  13.  18
    Wouldn’T Socrates Have to Be Present?Giovanni Mion - 2014 - The Reasoner 8 (4).
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  14.  4
    On Kant’s Hidden Ambivalence Toward Existence in His Critique of the Ontological Argument.Giovanni Mion - 2018 - Journal of Applied Logics 7 (5):1515 - 1522.
    The paper explores Kant’s attitude toward existence in the Critique of Pure Reason. It has two main goals: first, it argues that Kant’s criticisms of the ontological argument might be vitiated by an ambivalence toward existence, and then it attempts to provide a solution to the ambivalence in question. Finally, since my reading of Kant assumes that for him, existence is governed by the rule of existential generalization, I also prove the following biconditional: existence is not a real predicate i (...)
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  15.  85
    Knowledge and Objectivity.Giovanni Mion - 2011 - Rome, Metropolitan City of Rome, Italy: Aracne.
    Giovanni Mion defends the idea that knowledge is context relative, but, in contrast to current versions of epistemic contextualism, on his view, knowledge is relative to contexts that are objective. Following Christopher Gauker’s conception of what a context is, Mion argues that knowledge is relative to the speakers’ conversational goals; and since the best way to achieve the goals of a conversation depends upon the way the world really is, it follows that participants in a conversation might be unaware of (...)
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